#382 - “Don’t Do It!” - Mossad in Iran, Trump Regime Change, Clinton Bribe & Nuke Deal | Trita Parsi

Summary

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Julian Dorey Podcast #382: "Don’t Do It!”—Mossad in Iran, Trump Regime Change, Clinton Bribe & Nuke Deal | Guest: Trita Parsi

Date: February 10, 2026
Host: Julian Dorey
Guest: Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute, Iran-born political scientist, expert on Iran-U.S. relations

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Episode Overview

This wide-ranging conversation dives deep into Iranian politics, U.S. and Israeli foreign policy, regime change methodology, the internal and external opposition to Iran’s government, the nuclear deal, Mossad’s actions inside Iran, and the complex web of Middle Eastern geopolitics. Trita Parsi—a prominent voice on Iran, exiled since childhood—brings personal and professional insight, blending analyst rigor and lived experience.

The episode touches on historical context (from the 1979 revolution to modern protests), key international interventions, the role of organizations like the MEK, diplomatic efforts (and failures), and the dangerous path of external regime change. It’s both a primer and a critical deep-dive for listeners wanting to understand Iran and its place in the world.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Reforming the UN Security Council

• Current Issues: The five permanent members' veto power paralyzes action in crises like the Israel-Gaza and Russia-Ukraine conflicts.
• Proposed Reform:
  • Parsi discusses the "Veto Plus One" proposal:

    "Each and every veto that is cast by any of the P5 needs to be accompanied with one other negative vote by any other member ... If it's just that permanent member casting a veto and no one else casting a negative vote, then the matter goes to the General Assembly and 2/3 can overturn the veto." (05:05)

  • The proposal is an attempt at compromise, recognizing great powers won't voluntarily give up the veto, but the UN's legitimacy is collapsing.
• Why Reform, Why Now?

  "Unless we have some reform of the UN, particularly the Security Council ... it's reflecting the world as it looked in 1945... we might as well have based it on the geopolitical realities of the time around the life of Jesus Christ." (05:05)

  • The urgency, Parsi argues, is that reform is now necessary for the UN’s survival.

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2. Personal Stakes: Parsi’s Story and the Stakes of Revolution

• Exile Background:
  • Trita describes his family’s persecution under both the Shah and the Islamic Republic.
  • "My dad had just been twice in jail, so decided to take the opportunity to go to Sweden. He chose Sweden probably mainly because he was left leaning, and Sweden was like this leftist heaven back then." (98:07)
  • Upon his father’s return after the revolution, his name was on an execution list. He survived because revolutionary jailers—his former students—knew he opposed the Shah.

    "They whisk him out of prison I think after a month or so, put him on a plane, he's never been back." (101:31)

• The Human Cost of Revolution:

  "People forget that it is so disruptive ... now a revolution has happened and suddenly they don't even accept the previous degrees. Like, your entire education wiped out and you're still one of the lucky ones because you didn't get killed, you didn't get into prison." (11:59)

  • Both hosts warn against romanticizing revolution, highlighting how Iran traded one form of dictatorship for another.

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3. MEK: Cults, Terror Lists, and Washington Influence

• Origins and Evolution:
  • The MEK (Mujahedin-e Khalq) started as a radical, martially active group opposing the Shah, later allied with Saddam Hussein against Iran, losing all domestic credibility.
  • Eventually labeled a terrorist organization by the U.S. for killing Americans and repressing Shias/Kurds under Saddam.
• Cult Dynamics:

  "They did all of these crazy things. Forced divorce... They took children from MEK families and place them with other MEK families. This then ensured that MEK members could not defect because if they defected, they would lose access to their own children." (24:48)

• Bribing for Legitimacy:

  "They ran a huge lobbying campaign in Washington, 2010 and 2011, the MEK, which frankly, was illegal ... eventually managed to get Hillary Clinton to take them off the terrorist list." (26:43)

• Current Location:
  • After U.S. intervention, many MEK members now reside in a closed camp in Albania; they’re still highly controlling, with some defectors speaking out.
  • They run sophisticated online propaganda operations from Albania (see BBC reporting). (30:30)

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4. Iran’s Internal Cleavages, the Danger of Civil War, and the Diaspora

• Ethnic Tensions:
  • Multiple minorities (Kurds, Baluchis, Azeris) have long histories of marginalization or separatist tendencies.
• Civil War Risk:

  "What I see in Iran right now is all of the ingredients that very much could lead to a civil war if not handled and managed correctly." (16:19)

• Trap of Outside Regime Change:
  • The Iranian diaspora is ideologically diverse with conflicting claims to legitimacy.
  • Parsi cautions that revolutions/civil wars rarely end as intended, with external interventions (historically by the U.S.) often creating destructive power vacuums.

  "Foreign intervention will ultimately lead to democracy? I don't believe that ... Foreign intervention... is not going to bring about a democracy." (107:59)

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5. U.S. Policy, the Sanctions Trap, and the Nuclear Deal

• Obama-era Nuclear Deal (JCPOA):
  • Parsi, an advisor and scholar on the deal, defends its verification mechanisms as world-class, with intrusive 24/7 IAEA oversight.
  • He addresses "sunset clauses":

    "There’s no such thing as permanent forever in which all aspects are there." (55:03)

  • The real sticking point was that the U.S., by negotiating under the NPT, couldn’t make Iran a "permanent pariah."
  • Israeli nuclear scientists privately considered the deal effective, countering Netanyahu’s public stance.

    "These are the nuclear scientists of Israel ... who are in a position to assess whether these inspections will work or not." (82:03)

• Trump’s Withdrawal and “Maximum Pressure”:
  • The U.S. exit from the JCPOA under Trump, and re-imposing harsher sanctions, is cited as the death knell for Iran’s reformist movement:

    "One third of Iran’s middle class has gone into poverty in the last 10 years as a direct result of Donald Trump’s maximum pressure sanctions." (47:24)

  • The resulting economic collapse fueled the current fury within Iran.

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6. Israel’s True Motivations & Regional Power Balances

• Nuclear Program as Proxy for Regional Dominance:

  • Parsi describes an Israeli security logic less about the bomb itself and more about keeping the U.S. as an unambiguous ally:

    "Israel cannot allow the United States to become friends with a country that defines Israel as an enemy and does not recognize Israel’s right to exist. We cannot allow that to happen." (65:27)

  • Israeli strategy:
    • Use the nuclear file to tie the U.S. to Israel’s side; fear is abandonment, not just Iran’s nuclear capacity.
    • Pressure to expand U.S. military action against Iran, shifting goals from the nuclear program to missile capabilities and beyond (see Israel’s shifting "red lines"). (70:07)

• Military Operations and Costs:

  • Iran’s missile retaliation during Israeli strikes proved significant, showing that without American support, Israel cannot guarantee air superiority over Iran.
  • U.S. involvement in support of Israel is immense, with billions spent on missile defense in crises.

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7. Regime Change: Venezuela as Canary in a Coal Mine

• U.S. Action in Venezuela:
  • Recent U.S.-supported regime-change operation in Venezuela succeeded with minimal cost—no U.S. boots, no local casualties, Maduro replaced by his #2, not the opposition.
  • Parsi cautions against taking this as a template for Iran:

    "The idea that this can just be replicated anywhere, regardless of the circumstances, is a huge mistake ... to take that attitude and then think, okay, as a result, now we can do this everywhere else, very dangerous." (76:17)

  • The risk of contagion: If the U.S. sets new precedents of leader extraction, it invites escalation by rivals (i.e., China/Taiwan analogy). (79:47)

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8. Protests, Mossad, and Foreign Manipulation

• Recent Protests:
  • December 2025/January 2026: Unprecedented violence—both from government and mysterious provocateurs.
  • The death toll likely 5,000–7,000+; even regime supporters are in shock.
  • Parsi notes unique features:
    • Protesters faced not just state repression but also shadowy, violent actors (possibly state- or Mossad-backed, or rogue militias).
    • The dynamic was less controlled than 2022’s women-led protests.
• Mossad Penetration:
  • Israel’s intelligence agencies have executed deep strikes in Iran, with local assets, sabotage, and in-country drone operations.
  • Why so effective?

    "You have to have a very large critical mass of people that are so upset and angry ... that they’re willing to consider [helping Israel]." (166:14)

    • Disaffection produces intelligence opportunities.
  • Tactics for recruitment include offering medical help, exit opportunities, and leveraging personal grievances.
  • The extent is so large that Iran’s intelligence failures eclipse Israel’s own October 7 missteps.

    "The Israeli intelligence penetration of Iran is beyond anything anyone had envisioned or expected. It took, I think, everyone by surprise." (166:14)

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9. Diaspora Opposition & Leadership Crisis

• Disorganization Abroad:
  • Attempts to create a viable, democratic Iranian opposition in exile have failed—coalition attempts broke down rapidly in-fighting.
  • Many diaspora leaders lack democratic ethos despite years in Western society.

    "If you've been here that long and not picked up ... you're not an answer, you're part of the problem." (164:01)

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10. The Pitfalls of External Regime Change and Looking Ahead

• Civil War Risks:
  • Externally driven or poorly planned regime change is likely to produce state collapse, military entrenchment, or civil war, as seen in Syria and Libya.

    "Most civil wars cannot last for more than about a year... The cases in which they go on for longer ... is because of foreign military intervention." (115:17)

• Iran’s Future:
  • Parsi is pessimistic about an imminent revolution but believes the regime is mortally wounded ("a dead man walking") due to its loss of legitimacy.
  • The likely outcome: a reshuffling within the existing regime (“another iteration”), rather than a clean break.

    "I think within the next five years, this current iteration of the regime will be gone, but most likely it will be replaced with another iteration of the same regime." (179:54)

  • The best scenario? Demise through internal, not external, processes. Foreign military intervention is a dead end.

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Notable Quotes & Moments (with Timestamps)

• On the UN Security Council’s veto:

  “We might as well have based it on the geopolitical realities of the time around the life of Jesus Christ.” (05:05)
  —Trita Parsi

• On the hazards of outside regime change:

  "I'm not a fan of the idea of revolution... The United States is one of the few countries in the world that actually had a successful revolution." (10:14)
  —Trita Parsi

• On the MEK’s cult tactics:

  “Forced divorce. No one was allowed to actually have a wife or a husband. They were all supposed to just have their love only for the leader... They took children from MEK families and placed them with other MEK families. This then ensured MEK members could not defect.” (24:48)
  —Trita Parsi

• On sanctions and the economy:

  “One third of Iran's middle class has gone into poverty in the last 10 years as a direct result of Donald Trump's maximum pressure sanctions that have really been suffocating the economy.” (47:24)
  —Trita Parsi

• On Israel’s “red line” with Iran:

  “Israel cannot allow the United States to become friends with a country that defines Israel as an enemy and does not recognize Israel's right to exist. We cannot allow that to happen.” (65:27)
  —Trita Parsi

• On Mossad infiltration in Iran:

  "The Israeli intelligence penetration of Iran is beyond anything anyone had envisioned or expected. It took, I think, everyone by surprise... you have to have a very large critical mass of people that are so upset and angry and pissed off at the government" (166:14)
  —Trita Parsi

• On the failures of Iranian opposition in exile:

  “If you've spent your 45 years in the United States and you haven't picked up any democratic line of thinking... you're not an answer, you're part of the problem.” (164:00)
  —Trita Parsi

• On power and failed transitions:

  "Power is a very, very strange thing. And in an ideal world, power goes to the people who actually least want it. And that doesn't happen very often." (110:42)
  —Julian Dorey

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Timestamps of Major Topics

• 02:19 – UN Security Council & Reform Proposals
• 10:14 – Parsi’s Motivations & Perils of Revolution
• 20:35 – MEK: Origins, Terror Listings, and U.S. Lobbying
• 43:35 – Life under the Shah vs. Islamic Republic
• 47:24 – The Failure of Reform and Impact of Sanctions
• 54:08 – The Nuclear Deal: Terms, Verifications, & Criticism
• 65:27 – Israel’s Deepest Fears & Nuclear Program
• 76:17 – Venezuela Regime Change as Template?
• 82:03 – Technical Details & Verification of Nuclear Deal
• 107:56 – Why External Regime Change Is Destined to Fail
• 116:49 – Proxy Wars: Saudi, Iran, Turkey, & Qatar
• 137:02 – Parsi's Exile Experience in Sweden vs. U.S.
• 142:03 – Khomeini’s Charisma & the Post-Revolution Order
• 166:14 – Mossad’s Methods and Depth of Infiltration
• 177:18 – Is the Regime Finished? Likelihood and Scenarios

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Tone & Style

Parsi’s analysis is measured, methodical, and laced with candor—even when discussing personal trauma. He avoids romanticism or demonization, pressing for realism and peace. Julian Dorey matches this with sharp, informed questioning and a conversational, energetic tone. The conversation is thorough but accessible, often referencing both historical nuance and pop culture to help listeners stay engaged and draw parallels.

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Summary for New Listeners

This episode is an indispensable explainer for anyone seeking to understand modern Iran's internal crises, failures of reform, roots of global distrust, U.S.-Israel-Iran maneuvering, and the real stakes of external regime change. Trita Parsi makes clear that the path forward—if Iran is to avoid civil war and find democracy—must be internal, not imposed by outside powers, and that every failed intervention makes future peace less likely. The conversation’s depth and honesty set it apart as a must-listen for anyone interested in geopolitics, international law, or the lived realities of revolutionary change.

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For more:

• Follow Trita Parsi on socials [linked by Julian]
• Read his books: Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy
• Reference cited timestamps for specific segments or revisit the transcript for full context

Transcript

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Visit lifelock.com podcast terms apply. It was very bizarre origin story. The CIA described them as Saddam Hussein's foot soldiers. They were massacring Shias. They were massacring Kurds. They were on the list. They killed six or seven Americans. These were highly religious Shia Muslims that at the same time were Marxists. I mean, you mentioned the mek earlier on. Things were bad, but in between, something else also happened. My dad's name was put in the paper as one of the people that would be executed on the spot. I remember saying goodbye to him for the last time. They don't execute him as they had promised. Instead they put him in jail. And guess who he's sharing his jail cell with.

[A]

Wow, there's another great tangent right here. We just had something happen down in Venezuela where there was a regime change operation required no boots on the ground afterwards and no civilians were dead. Does this create a good scenario or does it create a precedent for the US to then try regime changes, which those regime changes could cause boot on the ground situations. Is it fair to say that that's kind of the V we're looking at?

[B]

Potentially it can really destroy Iran. The question is, what is cost to the us not just in terms of dollars, but the Iranians will strike back at the US I'm worried that this can lead to something worse, but.

[A]

Hey guys, if you're not following me on Spotify, please hit that follow button and leave a five star review. They're both a huge, huge help.

[B]

Thank you.

[A]

So I had put out on my Instagram a story asking for some ideas on Ron experts, and there were a bunch of DMS that just said your name, Trita Parsi.

[B]

Okay.

[A]

And then I got hit up by our mutual friend Eric Zuligar. He's like, you got to talk to my guy, Trina. He's helping me so much right now, so I'm glad we could actually do it. Thanks for getting in here.

[B]

Thank you so much for having me.

[A]

So you're just you're coming from the UN right now?

[B]

Yeah, I was spending two days doing meetings on UN Security Council reform.

[A]

I'm sorry to hear that. What a mess. Man, that place, it just feels like you. All you ever hear is just like people hitting their head against the wall.

[B]

When they leave, you know, I mean, look, it is a crucial institution. We won't understand how important it is until we lose and hopefully won't lose it. But it has just become next to impossible to get anything done. So reform and significant changes are going to be absolutely necessary. But it's important not to abandon it because I think people get so tired thinking, okay, you know what, let's just do something else. Reality. Anything we would create from scratch would end up being worse.

[A]

I think you're right about that. I fully understand why people out there are like, you know, abolish the UN and all that. It's a reactionary thought because it has lost a lot of trust and made a lot of mistakes, especially over the past couple decades in particularly. But to me, it's like we saw what happened when we failed with the League of Nations experiment and what that led to. When you don't have something where there's some semblance of making high level decisions in some sort of transparent way. And I don't want to see that happen.

[B]

Exactly, exactly. And you know, this having a venue in which peace and security issues at the highest level, in which there's like this standard diplomacy taking place, you don't have to pay this high political cost to get to diplomacy. You actually have it automatically.

[A]

Right.

[B]

Is crucial. And, you know, 30 years ago, the Secretary General was a much more important figure than he is today.

[A]

Why do you say that?

[B]

Because back then, whenever there was a conflict, the automatic first place to go to find a mediator was the Secretary General. He automatically, almost had the trust of the key parties. You didn't have to search for a mediator. You didn't have to wait for like some country to find itself in a comfortable political situation, to be able to have the bandwidth and the political maneuverability to step up and offer to be a mediator. There was the Secretary General. So Ukraine happened, he would be in there right away. We don't see that any longer. And it's largely, not entirely, but it's largely because of also the great powers. They've kind of pushed the Secretary General out and diminished his role. And now we see the consequences of that.

[A]

Are you allowed to talk about what we talked about just before camera. Regarding, like one of the ideas you have for reform.

[B]

Sure you are.

[A]

So specifically, because obviously you guys didn't hear that conversation we were having, but you were explaining to me that it sounds like a really reasonable compromise to me. One of the issues that we always hear about is the fact that five countries have a veto vote that can just totally shut something down regardless of what everyone else thinks. And you have an idea to like, I would say, soften that a little bit. And what does that look like?

[B]

So you have a position by many countries saying there should not be any veto at all, that the veto really is unfair, that it's block progress, etc. And you know, it's an understandable position. Perhaps in an ideal world there would not be a veto in the first place, but reality veto is there and the veto holding countries are never going to give it up. It's just not going to happen. In fact, most of them would probably prefer to see no reform of it at all because they benefit from having it. But unless we have some reform of the un, particularly the UN Security Council, which is not just the veto, it's composition and size, it is reflecting the world as it looked in 1945. The world has changed tremendously. Even if it had been formed in 19, sorry, in 2010, it would have already been outdated, given how fast things are changing. But 1945, we might as well have based it on the geopolitical realities of the time around the life of Jesus Christ. Frankly, outdated it is. So you need to change that. But within that there's got to be something. Also on the veto and rvo. So one of our proposals, and we have a whole package of different proposals that are being quite seriously considered right now in this process of potentially getting some change, is what we call veto plus one, which is that each and every veto that is cast by any of the P5 needs to be accompanied with one other negative vote by any other member. And it doesn't have to be a permanent member. It could be just one of these elected members that comes in there for two years. If it is, then it is insulated and it stands. But if it isn't, if it's just that permanent member casting a veto and no one else casting a negative vote, then the matter goes to the General assembly and then 2/3 of the General assembly can vote to overturn the veto and that causes the original resolution to automatically pass. In the last couple of years we have examples of eight vetoes. Six by the US on Gaza, two by Russia on Ukraine. All of them were completely alone. All of Them most likely would have been overturned if our reform had been in place. And much of what we talk about right now about the UN is not working, etcetera, Is precisely because of those eight vetoes.

