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- [00:05]
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- [00:32]
Afwa Hirsch
Peter Imagine a world in which a furious American president stages an intervention connected to a crisis and conflict in the Middle east that has seismic implications for the configuration of global power and triggers a massive economic crisis.
- [00:49]
Peter Frankenberg
You're not going to tell me they're like London buses. You don't see them for decades and then suddenly everyone's talking about them all at the same time. Give me a few more clues, Alfred. Let me guess. Does it lead to economic meltdown, destruction of ideas about the role of the west, the idea that imperialism is alive and well? Is that all part of the same story, or am I barking up the wrong tree?
- [01:10]
Afwa Hirsch
It's almost like you know something about the suez crisis of 1956, Peter. Or more specifically, the economic shock it triggered. Because this is our series on economic shocks. And you cannot do a series on. On great economic shocks without looking at Suez. And Peter, tell us why.
- [01:30]
Peter Frankenberg
Well, we've talked about the rises and falls of empire many times also. Where do you benchmark it? Last time we did 1915 and the Dardanelles. The British Empire actually reached its highest, largest point in September 1923. There's an excellent book by my friend Matthew Parker about this. That empires can keep growing even after you think that they haven't. But I know that you think, afwa, that Suez marks the exact moment when the British Empire officially dies. Tell me why you think that.
- [01:59]
Afwa Hirsch
It's not so much in literal terms. Because you're quite right, Peter. That wasn't the end of the British Empire. And it didn't collapse overnight. But it was definitely the end of an idea of what British imperial power represented. This kind of limitless capacity for Britain to rule the world. This, for me, was certainly the moment that narrative lost credibility. It was almost like the Emperor's New Clothes, where the rest of the world suddenly noticed that the Emperor was actually naked. And for Britain, it was a brutal reality check, showing them, and France as well, that they could no longer act like the 19th century imperial superpowers they still thought they were.
- [02:37]
Peter Frankenberg
But that's the problem. But in the place of one dead imperial superpower comes a new one to take their place. And that flexing of American muscles in the 1950s is something that I think is very interesting. That post Second World War order we sometimes think of as a kind of gentleman's club where people are trying to go through the UN and to de escalate and that there's a cold war that freezes everything. But when you start to add up the Korean War interventions in Egypt, in Iran, of course, eventually Vietnam too, the world looks much choppier and spicier. And today for sure, in the 21st century, we're living in an age of new imperial powers. And not just the United States. I think there's a whole long list of countries that you can add who are thinking about their territorial expansion and their political expansion. Israel is one of those. Russia, of course, China, I suppose, India, Pakistan. Then you have a whole raft of countries sitting alongside too who are thinking about what do their ambitions mean. And I think this period that we've chosen in the 1950s is a really key pivot point where you see a whole new world order being shaped. So that's why I think we wanted to think about the economic shocks produced by Suez, but also the world order that it shattered to.
- [03:56]
Afwa Hirsch
Hello and welcome to a new episode of Legacy. I'm AFWA Hirsch.
- [04:01]
Peter Frankenberg
I'm Peter Frankenberg.
- [04:02]
Afwa Hirsch
And this is is Legacy, the show that explores the lives, events and ideas that have shaped our world and asks whether they have the legacy they deserve.
- [04:18]
Peter Frankenberg
This is the second episode in our four part series on great economic shocks. This is 1956, the cataclysm of sewers.
- [04:28]
Afwa Hirsch
Thank you so much for joining us today and to support the show. Thank you. Please don't forget to sign up to Legacy.
- [04:35]
Peter Frankenberg
On Legacy. You can enjoy early access, fewer ads, Q and A and bonus content. Things like the legacy of the escalator. You can find us there on Legacy supportingcast fm. So please do sign up and support the show. Right, afwa, let's set the scene. Tell me about the Suez Canal.
- [04:52]
Afwa Hirsch
The Suez Canal is by the 1950s, an extremely important asset for Britain I after the Second World War, it's essentially the jugular vein of the British Empire. It connects the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, so you don't have to sail all the way around Africa to get to India or crucially, to the oil fields of the Middle east, which are becoming more and more lucrative, particularly to the British economy. But the canal belongs to Egypt. It's physically located in Egypt. However, it is controlled by a company which has been owned by British and French shareholders since the canal's construction in 1859.
