The author is a professor at Yonsei University College of Medicine and director of the Institute for Population and Talent.
The atmosphere in research laboratories has changed. Analyses that once required a week of work from graduate-level researchers can now be completed by artificial intelligence in a few hours. Yet I have not reduced the number of assistants in my lab. Instead, I use AI to conduct more research.
Workers in fields where AI is widely used often feel a sense of crisis, fearing their jobs may soon be replaced. By contrast, those in sectors less affected by AI often believe their roles are safe. Economists have begun addressing this issue through more than 20 empirical studies published between 2025 and 2026.

So far, overall labor market indicators appear relatively stable. One study tracked 25,000 Danish workers for three years and found no significant changes in income or working hours (Humlum & Vestergaard, 2025). The AI company Anthropic also measured "AI exposure" by combining usage data from its chatbot Claude with U.S. labor statistics (Massenkoff & McCrory, 2026). Unemployment rates in highly exposed occupations were no different from those in less exposed sectors.
There are three main reasons for this stability. First, many firms have adopted AI but use it only modestly. A survey of 6,000 executives across four countries found that although 70 percent of firms had introduced AI, managers used it only about one and a half hours per week on average (Yotzov et al., 2026).
Second, gains in individual productivity do not immediately increase overall output. After companies adopted AI coding tools, individual productivity rose by about 8 to 9 percent, yet there was no measurable change in total output or employment (Chen & Stratton, 2026).
Third, a wide gap remains between theoretical capability and real-world application. In theory, AI could perform up to 94 percent of tasks in computer and mathematics occupations. In practice, however, it currently covers only about 33 percent of those tasks (Massenkoff & McCrory, 2026).
The AI revolution, therefore, needs time before productivity gains appear in economic statistics. That transitional gap is the moment we are experiencing. Still, there is reason for concern because the long-term possibility of substitution remains high. Recent data already show early warning signs in youth employment.
In software development jobs, employment among workers aged 22 to 25 has declined by about 20 percent. Employment among workers aged 30 or older in the same occupation grew by 6 to 13 percent during the same period (Brynjolfsson et al., 2025).
Anthropic's recent research shows a similar pattern. Among workers aged 22 to 25, the rate of new employment in AI-exposed occupations declined by 14 percent, while no comparable pattern appeared among workers older than 25 (Massenkoff & McCrory, 2026).
Korea shows a similar trend. Over the past three years, jobs held by young workers declined by about 211,000. Of that decline, 98.6 percent occurred in industries with high exposure to AI. In contrast, employment among workers in their 50s increased by 209,000 in the same sectors, according to the Bank of Korea.
AI-driven labor market change is occurring mainly through reduced hiring rather than layoffs. Firms find it difficult to dismiss existing workers. Instead, they slow or suspend recruitment. As a result, the impact falls largely on young people who have not yet entered the work force.
Wage patterns show a similar divide. After AI adoption, the number of junior workers declined by 7 to 12 percent while the number of senior workers increased by about 6 percent (Hosseini & Lichtinger, 2025). Starting salaries for junior employees fell by 6.3 percent while senior wages rose slightly (Azar et al., 2025). This form of technological change that favors experience is unusual.
How AI is used also matters. When AI replaces call center agents, employment falls. When it assists them, emplo...