[A]

That's why. Because those are the two major wars going on in the world that for obvious reasons, incorrectly so, are incredibly controversial. Obviously there's like a ceasefire in Gaza right now, but you know what I mean, it's like there's gotta be. What you're talking about is not to me a big ask and I'll bet it's not really what you want, but you're compromising to at least get, get something moving, which I can appreciate, instead of like trying to be 0100 and sitting there to get nothing done and nothing changes.

[B]

Yeah. And look, even this, even though I agree with you, you know, it is a compromise at the end of the day is still a huge ask because many of the permanent members don't want to see any change whatsoever to the veto.

[A]

That was my next question though. Why? How would you get this change to happen if you need them on board and how does that work?

[B]

So ultimately then comes down to the fact that the situation is getting to a point in which you either have reform or collapse. I don't think that outside of a fear of collapse, the reform actually would take place. Right. Because you have to be in a situation which everyone realizes, okay, we got to change this or we all lose. Some lose more than others. In our view or in my view personally, the United States and the other permanent members actually have the most to do's because they're the ones who would lose the very strong privilege of having a veto if there isn't a Security Council.

[A]

Right.

[B]

So I think we do have an incentive on our end making sure that the council stays alive and relevant. And if that then means some give on the veto, that obviously is not as far as abolishing the veto, which frankly a majority of countries probably would have wanted then. I think ultimately when the moment of truth comes in, which is either reform or collapse, I think we'll make the right decision. But we also have to realize up until that point is probably not going to happen, but we are getting very close to that moment in which either there is some form of reform or this is either going to collapse or just fade into irrelevance.

[A]

You're involved in some pretty important shit. It's very impressive. Like you obviously as a originally native Iranian, which we'll get to treat his whole story as well today, I definitely.

[B]

Want to do that.

[A]

But, you know, I'm. I'm sure that's the most passionate subject and drives a lot of what you do. But whether it be trying to make reform in the un, which affects all these countries around the world, or working on mek, which I guess is like Iran slash Albania, we'll get to that in a second. Or, you know, advocating for the voiceless who are still in Iran today and trying to get rid of the regime there, you know, which is certainly. You want to see that come from within. We can talk about that rather than regime change in that way. But, you know, how do you keep it all straight, man? I mean, these are all. A lot of. These are very life and death type things at the end of the day.

[B]

Yeah. No, I gotta tell you, I'll be very frank with you. I'm not doing this because I think it's fun. In fact, I have a problem with people who think this is a fun. This is fun. Like, particularly people who come to Washington because they think it's like, politics is fun. It's like, you must be out of your mind.

[A]

I drive around D.C. when I have to, like, go that way, you know.

[B]

That'S the same thing to do, you know, because bottom line is not fun. There are people who are attracted to it because they like to be close to power. To me, it's actually the biggest problem. I have an easier time with people who are on the complete opposite side, ideological issue, because at least I can respect that they believe in something and they're there because they also want to see change. But those who are just attracted to power and just want to go for the ride, because I think it's fun. That's where I'm like, no, this is not working in my view. So I'm doing it because I believe that this change is necessary. Whether it is. I want to see an Iran that actually have the population itself being able to determine what kind of government they want to have that is not being bombed. It's not being the people oppressed in the manner that they currently are or the manner that they were with the previous regime. I mean, this is the sad story of the Iranian people, that they went from one dictatorship, did a revolution, which is not an easy thing to do. There's a reason why there's so few revolutions around the world in human history and then ended up, by and large, in a worse regime than they were in before. And now we're at another moment again. There's obviously an attempt at doing so. I'm worried that this too can lead to something worse because I'm not a fan of the idea of revolution. The United States is one of the few countries in the world that actually had a successful revolution.

[A]

Yeah, it was a long time ago now too. 250 years. Yeah, yeah, it's. I mean, it's fun to say, you know, viva la revolution and all that.

[B]

But yeah, there's a romanticism around it. But I think people forget that it is so disruptive. Like, you know, in the case of Iran, you could have a completely well established position, a degree from university, very valuable. But now a revolution has happened and suddenly they don't even accept the previous degrees. Like, you know, your entire education wiped out and you're still one of the lucky ones because you didn't get killed, you didn't get into prison or anything like that.

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[B]

So there's a disruptiveness in it that I think is kind of lost on us because we learned about the American Revolution, which was a good revolution, but it is an exception in the sense of being so successful.

[A]

Our mutual friend Eric has some bars that I've quoted for years on this show, since we first recorded back in episodes 163 and164. But one of the things he always says is countries are just stories. And when you really think about it, you're like, oh my God, that's true. And when you extrapolate that down from the top level, you realize everything around us, from the money we trade to the time that we agree it is in the morning or at night based on what this 24 hour clock is. It's all a story that we've told ourselves societally and in different places, come to different types of sets of agreements that this is what it is. But what you're pointing out is when you have a revolution, it's. It can be a burn it all down kind of moment. And everything that may have involved effort or years of work or security that was insured, whatever it might be before, is gone overnight. And that's a dangerous thing, no matter how you crack it or how morally.

[B]

Responsible times it might be necessary as well. I mean, sometimes those stories. Stories are prisons.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

And something is needed to change. And I mean, you have that story of V. Havill, who talks about communism, you know, the Czech Nobel Peace Prize winner who says that in that communist system everyone had to put up that sign of the Soviet leader or whatever it was, you know, loyalty to the Communist Party. No one believed that.

[A]

Right.

[B]

But they all had to do it because that was the story you had to say. You had to be part of that story in order to be safe. But at some point, someone decides to just take down the sign. And when someone is taking down the sign, the entire lie can fall apart, entire story can fall apart. And in revolution, you know, it goes perhaps even deeper than that. But that's what happens. And it happens because people fundamentally want to get that change. The question always is, though, do you have a plan for how you build a new story? Do you have a plan to make sure that this transitions in a peaceful manner, that you actually get to a better situation? Iran's experience after 79 was change led to something worse.

[A]

Right?

[B]

The revolution in Tahrir Square in Egypt, 2011, same slogan. The only thing they focused on was that Mubarak had to go. Same slogan in Iran. 79, 78. The Shah must go. What comes afterward? Not well defined. And then we saw that, you know, they had tremendous amount of turmoil and now they're pretty much back to a different version of the same type of a dictatorship that they had before and of course, even worse situations in Syria or elsewhere. And we have a complete civil war ranging off of 15 years. A lot of Iranians, in my view, have a very unrealistic and high view of Iran and thinking that no, no, that could never happen in Iran. That, you know, for whatever reasons, Iranians are different, better than the Syrians or the Iraqis, for whatever reason, you know, whether it's less sectarian strife or whatever. And as a result, they wouldn't have a civil. I think that's absolute nonsense. You have civil wars in countries that don't have different ethnic groups or sectarian divisions. It's, it's not dependent upon that. And what I see in Iran right now is all of the ingredients that very much could lead to a civil war if not handled and managed correctly. And again, what the regime is doing right now with the massive killings, I mean, these are things that just drive things actually further towards civil war.

[A]

So when you say civil war specifically there you are referring to a rise up of the part of the country that wants to get rid of the current regime, rather than a civil war that would occur after said regime is already gone.

[B]

No, both cases you could have an effort in which there's a violent uprising and that can then lead to civil war because, you know, the existing government would fight back, they have monopoly on power, so they would strike back. Could end up being more of an insurgency than a civil war or a scenario in which the state collapses. There's no centrality of power, and then there is a massive power struggle of who takes over, who establishes order afterwards. And in that scenario you can also have it. And Iran actually is a country with a tremendous amount of different minorities on the border areas. There are also minorities that have a history of seeking independence or secessionists.

[A]

Like who?

[B]

The Kurds, for instance, the Baluchis towards the east border of Pakistan, the Kurds towards the border of Iraq and Turkey. You have Azeri minorities that historically there has been, but I don't think it's a very. I mean, this is roughly 25% of the population and it's also very much part of the elite. I mean, the current supreme leader himself is an Azeri. So it's not comparable to the Kurdish minority.

[A]

How do you spell that? That word?

[B]

Yeah, A Z E, R I, from Iranian part of Azerbaijan. So that risk is there, in fact, in these last days of protest. The. Some of the earliest and most significant clampdown and violence was in the Kurdish area. One of the Kurdish groups that was deeply involved, which doesn't. Is not part of a democracy movement or. So it's actually a Kurdish group that was trained by the United States in 2011. No, sorry. In 2014 to fight ISIS. No, this is. It's a group called PAK. Okay. They were trained by the US in 2014 to fight ISIS. It's not clear whether the US knew at the time that this is actually an Iranian Kurdish group and not an Iraqi Kurdish group.

[A]

I feel like they probably knew that, actually.

[B]

I'm not so sure.

[A]

No.

[B]

Yeah. I mean, look at the time. They may have been part of a larger Iraqi Kurdish setting. If you knew a little bit about the leadership and you knew the names, you would immediately understand that they're actually Iranian. But nevertheless, look, don't underestimate how little we know and how huge U.S. mistakes in Iraq were.

[A]

Few of those. Few or 10 or 20 or 100, for sure. I'm with you there. But sometimes it feels like, you know, not even to put on a tinfoil hat, it feels like there were just so many other almost like sinister motives on the United States part as it related to what they really wanted to do in Iraq after getting there that, you know, they would be willing to make, quote, unquote, unholy alliances or things like that. No, certainly, certainly.

[B]

I mean, you mentioned the MEK earlier on. MEK is an organization that was founded in Iran in 1963. It was very bizarre origin story or bizarre creation in the sense that these were highly religious Shia Muslims that at the same time were Marxist. So they became actually rather popular group in Iran during the 60s and 70s because they were the most radical. They fought the Shah. They were the ones who started to use violence against the Shah's regime. And the Shah's regime was very, very unpopular.

[A]

Would they do, like, political assassinations?

[B]

They did. They tried to assassinate the Shah. They killed, I believe, six or seven Americans in the 1970s because the US, of course, was behind the Shah. So they became a target of this group. Then later on, they were part of the revolution. They were in an alliance with Ayatollah Khomeini, but it was an uneasy alliance. And as soon as the revolution was completed, in the sense that the Shah was out, infighting between them started. It was a very violent struggle between the MEK and what is now the actual regime, and they fled and they fled to Iraq and Saddam Hussein had invaded Iran. So they ended up siding with the country that was invading the country that.

[A]

Was okay, even though Saddam was a Sunni, he accepted.

[B]

So these different things are not that important. To be frank with you. You know this, I think from a U.S. standpoint, because of how we messed up Iraq, we've kind of over studied, you know, the sectarian element and the sectarian element. I'm not saying that it's irrelevant, but it became much more relevant later on than it was back then. The fact that they were an Iranian group was much more of a problem for Saddam, but he needed that Iranian group against the Iranian government at the time. But this also meant that the MEK then started to dramatically lose credibility and support because I mean, imagine an American that would have fought with al Qaeda on 9, 11. I mean it's seen as completely treacherous. And they landed on the US's terrorist list because of the terrorist activities they had engaged in, particularly for Saddam Hussein. They were massacring Shias in the south, they were massacring Kurds. The CIA described them as Saddam Hussein's essentially enforcers and foot soldiers when it came to clamping down on the Kurds and the Shias in the north and the south of the country. But then when the US invaded Iraq, despite the fact that they were on the US's terrorist list, the US started using the MEK for keeping control in certain parts of Iraq because the US didn't have enough troops. Because Donald Rumsfeld was adamant about making sure that it wasn't too big of an occupation, that he, that he could do this with a much more limited number of troops. And then he ended up actually using some of them.

[A]

How big was their. Let's even start like when they first allied with Saddam post revolution, how big of an organization were they? Are we talking a million people or.

[B]

I don't know what the size of the actual membership or. No, but this was a major group. I mean this, this was one of the major groups that did the revolution. And they were, they were not insignificant in any way, shape or form, but they always had an element of cultishness that.

[A]

Cultishness?

[B]

Cultishness in the sense that they were, were a cult, that, you know, they were completely undemocratic and that they weren't the type of freedoms inside the organization itself. They had elements of that by the time of the 1980s. The more they became unpopular in Iran, the more the leadership needed to turn the organization into a cult in order to retain the membership because otherwise they would lose all these people. So they did all of these crazy things. Forced divorce. No one was allowed to actually have a wife or a husband. They were all supposed to just have their love only for the leader. Okay. They took children from MEK families and place them with other MEK families. This then ensured that MEK members could not defect because if they defected, they would lose access to their own children.

[A]

Oh, my God.

[B]

This is all documented. Was happening in Europe because there were a lot of Iranian diaspora there. Of course, many of them supported them MEK and many of them stuck in that type of a scenario. And this was documented by Save the Children in some European countries, etc. So you had this really sad thing that the more they kind of lost credibility and the more it was obvious for people who wanted to leave the organization, the more the organization turned into a cult in order to prevent them from being able to leave.

[A]

It's always crazy to me. And all the cults that I've looked at or talk with people who were former members or whatever over the years, that of course, they almost always exist within some society with a standard of laws, and then they just kind of hide away their people from all those laws and create their own set of laws and say, nothing to see here.

[B]

Yeah.

[A]

And it's never. Not sinister. I mean, that's hard. They're taking children from the parents as collateral as crap.

[B]

Some of those children are now adults and have come, come out and spoken out about it, etc.

[A]

So good for them.

[B]

Yeah. But I mean, look, they're. They're damaged for life. Of course they're damaged for life. This is a terrible and unfortunate. Also, this is not unique to them. Other organizations have done the same thing. You mentioned the Peshmerga, the pkk, which the Turks view as a terrorist organization. The MEK is viewed as terrorists by the Iranian government, as well as it used to be by the US Government. But then they ran a huge lobbying campaign in Washington, 2010 and 2011, the MEK, which frankly, was illegal. They can challenge the legal designation as being a terrorist organization, but they were essentially bribing politicians to make their case, so. And they gave money to folks on the left, folks on the right, and eventually managed to get Hillary Clinton to take them off the terrorist list.

[A]

Oh, my God.

[B]

I mean, it is such. I mean, already back then was just clear. The US terrorist list had just become a complete joke because you can essentially buy your way off of it.

[A]

Yeah. Or become the president of Syria. Yeah.

[B]

Another pathway.

[A]

Oh, my God. So, but is that a type of situation if they're, if they're actually in D.C. lobbying and paying people? Is this something.

[B]

They were on the terrorist list and they had an office in the National Press building. And to make it worse, one, their spokesperson also got a gig at Fox News as a terrorist commentator.

[A]

Oh, my God. Their spokesperson.

[B]

Their spokesperson, Eddie. So, yeah, so I mean, it's. This is part of, this is part of why I said, like, you know, why would you be in D.C. because you think this is fun?

[A]

No, I'll, I'll skip those steak dinners. Those are some dirty ass steaks. But yeah, I, I really didn't know anything about this. And what Eric was telling me is a lot of it. You mentioned they obviously fled to Iraq and then had a. Years later had a role in the Iraq War and all that. So they have, they have a presence there for sure. But you also mentioned, and this is what Eric was telling me about, that there is a big presence in Europe and specifically there's like, I think he said it was like a conclave or something in Albania.

[B]

Yeah.

[A]

Where, where Eric is. What's, what's going on there? Is it like Scientology?

[B]

During the Iran Iraq War, they had a couple of bases in Iraq that was just MEK bases. Right. And that, that's. They kept them deliberately there. Both the Iraqi government didn't want them to be anywhere else, nor did the MEK leadership want them to be able to roam around freely because again, it was a cult. One of those bases is Camp Ashraf. Once the US took them off the terrorist list, the Iraqi government said, we don't want this group here any longer. In fact, there was a lot of concerns once Saddam Hussein fell that ordinary Iraqis would go and attack the base because they hated the MEK so much, because they had been essentially the thugs of Saddam's regime, clamping down against dissent inside of Iraq. So the US Government then engaged in this really elaborate and based on the people who were involved in it, extremely gruesome and unsatisfying negotiating campaign in which they needed to get the MEK out of Iraq and get some other country to agree to host them. Otherwise there was a risk that either the Iraqi government would attack it or that the Iranian government would attack it and just get rid of them. And part of the problem was the US Government, of course, knew a lot of the people who were there were completely innocent. They had been born into that camp. They had been kidnapped and brought there as a collateral against their family. They had, you know, for all kinds of different reasons, simply couldn't leave. And so the US government didn't want to stand there and see them get slaughtered either. But then they committed a mistake, in my view, because it was one thing to save them from either an attack, but it's another thing to save them from that attack, while ensuring that they will continue to be in the grip of a cult that doesn't allow them the freedom to leave. So they managed to get a deal with the Albanian government for whatever reason. I don't really know exactly what the Albanians got from before this, but. But they moved all of them to Albania, and now that's where they're sitting right now. But you still have the same problem as before. Many of them want to leave, but they can't leave. So the US didn't do anything. I mean, it had an opportunity. If it really wanted to protect the innocent people there, it would have actually made sure that people who wanted to leave would be given the right and the opportunity to do so. That's not what happened. Instead, the whole cult was removed from Iraq and transplanted into Albania. And that's what they're sitting right now.

[A]

And you all.

[B]

And there was a. I just have to say this because you're probably going to see it in some of the comments on. On the YouTube later on. There's going to be a lot of attacks for me, criticizing them. But there was a great BBC story in which they actually had managed to get some of the defectors to speak on record, including footage of these bot armies that they have in Albania. Yeah, and it was like all of these cell phones that were connected to each other so that the. You know, so they have all of that in Albania and they're using it to essentially wage some sort of a digital war, whatever it is that they're doing.

[A]

80% of any conflicts that are occurring in the world, be it literal war or ideology war or things like that. And I'm just throwing out a number right there. People don't quote me, but it's literally what you just described. There's a bunch of fucking screens and, you know, bots doing it.

[B]

Unbelievable how much social media is not central, but nevertheless an extremely critical element of any major conflict right now.

[A]

It's also. It desensitizes us to so much.

[B]

It does.

[A]

Because you. I mean, I constantly go on there, it's like, oh, you know, there's fucking four people who just had their heads blown off. And then you got to worry about, you know, first you see that and you're like, oh, my God. Yeah, that's real. And then the next question is, is it because we got AI, you know, and it's so the fog of war now with technology, whole different level than in the past. And I'm not saying that in the past, they couldn't hide things behind closed doors with a bunch of dudes in suit.