- [05:30]
Peter Frankenberg
And that canal is so important that Bismarck is often quoted as saying that it's the spinal cord that connects the brain of the British Empire with the rest of the body. Because as you say, afwa, it is a narrow body of water that cuts out huge amounts of sailing time, that reduces costs of fuel. That means that you can get ships faster and quicker, so the profits go up. But it's obviously therefore hugely strategically valuable because if you can close it or you can compress it or you can shut it, you can strangle too. So the Suez Canal is absolutely key. It's a classic colonial setup. Too alpha, isn't it?
- [06:06]
Afwa Hirsch
Yeah. This is what's so interesting. Let me just ask the question. What happens if infrastructure is located in a nation, in this case Egypt, it's controlled by a company essentially run by colonial powers, Britain and France, which what happens if the country Egypt decides that it wants to start attacking the colonial powers who control it and taking back control? Now this isn't exactly an act of war because what it's attacking is a private company, not a nation. And actually the canal is located in its own sovereign territory. The status quo up to that point had been controlled also in a kind of colonial setup through these agreements, treaties, understandings. British Britain had military bases in Egypt and under the Anglo Egyptian treaty of 1936 it was allowed to station its troops in Egypt. But when the Egyptian authorities break that treaty, then it opens up a new realm of insecurity for Britain and nationalistic ambition for Egypt.
- [07:09]
Peter Frankenberg
Afra, you know you've done a lot of work on post colonial societies and all the process of countries becoming independent. Is this part of the kind of end of the Second World War, that desire for self determination, countries like India becoming independent in 1947 and then finding a way through countries like Egypt wanting to have full control over their sovereignty. So that phrase you used, taking back control that I think here, if you're a British listener, you always associate with Brexit. It is about sovereignty. It is about the idea that you don't have outside forces telling you what to do. Is that just a way that gets domestic discussion and support for domestic leaders or is it about something more substantial, which is that this is our territory, we therefore demand to have either better terms or better still, we don't have anybody shaping those terms at all.
- [07:55]
Afwa Hirsch
Do you know, it's such an interesting question, Peter. I was actually recently in the British Virgin Islands, which is a British overseas territory in the Caribbean, so one of a really small number of places now that's still essentially A British colony. I mean, we use this language of overseas territory. It means basically, even though it's in the Caribbean, it's part of the uk and you know, speaking to people there, it was so interesting because when they talked about their yearning for independence, and not everyone wants independence from Britain, but some people do, they talked about it in very spiritual terms. They talked about dignity, they talked about feeling free, that their bodies, their land, their livelihoods were the domain of people. They elected their own control, that if they made mistakes, they should be their mistakes. And I think there is something that we can all relate to. It's actually quite universal. Ironically, it was part of the narrative of Brexit. The irony is that British people took away this dignity from people elsewhere and kind of are nostalgic for a world where they still control those places. But what's happening in Egypt is different from elsewhere in Africa. It's different from what's called, and I don't like this language, sub Saharan Africa because you have these royals, these monarchies that are kind of propped up or encouraged by the colonial powers. But what is similar to what's happening in say Nigeria or Ghana or, or Senegal is that you have these young leaders coming up who want that dignity, they want that freedom, they want self determination, they want independence. And that's what happens in Egypt in 1952 when a military coup forces the king, King Farouk, to abdicate. And this Free Officers Movement that have staged this coup escalate into a revolution which ends up putting Gamal Abdel Nasser, a charismatic and fiercely nationalistic young man, in, into power as president. And he is certainly someone who has deep connections and relationships to other pro independence, decolonizing leaders of the time. In fact, if you listen to our series on Kwame Nkrumah, you'll know that Kwame Nkrumah, who's from Ghana, married an Egyptian woman in a marriage essentially arranged by Nasser because he wanted to forge closer links between these revolutionary, pro independence African nations at the time.
