Kang Won-taek
The author is a professor of political science and international relations at Seoul National University.
President Lee Jae Myung has allowed the so-called "three judicial reform laws" to take effect. Although they were passed through legislative procedures in the National Assembly, the measures amount to a fundamental restructuring of Korea's constitutional order that has remained largely intact since 1948. Formally they are amendments to ordinary laws, but in substance they represent a change closer to constitutional revision.

Such a significant transformation has occurred without sufficient public debate, without meaningful consultation between the ruling and opposition parties and without serious consideration of the judiciary's own views. Given these circumstances, several side effects and institutional tensions are likely to emerge.

One of the most controversial elements is the introduction of a constitutional complaint system that allows appeals against finalized court rulings. This measure effectively transforms Korea's existing three-tier judicial system into a four-tier structure. Since 1948, the constitutional design has recognized the Supreme Court as the highest judicial authority. By allowing final judgments to be challenged before the Constitutional Court, the reform alters that structure in a fundamental way.
The Constitutional Court is now likely to face a sharp increase in its workload. It will also bear greater political pressure when dealing with sensitive issues involving political figures or state power. If the court reaches decisions that differ from those of the judiciary, its rulings may increasingly be interpreted through partisan or political lenses rather than purely legal ones.
Another measure expands the number of Supreme Court justices from 14 to 26 over three years. Concerns about this proposal were already raised in this column in September of last year. Expanding the size of a court to change its ideological balance is a well-known political tactic often described as "court packing."
Such practices have appeared in countries where democratic institutions have weakened, including Hungary, Poland and Venezuela. Political leaders increase the number of judges in key courts and then appoint allies to fill the new positions, thereby shifting the court's orientation.
What are the consequences? In their book "How Democracies Die" (2018), political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt noted that in 2004, the government of Hugo Chávez expanded Venezuela's Supreme Court from 20 to 32 justices. In the nine years that followed, the court issued no rulings against the government. Whether Korea will experience a different outcome remains an open question.
Perhaps the most unusual provision of the three measures is the introduction of the so-called "crime of distorting the law." Korea's system of governance assigns different responsibilities to each branch of government. The National Assembly enacts laws, the executive branch implements them and the judiciary interprets them. The new measure proposes punishing judges for incorrect interpretations of the law.
This effectively creates an external authority empowered to reinterpret judicial interpretations themselves. Of course judges can make mistakes. For that reason Korea's legal system already includes multiple layers of review. A decision can be reconsidered on appeal and ultimately examined by the Supreme Court.
Under the new framework, however, litigants who receive unfavorable rulings may claim that the problem lies not with their case but with a judge who allegedly distorted the law. Such accusations could weaken confidence in the stability and authority of the judicial system as a whole.
With the passage of the three laws the ruling Democratic Party of Korea has come to exercise influence not only over the presidency — often described in Korea as a "powerful presidency" — but also over the legislature and now potentially th...