[B]

Yeah, they did. Yeah.

[A]

But, like, you weren't seeing all this stuff all the time or seeing fake stuff all the time.

[B]

Yeah, yeah. No, you're absolutely right that you constantly now have to question whether what you're seeing is true. And even when it comes to, you know, how many images of protests from whatever country did we not see? And then later on turned out, well, that actually wasn't that country, that was argent. That's right, 10 years earlier. I mean, so it's. That fog really ends up pacifying people because you don't want to constantly be proven wrong by react, you know, going with your first reaction all the time. So you kind of take a step back and then you become paralyzed because you don't know what to trust any longer.

[A]

Right. Now, MEK is one example of an organization that obviously has a different opinion than the current regime in Iran. But like you said, there's an enormous diaspora of Iranians around the world who all have different political ideas, many of them at least united on the idea of, like, they would love to see the current regime not there. So, you know, sometimes we kind of group that all into one thing, and that's not fair to do because there's a lot of different people that could be potentially, I don't know, competing for power if a vacuum were created. You know that moment when you're running out the door and you need a shirt, and preferably one that you don't have to set up the iron to get all the wrinkles out. That's exactly what Mizzen and Main makes. Clothing that's fast, sharp, and ready to go the second you grab it. Mizzen and Main makes classic menswear with performance fabrics, so it's effortless for you to look sharp and feel great. They actually invented their performance fabric dress shirt over 10 years ago, and since then, they've perfected it with modern fabrics. Mizzen and Main shirts and pants look refined, yet they're stretchy, lightweight, moisture wicking, wrinkle resistant, and completely machine washable. No ironing or dry cleaning. When you put their clothes on, you'll feel the difference instantly. It's a professional style that's actually comfortable, whether you're in the office, on the road or even on the golf course. And I also love that Mizzen and Main is a veteran led organization. You know, I got a lot of friends who are veterans. We've had a bunch that we've been privileged to have on the show. So when organizations are founded by guys like that, I always like supporting it. And if you're a veteran, Mizzen Domain offers a year round military discount while also proudly giving back to veteran organizations. Their clothes are timeless style that you can invest in once and enjoy for years. That's why thousands of guys swear by Mizzen and Main when they want to look great without the hassle. Right now Mizzen and Main is offering our listeners 20% off your first purchase at mizzen and maine.com that link is in my description below where you can use promo code Julian20 at checkout. That's Mizen spelled M I Z Z E N and Main m a I n.com promo code Julian20 for 20% off mizzenmain.com promo code Julian20 link in description and if you'd like to buy them in person, you can find Mizzen Main stores in select states. But please use the link and support the show down there. That's the best way to do it. That said, you know, we do have in this current country right now in the United States, we've had the exiled former royal family of the Shah living here since 1979. Obviously, Reza Pahlavi is someone who's been in discussions as like if something happened, he would suddenly move back to the country and take over. What I think would be really helpful for people though, Trita, just to start this off before we get to your personal side with this, as I was talking with Eric about some of that, you have some very personal things going on on both sides of this conflict. But you know, for people who want, who don't understand where this started, which is frankly 25 years before the revolution happened in 1979, what you know, whether you're going to go through the whole Kermit Roosevelt thing or whatever happened there, like how did the shah come into power? And the shah's, I guess the Shah's father and then later the son was deposed. Like how did that happen and what politically did that look like in the country of Iran?

[B]

Yeah. So the former shah, his father, Reza Pahlavi, he was a soldier that essentially did a coup and got rid of the previous dynasty, that was the Qajar dynasty, and established the Pahlavi Dynasty. He was quite brutal, but he's also been credited for keeping the country together, setting a stage for a significant modernization that took place back during his era. But he also was very, very on the wrong side of the Russians and the Brits for a variety of reasons. You know, the Brits had not colonized Iran. It was never a colony. It was almost as if it wasn't worth colonizing. But they were absolutely extracting resources from Iran in a significant way. And there are. You know, Iran and Russia has had so many different wars. Iran has lost a lot of territory to the Russian republics in Central Asia. So he had German sympathies during the Second World War. Oh, yeah. And. But it wasn't because I. I don't think there's clear evidence that he had some sort of affinity with Nazism or anything like that. It was mainly that that was a European country that had not tried to colonize Iran.

[A]

You know.

[B]

So the Russians and the Brits occupy Iran during the Second World War. The pose of Reza Paladi, he goes into. I think they send him off to South Africa and they install his son, who at the time was no more than 21, I think Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, who becomes a shah, a very young guy, continues to rule. At the time, There are also 1906, there had been a revolution, a constitutional revolution in Iran, and Iran had sought to establish a constitution. Within that there was a parliament. The parliament elected a prime minister. There was a division of duty between the shah and the prime minister. It was very much of an imperfect system, but it was an embryonic democracy. But the Iranians wanted something that the riots that Brits thought was absolutely unacceptable ago, which was this guy, the prime minister, Mossadegh, who actually himself was part of the previous dynasty, the Rajar family. Well, an aristocratic family. They wanted to make sure that Iran would keep 50% of the oil revenue of its own oil, because at the time, 100% of what the Brits were pumping out of Iranian oil wells went to the British coffins.

[A]

Oh, 100%.

[B]

Not keep a dime. Wow. The Iranians wanted 50%. The Brits, I think, did not want to offer more than 5 to 10%. So the Brits tried several different ways of getting rid of Mossadegh and try to convince the United States. Not successful until they figured out what's the winning card within the context of the Cold War, which is they couldn't point to any evidence that Mossadegh was a communist. So instead, the argument was he might become a communist and eventually the United States under the John Foster Dulles goes along with it. The US does a coup that apparently cost no more than $10,000. They get rid of Mossadegh and install the Shah as the only ruler of the country.

[A]

$10,000.

[B]

$10,000.

[A]

That's a good bang for your buck couple.

[B]

I mean even $10,000 of that time is still a small amount of money when it comes to doing a coup. And, but this is the moment in which the United States kind of loses its innocence in Iran. What is oftentimes not known is that prior to that, the United States was seen as a tremendously positive force globally, in the Iranian view, because the US actually was one of the main anti colonial forces. This is the area in which you have major decolonization taking place in the world. A lot of countries gained their own independence from European colonialist powers and the United States was actually a major force in favor of that. The United States itself had been a colony, had done a revolution. So it was very sympathetic to this. There was a gentleman who still, whose statue is still in northern Iran by the name of Baskerville, who actually fought and died with the Iranians for the 1906 Constitutional Revolution. What was his name? Baskerville Basketball.

[A]

Can we pull that up?

[B]

Thief.

[A]

Give him some love.

[B]

So he died, he was, he got, he was killed in the trenches fighting with the Iranians for the Constitutional revolution. So, but now suddenly the United States actually asked to get rid of a. Not only the Prime Minister, you know, democratically elected through the parliament, but get rid of that system as a whole and install the Shah as the only trusted dictator of the country that would be squarely on the US side against the Soviet Union. A close ally, trustable ally. And the Shah's reign ended up becoming more and more despotic and more and more repressive as time went by as well.

[A]

From 54 to 79.

[B]

From 53 to 79. Yes.

[A]

Okay.

[B]

And, and eventually that leads to a revolution. And that revolution in 79 was in the minds of the revolution. There's also a revolution against the United States because they believe that the only reason why the Shah was still in power was because of the United States. Whether that's entirely true or not, nevertheless, let's set that aside. But that was the perception. And the revolution eventually, not initially, also end up becoming anti American. You had these leftist students who take the American embassy hold 52American diplomats hostage for 444 days, which becomes one of the biggest traumas in America's recent memory. Because this was not just, I mean, I'm not trying to belittle 911 in any way, shape or form, but that was one major attack. This was going on for 444 days. Every night. The news was what is happening with the American hostages at the embassy. And it was in some ways, according to at least some American historians, more humiliating for the United States States than what the Vietnam War was. Even though 50,000Americans died in Vietnam and it was a loss. But this idea that this former ally of the United States would have taken the embassy and the hostages and then of course, there was this failed attempt to win their release by having these helicopters flying into Iran that crashed in the desert, etc. And that has just set this tone of US Iran relations since then in a very, very bad direction.

[A]

Yeah, in, in those critical years though, leading up to that, leading up to 79 in the 70s, like you mentioned, the Shah obviously was a dictator and you know, ruled in certain ways with an iron fist. But you know, at the same time, this is a low bar. But you look at pictures of Iran from the 70s and you see women walking on college campuses and stuff like that without, you know, being covered head to toe. You see some freedoms. I guess what I'm trying to ask is not to say he was good, not to say there weren't serious issues, not to say there weren't human rights abuses, but was part of the revolution the idea that people were basically saying they were just kind of fed up with him and assumed it couldn't get worse, and then it just got way worse, you know what I mean? Like almost like death by a thousand cuts.

[B]

So look, there wasn't the type of realization or the type of imagination that things could really get worse. And when you look back at it, you see, look, things were bad. It was a very repressive regime, thousands of people in jails, being tortured, etc. And it was politically very repressive, socially extremely liberal. So you point to the fact that, you know, women could dress more or less how they wanted, etc, and it looks very modern, right?

[A]

Sure.

[B]

But politically was very repressive. So it, the Shah's model was closer to that of East Germany in which like one out of five in every town or every city was actually an informant to this secret service. And people couldn't trust each other. So it was suffocating in that way, but not suffocating in the social way. After the revolution you have a much more suffocating social reality with the enforced hijab, etc, which of course in the protest in 2022, it was very much centered on getting rid of that. But then politically it's also repressive, suffocating, but different. You don't have the same type of, you know, 1/5 are informants or anything like that. There's actually a degree of freedom which people can criticize as long as they don't cross certain lines. So for instance, if you criticize the supreme leader, then that's the line. You don't do that. But it's a very, very false political freedom because if you were to organize against the regime than that, there's no freedom there whatsoever. But there's like this pressure valve in which, yeah, you can express certain things, etc, perhaps nothing huge will happen to you, but if you actually start organizing your friends to actually do something, that is a completely different story. So these are different models for repression. They're both repressive. We can have debates. Which one is worse than the other? To me, that's not interesting. Bottom line is he went from a repressive system that looked in a certain way to a different repressive system that looked in a different way. There are certain elements of democracy that has become stronger, but not in an impactful way. They actually have elections. They have municipal elections, they have parliamentary elections. Well, the local ones are real. The parliamentary elections used to be real. And the presidential elections at this point are more or less not a joke. But they're certainly not that real because you have this other very, very undemocratic element, which is called the Guardian Council. 12 jurists whose task is to vet candidates and make sure that they all fit whatever kind of mold for them to be permitted to run. So you had like a thousand people declared a candidacy for the presidential election, but only seven are approved. But increasingly this vetting body, extremely undemocratic, has become even more undemocratic. In the past, they had to justify, if someone is rejected and it was an appeals process or something, pressures that could be put on. That's not even the case. You have sitting members of parliament who can't run again because now suddenly they've been deemed to be unfit without any motivation whatsoever. So instead of seeing the political space in the last 20 years actually expand, there's been a massive contraction. And this is part of the reason why you have more and more protests. Previously there was an attempt to try to open up the space through reform. It failed. We can go into why it failed, but now it is much more restrictive than it was just 20 years ago.

[A]

Can we take that tangent Real quick, why that? Why those reform efforts failed.

[B]

It's not a small tangent, it's a big one.

[A]

We got all that.

[B]

I think it's very, very important because. And I have a piece of in Foreign Policy, it was just published today about this, looking at the fact that now you suddenly have elements inside of Iran asking for the US to take military intervention to save them, right? Just six 12 months ago, this would have been treason for anyone to say, yes, come bomb my country.

[A]

And it's not now.

[B]

It is still for a lot of people, but this is a growing group. It's impossible to say, are they just the loudest minority? Is it a plural? I don't think it's a majority, but it is clearly much larger than what was before. And the question is, why? How could such a dramatic change happen? The obvious first answer is the repression of the regime that has just become worse and worse. And what we're talking about here, several thousand people being killed between January 8 and 10. That's just never happened before. As bad as this regime has been, it's never been killing at that level.

[A]

Really?

[B]

Never. Really. This is unprecedented, and it's just shocked the entire nation. So obviously, that type of repression yields a counter reaction, undoubtedly. But you also have this scenario in which there is a belief or a perception that there are no other pathways at this point, because all previous pathways have been tried and they failed. Up until 2017 or so, it was the reform project, you know, try to change it through elections and getting less and less bad people elected who would slowly but surely open it up. That failed. Several reasons why I would point to one that is very crucial. The reform project knew that without improving the economic situation, you would not be able to have a middle class that would grow. And the middle class becoming more powerful is very crucial because it's the backbone of a democratization process. You need to have a powerful middle class that can exert that type of a pressure on the state to do that, you need to have a functioning economy. To have a functioning economy, you need to have a deal with the US that lifts economic sanctions. Those sanctions, yes, the government's own mismanagement, corruption, all of these things, huge factors. But even with all of that, you would not have an economy as bad as right now. Even with this incompetent government. You would have a middle class that would have grown 17%. Absentee sanctions. Instead, the middle class has essentially been cut down. One third. One third of Iran's middle class has gone into poverty in the last 10 years. As a direct result of Donald Trump's maximum pressure, sanctions that have really been suffocating the economy. So you had a deal between the US and Iran and P5 on the nuclear issue struck by the Obama administration. For those two years, the Iranian economy grew between 6 and 7%. But it only lasted two years because once Trump came in, he pulled out of the deal, not only reimposed sanctions, imposed way tougher sanctions than the US Ever had imposed before, crashed Iranian economy, crashed the currency, pushed one third of Iran's middle class into poverty. So reform failed for many different reasons, including the calculations of the Iranian government. I mean, the Iranian hardliners were never going to voluntarily accept reform. It was all about strengthening the middle class so that they can exert pressure so that the hardliners would have no choice but to have to acquiesce. Yes, to those reforms. But that failed once. That failed in 2022 when you had protests, people were not asking for reform. They asked for regime change. And the pathway was no longer reform. The pathway was revolution.

[A]

Right, okay, there's a lot on the bone here. Let's start with that nuclear deal and for a minute, let's remove the 500 pound elephant in the room that rhymes with Schmid's real for a second. But you know, my friend Scott Horton would disagree with me on this a little bit because he really hates pretty much every president that has existed in the last 60 years. That said, one of the things about Obama, you know, he was very green in foreign policy and I think he made a fucking a ton of mistakes on foreign policy. But there is one thing that he was, that was like a little personal for him, which is he was one president who, when Israel would come to him, particularly Netanyahu, and propose ideas that he felt were not good for America, he was willing to say, please go fuck yourself. Thank you, there's the door. And they hated him for that. And so what I have always looked at, and this is a bit of a broad way to look at it, I'll admit, but, you know, the nuclear deal that Obama made felt like his personal kind of fuck you to Netanyahu. Because obviously, and I understand this, Israel is not a fan of, of Iran's regime. I fully understand that that's fine. But the issue with the deal is that they claim the IAEA would be able to have 24, 7 access, but they also didn't declare all the places where nuclear or COVID testing could be done on weapons that also could include like ballistic missiles and things that are slightly below nukes that could eventually go to that kind of thing. And there were also sunset provisions that basically said a lot of this would go away sometimes in 10 to 15 years. It didn't help that it was written in many cases by Ben Rhodes who was a speechwriter, you know that just for the optics that didn't help either. And so I don't think it was a strong deal. I think Obama kind of took it personally. That said, here's the other side of it and it's an important point you make. I talk with my friend Joby Warwick about this as well, who you know, he's like, damn, it's really tough. When you look at all these countries, whether it's Iran, Syria, you name it, when you put economic sanctions on them, you create some self fulfilling prophecies because you are locking them off from the world. But if you don't, you might reward a regime that, you know, if we're looking at Iran, might fund places like Hezbollah or Hamas and these different organizations that are problematic for many reasons. So it's easy for me to sit here and criticize all this stuff. What I'm not going to do is be a hypocrite and tell you hey, I got the answer, this is what it is. So in a perfect world, if the answer is not go make the 2015 Iran deal and the answer is also not go sanction the out of them into kingdom come, what is the answer here?

[B]

All right, so let me also, and.

[A]

You can pull that mic with you by the way.

[B]

So let me put my cards on this. So I, I was advising the Obama administration on this, so I probably have my biases. So take that. I appreciate that a lot of things that you said there. If we just go into some of the specifics of the deal, sunset clauses, which actually they're not really sunset clauses, just certain aspects of the deal. Certain aspects of the deal expire after X amount of years. That is actually pretty standard in most non proliferation or disarmament agreements. I mean just these days start agreement is expiring and the question is, is the US and Russia going to renew it and if it isn't we're going to be in a very, very bad situation. I haven't followed it all to see whether they managed to figure out but it actually expires any day now. That is there's no such thing as permanent forever in which all aspects are there.

[A]

Permanent's a strong word.

[B]

Permanence is wrong. The most important aspect of the deal however, actually is permanent and that is the inspections regime. Now you mentioned that they couldn't get access to certain places. So first of all they did have 24, seven access. And the access they had is not the way they look back in Iraq where you know, inspectors would run around with white helmets and trying to figure out if they're hiding a nuke under the sofa or anything like that. The ie it had instruments inside the Iranian nuclear program. Instruments, instruments measuring things inside the program that would detect any deviation, any radiation, anything, and would send that immediately to the IAEA headquarters in Vienna. Way superior than to just having people running around and looking for WMDs under or even running around trying to measure things. The measure of things are actually in the place and it's in all four aspects of the program from you know, beginning of uranium mines all the way down to the final facilities. So that aspect is super strong. There are elements of it that expire and there was a big fight about that. The position that ultimately prevailed. And the thing was the position was never that oh we this has to be permanent. The US wanted certain things to be 25 years or even 40 years. The Iranians want it to be five years. And obviously they ended up with on some sort of a compromise. The idea that it would expire at some point, however, was not really in dispute because the US and Iran agree that this whole negotiation would take place within the legal framework of the non proliferation treaty. So the US is not coming there and saying you cannot have a nuclear weapon or enrichment above 3.67% because we say so. US comes and says that you have signed the non proliferation treaty, you are bound to not build a nuclear weapon. You have violated certain aspects of this and as a result you have lost the trust of the international community. And as a result there needs to be measures, punishments, et cetera to make sure that you don't build a nuclear weapon. But that needs to be coupled with a process in which you rebuild the trust and at the end of that tunnel you then become, once you've earned the trust, re earned the trust, you become a normal state to say that no, this is a deal in which you permanently will be a non normal state. It was just not in the cards, right? You couldn't perhaps if you had a war and defeated them completely in, in battle, something like that could be imposed. But this is a negotiation and they had not built a nuclear weapon. They had done things that were illegal, they had experimented those things. Well, they had certain aspects of triggers for a nuclear weapon. There are certain they had enriched uranium at higher levels than they were supposed to. There was a fight as to whether they had told the IEA in Within the 180 days of a specific nuclear site and things of that nature, and some things that were much, much more severe than that. And they clearly had at some point experimented with some sort of a nuclear weapons program. But the US intelligence itself came out in 2007 and said that stopped in 2003 and the Iranians had not restarted the nuclear weapons program. And Tulsi Gabbard, Trump's dni, said exactly a year ago the same thing that the U.S. intelligence assessment, which was the same as the European intelligence assessment, was that they had not restarted an actual nuclear weapons program.