- [10:09]
Peter Frankenberg
Now, if you have younger listeners with you or you have a sensibility to swear words, you might just want to turn the volume down for the next 20 seconds. The CIA are very busy in the 1950s trying to reshape the world and they devise a plan that's called Operation Fat Fucker to get rid of King Farouk. And it's because these portly heads of state and kings and rulers in places like Libya, Iran, Egypt are in fact considered quite unreliable, partly because they are thought of as being too venal. They have often personal Predilections that are perhaps a little bit racy, if not illegal, and they are very unreliable. And what the CIA people like Miles Copeland, Kermit Roosevelt and so on are trying to find vulnerabilities that are going to impact the United States in its post war and the Cold War setting. And places like Egypt are therefore extremely sensitive and important because of the Suez Canal. Places like Iran, likewise with the overthrow of Mosaddegh in 1953, engineered by the CIA with a bit of British intelligence help too, are designed to try to get rid of people who are going to be difficult towards Western sentiments. And in the case of Iran, that's because Mosaddegh tries to in fact does nationalize the Iranian oil industry. Nasser, who comes through as a sort of not chosen by the US but as welcomed as a breath of fresh air, a man who's appointed and risen through the ranks of merit, might be able to forge a modern Egypt, looks like a man that you could do business with. The problem is that he also thinks about the world in a slightly different way because he's not a CIA asset. So in 1956, to mark the anniversary of the 1952 coup, four years on, he decides to nationalize the Suez Canal. And that sends feathers flying absolutely everywhere. He says we built this with our blood and, and we will use the tolls to build our dam. He's looking to modernize Egypt. He wants the Aswan Dam to be built. He wants nuclear power, he wants to have the apparatus of a modern state and doesn't want to be stopped in how he does that. But this unsettles, particularly in Britain where suddenly the fear that not only is the empire starting to slip away with countries becoming independent, the post war economic downturn is taking a long time to put right and suddenly these key corridors are being exposed.
- [12:29]
Afwa Hirsch
I think the thing that's interesting about this is that these interests don't have to be diametrically opposed. I mean, on the one hand you have Nasser's audience, the Egyptian people who love this. This is a moment of defiance against colonial exploitation. This is the rhetoric of taking back control. Their own power, their own destiny in their hands. Britain sees it as a threat to its economic interests and prestige. At the same time, as you said, Peter, it doesn't have to be existentially threatening to Britain. Nasser is not someone who refuses to do business with Western nations. But it's Britain's lens of fragility, its fear of losing control. Perhaps the memories of the Dardanelles and the pain of losing these critical points of access to the rest of its colonies, which are also striving, or even in India's case, already gaining independence. And that is why, as we'll see after the break, this unique combination of the personalities of Nasser, Britain's Prime Minister Anthony Eden, and this atmosphere of Arab and general decolonial nationalism all combine to cause a crisis that absolutely rocks the world. Foreign
- [13:51]
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- [14:46]
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- [15:22]
Peter Frankenberg
Before the break, we mentioned a little bit about that world decolonizing after the Second World War. Was that a product of Western exhaustion? Was it the fact that the model was broken? Was it the fact that the west is also unable to keep pumping in cash and to get the rewards back for that it used to be getting? How do you understand decolonization? Because it's very important in the Arab world. Because NASA's steps to nationalize the Suez Canal were hugely popular because it was a moment of, of apparent defiance of Arabs standing up to Westerners. How do you see this fitting in with the wider context that you've looked at?
- [15:54]
Afwa Hirsch
I actually see it more as an inevitability rather than anything that particularly went wrong. I mean, Britain never did pump in a huge amount of resources to its colonies for the wellbeing of its people. And I think that the Second World War was a massive turning point in rhetoric. You know, all of these young colonized people heard Britain speaking the language of overthrowing Nazi oppression, of fighting for democracy and self determination, all things they weren't able to enjoy because of Britain. And I think the hypocrisy of that started to really come home to a generation of young people in African and Asian countries who listened to Britain's wartime rhetoric, who took part in the war effort fighting for their colonial overlord, and came home thinking, we want that for ourselves, we want to taste that freedom. We've done our part and why are we not having sacrificed alongside British people being treated like equals? And I think Egypt is no different. But Britain, having reeled from the effort of rebuilding after the Second World War, is in no mood to lose these crucial lifelines. And then you add to that Anthony Eden, who is himself a fascinating character, Peter. And of all the leaders, you kind of need a safe pair of hands, somebody who can have a calm head in the face of what I think are these quite inevitable sentiments coming from the Middle east and Africa. Eden is not that guy.
