Park Sang-hoon
The author is a political scientist.
When political parties rely on ordinary members' dues rather than large donors, they are often described as "mass parties." When they reduce competition and depend on state subsidies, they are labeled "cartel parties." Korea's major parties appear to fit neither model. But a different pattern is emerging, one in which large parties generate significant revenue by leveraging the ambitions of candidates seeking elected office.

If the pattern continues, it may lead to the emergence of a new type of party.
Parties are no longer primarily vehicles for representation or policy formation but function increasingly like platforms that monetize access to nominations. While this tendency is not limited to any one party, the Democratic Party (DP), expected to perform strongly in the upcoming elections, offers a clear example.
Contrary to the common assumption that state subsidies account for the largest share of party finances, carried-over funds make up the biggest portion of the DP's revenue. According to the National Election Commission's January report, "Overview of Party Activities and Financial Statements 2024" (translated), the party accumulated 248.9 billion won ($166 billion) in carried-over funds between 2020 and 2024, exceeding the 188.4 billion won it received in state subsidies.
A key source of this accumulation is special party dues. Party income is divided into general dues, position-based dues and special dues. In 2024, total dues amounted to 37.6 billion won. However, special dues have surged during the current election cycle.
As of mid-March, the DP completed candidate registration and screening and entered the preliminary primary stage. Candidates paid a registration fee of 500,000 won and screening fees ranging from 3 million won for local council seats to 8 million won for metropolitan mayoral races. Additional deposits for primary participation were also required. These payments are classified as nonrefundable special dues.

Estimating the total requires several assumptions. If one assumes a relatively low competition ratio of three candidates per seat and excludes reductions or exemptions, the figures are substantial. For 17 metropolitan mayoral positions, 51 candidates would collectively pay about 800 million won. For 226 municipal chief positions, 678 candidates would contribute approximately 8.5 billion won. Extending the same method to 872 provincial council seats and 2,988 local council seats yields 22.2 billion won and 58.3 billion won, respectively. Combined, these payments amount to nearly 89.8 billion won, more than double the party's total dues collected in 2024.
Position-based dues follow a similar pattern. Many party officials who pay these dues are also prospective candidates. Their payments resemble advance contributions toward future nominations. Elected officials affiliated with the party also contribute monthly dues, with governors paying 1 million won, municipal chiefs 500,000 won, provincial council members 200,000 won and local council members 100,000 won. These payments alone are estimated to total around 3 billion won annually.
General dues also reflect candidate-driven dynamics. A significant portion of dues-paying members is believed to have been recruited by candidates themselves. If half of one million members were mobilized in this way, their dues for six months, totaling around 3 billion won, would effectively be borne by candidates.

For candidates, the financial burden is considerable. After paying substantial sums during registration and preliminary rounds, they must continue to spend on polling and campaign costs in the main primary and runoff stages. Those who lose receive no reimbursement and are often not informed of detailed results. Internal procedures offer little recourse, as vote-counting processes are not transparent.
In this system, parties primarily manage the nomination process while offering limited support in terms...