[A]

Gabbard said that.

[B]

Gabbard said that in February of last year.

[A]

Yeah, you know what, Thief, maybe to help out here, just because it's also been a while. Can we just Google, just for basics, 30, 000ft in the air, like outline of the terms of the 2015 nuclear deal, just so that some of the things you're referring to as well, people can have transparency with that.

[B]

But now within that, I can still say, look, yeah, you can make a position that, you know, perhaps this should have been 25 years or when it comes to the sites, there is a mechanism there that was put in place which is that if there any suspicion emerges that there is another secret site that they're using and that they haven't given IA access to, there was a voting structure that was set into place that would ensure that as long as the US And Europe are on the same side, the Iranians would be forced to accept IAEA inspecting inspections in those sites. Okay, now that was tried by the Trump administration during the first term.

[A]

It was.

[B]

But the Europeans were not on board because the intelligence was not there. There was flimsy intelligence. And this is important. If you abuse this mechanism, then you lose credibility.

[A]

Absolutely.

[B]

So the Europeans were not on board going just on a loose goose chase in Iran and then seeing the IAEA lose credibility, because then suddenly the Iranians would start saying no to everything, and perhaps there would be a case that actually was legitimate. And then we didn't have the IAEA go in there. So there were these mechanisms. But reality is that those who were dead set against the deal, such as the Israeli prime minister, they were dead set against any deal.

[A]

That's what I'm saying.

[B]

The problem was they didn't want the deal. They wanted the United States to take on Iran militarily, change the balance in the region in favor of Israel. And that necessitated sanctions and no agreement. Regardless of what the details of those agreements were.

[A]

That can't be argued with. You're right about that.

[B]

And I don't think Obama did it to screw over Netanyahu. What really happened? I can give you the details.

[A]

Please.

[B]

In January 2012, the US assessment of Iran's, what is called breakout time is the amount of time it would take for the Iranians to enrich enough uranium to have for one bomb. It's not to have a bomb, but to have the material for a bomb. It would take them 12 months. Okay, okay. This is January 2012. By January 2013, that breakout time had shrunk to about six to eight weeks. And this is at a time when Obama was actually imposing really, really strong sanctions on Iran. And the calculation was that the same sanctions will cripple the economy and force the Iranian to come and offer a compromise.

[A]

I'm sorry, what year did you just say that was in now?

[B]

The January 2013.

[A]

2013. So this is also, if. Correct me if I'm wrong here, this is starting to get in the area to where Obama's NSA was hacking the centrifuges with the zero day.

[B]

Yes. So in Iran, happening a couple of years earlier, together with the Israelis. So simultaneously with all of this, the US Is, through Stuxnet, et cetera, is trying to sabotage the program. But it became clear then that the sanctions bid did not cripple the Iranian economy faster than Iran could build its nuclear program. And if nothing changed, then the Iranians would become a de facto nuclear power within weeks. And then Obama would be faced with only two accept Iran as a de facto nuclear state or go to war, unless he changed the parameters. And what he did then is in secret negotiations in the country of Oman that talks that had started, but without a change in the US Position. Obama changed the position, accepted enrichment on Iranian Seoul on the very, very strict and requirements in return for major restrictions on the program and sanctions relief, and that then gave the basis for the deal. So what really happened is that Obama realized the sanctions path is not going anywhere. If I don't take on a more realistic position in the negotiations, I will either have to go to war or I'm going to become the president in which Iran essentially becomes a nuclear power on my side term. Right. And he changed that. And of course, Netanyahu did everything he could to destroy it. He failed. But then once Trump came into power, he succeeded by convincing, or at least in his narrative, he's the reason. He's the one who Convinced Trump to walk out of the deal.

[A]

Right, Okay, a lot of directions here. So I think one of the mistakes we make in social media does not help with this because we all, me, Joe, you, everyone who's outside these situations has a voice to put their opinion out there, which I think is great. But it creates a lot of noise on stuff. I think something we fail at all the time is as much as painful as it is to do. Putting ourselves in the skin or in the shoes of people we don't like, which is something you obviously have an ability to do for better or worse because you don't like this regime at all. Your family's been gone from Iran for years because of them. So it's personal for you. And yet there seems to be some demonstration, a lot of demonstration throughout your career, that as much as you may hate them, you also are trying to be realistic with what progress might look like. So I appreciate that. But you know, part of the problem with this is like, I get it. If I'm looking at, from Israel's perspective for a second, I get it. You got this regime right there, that a part of their charters, like get rid of Israel, bomb off the earth. And they're extremely in the opposite direction and they're in your region. Okay, so you don't want them to have a nuke. But at the same time, if there's, if regime change is going to cause massive reverberating effects around the world, if it's done from the outside, there has to be a way that you, maybe they don't get a nuke, but you at least like contain the problem without trying to blow it up.

[B]

No, look, I think it's very important to try to understand the Israeli perspective because it is such a big factor in U. S decision making here. And it's also important to of course understand there's not just one Israeli perspective. So, for instance, that's right, the Israeli Atomic Energy Agency. Guess what they did. They endorsed Obama's nuclear deal.

[A]

I actually didn't know that they thought.

[B]

It was a good thing when the IDF came out with their threat assessment the year or a couple of months after the jcpoa. Very interestingly, Iran was not even top five any longer. But you have a political calculation that is also rooted in a different perspective on security matter, which actually really isn't about the nuclear program at all. I was at a track two meeting. This is 2012, I think. 2012. Track two, track two. So these are actually, it was track one and a half. Track two is a concept that came up a couple of decades ago during the Cold War. You know, when you have a scenario in which governments don't talk well to each other and if they do, they just repeat talking points, but there isn't really any real dialogue when you have that type of conflict, sometimes it's very valuable to have small conferences in which you have academics or others from both sides talking to each other. They're not officials, they don't represent their government, but they understand their government's position, they can convey the reasoning behind it and you can get a little bit more open conversations that are nevertheless, no one takes responsibility for it because no one is an elected official there. Then you have track one and a half, which is, you still have the track two, but within that group of perhaps a room of 25 people, there might be four actual officials there as well. Sometimes they mostly listen, sometimes they talk a little bit. But it's a little bit more official than a complete track two. But it's also not a complete track one. So this was one in which you had several people from the Israeli side, including former head of Mossad. You had several Iranian diplomats, sitting diplomats and former diplomats, and one of them was actually a member of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team. You had U.S. officials, including a four star general. And, and you had representatives of other countries from the region, etc. In that one of the Israelis, probably one of the smartest ones, I would say, frankly, very deep, deep respect for this person and what, what he has done for his country from his standpoint, said this was never about enrichment, essentially saying this was never about the nuclear issue from Israel's standpoint, which kind of shocks the room because of course that's what everyone thought that this whole thing was about. He says, no, this is about the fact that Israel cannot allow the United States to become friends with a country that defines Israel as an enemy and does not recognize Israel's right to exist. We cannot allow that to happen. And the reason for that is, although he didn't explain this in those same terms, is there's something called the fear of abandonment on the Israeli side, meaning if the United States and Iran have negotiations, they strike a nuclear deal, what happens? Well, the US and Iran don't become best friends. It's not going to be a love fest. But the United States is going to be like, well, we resolve this issue and we're a superpower, we have global responsibilities. We need to focus on Taiwan, we need to focus on X, Y and Z and another planet. We cannot have 80% of our attention be given to Iran, particularly now, where we have resolved this issue. So the Israelis then calculate that the United States will more or less leave the region and Israel, they'll then be stuck in the region still facing an Iran that in their view will not have a change its attitude towards Israel, but now without having the US Superpower on the Israeli side automatically to support them. So it wasn't, as he explained it, the nuclear issue per se. It's just that the nuclear issue is how you get US s attention because it then feeds in to non proliferation, which is a very critical American interest. Had it not been for that, it would be something else. In fact, when Benjamin Netanyahu came to the White House on December 29th last year, meaning a month and a half ago, what was his key message? His key message was that the United States needs to take military action against Iran. Not to destroy the nuclear program because Trump claims that he already had destroyed it, but to take out Iran's missiles. So now we have a situation in which the US has already bombed the nuclear program, but now the goalposts are shifting because now you have to take out the missile program and then, I don't know, perhaps kitchen knives need to be taken out as well. It's not about. I'm not saying that the nuclear program is unimportant in any way, shape or form. I'm just saying ultimately what this comes down to is the balance in the region.

[A]

Yes.

[B]

And that Iran was a growing power, a strong power, challenged Israel, reduced Israel's maneuverability in the region. The Israelis themselves cannot entirely shift that balance. In fact, they tried in 2000, last year. The narrative here oftentimes is that, oh, that was a success. It wasn't. We can go into the details of it, please. Yeah, the Israelis took huge hits. I mean, the Israeli. Okay, many tangents here, but I love this.

[A]

That's what we do.

[B]

Very few places you can just talk for three hours. The Israelis had three objectives without war. One was to get the US into the war. That was the one that they were successful with. The second was to decapitate the regime within the first 24 to 48 hours as they had kind of done with Hezbollah in Lebanon with the pager attack attacks. And they had successes in the sense that they took out about 30 top Iranian generals and scientists, as well as their families and neighbors, incidentally, very exact strikes. Exact strikes, but strikes that probably would never have been allowed by the US or for the US to do itself because of the large number of collateral damage. Because families, neighbors, all of them were killed as well. But within 12 to 18 hours, Iran had replaced all those people and was now starting to shoot 200 missiles at Israel. And Israel has arrow one, arrow two, arrow three, patriots, David sling, Iron Dome, and even the American Thaad air defense systems. Thad T H A D is one of the most advanced ones. I think we have eight in total. Two of them were put in Israel. Wow. Still, the Iranians managed to constantly get through these air defense systems, inflicting significant damage on Israel. The last day, the Iranians only shot 30 missiles. They got 19 of them through.

[A]

Through all that stuff.

[B]

Through all that stuff. And these interceptors are extremely expensive. The United States consumed 25% of all of its THAAD interceptors in those 12 days for Israel. The United States in the year before covered one third of Israel's entire defense budget.

[A]

Yeah. What kind of cost are we looking at?

[B]

Oh, we're talking about billions of dollars. We're talking about billions of dollars.

[A]

Yeah. Just the Thaad thing alone.

[B]

Yes. I mean, in October 2024, when Biden was president and there was an exchange of missiles between Israel And Iran, that two day operation cost the US about $1.5 billion. And that's not adding the other cost for the Israelis. Oftentimes some of that also end up being covered by the U.S. yeah. So they didn't manage to take out the political leadership. And because the Iranians managed to inflict so much damage on Israel, they didn't achieve their key objective, which is to reduce Iran's military power to the point in which it can become the same as Lebanon or Syria, countries that Israel completely dominates. It can bomb them at any time with impunity. Without American involvement, this could not be achieved. And this is part of the reason why the Israelis came back six months later and wanted the United States to do it. Because the US Is in a completely different military position. Of course, yes, it can really destroy Iran, but the question is, what is the cost to the US not just in terms of dollars, but the Iranians will strike back at the US as well.

[A]

You know what, there's another great tangent right here because we just had something happen a couple days after Netanyahu was hanging with Trump, by the way, down in Venezuela where there was a regime change operation. And one of the. I just want to give you context, you understand, like how I'm looking at this and then I'll let you go off on this. But one of the things that like always kind of pissed me off about this is Everyone had to have an opinion right away, 100% this way or that way. And to me, if I'm looking at this objectively and removing the characters involved, I don't know that I can have an opinion on this for one to two years. Right away, just the first two strikes on this, one for one team and one for the other, is yes, it's a broken campaign. Trump promised for Trump because he went in and did a potential regime change here by extracting Maduro. And it was a brilliant military operation that required no boots on the ground afterwards and no civilians were dead. So that's square one for him, square one against. But something like this, all due respect to Venezuela, obviously there's a lot of oil there and they have the biggest reserves in the world. So of course that has something to do with it. But, you know, it's more of a canary in the coal mine situation. What are the reverberating 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 10th order effects of this over the next two years? Does this create, you know, a good scenario where in one direction it's like peace through strength and other countries that are problematic, be it Iran or whatever, kind of fall into line on things because they're like, don't with the US or does it create a precedent for the US to then try regime changes that this same administration has said they're not gonna do, which those regime changes could cause boot on the ground situations because just to use the Iran example, you is, as you know, this is a region filled with over a billion Arabs. There's a lot of cultural, religious and holy war strife in that area as well. That is outside the borders of Iran. You don't have that problem in Venezuela. So if you use the precedent to then do that, not only could that create a crazy east versus west type scenario, but you are also now opening the door to vicious and you know, in some cases maybe fair propaganda from your enemies around the world, which you have to assume is everyone who are going to say the imperialist US is now here once again with George Bush 3.0 saying, let's go find you, kill you and take over a new government. And now it's a total failure. Maybe you even have China go, you know what it, we got to take Taiwan, look what the US did, you know what I mean? So all this, this could go very good or very bad. Like, I guess the first question is, as far as me looking at those scenarios, is it fair to say that that's kind of the V we're looking.

[B]

At potentially, you Put your finger on a lot of important things. One, the idea that this can just be replicated anywhere, regardless of the circumstances, is a huge mistake. And I do think that there has been a bit of sugar high because of that success and a belief then, okay, well, we could do it in Venezuela. And they told me I could, and I did, and it worked out really well. So, you know, whatever they're telling me that I can't do in Iran, I can probably try to do that.

[A]

Right.

[B]

In fact, about two weeks ago now, two and a half weeks ago, Trump was on the verge of attacking Iran.

[A]

Oh, he was.

[B]

Last minute, he called it off. I don't know this for certain, but my understanding is that he actually tried to get the Iranians to agree to essentially an orchestrated exchange, meaning the US Would hit a lot of important places and he would say that he's enforced his red line when he said that the Iranians cannot kill protesters and the Iranians would respond symbolically by attacking an empty American base. This is what happened in the summer. Iranians. Exactly. And the Iranians said no. He said, if you attack, we attack. And this then caused Trump to back off and then get the entire armada to come there. We have now more assets in the Persian Gulf and in the Indian Ocean that we've had, I think, for 30 years. So he didn't back off. And this is, okay, like, I'm not going to do this. He backed off and said, give me a little. Give me two weeks, I'm going to put the entire US Navy on your doorstep, and I'm going to retry this. And that's where we are right now. And it's going to be talks tomorrow in Oman. See whether they work or whether this actually goes towards a military confrontation.

[A]

That's a Mexican standoff.

[B]

It is, it is. And, and the standoff, you know, his calculation seemed to have been that he thought that the Banis would back off, and they didn't, and they're still not. Whether this is necessary at all, it's a different question. I don't think it is. I think actually there's a diplomatic solution that can and should be pursued, and we can get into that. But other aspects of what you said, I think is very important on one level, you have to admit, and, you know, give. Give the credit to the administration that they learned a couple of things from Iraq, in Iraq. And of course, some people will be very upset that me saying this because they wanted Trump to put Machado, the Nobel Peace Prize winner, in place. The Venezuelan opposition, he Didn't. Instead, he went for the number two on the Maduro. So it's the same regime as before. It's not really a regime change. It's a change within the regime change. So very soft. And he didn't want to put Mashado in place because he was worried that it would create instability and he didn't want to see an Iraq type of a scenario. But keep one thing in mind. Iraq also looked like a success for the first five and a half months.

[A]

Yes.

[B]

It's not until August 2024, when there's that big UN press conference and the insurgents blow it up in the middle of the press conference and the insurgency really spreads, that things start to go down. Up until that point, mission accomplished, all of the type of arrogance of success was there, similar to what we say now. I'm not saying that things are going to go in the same direction. I think they have learned a couple of things there and they're doing some things differently. But I would still be very cautious of thinking, oh, this is, look, it worked out for the first two weeks, clearly we're safe. That's, I think, a very charitable interpretation of what has happened. But then to take that attitude and then think, okay, as a result, now we can do this everywhere else, very dangerous.

[A]

Yes.

[B]

And the other thing that you mentioned, Trump, I think, does cherish the idea of being a norm breaker and a norm destroyer. But some norms actually do serve US Interest. Because if it is now completely okay to go and extract leaders you don't like, if you have the military capability to do so, then, yes, then you may end up seeing the Chinese try to do that in Taiwan or other places. So we're setting precedents that I don't think are helpful. I still don't understand the fundamental strategic necessity of doing what they did. But we can. That's a different story. The strategic necessity of necessity in Venezuela. Because, you know, as you remember, in the beginning was all about fentanyl. No one talks about fentanyl today.

[A]

Oh, no, it was.

[B]

Yeah.

[A]

Listen.

[B]

Yeah.

[A]

I'm not saying Venezuela wasn't moving drugs. They were moving three baggies in an eight ball compared to Mexico. It was like. That was actually the one thing I appreciate about Trump. You had afterwards, you had Hegseth being like, this was about the drugs. And Trump's like, it's about the oil. Yeah, exactly. Of course it's about the fucking oil. You know what I mean? Like, they removed that from the indictment in five seconds when they got him here. I completely agree. Yes. So I think the other problem, like when we're looking at Iran, though, is that when you, and you raise a great point, by the way. I held this off because you were, you were going on a tear right there. But your point about the Israeli, Israeli Atomic Energy Commission back in 2015 implicitly endorsing the deal, I pulled that up. That, that is real. So this was in opposition, obviously, of then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The iaec, which advises the government on nuclear policy, concluded the agreement contains sufficient limitations and the violations would be easily detected by international monitors. The commission said stance was at odds with Netanyahu and most of the political opposition, which viewed the deal as a significant historic mistake. So there were people on both sides of political aisle, at least in government, who did disagree with it. And I understand, like their fear on this, by the way. But it's interesting that you had an organization that does this in the country.

[B]

These are the nuclear scientists of Israel.