- [17:16]
Peter Frankenberg
No, I think that he's an establishment figure, but he's extremely experienced. Like you said, he's a safe pair of hands and he sees the world for what it is. So he sees in Nasser a kind of new Mussolini, someone who's coming to galvanize all of the people, and that that's going to threaten not just imperial interests and British interests, but also elite local interests too. And I think that's one of the kind of funny things we perhaps don't always see when we think about independence movements and the Post World War II, particularly in the Arab world, is that lots of these countries become independent places like Syria and Lebanon. But countries like Britain and France leave military bases. They still have deep infrastructural and economic roots in the countries that are notionally independent. And so although countries have on paper become independent, it's not just that you have outside powers evolved, it's also that local elites have worked hand in hand with London and with Paris for generations. So some of the Arab nationalism is about turning on people who are the kind of the wealthy, the traders, the merchants. People have done well from the old system. And so why Nasser is so popular is he's a very good communicator. I mean, that's a really important thing to think about, that he is the voice of the Arabs, not just in Egypt, but beyond too, who's taking the fight to the outside world, but is also the process of knocking down people domestically who've got too big for their own boots too. Those two things work hand in hand. That fits a bit like how Bussolini worked in the 1920s in Italy. It was about opening Italy not just away from outside world, but to new generations to come in instead, too. And Suez was critical in that storytelling that Nasser was so good at doing.
- [18:55]
Afwa Hirsch
The issue is Nasser wants to nationalize the Suez Canal. Now, to nationalize assets that are owned by a foreign company certainly can give rise to litigation in commercial courts or international tribunals. But it's very far from the kind of violation of the UN charter that provides a basis for military action. There is no legal basis for Eden, for Britain to invade, to stop NASA doing this. And this next part might sound familiar, no basis in international law for a military invasion. Why let that stop you, Peter?
- [19:33]
Peter Frankenberg
Well, you know, you tell me, you're a lawyer, afwa, you know international law, and you know, my mother's international lawyer. It's worth the paper that it is signed on. But the problem is, if people break the law, then it's very hard to stop them. I mean, one of the things that the UN was set up to do was to prevent and to coerce, to use coercion, a military force, if needed, to stop bad actors from behaving in a bad way. The problem is that you can agree that here are the rules of the playground. But in the modern world, like in 2026, if it's about attacks on Iran, you can waive whatever paper you like, saying this is against international law. But if the competence or the aggressor doesn't pay any attention to it, your tools to be able to box them in or punish them are pretty limited. So does that mean that international law, as is shown in Suez, is. It's a nice idea as an abstract thing, that actually enforcement is a different story.
- [20:24]
Afwa Hirsch
Yeah, I mean, that will also sound very familiar, that they are a nice set of ideas, but there is no world policeman, there is a world court, but no one in this action ends up in it. And this is exactly the calculation that Britain, Israel and France do. They get together, they hatch a plan, they work out that they can invade Egypt and seize back control of Suez, but they still try to dress it up as something that seems justified in international law. And that's what I find so interesting about this Protocol of Sevres, Peter, where these powers get together and hatch a plan that really is something that belongs in a Le Carre novel. So it starts with the Foreign Secretary, selwyn Lloyd, on 22nd of October 1956, announcing that he has a heavy cold and cancels all his engagements. And instead of going to bed with a cup of Lem sip, he's driven to an RAF base and flown to France. There at Sevres, he sits down with France and Israel and concocts what is probably the most controversial military operation of the 20th century. I say that knowing there's a very high bar for that status. And this is the plan. Israel will invade the Sinai Peninsula, that is a sparsely populated desert region in Egypt. And Britain and France will then pretend to be shocked, issue an ultimatum for both sides to pull back from the canal, which is bordered by Sinai. And when Egypt inevitably refuses to back down, which they calculate Nasser will refuse, Britain and France will then swoop in as quote, unquote peacekeepers to seize the waterway and restore international order. If that sounds far fetched and probably pretty obviously fake, everyone else works out that that's what's going on too. But nevertheless, the plan goes ahead. In October 1956, Aphra, you know, to
- [22:19]
Peter Frankenberg
announce you got a heavy cold. I mean, it's pretty late, it's pretty lame. I mean, when you said Le Carre, I mean on Netflix, it's sort of schoolboy stuff, isn't, would be a bit
- [22:30]
Afwa Hirsch
insulting to Le Carre, actually. He, he finds better ruses for his, his, his covert operations.
- [22:36]
Peter Frankenberg
But I mean, it's, but it's an interesting thing. I mean, I've done some work on why is it that dictators bother holding elections, you know, if you're going to get 90. In fact, in March 2026, Kim Jong Un just got reelected with 99.9% of the vote in North Korea. You know, I think it's no surprise that he did as well as he did. The surprise is that there was 0.1% that voted either against him or filled in the form wrong. But why bother going to all that trouble? So, I mean, it's a bit like that with 2003, when the United States invaded Iraq. You know, George W. Bush did go to the un however flawed it was, he did build a coalition of 49 countries to go in with the US to Baghdad. There was an attempt to try to dress this up as something that was to do with international law. Again, however flawed that was, in 2026, Israel and the United States, as they did in June 2025, just went in and walloped Iran and then reverse engineered to say, well, there was a threat posed to the US for example. So I wonder what role. What's the point of going to the subterfuge of having this very elaborate plan where you say well, we'll give a false ultimatum. We'll tell you to withdraw, then, in fact, we'll turn our back on it. Why bother doing that? Why not just send in the troops?