[A]

Right?

[B]

These are the people that actually know the technicality of all of this and who are in a position to assess whether these inspections will work or not. I mean, just to give you an example, I didn't put this in my book. I wrote a book about the nuclear negotiations because throughout the talks, I could talk to the Obama administration, I could talk to the Iranians, I could talk to all of the Europeans, IEA, etc. And the last stretch of the talks was three weeks in Vienna, Austria, and it was an unbelievably hot summer. And you don't build buildings there to keep your, you know, the apartment or the hotel cool because there's no necessity for that. And it was in the middle of the World cup as well, the soccer World Cup. And at times things were moving very slowly. I ended up scoring a lot of really good interviews with the Iranian negotiating team because they had a lot of time on their hand. And at the time they told me it's because whenever the US Take receives a new proposal from the Iranians or whatever, they have to take it back to get new instructions. And it takes such a long time, we don't understand why. Well, afterwards we understood why, because it was revealed, I think in the New York Times, the United States had built a replica of the entire Iranian nuclear program, of the facilities and every new proposal with a new constellation of how the century rules will be placed, etc. Etc. They tested it to see can they cheat or can they not cheat? Is this safe? Is this not safe? And that's why it took such a long time before the Obama White House came new. So the idea that this was like rushed or that it wasn't really thought through, it was amazingly well thought through by nuclear scientists. Towards the end of the negotiations, it became so technical that the lead negotiators could no longer be John Kerry, the State Secretary, Secretary of State of the US or Java Zarif, which was the Iranian Foreign Minister, because none of them had a technical know how. So they had to bring in the head of the Iranian IAEA Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, who is an MIT graduate in nuclear physics. And his counterpart was Ernest Muniz, the Energy Secretary at the time, who was also not only a graduate of mit, he was at the faculty there when Salehi graduated with his PhD from there. Okay. And the two of them had to hash out the details because it got so goddamn technical that the politicians, they were incapable of doing it. And this is why I wanted to mention this. So when the Israeli nuclear scientists come out and say, actually this deal holds up, it's got to count for something because these are the people actually know it. And the people on the political side, they have other considerations which is totally legitimate. The nuclear scientist only has to think about X amount of things. A politician has to think about all kinds of things. But some of them may not be entirely legit. It's about his political credentials, about whether this is a political win for him or not. It's all of those different considerations that are more selfish rather than in the national interest of the country.

[A]

God, you have such a calm way of looking at a lot of crazy moving pieces here. But also in, in the middle of that, you know, this three weeks in Vienna, you mentioned sitting down and scoring interviews with the Iranian negotiators. What's that like for you to be in a room with someone who represents that regime that, you know, tore up your family's life in a lot of ways. And we'll get that story in a second. But like, what's that like to sit with that person and be calm?

[B]

So you have to understand that there's a whole spectrum of people. Right. I don't think I've ever been in the room with someone who is a high ranking IRGC official who's doing that. Right. So I want to make that clear so it doesn't sound like, oh, you know, that it wasn't anything. These are the diplomats of this country. And I've dealt extensively as we talked about, I just spent two days at the UM with all of these different diplomats. So they're not necessarily Responsible. And their job is to give the nicest face to their country, whatever that country is. That's the job of all diplomats. My attitude in all of this is one in which I want to find solutions to make things better, to stop the killing, prevent the war. I mean, I respect all of these human rights organizations that are going that extra mile to save one guy who should not be on death penalty because of his political opinions. And God bless him for doing that. And I hope we have more of them. At the same time, I do think if we are capable of preventing a war that might have killed 50,000 people, that the human rights of those 50,000 people, the right to life, is also something that is important. Yes. And not just the political rights. All of them are important. And that means you gotta. I mean, look, I deal with Israelis, I deal with folks in the U.S. senate. We may have profound disagreements. Folks that in this specific regime in Iran, imprisoned, my dad has imprisoned other family members of mine, etc. You can make the choice of saying, because I don't like you or because I hate you, I'm not going to deal with you. Or you can make the choice of saying, okay, how do we make this better? How do I make sure that my kids or their kids don't have to live through the same stories that I did? My family had to flee Iran, etc. Etc. And if you have the ability, the patience, the willingness to do so, I think it's important. I see you have a necklace on the front page of my book on the deal. There's called losing an Enemy. Obama, Iran and the Triumph, diplomacy. I'm quoting him Jesus from Matthew. What is it, 2, 14, whatever. Blessed are the peacemakers because they will be. What is it? They will inherit the kingdom of God or somehow my quotation of Bible is not as precise as they should be. But you guys can look it up. Yeah, but it's a very famous quote of one of the things. And I see the world today and I'm like, I just do not understand why there are not more people trying to do this. We're just moving in terrible directions on almost all fronts. I grew up in Sweden. We haven't gone into my personal story. I grew up in Sweden. Sweden back then. It is not now today, unfortunately. But back then was this small country up in the north that punched way above its weight diplomatically, was mediating peace in all different kinds of conflicts, including between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s, really had played a crucial role in the beginning of the establishment of the UN etc Sweden did Sweden did Sweden, yeah. So the former Prime Minister Ul of Palmer who was assassinated and yon Eliasson who later on became foreign minister, played key roles in mediating these things. So I grew up in a country in which that was really respected. That was like, that was the pride of the foreign policy, of the type of peacemakers they had and the role that they played, played internationally, which really was the case back then. It isn't now. They've been completely. I mean, first of all, they don't even have the ambition at this point. The Norwegians have taken over that in Scandinavia. But you also have new. Complete new. Well, sorry, I shouldn't say new actors, but actors that have risen to unprecedented prominence, which is primarily Turkey, Qatar and Oman. I mean the Qataris are mediating about 11 conflicts around the world, several of them for the United States, including Venezuela. But by the way, and, and this is a very tiny country. I think the actual Qatari population is probably no more than 2, 3, 400,000.

[A]

How did they get into that position? They got the best coffee, like what's the deal?

[B]

They invested very heavily and sending their smartest people to the best schools in the United States and in Europe and, and took it very seriously. They realized that they are squeezed in the Persian Gulf. They have Saudi Arabia to the south, which is a giant. They have Iran to the north, that is a giant. They're sitting on huge amount of gas. They're the richest country. They have the bandwidth and the ability to do things that others cannot. But also they have a geopolitical position in which they're going to be completely screwed if there's war. Right, because they don't have an army of their own that in any way, shape or form can defend themselves. They have to have stability in the region between the giants in order to have the circumstances for themselves to be able to flourish. And by noticing that the space for peacemakers had more and more become vacant, they very cleverly went in and filled it. Not entirely others are there as well. But you know, if we had a UN that was at on par with what it was 30 years ago, if the Swedes were still doing what they were doing, then the Qataris probably wouldn't have the space to do so. Now they do and they took it. And I personally think that we should be really grateful that they did because we do need it. And I give a example, we touched upon it a little bit. When Obama realized that he needed to negotiate or potentially go to war, they went to Muscat, Oman, And Omanis were the mediators. And something happened there which was that Bill Burns, who was the lead negotiator at the time for the us who later on became the head of the CIA. Yeah, he was given a written statement by the administration which I still don't know the exact details of, but the contours are that there was an acceptance by the United States for the first time ever, that Iran could have enrichment of uranium on its own soil under specific restrictions. This is the thing the Iranians had waited for, the acceptance of their red line. They were not going to show any flexibility, regardless of how many sanctions were imposed on them, until this was accepted. This was accepted in Oman, but there was a problem. This was conveyed orally. And the Iranians were like, no, we need this in writing, otherwise we don't trust it. So a solution came, was presented. I think it actually came from the Omanis themselves. The Omanis wrote a letter to the Supreme Leader of Iran in which they said, this is the American position. They put it in writing, but not from the US Then the Sultan of Oman, the late Sultan, he has passed away now in between his chemotherapy for his cancer, flew to Tehran and presented the letter in person to the Supreme Leader. That was a gesture to essentially say, if you say no to this, you're not saying no to it because you don't trust the U.S. you're saying no to it because you don't trust me. And the US And Iran don't have any trust, but Iran and Oman have a tremendous amount of trust. So even a superpower, the United States needed a small, tiny country like Oman to be able to get this breakthrough. And we should be grateful that there are these small countries that are willing to play this mediating role because they can do things that we cannot do. Despite our tremendous power.

[A]

With the Qatar one, though, is it. Is it kind of a difficult political position for them to be like a mediator right now, considering that they. I'm not even saying that this is definitely the case, but the way the optics are, it's that they're very at odds with Israel. So therefore, like, seeing it from the Israeli perspective, they might be like, well, they're not gonna. They're totally biased. And, you know, they're also helping out Iran or whatever, which is going directly against our purposes. Therefore, they shouldn't be at the table mediating this stuff. Do you think that that's fair criticism from them?

[B]

The reason why they're mediating, and you're right, the Israelis, first of all, the Israelis wanted The Qataris there before. I mean, the Qataris. Yeah, I mean the Qataris are there because the U.S. so in 2006, Hamas wins the elections in Gaza. Shortly thereafter, the United States asks Qatar to host Hamas in Doha in order for the US to be able to have its indirect negotiations with Hamas since they're in charge. So this whole thing started off with the U. S. Requesting it and the Israelis were on board as well because they needed that channel. And the Israelis asked the Qataris to the money that the Israelis would give, or who exactly is giving. But bottom line is they wanted to make sure that the Qataris would pay Hamas to keep Gaza floating. Not flourishing, but floating. In 2024, December, the Qataris were like, okay, we're doing the mediation because he asked us, but we're getting so much for it. So you know what? Fine, we'll kick out Hamas. They won't have an office in Doha any longer and we don't have to do the mediation. Guess who intervened and said, no, no, no, no, keep them in Doha, United States, because we need them in order to do this mediation. At the time, the hostages were still kept there.

[A]

I understand.

[B]

And, and you needed this. So it, on the surface it may look like, oh, well, that this is a favor to Hamas or this is a favor to Iran. But bottom line is you need these channels to be able to resolve these conflicts and it is a position that, you know, you get a lot of flack for doing it. So there's plenty of countries that probably could. But like, you know what, we're fine. Solve your own problem. We know that you ask us for help, but then if we do it, then we get all of this bad PR and we're being accused of X, Y and Z, etc. We're good. Ask someone else.

[A]

We keep on or not. We. I've, I've kept on pushing off your actual story with this and you just kind of hinted it with the whole grown up in Sweden thing. But one of the things when I was talking to Eric about you, he was saying is that your family actually had history on both sides of the revolution. Meaning, like pre revolution. I think he was saying there were your family like had some sort of disagreements with the Shah and then post revolution, obviously like they imprison your father, as you mentioned. And I want to get into all that. But like before the revolution, what were, what was the history there with the Shah and his family as it relates to your family?

[B]

So my uncle was a governor, so we had people in the family who actually were in prominent positions. But my dad was university professor who was very left leaning, was very critical of the Shah and twice ended up in jail for criticizing the Shah. Well actually the first time he was actually criticizing Islam and that ended up getting into jail even on the time of the Shah. That's interesting. Yeah. The second time, and he was tortured by the savak, the secret police of the Shah. Got out and he had an offer to do become a guest scholar in Sweden. He had an offer to do it in Marseille, in France as well. And situation was very uncertain at the time. This is late mid 78, I think. And it wasn't clear what was going to happen. No one knew. Will there be a revolution? Will there be like massive clampdown? My dad had just been twice in jail, so decided to take the opportunity to go to Sweden. He chose Sweden. And he chose Sweden probably mainly because he was left leaning. And Sweden was like this left is heaven back then. So we went there because of the fact that it was too unclear what would happen. I was only four years old, so obviously I had no say in this decision.

[A]

In 78 some.

[B]

I think we arrived in October 78, if I'm okay. Yeah. If I remember correctly, a couple of months later, February 20, 1979, the revolution is a reality. We're still in Sweden following it from over there. But it's still very unclear exactly what's going to happen. Chaotic. Eventually Khomeini completely takes power. But then you have that fight between him and the MEK. Then September 1980, the Iraqis attack and invade. And they invade in the south of the country. My family is from the south, from the Khestan area. But in between something else also happened. My dad's name was put in the paper as one of the people that would be executed on the spot if he returned to the country. Accusing him of having been a collaborator with the suboctor secret service, which was not true. My dad had been tortured by them. But we're in Sweden at this point when this happens. Thank God my dad decides to go back and clear his name. And he decides to go back and clear his name. Because at the time if they didn't get a hold of you and you were wanted for whatever reason, and it's not as if you would get a fair trial in any way, shape or form in the first place anyways. But if they couldn't get a hold of you, they might just execute one of your relatives. And there's plenty of cases in which they executed a brother for a crime they accused someone else of doing right. And because my family, other family members had been in prominent positions during the time of the Shah, he goes back. I remember saying goodbye to him for the last time. I was about that time, four and a half or something. He goes back. They don't execute him at the airport as they had promised. Instead they put him in jail again. Now he's in Khomeini's jail, but guess what? It's the same jail as before. And guess who he's sharing his jail cell with? The same guy who was the head of that jail just months earlier when my dad was in that same jail, his former jail ward was now his jail mate.

[A]

Oh my God.

[B]

Head of that prison, who ran the prison for the shop, was now in that prison and sitting now sharing the cell with my dad. They did execute him. My dad, however, managed to get out or clear his name, however you want to put it. And I've.

[A]

How did he do that?

[B]

So that's the question. And I oftentimes ask that when I'm at college campuses, etcetera, Just to see if people could guess it. And I think if I've told this story perhaps, I don't know, 30 times, I don't know, I think there's only one time someone guessed it right because immediately people think, oh, he fled, or they think that, you know, he gave a bribe or whatever, all kinds of creative things. None of that is the case. The case is, and this goes to the core of what we talked about earlier on, what actually happens in the revolution. Guess who was running the prisons?

[A]

The, the new regime.

[B]

Who's the new regime?

[A]

Well, it's the complete opposite of what they overthrew.

[B]

Who are they?

[A]

Not the leftists, because they were allied with the leftists at the beginning and then kicked them out.

[B]

Yeah.

[A]

Is that where you're getting at?

[B]

It was left really, but kind of closely perhaps. The people running the jails now were a bunch of 20 year olds, many of them my dad's former students.

[A]

Oh my God.

[B]

Who knew that he was not with the Shah, who had listened to him get into jail because of his criticism against the Shah. They whisk him out of prison I think after a month or so, put him on a plane, he's never been back.

[A]

Wow. Did some of them get executed for that?

[B]

That I don't know. It's a good question that I need to ask my dad. He's still alive.

[A]

That's a. Wow.

[B]

And I'll tell you one thing, it is not a unique story it's not. It's even a story with a relative good ending because my dad was not executed. There's terrible stories. People who suffered far, far more than I did, did for my family did.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

First in the revolution itself, during the time of the Shah or after the revolution. This is again, why I said earlier on the American romanticized view of the revolution is because the US ended up having a good one.

[A]

Right, right.

[B]

The 1979 resident was a disaster in so many different ways, and people suffered tremendously. And. And my story is not in even top 50 in terms of how bad many people suffered.

[A]

Yeah. Your dad was able to get out. He's still alive today. It's amazing. What does your dad think today of what's going on in Iran? I'll come back.

[B]

I spoke to him two days ago. Look, he is, as most people right now, just in a state of shock, in the sense that the level of killings that the Iranian government engaged in between January 8th and 10th in particular, is just unprecedented. Now, some numbers have been thrown out there that this would be like 30,000, 40,000. I've not seen any evidence of that. And I find it a bit difficult to believe because even you have, like, these massive wars, and it still doesn't get into those numbers, you know, even over the course of weeks. I do definitely believe that somewhere between 5 and 7,000 is a very realistic number. And that is a huge number. That's an absolutely massive number of people. Right. I mean, just take folks that are looking at what's happening in Minnesota and being deeply, deeply upset over. What is it at this point? Two or three people getting killed?

[A]

Yeah, right.

[B]

Take that times 2,000 or 3,000. So people are just in a state of shock. Shock mainly because of that. Then there's also another element of shock, which is that there were elements, I used to say part of the protest, but I think it perhaps is more correct to say there were elements that took advantage of the protest to pursue a different agenda, who used a tremendous amount of violence, who burned about 48 fire trucks in the first night, burnt banks, museums, etc. About 300 police or Basij members, which is part of this militia, were killed as well. There's videos on YouTube or on Twitter you can see, and, you know, they're putting them on fire, alive. I spoke to one guy who was out in the protest. He'd been out in almost every protest since 2009, not a fan of the regime. And he said, Back in 2009, if we saw someone start using violence Everyone intervened because we really kept a very strong nonviolent discipline this time around. He said, I saw these folks, I don't know who they are, but they were all dressed in black. They seemed to be professional. They seem to know what they're doing. They were acting very fast and I didn't have. And no one else had the guts to step in because frankly, we were as afraid of them as we were of the besiege. So there was something else going on. It doesn't in any way justify this massive killing by the government.

[A]

Government, right.

[B]

But something else was going on that we have not seen before that led to a counter violence that led to these 300 police being killed. Etc, and, you know, why would you go burn fire trucks? I mean, what are you aiming to do, right? Particularly since you are at the same time putting a lot of buildings on.

[A]

Fire, you're also giving propaganda to the government.

[B]

You are giving. So, you know, there's a suspicion what he's actually done by the government itself in order to discredit the protests, etc. So there's a lot of question marks. And one of the things that happened certainly by January 8, but had already started is that in the beginning, when those protests started was in the middle of the day, and it was these currency and tradesmen that were out there protesting because the collapse of the currency was in the day. By January 8, all the processors are at night. At night is much more difficult to see what's going on. It's difficult to see who's doing what. And it also makes it much more easy if there is an element that wants to take advantage of massive protests to be able to pursue a different type of approach, which is, you know, and I assume that if they're completely homegrown, their belief is this regime is not going to be overthrown by peaceful protest. There needs to be some sort of a response to them that is not just peaceful or if it is something that is supported by outside elements. And we know that the Mossad had a tremendous amount of presence in Iran in the summer war. So if it's that, then, you know, it's something. But bottom line is this guy who went to all of these protests were like, whoa, I've not seen this before. And he actually ended up going home because it was like, okay, this made me uncomfortable. I want to protest the government. I want to, you know, but anything that uses my presence in order to go towards something that could lead to civil war, for instance, he didn't want.

[A]

To have a part so this is. There. There's. This is also a major difference between, like, what happened in 2022.