- [23:51]
Afwa Hirsch
This, I think, really goes to the heart of what we're experiencing today. You know, the only thing I can say in defense of President Trump, and it's. I use the word defense lightly, is that there's a transparency about it. Trump will say, we're going into Venezuela. We want the oil. He will say, we're going into Iran. I don't like them. We're strong. You're weak. You know, it's not dressed up as something that's for the benevolence of the global community or even the people on the receiving end of these military actions. Britain in the 1950s still saw itself as this benevolent power on the world stage. It still spoke the language of having colonized people for their own good, to civilize them and bring Christianity and common law. And, you know, I think there's some level on which British officials believed this. They believed that they were on this civilizing mission. And so Britain wants to still have this moral upper hand. It doesn't see itself as this kind of brutish bully in a way that Trump is so comfortable with just kind of wading in and taking what it likes. It needs to believe, or at least needs to show British people that this is all part of a plan that has some kind of divine order or destiny about it. And it's just sheer hypocrisy, because what Britain does in 1956 is. Is highly comparable to what Trump has done in Iran in 2026. The only difference is the level of honesty and transparency around it. I would say.
- [25:19]
Peter Frankenberg
I guess the difference is, is that Britain in 56, it's still just over 10 years on since the end of the Second World War. Then there's been engagement in the Korean Peninsula, too. And that sense that the world is changing feels, I think, to people like Eden and to elites in the United Kingdom and Britain that the world is changing very fast and that something needs to be done that is drastic. And if you lose access to Suez, then things could become extremely difficult, too. I mean, rationing only stops the year beforehand. So I think it's all dressed up as seen as being justifiable. But the bit that's sort of odd is why go to the sham of creating a scenario, which, rather than say, this is why we're going to do it? And I suppose you're right, afwa, part of the Answer must be, we need to be seen to be doing things righter than right. The fact that you are in fact plotting these in the background rather undermines the credibility and the justification in the first place. But I wonder whether you think that also betrays a kind of lack of confidence. I suppose, whatever. Again, what you might say about Trump, he believes his own destiny. He believes that he has the right to do things and doesn't want to be constrained by doing things. So he acts imperially, whereas the British were, and the French and Israel here are trying to work in a way that makes it look like it's something that it's not.
- [26:31]
Afwa Hirsch
I think you're right. Britain is experiencing this fragility. You know, it's been weakened by the Second World War. It's been dependent on the US financially. It is watching its great colonies like India gain independence, the rest of its colonies want independence. And it's facing a world that is radically changing and that threatens its very place on the world stage. And I think on top of that, there's the Cold War dynamics. You know, these are the early years of the Cold Cold War where these newly independent former British colonies are going to be sovereign states. Britain still wants to stay in the, quote, family. It wants them to be in the Commonwealth. It wants to retain its sphere of influence over these countries. And it wants to show that it's different from the ussr, that it's the nation of democracy and the rule of law and free press. And you can't make that argument if you are acting like a aggressive dictatorship, invading and seizing control of assets because you want them. So I think Britain is trying to have its cake and eat it. It wants to and needs to, for really important reasons, appear like a club you would want to be in as a newly independent Arab or African country. But it still wants to preserve its power. And there's a. There is a lack of clarity, to put it mildly, and indecisiveness there that I think is probably the worst of all worlds. And that's really exactly how it plays out. And it plays out in places you wouldn't expect. I mean, even the Queen is reported to have told a friend that she was having, quote, the most awful time deciding what she thought of the operation. And her cousin, Lord Mountbatten, who nobody would cast as an enemy of empire, the First Sea Lord at the time defies the traditions of the Royal Navy by sending Eden a letter personally to condemning his decision. So the sham and the embarrassment of this is not confined to anti colonial agitators. It's quite clear for even those right at the heart of the establishment to see.
- [28:31]
Peter Frankenberg
I think it's also to remind, and again, I'm sure everybody listening to this will know about the Bandung conference that took place in April 1955. But it was a meeting of Asian and African countries that have become newly independent. That represented about 1.5 billion people. That was more than half of the world's population at the time. Talking through what that world order looked like and how, despite independence, Western powers in particular, but also the architecture set up after 1945 was compromising and tying the hands of independent states. And Nasser is feeding into all of that as well, and therefore is wildly popular not just in the Arab world, but in other parts of the world, too. So I think it's probably fair to say, afpa, that the Anglo French Israeli plan leaves something to be desired in terms of how it's actually pulled off.
- [29:23]
Afwa Hirsch
On 29 October, long columns of Israeli tanks rumble implacably across the sands of the Sinai, halting their advance 10 miles away from the eastern side of the canal. The Sevre Plan is underway. And the next day, Eden's ambassador, according to according to the plan, delivers an ultimatum to NASA ordering him to pull back his troops from Suez or face an invasion. Nasser refuses, as is predicted, and the pace of events quickens.
- [29:52]
Peter Frankenberg
So on the 31st of October, wave upon wave of British and French bombers sweep down on the Egyptian coast. And within just 24 hours, more than 250 Egyptian planes have been destroyed and the British and the French have complete aerial superiority for the loss of just two British pilots. So it looks like it's going just fine. The British and the French then occupy Port Said and other strategic points at the northern end of the canal. And in the campaign that sees one of the first uses of helicopters, as well as a parachute drops by British airborne forces, a strong Anglo French military presence gets established. It looks like the plan has worked. It looks like the Suez Canal is going to be secured and the British think they've got away with it. So, dismissing all talk of a conspiracy, the Daily Sketch sounds a patriotic note that says, let the crybabies howl. It's Great Britain again. So super popular, but things don't go quite as well as it sounds.
- [30:49]
Afwa Hirsch
Outside of those yearning to prove that Britain still is this great imperial power, nobody is fooled in everybody else in the world recognizes Britain and France's actions as an act of aggression by former colonial powers. And it's actually far from uniformly popular at home in Britain either. It's often seen as the most divisive British military action until the invasion of Iraq. Polls at the time found that almost half of the population disapproved of Eden's decision to take military action, and tens of thousands turn out to demonstrate in Trafalgar Square. So this is not uniformly popular. And it's now coming under intense pressure from the international community. None more so, Peter, than the United States is far from impressed by this British, French, Israeli stunt.
- [31:39]
Peter Frankenberg
Before we go on to talk about the fallout of Suez, let's just do a very quick recap of what's happening in the region. And we've talked about Iran a few times on the podcast recently and about the consequences of the overthrow of the Prime Minister, Mohamed Mosaddegh in 1953, just after he has nationalized the Anglo Iranian Oil Company. That's been part of this whole story of not just decolonization, but also of states having control of their own natural resources. That's not just about a pricing mechanic. It's not just about renegotiating to make sure you've got better terms. It's about where do the fruits of foreign investment go and who has the right to be able to benefit from those. So at the time, the Abadan refinery in Iran was the largest in the world and was the crown jewel, was considered the crown jewel of British overseas assets. So by losing its monopoly on Iranian oil, there's a massive economic compression and a geopolitical crisis. And that was why the CIA, with some UK help, goes in to overthrow Mossadegh in 1953. The Shah at the time, panics. He flies off to Rome only packing a spare pair of socks with him. He thinks it's the end of the world. He thinks it's all about him. He then comes back when Mossadek has been removed in what he thinks is triumph. And he takes it as a sign that his people love him, rather than the more rational answer, which is that the forces that have destabilized have decided on another candidate. But when Nasser nationalizes Suez in 1956, Eden and his cabinet are terrified, afraid that it's going to have a domino effect.
- [33:11]
Afwa Hirsch
They didn't go to all the trouble of orchestrating a coup in Iran, only to see a wave of nationalization of Arab assets across the Middle East. And they actually worry that the nationalization of Suez could inspire Iran to try again to nationalize its oil fields, which would be devastating for Britain. So there's this fear that anything like Suez could have this ripple effect throughout the Arab world. And then of course, there's the logistics of Suez, because even if Britain has access to Iranian oil, which it does now that it staged this 1953 coup, the majority of oil tankers departing from the Persian Gulf, including Iran, rely on the Suez Canal to reach the Mediterranean and Britain. So there are many reasons why this particular threat is deeply felt by no one more than Eden. And it's also at a time when Britain's economy, although it's beginning to make quite a strong recovery from the Second World War, still depends heavily on extraction from its colonies and does not feel resilient to the idea of losing access to Iranian oil or control of Suez more generally.