[B]

Absolutely, absolutely. Then you had massive violence from the government itself. You did not. I mean, look, the main elements of those protests were teenage kids.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

And young women. Right. So, no, not a demographic that is prone to that type of violence. Right. So this is new. And this is, again, part of the shock. I mean, the biggest shock, clearly, is a massive kill buildings by the government. Yeah. But also that there's something else, and it has scared a lot of people. And I think my dad is one of those who's very. Is not in favor of military intervention by the United States or anyone else. I'm certainly not either. I think it's. I'm against it from both sides from the standpoint of Iran, but also from the standpoint of the United States. After seeing what the US have done and what has cost the US Itself, I'm not in favor of it. But the fear of civil war, I think, is also very tangible at this point.

[A]

So what do you mean from the standpoint of Iran as a.

[B]

As well as in the sense that I don't believe that foreign intervention will ultimately lead to democracy. And I think democracy is where things should be going. And foreign intervention. And frankly, you mentioned the son of the Shah. If you look at the strategy that he's pursuing, it does not. Does not leave me with the impression that he actually is seeking an internal overthrow of the government. If you were to do that, you would build a big coalition. He's not. You would be working, going the extra mile to get amnesty to people from within the IRGC in order to get defections, because you have a massive security establishment and you need to get them to defect. You cannot just beat them, particularly when you don't have an army. Right. But he's not doing that either. He's talking about it. But his supporters, and you will see them in the comment sections on YouTube later on, are not building this thing and are not pursuing that type of an approach. Instead, what they're pursuing is the same thing as Machado did, which is Trump, make me the king.

[A]

Right.

[B]

Install me. And we started off with 1953, and now we're 2026. I don't think going that full circle is the right thing.

[A]

Do you know him?

[B]

I've met him, yeah. I've not had a lengthy concert, but I met him, yeah. When I think the first time is the one that I do remember. He gave a briefing on Capitol Hill when I was working there. And I do, I do remember it well because I was not left impressed. And he looked very uncomfortable and uncertain and was constantly leaning over to some of his handlers to see am I doing a good job or not.

[A]

His handlers.

[B]

Yeah, that's the way it looked like. And that's not to question his motives, which at the time I don't think were what they are today. I mean, at this point, he's very clearly explicitly pushing for US And Israeli military intervention. I think that's absolutely wrong. But also because there was a moment which the congressman asked him, so how do. What. What do I call you? Do I say Mr. Palavi? And he responded saying, your. Your Majesty would. Would work.

[A]

That don't play well in America.

[B]

Yeah, it doesn't. But also it doesn't work well if you're saying, hey, I'm actually not going to try to take over the country. I'm just going to handle the transition. Transition, Right. To a democratic government. Well, then the title Majesty should not be part of the mix. Yeah.

[A]

Their power is a very, very strange thing. And in an ideal world, power goes to the people who actually least want it. And that doesn't happen very often.

[B]

Yeah, that's the way it should be.

[A]

That's the way it should be.

[B]

And is Salmon Frodo at Mount Doom.

[A]

Yes, exactly. That's a great way to put it. And with him, I don't even say this to be a cynic, but like, the guy has lived as a guest of the United States government since he was 19 years old. That shit ain't free. You know what I mean? And I understand, like, by the way, like, seeing it from my government's perspective, they would love a world where it's not the current regime there. I'm with them. But I really appreciate your. Even with your own history, like, understanding the serious problems there could be if it's caused from outside. And you had said something early on in this conversation, then we got off it, but it. You were talking about, you know, the dangers of revolutions on the other side and how they often look. And it's not necessarily like the American one, and you're right about that, but like an example of one that the world kind of blew in addition to the country itself that could have been good was when the USSR was overthrown. Of course there was intelligence involved there. That's just the nature of the world. I'm cool with that. That's what they do. But roughly 15% of the population there overthrew that government. It wasn't 50 it wasn't 40, it was 15. Largely peacefully. Yeah, the aftermath, a lot of diplomacy was fucked up for sure. And that United States deserves blame for that, European countries deserve blame for that and everything. And of course the new Russian government deserves blame for that. And the way that they set up the country was not smart. And here we are 30 years later, but to me, like, just cut it off. When they took down the wall and took down USSR up to that point, it's like, all right, if you're gonna do it that internal way, that's the way. And that's the way, like something like Iran in an ideal world should happen. And then you just hope the world and the new people taking over Iran at that point will have learned the lessons of the past. They almost never do cynically, but like, and realize, okay, let's not do the same things we did, that we did with the USSR moving to Russia, and let's have some sort of like, you know, new democratic system in this country that actually works, that's self sustaining and, you know, is like some sort of slow burn into the future. Is that fair to say?

[B]

It is. But I think we have to be clear though. Look, countries have their interest, right? If you have a vacuum created in Iran and some sort of a new formation may be formed, new government, new system, them, if you're sitting in Turkey and Saudi, in Russia, in the US, In Israel, you're not going to sit there on the sidelines and be like, well, let's just hope for the best. That's just not the way it works. Now, there's a spectrum, there's countries that may interfere very aggressively, completely overdo it, others who may play a smaller role, but, you know, reality is it's going to affect them. So it's not illegitimate for them to be concerned. It may be illegitimate for them to intervene in a very problematic way, of course. And when it comes to, like, a country like Iran has 15 land, 15 neighbors around itself, very strategically positioned in a position to control the waterways of the strait of Hormuz, 40% of all of the world's energy flows through there. You're not going to have disinterested parties just not going to be the case. But you can help at a minimum by making sure that you don't make it worse. And what we have seen in the region up until now or in recent history is that when you have Syria, for instance, the Iranians intervene, the Russians intervene, the Qataris, the Saudis, the Emiratis, the Turks, and studies show that most civil wars actually cannot last for more than about a year for a very simple reason that you run out of weapons and ammunition. The cases in which they go on for longer, and the Syrian case went on for about 15 years is because of foreign military intervention.

[A]

Right. There were like 20 groups there.

[B]

Exactly. Well, actually at one point was 414, 55 groups.

[A]

20 main ones. I'm sorry, that's a little off on my math. Point taken.

[B]

So you have all of these countries trying to, you know, starting to play their competition with each other inside of Syrian territory. Same thing happened in Yemen, the Saudis and the Iranians and in Iraq, the Saudis, the US and the Iranians again. And the Turks were involved there as well, of course. And it just ends up. It doesn't matter if any. Any of them had good intentions, does not matter. It just ends up ruining those countries. And Syria is completely ruined to the point that they're welcoming a former Al Qaeda head as president because playing basketball with U. S. Congress better than what it was before, apparently. Okay, I'm not going to judge. It's their call. I'm personally skeptical, but if ends up working out well for them, then fine. But I'm mostly taken aback by is the speed in which the US went from having him $20 million on his head to not only playing basketball with US military, but David Petraeus on the stage asking him, are you sleeping well at night? Was that the best? I mean, it's just the best. Whatever conspiracy existed in the region and there's plenty of conspiracies in the region that says the US Was behind ISIS and al Qaeda etc. I don't think there's any truth to him, just to be clear. But rest assured, they got a huge boost after seeing what they. Petraeus being that chummy with the guy.

[A]

Yeah, that was one of the cringiest things. It's, it's like just optically, Petraeus has got to be like, all right, someone else go on stage. You know, he's, he's already present. Just somebody else do it. Like there's got to be someone gotta be. Find some diplomat on K Street. They'll do it. But yeah, I think that's, that's also like you raised the point about the Saudis here. I kind of forget that. That's a, that's a mistake on my part because there's been all these proxy wars in the Middle east where it's Iran versus Saudi and you mentioned one with Yemen, which is effectively, that's what that's been. So as it relates to the current protests. Like what? You know, we focus on the U.S. israel and Iran with this and I guess a little bit of Qatar. Are the Saudis playing some roles right now as to what's going on in Iran?

[B]

And also so very interesting what has happened in the region now. So, you know, the Saudis and the Iranians long standing competition. The Saudis always during the time of the Shah felt that the Iranians were, you know, very arrogant against them and treated them as, you know, quite inferior and without there's some justification for some of their criticisms. But then when the revolution happens, it actually becomes much worse because now the Shah viewed himself as the superpower of the region. And he had convinced Richard Nixon to exit the region militarily and let Iran essentially take care of the security of the region of the Persian Gulf. And Saudi Arabia was like a junior partner in that. It was called a twin pillar policy, but was really just an Iranian pillar to it. By the time the Khomeini government comes in and during the Islamic Republic, they actually take on a very hostile position towards the Saudis. They want to overthrow all of the kingdoms. They had overthrown their monarchy and it was Iran that was the regime change advocate back then. And they wanted to overthrow all of the kingdoms. And they particularly targeted Saudi Arabia because Saudi also was a US ally and Saudi was the center of Islam because that's where Mecca and Medina are. So Khomeini goes on constant attack. He accuses the Saudis of practicing American Islam. So this was really the deepest American Islam. It was like the deepest insult, essentially saying you're not legitimate, you're not the legitimate leader of the Islamic world. So things are really bad. And the Saudis, mayor of Minneapolis and you know, the Saudis together with the Kuwaitis and others were funding all of Saddam's military expenses. So it was really most of the GCC and at war with Iran indirectly during that war. But then they had their ups and downs. Now we're in one of their ups since 2022. Guess who? The Chinese mediated and got a normalization agreement between the two sides. A lot of legwork had been done by Oman and Iraq, but the last 10% of the distance was taken by the Chinese. And this is the first time the Chinese step into the mediation game in the Middle East. Yeah. And it freaked out the US righteously.

[A]

So actually.

[B]

But now given that, that has really reduced tensions between Iran and the Saudis, reduced tensions in Yemen. But something else has now happened that has actually pushed the Saudis not close to Iran. But in a way, they're actually very worried about the US Going to war with Iran and really want to avoid it. Not just because of a fear of instability and retaliation and things like that, but because of something else. Give me two minutes to explain this one.

[A]

You take your time, Trina. Just keep this pointed at you, if you don't mind.

[B]

Sure. During the BIDEN Administration, the U.S. really lifted almost all restrictions on Israel and what Israel could do and not do, particularly with US Weapons. And almost all the weapons they use are American weapons. And this has led to a scenario in which what the Israelis allow themselves to do in terms of collateral damage, meaning innocent civilians getting killed, is just completely out of whack. The US Would never follow those guidelines. We cannot do it. We're not allowed to. But we allow the Israelis to use American weapons in a way that we are not even allowed to use ourselves.

[A]

That's kind of strange.

[B]

Well, the Biden administration was like, we have to give Israel whatever they ask for, essentially. And the Biden administration broke U. S. Law on numerous occasions and even lied to Congress about what Israel was doing.

[A]

They lied to Congress.

[B]

Anthony Blinken lied to Congress about internal reports and State Department of the assessment of what the Israelis were doing. And internally in the. In the building, they knew what was going on. They had written the reports. Blinken and the leadership refused to publish them, and then lied to Congress about what actually the report said.

[A]

Now, why all of this not being.

[B]

Oh, it's out there. It's just that we live in a world where it's like there's five scandals a day. You know, 20 years ago, that would be the scandal of the entire year.

[A]

And nobody to root for.

[B]

Yeah, this is hardly a weakness at this point. This then led to a scenario, and let me give you examples, actually. I think it's quite helpful to see how much the US has changed in terms of what it permits Israel to do or not. In 2004, the Israelis assassinated the head of Hamas, the founder of Hamas, Sheikh Yassin. He was in a wheelchair. They struck his. The place that he was at, and killed about nine other family members. The Bush administration rebuked Israel publicly for this because of a high number of civilian casualties. Collateral damage.

[A]

Bush did, Bush did.

[B]

Dick Cheney was in that White House. Just want to, as a reminder, was he aware that they did that in 2006 also Bush. Israel and Hezbollah have this war. On two occasions, the Israelis tried to assassinate Hezbollah's leader, Nasrallah, and they struck his bunker but couldn't get through not because he didn't have, but because the U. S. Would not allow them to use the weapons that could blow up the bunker. Not because they didn't want to stop the Israelis, but because the damage that it would do to the entire neighborhood and all the collateral damage. So twice they tried, but with the limited amount they could, but they failed. Bush 2024, the Israelis assassinate Nasrallah.

[A]

Right.

[B]

Blow up his bunker using 82,000 pound bombs. Kill probably another 3 to 500 people in that entire neighborhood. Yeah. And they get a congratulatory note publicly from the Biden administration. So just see the distance. A rebuke for nine deaths to a congratulation for something around 3 to 500.

[A]

You want to go kill someone who's listed as a terrorist and you know, could be agreed upon by other countries as a terrorist. Okay. That's where I run into the issue though, how you do it. My buddy Brandon Buckingham, I don't know if you've ever seen his channel, he does all kinds of documentaries, but he was supposed to go to India for. I don't even know what the. It was for some documentary. This is late summer, 2024, I want to say. And basically he's halfway. He's on his leg flight there and then something goes wrong with the visa, so he can't get into Israel or into India. And so he's like, well, I'm already out here halfway around the world. Let me find a place to go. Goes to Lebanon, happens to go the week where the bombing starts.

[B]

So. So what year is this?

[A]

This is 2024.

[B]

Wow. He doesn't follow the news or.

[A]

Well, he does, but like he gets there and the bombing starts and you know, his dad's like hitting him up like you're. Your girl is pregnant, like you need to get home, like the whole bit. But he, Brandon, is about being on the ground. So he does this amazing like hour and 20 minute documentary interviews. All kinds of Lebanese civilians on the ground. Just very nuanced and you know, real like a great human piece. All of them are dead. All of them. They're all gone. Yeah, it's a relic already. It's not even a year and a half old.

[B]

Yeah.

[A]

And that's where. And I don't care who it is, like my country did it too, in, in Iraq. I don't care what country it is. I will always call it out like the collateral damage that not the tip of the spear, but the suits in back rooms order to happen. This is how you create the next generation. Of quote, unquote, terrorists.

[B]

Yeah, absolutely. Again, and we have norms around this, what can, what is permitted and what is not permitted. And the Biden administration completely lifted all of those and allowed Israel. I mean, that's part of the reason. I mean, like, bombing hospital. Doesn't matter if you think or if there even was Hamas. There's still not a single piece of evidence that there was. That there was what, a Hamas cell underneath the hospitals.

[A]

There's no evidence of that.

[B]

There's no evidence of that. But even if it's still not permitted, I mean, there's international laws quite clear on these different things. Right. But they lifted all of those restrictions. Now, that led to an Israel that just felt completely unrestricted and unhinged. In the last two and a half years, they've bombed seven countries in the region. One of those countries is a strong US Ally, Qatar, who hosted Hamas because the US Asked him to host Hamas.

[A]

Did you see the picture of the phone call in the Oval Office when.

[B]

Trump made Netanyahu, made him apologize. We'll get to that. Let's see what happened up until that point. Qatar's air defense systems are all American because the US has one of its largest bases in Doha, right outside of Doha. Didn't even get activated. So now put yourself. Yeah, didn't even get activated to get activated. Israelis hit, they failed to kill the people that they were trying to kill, but they were there to negotiate the latest version of the release of the hostages and the Israeli strike. So you're sitting in the region. Let's say you're Saudi Arabia. Your entire security is in the hands of the United States. Right. You put all of your security eggs in that basket. And as much as you needed that because you had an enmity with Iran and you needed American protection from Iran in the back of your head, it was also, it's always good to have that relationship with the United States because that is a protection against Israel if anything ever goes wrong. Right. But now the United States, like, well, Israel can do whatever he wants. It can even bomb a country that we formally are supposed to protect or inform and supposed to protect. And we have our base there. And the system apparently doesn't even get activated when the Israelis do it. So what do you do in that scenario? Well, you start to realize you can't have all your security eggs in one basket. You need to diversify. You can't completely rely on the US So a couple of weeks later, announcement that there's a pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and Pakistan will Provide Saudi Arabia with a nuclear umbrella.

[A]

With a nuclear umbrella umbrella, because the.

[B]

Pakistanis have nuclear weapons. Right. At the same time, you start to think, well, if our alliance with the United States doesn't protect us against Israel, then we need to find some new constellation in the region that can balance against Israel. And though as a result, now you see the Turks, the Saudis, to certain extent, perhaps even the Qataris and the Pakistanis coming together and it's not because they want to have an enmity with Israel, but they need to have their own security and they feel that Israel right now is unhinged. The US Is allowing it to do almost what it wants. Even though you're right, after they did this, after they did this, the entire region went to Trump and complained. And as a result, they had that rebuke. And they even had Netanyahu called Emir from the Oval Office reading from a written apology. And in the back of that room, I don't know if you notice, there's a Qatari diplomat sitting in the Oval Office to also observe it from this side of the telephone. No other American president has ever done this to Israel. To the best of my knowledge. There's a huge difference between Trump and Biden in the sense that I think a lot of things that Trump is doing right now in terms of border, peace, etc is also highly, highly problematic. But we saw no pressure from Biden at all on Israel after October 7th. Just nothing. Now, where does Iran fit in all of this? Well, Iran is not part of that constellation, formally between Saudi, Pakistan, Turkey, but informally it is a buffer between Israel and these states. If there is a war and the United States completely defeats Iran, the Israelis bomb Iran, it's either chaos or a very weakened Iran or perhaps even a pro Israel puppets that is installed in Iran. From the standpoint of these countries who otherwise have no love for the Islamic Republic and have no reason to have love for Islamic Republic, it's actually a very bad development because this then strengthens the Israeli position vis a vis them. They see Israel now. They explicitly say that Israel is seeking regional hegemony and Iran is a buffer between them and the Israelis here. And this is part of the reason why these states have taken such a strong position in trying to prevent the war that is being that we're marching towards right now. It's not just because of the instability that's there. It's not just because of risk of a civil war spilling over that's there. It's not just because of the refugee flows that's there. But that was always there at a moment when some of them even were in favor of a war. The reason why they're all now against the war is because of this new geopolitical scenario that has been created in which they need Yvonne as a buffer. Not as a partner, not an ally, but as a buffer.

[A]

Almost like the. Almost like the hostage negotiator in a way. You know, that. Like in those old Westerns where one side sends a guy to just sit with the other side while they're actually over here negotiating. And that guy is just like playing cards, but if it goes bad, he gets shot.

[B]

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[A]

It's kind of like Iran's.

[B]

That.

[A]

That's interesting. Yeah. Not to make light of it, I. I know that is obviously extremely personal, but nonetheless, that's.

[B]

That's.

[A]

I. I didn't realize that scenario at all. That's why I bring in people like you. I learned this stuff. You got your finger on the pulse. But what, you know, I. I got off it.

[B]

There's.

[A]

There's something I did want to go back to at. At the initial history you had said. You remember the conversation you had with your dad when you said goodbye to him when he was going back?

[B]

Yeah, we were at the airport.

[A]

Did you have. I mean, you're four and a half years old. Did you have any concept whatsoever of what he was doing?

[B]

No, not then. Not at all. I mean, look, it's very important to make distinction between economic refugees and political refugees. If you're an economic refugee, or refugee might be the wrong word, but if you're migrating to another country for economic reasons, you're actually deliberately trying to start a new life in another country. You're going there. You are consciously saying goodbye to the old country, and you're openly embracing the new country.

[A]

Ellis Island.

[B]

Exactly. Exactly. I mean, they're coming in. They're Americans. They come here because they want to be Americans. Right. When you're a political refugee, you're involuntarily leaving a place, and oftentimes, mentally, you're still there, and you're just waiting with the suitcase packed underneath your bed to go back. Right. Because you didn't come to this place to actually stay. You didn't come here to make a new life. You came here temporarily because the situation is bad, and then you're planning a return. When you have that mentality, I think one of the things that comes with it is that both me and my brother, who's two years older than me, you know, we weren't just. We Weren't told, oh, we're going to be here forever. You know, we were told explicitly, no, this is just something we have to do. We're going to go back to Iran. Right? Because that was the plan, that was the intent. It didn't end up happening that way at all. And it's been 47 years now. But given that, you actually become much more aware of what is going around. Add to that another aspect that is perhaps a bit unique to Sweden. So Sweden was extremely generous in terms of having a very open policy for refugees. So it was a very open country, took in a lot of refugees from countries that had wars. So the folks I grew up with in what was then essentially the immigrant ghettos of Sweden were from Chile who had fled 1973 because of the coup against Allende, which also incidentally, CIA coup. That one too? Well, yeah, when in Rome, the other Romans, other refugees from other war zones, all of us had similar stories. So that was a normal thing, you know, so we were not like the different ones. And as a result, we kind of kept it below the radar. Everyone had stories like this, everyone had fled some sort of a war. So it was just a very natural thing. So it wasn't hush hush. It wasn't something that was kept away from you because everyone else in your surrounding, whether they were Iranians or Chileans or from whatever other country they were, had the same story, more or less.

[A]

As you were growing up, did you. I mean, first of all, do you remember anything from Iran?

[B]

I do. And it's interesting. I apparently remember more than my brother, who's a year and a half, two years older than me. So I have a lot of vivid memories from about two and a half. And I remember very vividly my dad had left before us to just settle, you know, make everything clear in Sweden before we came and things got really bad in Iran and we had to go to the embassy several times and my mom had to bring me with him because we couldn't get the documents unless I was president, even though I was just four years old. And I remember, you know, the soldiers, I remember we were shot at at one point and, you know, more in the air, I think, to disperse the crowd. And I got separated from my mother at one point, etc. I don't remember exactly how we got reunited, but yes, I remember because it was a lot of traumatic, traumatic things that happened. Again, don't want to overplay it. People have had way worse stories than this, but I do remember it.

[A]

As you were growing up, though, you know, because it's impossible for me to relate to a situation like this when I have conversations like this. It's another, like, important reminder of, like, how happy I am to be born where I was born. It's like winning the lottery. You know, we didn't. We haven't had to deal with this kind of stuff here, and. And, you know, that's such a lucky thing. But as you're growing up and you only have limited memories, and you were only in Iran for short time, and your reality is you're growing up in Sweden and you're growing up around a lot of different people from a lot of different places as well. Was there, you know, did you naturally develop a real yearning and feeling about your Iranian roots? Or was that something also your parents kind of had to, like, ingrain in you and remind you of what that was because they understood it fully?

[B]

So it goes back. I think it's a great question. I think it's also something that might be useful for your audience because the United States is truly very different in this sense than growing up in Europe. And I don't want to knock, Sweden had a fantastic upbringing there. It's a great country, but it is very different. First of all, going back to what I said, because we were not economic migrants, we were involuntarily leaving and had no plans to stay. The Iranian identity was actually very strong because there was no active effort to become Swedes. That wasn't the plan. There was no reason to do that. In fact, I don't think I even applied for Swedish citizenship until 15 years after having lived in Sweden, even though I probably could have after a couple of years. So that was partly. But there's also another aspect, I think, which is the difference between Europe and the United States. I came here as an Exchange student in 1991, and I had visited the US several times. Loved the US had family members who lived there. And it was quite an eye opener for me, because you step in, you step off the plane, not only do you feel like an American, you're treated like an American. Right now I have Middle Eastern features, and I can tell you in Belmont County, Ohio, that was quite unusual. But still, it wasn't like, oh, it must be because you're foreigner. I mean, you were not treated differently. But my features in blonde blue eyes, Sweden really stick out, right? And you were never really treated, at least not when I was growing up as a Swede, you were always treated as if you were an outsider. Not necessarily in a hostile way, but nevertheless, it was always there. Things may have changed, but I haven't been in Sweden or lived in Sweden for 25 years. It may have changed, but it meant that. That for us who grew up there, at least in that generation, we kind of felt rejected by Swedish society. We were outside society, which then meant that we then kind of embraced our other identity even stronger as a result. And I noticed that when coming into the US and meeting other Iranians here, etcetera, That I felt like, okay, they clearly had something different. They had a very strong American identity. You would not have found that in Sweden with a lot of people having a lot of Iranians having a very strong Swedish identity, at least not back when I grew up. Maybe changed now because it's, you know, time has passed, et cetera. But there is something about this country that really embraces you. At least when I came here. I can't speak about the recent folks that have arrived and the sense that you're actually automatically assumed to be American in a way that never was the case. And those are some of the factors actually led to a stronger identity because you're rejected by that one, so you double down on the other one.

[A]

That's. And that's. That's also a great point because we take that for granted here. You know, outside the studio, I have a picture of Bill the Butcher from Gangs in New York.

[B]

Yeah. Yeah.

[A]

See that movie?

[B]

Yeah.

[A]

So I think about that a lot because that takes place in, like, the Civil War years in America, in New York City, where there was much more of, like, one kind of Anglo identity in America. It's just before the immigration surge starts.

[B]

Yeah.

[A]

And they would recognize the Irish as, like, outsiders. You're not from here. And it's just crazy to think about, especially in New York, like, ground zero for this. Twenty years later, you have people from every country around the world coming in, which has created this melting pot, which I think is a beautiful thing in this country, to the point that when people come here and are, like, excited to be here and become a part of society and all that, like, there's a lot of places that are like, oh, cool. It's just normal, because we don't have that. I'm not even blaming the sweets. Like, they know the identity.

[B]

Yeah.

[A]

You know what I mean?

[B]

To their defense, there were never any major refugee flows to that northern part of the world until about 50 years ago.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

Right. There was. So the type of. Of cultural traits that you develop when you are a melting pot or when you're a country like Iran that had the Silk Road go through it and you had armies from 50 different directions coming in and out. Just creates a different type of culture. But if you're kind of isolated up in the north, you can't blame them for not necessarily having that naturally. Can I ask you, are you Irish or Italian or Both? Both. Okay.

[A]

50. 50.

[B]

50. 50. Okay.

[A]

You're in New Jersey. It's on.

[B]

Yeah, exactly. I mean, normal thing.

[A]

Yeah, yeah. That's funny you asked that. But what.

[B]

So I was kind of both, right?

[A]

Yes, absolutely. Another thing I've been thinking all day, I forgot to ask you, like, since 1989, it's been Kameni, who's been the Supreme Leader. I want to get to that in a minute. Khomeini, the original Ayatollah until 1989, who came in and did the revolution. What made him so charismatic and true people to him, other than him, you know, yelling shah bad.

[B]

Well, because he yelled much more than that. Yeah. First of all, one thing that oftentimes is not understood in the United States or something that is understood, it's just not known, is that these ayatollahs have written like 50 books. You don't become an Ayatollah without having like huge. I mean, it's similar to like a pope. Right.

[A]

Are they good?

[B]

I haven't read a single one, so I won't judge. But. But they don't go up in rank, just random.

[A]

Yes, right.

[B]

I mean, same thing with the Pope. You have to have a tremendous amount of frankly scholarly work in order to be able to advance to that position. And one of the things he had done is that he had developed a theory that is called a completely different political system in which you have a spiritual leader, an ayatollah at the top. And there were a lot of different lines of political thinking back in the 60s and 70s during, within the opposition, you had some people who also wanted to some sort of a return back to Islam, but it was more of a political or it's a different approach to it. Then you had the leftists who, you know, were more on the Marxist side. You know, they didn't really give much space to religion, etc. But he emerges as someone who is extremely strong, principled, one of the first to really call out the Shah. Several ayatollahs were actually kind of collaborating with the Shah that had kind of been co opted or bought. I mean, they were not naturally opposed. I mean, at the end of the day, so it's important to understand that. But he's Just relentless in his criticism. When the US signs the SOFA agreement with Iran, 1963, the Status of Forces Agreement, which essentially puts US personnel in Iran above Iranian law, that's what the Sulfa agreements do. I mean, this is what the Obama administration wanted in Iraq. Didn't manage to get it because the Iranians intervened and pushed Iraqis not to sign it. And that actually ultimately helped Obama withdraw troops from Iraq. Because if U. S. Troops were going to be treated on the Iraqi law, you know, it doesn't make occupation that attractive any longer. Longer.

[A]

Right, right.

[B]

The Shah signed that thing and he just went at the shah saying that, you know this. The Shah is the American shah. He's, he's a servant of the Americans. This is not a nationalist shah, etc. So he increasingly emerges, even though he had his huge critics and a lot of different folks that were against him very much as the one that just is this type of uncompromising Ayatollah against the Shah that kind of exudes the type of strength people wanted. And by the way, it's also important to understand he held his cards very tight. He did not reveal really what he was planning to do. Look at some of those revolutionary demonstrations against the Shah. The women did not have the hijab on. In fact, it took another six months before he actually pushed that through and there were massive protests against that. So what he promised would come is not at all what the Islamic Republic.

[A]

Yeah, he used the leftists in a lot of cases.

[B]

Absolutely, absolutely.

[A]

Now you said like six months right there as an example of when he, after he came in, started now saying like, oh, by the way, we're doing jobs and hardcore like Islamic law. But when would you say the majority of society, how long before the majority of society had quietly, silently, I might say, turned against him? Was that within a year or two or did that take a decade?

[B]

Look, the Islamic Republic had huge problems from the beginning. You know, you had opposition groups that were pushed out. But then you also had Saddam Hussein invading the country. And in many ways it ended up becoming a blessing for this blessing, yes, because the country completely rallies around the flag. What's most important is to expel the invader.

[A]

Common enemy.

[B]

Common enemy. And in many ways it postponed a lot of the other internal contradictions of the Islamic Republic for a decade almost. It's not clear to me at all that the Islamic Republic would have survived by 1982 had it not been for Saddam's invasion. And so by the time the war ends, you both have a devastated country, a revolution that is a complete failure because it's not delivered. You know, I mean, Iran is in ruins after that war. But you also have people who now have invested so heavily in this. It's not just a revolution. Their children died defending the country. Right. So amongst the supporters of the Islamic Republic, the war profoundly deepened their support because they had now sacrificed so much for it. It was just so much more difficult to walk away from something you had such a high sun cost. By the end of that decade, something else had changed. First of all, Khomeini was now gone. So there was politics in Iran in a different way, because Khamenei did not replace Khomeini as that type of a unquestioned ruler.

[A]

Oh, he didn't.

[B]

He was actually quite weak. He didn't even have the religious credentials fully. He wasn't ayatollah at the time that he was elevated to that position.

[A]

Oh, I didn't know that.

[B]

He was a rank below. He was a compromise candidate at the end of the day. And the elements that were pushing for him were. Did so because they thought that they could take advantage of him because he was weaker. Over time, it turned out to be the other way around. He actually grew, really consolidated his own power, but he was constantly challenged. And by the end of the 1990s, 1997, something happened that was really a shock. There was an election, the presidential elections, and this former head of the state library and a minister of culture of the Rafsanjani government decides that he's throwing his hat in the ring. That guardian council that I mentioned allowed him to probably thinking that he won't win, but it will give the air of legitimacy for the elections and perhaps even push up voter participation without obviously undermining the favored conservative. But no, instead you had, I think, 79% voter participation, and the guy overwhelmingly won in the first round. And it was because he's a reformist. And he was saying that the system has to reform, has to change, and that's the beginning of that reform movement that now essentially is more or less dead.

[A]

How did they kill it?

[B]

As we talked earlier on, they failed in many different ways. But also in my view, in my book, the Trump administration walking out of the JCPOA killed the one critical achievement they had. That was the key to the other achievements. Few people thought that. I mean, if you listen to the conventional wisdom in Washington, some of the criticism against the negotiation was like, the Iranians will never negotiate. Well, then the Iranians showed up and they're like, well, they will never negotiate. Honestly, well, progress was made. Well, they will never agree to a deal. It's just not possible for the Islamic Republic to agree to a deal. Then they agreed to a deal. They were like, well, they're never going to actually live up to the agreement. They will cheat. Well, 14 reports by the IAEA, who was the body that was inspecting the adherence to the agreement, to say that they were doing everything they had to do. Several reports by the U.S. state Department, twice under the Trump administration itself, certifying that the Iranians were living up to the agreement. People thought this was impossible, but it was possible. But it was key to then unlocking the economic disaster that Iran was in and be able to, as I mentioned, strengthen the middle class, slowly but surely grow. And over time, Iran could have imperfectly, in a way that is not perhaps in any way, shape or form identical, but move kind of like China. China still has a Communist Party, but there's nothing communist about the Chinese economic system at all. In any way, shape or form is a complete market economy, but the government controls all the government controls. Exactly.

[A]

That's, that's pretty.

[B]

So you don't have that type of a political liberalization. So that is one path that some people wanted to go. And other elements from the reformers didn't believe that that was ever possible in Iran, that there could not be such a thing as pull as economic liberalization without the political liberalization following suit. But as long as there's no economic liberalization, the options, the opportunities, the chances, the window for the political liberation, liberal liberalization also just completely closed.

[A]

Yeah, I didn't realize the timeline was that long, by the way, because when you said this reform election happened in 1997, I'm assuming that that was a different reform than you were talking about earlier. And you're saying it's the same thing.

[B]

Which it's the same movements. And you know, in 1998, a year after or just months into his election, he gives his presidency. Khatami gives this historic interview to Christiane Amanpour of cnn, who's herself half Iranian, grew up in Iran, half British, half Iranian, in which he says that the wall of mistrust between the United States and Iran needs to be tear down, that he wants to have a dialogue. He quotes Alex de Tocqueville and knows a lot about US history, etc, and there was actually quite a lot of excitement in the Clinton administration at the time as well, that, okay, this is great, let's pursue this. And then because of problems on the Iranian side, they actually don't go down the path in the manner that they could have and should have. They did some things when the United states suffered from 9, 11, not too far away from here. And it became clear that this was done by Al Qaeda. And this was planned out of. Well, it was partly planned out of Afghanistan with the Taliban government giving Al Qaeda space to be there. The Iranians had already been in indirect war with the Taliban for about 7, 8 years. The Iranians were the ones that were arming and training the Northern alliance and standing up against the Taliban taking over the entire country. Country. So the US Actually deals with Iran. And there's both during the war in which the Iranians were complaining to the US that you're not bombing the right places in Afghanistan, while incidentally, Ayatollah Khamenei was giving Friday speeches condemning the United States for bombing another Muslim country. So the, the dock double games in politics, you know, you have to just understand that they're there. But then after the Taliban was defeated, the much tougher task came, which was, okay, how do we make sure that Afghanistan is stable and it has a new government and a new constitution? Then the Bush administration and the Iranian government completely coordinated the Bonn conference in Germany that got the Afghan groups together and got the them to finally agree to a new constitution that established the Karzai government. And the US Actually didn't have the relations or the trust with any of the Afghan parties from the Northern Alliance. Iran had them. And according to Jim Dobbins, the late Jim Dobbins, who was Reagan's. Sorry, who was George W. Bush's representative there and led the negotiations, none of this was possible had it not been for the help that the Iranians gave the United States at the time. And the Iranians did so as part of the reform project. The calculation being if Iran shows itself to be strategically useful to United States over here, then that can pave the way for an opening between the US And Iran. On other issues, what the Iranians didn't know was that the Bush administration had made a decision was called the Hadley Rule in the nsc, which was that within the war on terror, it was permissible for the United States to collaborate with an enemy state tactically, but not allow that tactical collaboration translate into a strategic change in relations, meaning you work with them, but not with the intent of actually improving relations. You're not allowing this. So six weeks. Six weeks. About six weeks after the bond conference. Five weeks. Bond conference was December 10, 2001. January, State of the Union speech of George W. Bush. I think was in last week of January. Remember what he said in that speech? He said there is an axis of evil. Iran, North Korea and Iraq. So after all that collaboration, the Iranians got themselves into the axis of evil. And then you had another down. So look, there's been this dance up and down. There's been moments where the US actually have done tremendous outreach and the Iranians have not responded or they betrayed their words. And there's been the opposite. The biggest one though, the one that actually is a written, negotiated agreement was the jcpa.

[A]

Now, what is the balance of power? I don't know if you can like put a percentage on it. Oh yeah, can we get water?

[B]

Sorry about. Thanks, man.

[A]

I don't know if you could put percentages on each part. But like what is the balance of, of power you would say in the government? Meaning you have the Supreme Leader, you have the President. And then I'm going to combine a lot of things. You have the legislative body. Like, you know, does the Supreme Leader have 70%, say the president's got 20 and legislators got 10, or does it vary?

[B]

It varies with the individuals. The current president by design, does not even want to have much. He's just want to work in tandem with the Supreme Leader. So he's really not a particularly important figure. The previous president was the one before him, unfortunately was as well. And that was Ahmadinejad, who did all kinds of crazy things. So it worries. It's not a very set system in the sense that the institutions are crucial. The institutions are there, they're not unimportant. But the personalities within the institutions are even more important. And we are now in a situation in which Khamenei, the Supreme Leader has managed to really wrap everything around his finger.

[A]

Right? That's what it feels like. Yeah.

[B]

And he is in a much, much stronger position than he was 10 years ago. And those who. And this is part of the reason why, again, why there's a belief that the reform project failed. And if you're a young Iranian, right. Like if you weren't at 20 year olds, I totally understand why they're like, we don't bother with reform. We saw it fail for 20 years. Why would we waste another 20 years on that? No, no, we want revolution and we want it now. And we're going to do what our not parents, but perhaps our grandparents didn't just ask for revolution instead of asking for reform.

[A]

Right.

[B]

Totally understand that if you have 60 years ahead of your life and this reform process hasn't gone anywhere, it's totally Understandable that we're like, no, we don't have time for this. We need change right now.