- [34:21]
Peter Frankenberg
And the currency afore is Achilles heel here. So the British, because of their interests in Iraq and in Iran, are able to pay using sterling rather than using the dollar. That saves them currency transaction costs. But also it means that they're independent of the strength or weakness of other people's currency. It's all set by what the bank of England are doing. But that chronic weakness of the British pound is a persistent feature of the entire 1950s as it happened. Because if you can have as many paratroopers as you like, you can invade here, there, wherever. But if your economy can't sustain it, then of course you're finished. But I want to know alfw about a missing piece of the story that we've had so far, which is we've mentioned, of course, Egypt, the Arab world and surrounding. We've done a bit on Israel and we could do that for a separate episode, I think, Britain and France. But how does the US fit into all of this?
- [35:08]
Afwa Hirsch
It's so interesting. It's as if Britain and France are behaving as if it's a kind of Pre World War II world in which they are not deferential to US interests, as if they're not dependent on the US in a way that they really are now. And they've been conspiring amongst themselves as if that's an afterthought. The reality is they cannot afford to ignore the US opinion and interest in this plan. And unfortunately for them, the US opinion is pretty apoplectic. Dwight Eisenhower is furious. He wasn't even told about the invasion before it happened. And it's an election year in the U.S. so this imperial adventure from these rogue Europeans is distracting the world from his Cold War narrative. We've got at the same time in 1956, a violent crushing of the uprising in Hungary by the Soviet Union. And the last thing he needs is this Suez crisis on his hands. So he sends angry telegrams, but that's really only the beginning. He decides to hit Britain where it hurts. Peter?
- [36:12]
Peter Frankenberg
Yeah, I think Eisenhower's got two or three different things going on. First, he'd commanded the American armies in Europe, so he felt very strongly about self determination. And also this was a time of peace. So military actions were not just bad, but they stood against what the United States had fought for, which was to liberate people rather than to intervene. That's part of it. I think that the story, like you mentioned, of this happening while the Soviet Union are hunting down people and shooting them in Hungary and suppressing a revolution, it's not just about that happens at the same time, which is extremely unfortunate, is the fact that the United States is trying to stand for the free world. And this idea of empire is something that has played very badly with American presidents since before Woodrow Wilson even, and the First World War of what happens when the west intervenes is it makes the world a worse place. And the US is trying to see itself as a more benign, beneficent global policeman. That story in the course of the 20th century, through Vietnam, et cetera, starts to shift as well. But you even see that in the strands around Trump saying there are going to be no more forever wars or the US won't get involved in other parts of the world, in particular the Middle east, actually, as part of the national security strategy. And then, lo and behold, so you have a slightly schizophrenic reaction. But what happens, as you say, afwa, is he sends angry telegrams to start with, but he then decides to hit Britain where it hurts. So in the morning of 6 November, sterling comes under huge pressure on exchange markets. So when treasury officials approach Washington for assistance, they don't just get a frosty reply, but within hours, the Chancellor, Harold Macmillan, who's formerly a keen hawk, is telling his colleagues that in view of the financial and economic pressures, we must stop. So the Americans haven't just told the British to stop, they haven't just used displeasure, they've used economic coercion to show the British that they are willing, despite the fact that there's the special relationship and they fought side by side during two world wars. But the United States is willing to use its tools to stop the British from behaving in a way that's counter to its own national interests.
- [38:16]
Afwa Hirsch
What happens next is that global markets start to panic. Investors start dumping the pound at a terrifying rate. The bank of England bleeds golden dollar reserves trying to prop up the currency's fixed exchange rate. This is a disaster, quote, caused by speculation. And we talked about how Britain's currency was really its Achilles heel during this period. This is for Britain, a disaster. The bank of England is forced to deplete its US dollar reserves to defend the value of the pound against the dollar and to have to put up a brave face to stave off an attack to try and shore up confidence. But it's really a losing battle. And by December 1956, the threat of a forced devaluation is very real. And where does Britain turn in this monetary financial crisis? It turns to the newly formed International Monetary Fund asking for an emergency loan. But the problem is that the IMF, which has only been operational since 1947, it's got international in the name. Peter the reality is that these Bretton woods institutions, as they're often known, are essentially controlled by the US and, and again, this is where Eisenhower's clout shows,
- [39:27]
Peter Frankenberg
well, and it's the humiliation, you know, first to go cap and heard, as it's, as it's called, and to ask for a bailout. It shows how the mighty have fallen. And then the fact that the bailout could get blocked by the United States shows the realities not just of economic power, but of a new world where former empires like the British and the French are powerless to be able to stand in the face of reality. I think that gamble then around, why go into Suez? Why try to protect the canal? I suppose you could see it's not just the dying embers of an empire, it's a kind of last shot to try to show that you're still able to shape the world in your own image. And it all goes from bad to worse. So not only does the IMF turn it down, but the US threatens actively to sell off its own holdings in British sterling bonds. That's a full on financial attack by the us, Britain's most important and closest ally. And the message is simple from Washington, withdraw your troops or we're going to bankrupt you.