[A]

But it's interesting that, like, when even like Netanyahu will give a speech as it relates directly to Iran. And there's all kinds, obviously, like blocks that they put on the Internet and stuff. But when, I guess like the Israelis and Americans work to get speeches like that into the country so people can see it, you'll. You'll hear about numbers like 20 million Iranians tune into this speech just because it's one issue, like, oh, well, he wants to overthrow the regime, and we want that too. So, like, you know, the impetus for it is there. But I want to take a step back to the 2002 protests for a minute because I remember 22, 20. I'm sorry, 2022. I remember, like I was doing this show during that time. I was talking to some people about this. Like, this feels a little different. And then it kind of died off. So just starting there for a second, why did that. Why did that not go through? And how on the ground was like CIA and Mossad at the time, I assume obviously not enough.

[B]

So look, the first thing I think one has to remember when. Look, and I'm not an expert on revolutions, my brother actually is. Is a researcher on this topic and knows much more than me. First thing you have to accept, revolutions are extremely rare, and they're extremely rare for good reason. It is not enough just to be angry. It's not enough to have a huge amount of people being really, really angry. That in and of itself does not bring about a revolution. It is oftentimes a necessary requirement, but it is not a sufficient requirement. You have a tremendous amount of anger, and you did have that in 2022. And perhaps important to go back, you had this Iranian woman who was visiting Tehran from her own hometown, gets called in by the morality police accusing her of not having worn her hijab properly, and then ends up getting killed in custody. Different stories. The police said there was an accident, but clearly she was beaten up one way or another. And she. She was killed, died. And it just captured the country's imagination because she didn't die right away. She was hospitalized in a coma. And people for following that story, and they were very upset about this happening. And then she passes. And then you have protests that are starting to bubble up in several different places. But it looks very different from 2009 and other protests. First of all, these one were also more middle class, whereas in 2017, you had more of a Poorer classes really rising up. So this was not as economically driven at all. This was clearly more political. But this was the first time that the protesters really, well, not the first time, but at least from the middle class to really come out, protest and completely reject the reformists. They were not looking towards the reformist leaders as their options, as their candidates. They were like, no, no, no. We're saying no to all of you. We don't care if you're reformist or if you are in the middle or if you are a hardliner. To us, you're all the same.

[A]

Burn it down, Khan.

[B]

Exactly. And we're not going to fall from their perspective, from the lie of thinking, oh, if we work with the reformers, that's how we get changed. We haven't seen that work out. So we just want the entire political structure to be overthrown. But that then also meant that they didn't have political leaders, because the political leaders that were still tolerated within the system system were the ones who were on the reformer side, many of them in prison. But nevertheless, they were still within that framework some way somehow. But if you're saying no, we're actually going for people who don't want the system at all whatsoever and don't want it reformed, want it to come replaced, then those leaders are not out in the open. And without leadership, it's very difficult to channel the immense energy that existed in the system, in the society, to pressure the government and induce these situations. You actually end up negotiating with the government to get rid of it or whatever the end result is. But they couldn't do that because they didn't have leadership. And there were justifications for saying, you know, it's better not to have. We're going to have a leaderless revolution. There's no such thing. Because what happens is that there is a leadership vacuum. And that leadership vacuum ended up to a large extent, being filled by elements on the outside. And those elements, most of them from the outset, pursued a different agenda. Yes, they agreed on the core thing. No more reform, just get rid of the system as a whole. But look what they were also calling for. They were calling for more sanctions on Iran. I didn't see a single protest back then asking for more sanctions. The population has suffered tremendously from sanctions and you can hate the regime immensely. Max, you still hate the sanctions. You're not seeing the sanctions helping you. But they were pushing for sanctions. They were pushing for Iran to get kicked out of the World cup in soccer. One of the few elements of joy that the population still have. Again, I never saw anyone inside in a meaningful numbers, but I didn't frankly see anyone call for that. Right, so you had elements on the outside, exiled opposition groups, many of them have been away from Iran for 40 years, pushing, taking advantage of that leadership vacuum, in my view, and I'll get shit for it in your comment section. I don't think any of them, frankly, have shown themselves to be democratic. And part of the reason why that is crucial, it's not just because you need to show your democratic behavior to win support from inside the country and get defections, but it's also something you need to do to build coalitions. There was an effort to build a coalition. They got six of them together at Georgetown University. Within five weeks. They were fighting each other at each other's throats. And it was an embarrassment and it actually really disillusioned a lot of the people inside the country that were hoping that the diaspora would be able to do something useful. Gotta be able to agree. Yeah, but if you don't, if you're, if You've spent your 45 years in the United States and you haven't picked up any democratic line of thinking.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

Then you're not an answer. You're part of the problem, in my view.

[A]

I think you're right about that.

[B]

I mean, it's one thing if you say that someone grew up in a terrible dictatorial, communist, whatever type of a system and you're not surrounded with it. I'm not saying our democracy is perfect and sure as hell it has a lot of issues right now, and I'm very worried, but nevertheless, it's a democratic system with flaws, like all of them do. And if you've been here for that long and not picked up from that, then you must have almost actively tried to not become more democratic. And that's unfortunately the reality. And if, and it's, you know, it's not an insult from my end, it's just an assessment because if it was, that coalition would have ended up working out. But it didn't. It didn't even last five weeks.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

And now you have all of the. I don't know if you've seen some of these protests that are taking place outside the country with different opposition figures or groupings actually fighting each other, etc. This is very demoralizing for people inside of Iran who are not in a democratic system.

[A]

Right.

[B]

We're hoping that people who actually have the maneuverability be able to take that with far greater responsibility than what we've seen now.

[A]

Obviously, so that the one in 2022, that's a great explanation by the way, of how that goes away. But we're now seeing some of those same patterns, unfortunately outside of Iran not having solved themselves. But before we get to just these protests that are happening right now real quickly, obviously there was something very important that you alluded to earlier that happened in June where the United States got involved with hitting Florida and some of these other facilities. But my understanding is that this was precipitated. The ability to do this in the initial strikes before that that Israel carried out is because Mossad was able to get a lot of assets on the ground. You know, I would think that Iran is, and the IRGC are, you know, almost like 1984, looking for any type of Israeli influence that could be happening in their society. How were they able to, to get so many different agents available to, to get them intelligence to pull off? You know, I have to say it was very well, well executed strikes.

[B]

So it's a very important question because the Israeli intelligence penetration of Iran is beyond anything anyone had envisioned or expected. It took, I think everyone by surprise. It certainly must have taken the Iranian government by surprise because if they knew this, then it's, you know, even more incompetence. The first absolutely essential circumstance is that you have to have a very large critical mass of people that are so upset and angry and pissed off at the government that they're willing to consider because you need to have a huge number of people that have that sentiment to get a very small number of them to be willing to be flipped. Right, right. Of those, that huge amount, probably not even 97 would he be even willing to consider it. But to make sure that that 3,000, that 3% is large enough that you actually could make the connections and everything else, the original pool has to be very large. And that can then comes back to divining government that their treatment of the people have just been so poor they have produced people willing to be assets for a foreign government inside their own, including actually helping them militarily. So this is ultimately on the Iranian government itself, would you say? And in the meantime, incidentally, I have to say I've not been able to go back to Iran. I can't go back. They made it very clear I would be taken, I would be accused of being a CIA spy if I go to Iran and you see all of these dual citizen Iranians who have been taken, so they go after them, whereas in reality there's just been this massive penetration. So there's the, the intelligence failure on the Iranian side is far beyond the Israeli intelligence failure on October 7th. And so the. The Israelis themselves have openly spoken about how they've done some of these things. I. I'm just going to repeat to you what I've read. This is not my area of intelligence, of expertise. I'm not an intelligence person in any shape or form. And I'll also start off by saying, I don't know if this is what they're saying publicly, because it's true, or if it's actually part of the communications. Sorry, the. The psychological warfare between them. But what is said there is that the Mossad has various different ways of winning people over. And it's a long process. Starts off with small things that they asked him to do by offering them favors. The two most common ones, as I. If I remember correctly, is someone has a family member that needs medical help, they offer to be able to take that person out of the country for treatment in Switzerland or whatever. That's one. The other one promise of making sure you get into a good Canadian or American or other Western in university, and that way you win over some young people. But even then, the success rate, I don't know what it is, but it's not so that everyone that they try, they succeed is probably relatively low, but the pool has to be large.

[A]

Yeah. They're throwing a lot of fish hooks out there.

[B]

Yeah. And a lot of them have their own motivation. They have been so mistreated by the Islamic Republic. This is revenge they think that they're doing. In their mind, they're doing something very patriotic, in my view. I understand that they think so. I don't think so, because I think there's a larger geopolitical dimension in which these are rival states and Israel is not looking out for Iran's best interest, and Iran is not looking out for any of the. You know, there's plenty of Israelis that are also being caught spying for Iran in Israel. Really? Oh, yes. Absolutely. Nowhere near what the Israelis have managed to do in Iran.

[A]

That's.

[B]

But there's a lot of that as well. And they may think that they're being patriarchal. I have no idea what they're thinking. But bottom line, Iran is not looking for Israel's best interest, nor is Israel looking for Iran's best. It's just not the way.

[A]

It's a game.

[B]

Yeah. I mean, geopolitics is not a game of charity.

[A]

Right.

[B]

Right. It's a game of competition. But anyways, they're so upset, in their view the only real enemy is Islamic republics if they're willing going this direction. What the Israeli story is is that they extracted a lot of these people out of the country, trained them, and then three days before the attack they slipped them back in.

[A]

How?

[B]

Through border. Iran's borders are massive. Just the border with Iraq and Kurdistan is, is very, very long, mountainous. Tremendous amount of smuggling taking place. Very, very difficult to keep safe. Same thing is true of the border to the east. They get them back in and then as the war starts, they have whatever orders, etc. But what we saw happening there is that a lot of the attacks actually were not done by Israeli F35s or American F35 flown by Israelis getting into Iranian airspace. They were either outside of Iranian airspace and shooting their missiles or these cells had smuggled in components of drones, had spent the three days assembling them inside the country and the attacks actually took place from inside the country. We saw the Ukrainians pull that off in deep in Russia as well. Those drones did not fly from Ukraine to Russia deep in. They were smuggled in, assembled and then flown a short distance from within Russia. Same thing was done, but probably on a much larger scale by the Israelis inside of Iran. Using Iranian defectors to get this many.

[A]

Though, and to be able to flip people, I mean, I'd say it's pretty safe to say, no pun intended. That means that Mossad has been able to develop plenty of their own undercover people within the country and have safe houses within Iran.

[B]

Even before all of this. They did this right. In fact, it's kind of interesting. The Israelis had the best intelligence in Iran back during the time of the Shah.

[A]

Yeah, they knew it was happening.

[B]

They knew what was happening. The reason for this was the Shah was very untrustworthy of the United States, did not allow the CIA to roam around freely. It was a very limited number of people the CIA could be in touch with. Is part of the reason why the US actually was really taken by surprise by the depth of unhappiness and was taken by surprise by the revolution as a whole. The Israeli source of intelligence was not spies. It was at the time, hundred ten thousand strong Iranian Jewish community who traveled extensively back and forth between Israel and Iran and as a result had a much better sense of what was going on inside the country. It's very interesting. When the revolution happened, the Israelis knew this. They saw it coming, they warned the U.S. the U.S. didn't take it seriously, didn't listen. And there is a scene I describe in my first book on Iran and Israel the head of Mossad in Israel, in Iran, he was usually actually stationed in Iraq for an operation that the Iranians and the Israelis were conducting against Iraq at the time. His name is Eliezer Safra. He just passed away, 92 or 93 years old, a couple of days ago, actually. He and the defense attache go out to Tehran at Aussadi Square the day when Khomeini returns to the country, and you probably have 2 million people out in the streets. They blend in. They're. I don't know for certain, but I think they're Sephardic Jews. So, I mean, they're. They're Israelis of Middle Eastern background. So they can blend in. They can blend in. And they were just going there and, you know, trying to make sure that these didn't stick out in any way, shape or form. And at one point, a revolutionary comes to them and asked them, why don't you have any signs with the picture of Khomeini? And they're like, well, give us. So they get these signs with Khomeini's pictures and they're sitting there chanting, long live Khomeini and death to Israel. And this is done by the head of Mossad in Iran at the time. They have those cells. They clearly do. It would be malpractice for them not to. This is what states do. The degree of it, again, took everyone by surprise. But this is also part of the reason why, when we see this element, violent element amongst the protest in January 8, Etc. Yes. The Iranians always blame Israel or the US and they say that Israel was behind every protest that have taken place. Sure. So obviously cannot just go by that. But when you have a scenario in which the Israelis are openly admitting on Israeli TV that they're there, that they train the people, etc. When you have the former head of the CIA, Mike Pompeo, tweet the same thing, say good luck to every Iranian protester and every Mossad agent standing next to them. Now we have to recognize two potential scenarios. Scenario one, it's true, they're doing it, and because of the June operations, they don't need their. They don't even bother to try to hide it any longer.

[A]

No.

[B]

Right. Or two, and it could be both. Two, this is exaggerated or perhaps even entirely false, but it's part of the psychological warfare between Iran and Israel. And as a result, they say that. But at a minimum, as an analyst, it's probably both. Probably both, exactly. But at a minimum, as analysts, you can't completely dismiss the likelihood that this is happening just because the Iranian government is saying. Because now the Israeli government is saying it as well. So at least you have to entertain that that likelihood is probably not terribly small.

[A]

Yep. It's actually interesting when you talk about going back to when the Shah was deposed. You ever read Ronan Bergman's book Rise and Kill First? He talks about that, about they were like, hey, guys, this is not going well. The US Is like, everything's fine. And then, yeah, like, oh, whoops, that's interesting.

[B]

And you know, there were people at the US Embassy that were sending warnings.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

And those cables were hidden. They were not allowed. They were stopped. They were not allowed to get all the way to the top. And 140, there's a new book. Forgot what it's called. A historian wrote it. It's very important new information. A lot of in depth interviews with some of those people at the embassy at the time. Oral history.

[A]

If you get it after send it.

[B]

Yeah, yeah, no, I have the book. I have in my Kindle house for you.

[A]

Yeah, cool. Well, where do we go from here, Trita? With what's currently I have to head to the airport. So that's what I'm saying. We're coming right to the end. Where do we go from here? With the current 2026 protests, like, what kind of information are we even able to get out of the country to see what's real and what's not? And like, is this potentially a moment where there's enough cream rising to the top that you could see this thing explode from within?

[B]

I don't think there will be an explosion from within. And now, of course, this is a scenario in which you don't have war and things like that taking place. I do think, however, that the Islamic Republic is increasingly a dead man walking. There's obviously those who are, you know, supportive of the regime and there still are. But I think every time things like this happen, including 2022, by the way, in which a lot of conservatives were like, we want the hijab, but we don't want it to be mandatory. Why on earth are we having a big fight over this? Weakening the country, opening it up for attack, all of these different things, for manipulation, by having the civil war over this issue. This is ridiculous. So I do think that every time this happens and what happened this time around is worse than anything else in terms of, you know, death. Five to seven thousand deaths, perhaps more. I mean, this is just unprecedented. And I think that further just kills amongst their own supporters. And their own supporters are already very Small. I mean, we're talking about a regime that probably is in place because roughly 15 to perhaps 20% of the population is supported, not more. But then you have a plurality who want to see change, but not at any cost. They do not want to see a repeat of 1979. And then you have a growing minority, perhaps a plurality at this point, but I think growing minority who are of the view, no, this is intolerable at any cost. And this is the thing we've seen now lately. We didn't see it even in 2022. We didn't see that. We didn't see any cost for military intervention, for instance, in 2022, from inside the country. You do now, it's impossible for me to make an assessment how, if that's a majority, polarity, whatever, but you have that now in a way that was just simply not the case before. So I think over time, every time they do this, and this is the worst thing they've done, they actually erode the legitimacy. Not amongst the larger population. They don't have much of that to begin with, but even amongst those who actually support it. And so this is not tenable in any way, shape or form. But in my view, it's never been tenable. I never thought the Islamic Republic could survive. The question has always been, how does it fall? And does it fall in a way that actually paves the way for democracy, or does it fall in a way that paves the way for another dictatorship, or even worse, a civil war, et cetera? That question is still unanswered.

[A]

If you were a betting man, do you think in the next five years you'll set foot in Iran?

[B]

I would put it this way. I think within the next five years, this current iteration of the regime will be gone, but most likely it will be replaced with another iteration of the same regime. Other elements of the regime will take power. I mean, remember, taking power means that you have control of the security establishment, etc. To get that to fall, as happened in the Soviet Union, you have to have defections, you have to have. We're just not seeing that. In fact, another thing that the son of the former Shah said that I thought was very clumsy, if he actually wants to get an uprising from the bottom. In an interview with cbs, the anchor asked him. I was actually surprised that they said this. They asked him, you know, do you feel a degree of responsibility? You urge people to go out and protest and thousands got killed. What is your responsibility in all of this? You sitting in. In Maryland, Right. I think It's a fair question.

[A]

It is a fair question.

[B]

You can also have a fair answer. He gave what I thought was a very unwise answer because he said, hey, this is a war, and in war, you have casualties. Well, let's. Let's break that down, first of all, was no expression of empathy and sympathy with the victims. Right? But more importantly, your job in trying to get an entrenched system to collapse is to chip away at its legitimacy and delegitimize it. Now, they have used an excessive amount of force. You have to delegitimize the use of force by you calling it a war. And that war has casualties. You indirectly legitimize it, because if it's a war for you, then it's a war for them. And if it's a war for them, then they're going to act as if it's a war. And in war, according to reservality, they're casualties. That's just such an unwise answer. For someone who says that he's been preparing himself for this moment for 47 years, I expected a bit more shitty preparation.

[A]

True to parse, we got to get you to the airport, as you said. Otherwise we'd keep going. But this has been an amazing education on a lot of things.

[B]

Thank you in the region. Thank you so much for giving me the opportunity. Usually you get like three and a half minutes on CNN, so this is.

[A]

Three and a half plus 257 right here. That's what we like. But thank you so much, sir.

[B]

Thank you. Thank you so much for having me.

[A]

We'll link your socials down below and everything, and I'm wishing the Iranian people all the best.

[B]

Thank you so much.

[A]

All right, everybody else, you know what it is. Give it a thought. Get back to me. Peace. Thank you guys for watching the episode. If you haven't already, please hit that subscribe button and smash that like button on the video. They're both a huge, huge help. And if you would like to follow me on Instagram and X, those links are in my description below. Spring break isn't what it used to be. It's better this spring.

[B]

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[A]

Experian.