- [40:26]
Afwa Hirsch
And the physical economy in Britain is feeling the hit too. In response to the invasion, Nasser has blocked the canal by sinking dozens of ships filled with concrete. This is now cutting off Europe's energy supply. So we've gone from a speculation crisis that affected the currency to now a very real economic crisis caused by the cutting off of oil. And this is so damaging to a whole decade of Britain's post war recovery. It goes right back into crisis mode. The government has to introduce petrol Rationing. And you know, you can see that for a generation that has become used to rationing and the privations of the Second World War, going back to this state of austerity after it started to feel like the green shoots of recovery were fully in motion is humiliating and even traumatizing. And for Anthony Eden, as we'll see after the break, it is a lifetime legacy defining disaster.
- [41:32]
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- [42:15]
Peter Frankenberg
So you mentioned, afw, that for Anthony Eden, it's political ruin. I mean, he's a shadow of himself. He essentially has a breakdown. His face is gray, except for there are these black rings around his eyes. And for Eden's personal fortunes, I mean, he goes exhausted and broken to a recuperative blank in Jamaica, where he stays, I think probably appropriate enough at ian Fleming's villa, Goldeneye, but resigns when he comes back in January 1957. I think it's not just about Eden and the personal toll that takes on him. He speaks for that class of people who've led Britain, of public school boys who have fought very bravely for their country in wars, but have felt that they were part of an imperial apparatus that could behave as though there'd be no change. This was still the 19th century where you could, you could snap your fingers and you could shape control over arteries, colonies, trading zones at will. And that shattering experience was not just about Eden. I think it's about a new world that's coming into shape. I suppose there's no coincidence that around about this time where things like rock and roll and eventually new types of Britons like the Beatles start to gain prominence. It's not just because of the music, it's not just because of mass media. It's also speaking to the fact that Britain is looking for new kinds of leaders, you know, footballers, celebrities, film stars to replace those old men in suits who've been responsible for steering the empire
- [43:42]
Afwa Hirsch
onto the rocks, two world wars and the decline of empire have changed Britain unrecognizably in a relatively short period of time. And you were talking earlier in the episode, Peter, about how actually, you know, we think of the British Empire as having its heyday in the 19th century. The 1920s were actually when it was at its apex. And this generation of politicians, Foreign Office, Commonwealth and Colonial Office officials have come of age at a time when Britain really was objectively the greatest colonial world power. So they are struggling, probably like many other people, to adapt to a world in which they don't have that kind of power anymore. They can't make these unilateral decisions. They don't have the economic strength or even the global territory and resources. And they have to take into account the US at the very least, make the US feel included and involved in these decisions, let alone plan operations behind America's back and then go cap in hand when they go tits up asking for a bailout. And it really reveals how out of touch they are with the geopolitical reality they're in. And that's why, for me, this marks a really important turning point with Britain's identity. It forces Britain to confront the fact that it is no longer the global colonial world power it once was and still thinks it is. And of course, you can understand, you know, I passionately believe that imperialism is objectively wrong. However, you can understand from a British perspective why no one's in a rush to confront this new reality because it's painful. You know, it's much nicer to think of yourself as the greatest power in the world, controlling half quarter of the world's territory, being the most influential nation on the world stage. It's much harder and not very motivating to look with the cold light of day at a world in which your power has massively declined and now there's a new power that you have to show deference to. So I think that all of those ingredients manifest very clearly in this crisis.
- [45:47]
Peter Frankenberg
So we obviously, the name of the podcast is Legacy. I mean, it's interesting because some of my colleagues working in both history, but also behavioral economics and other disciplines have argued that one of the reasons why Britain finds itself in such a difficult spot in the 1950s with such bad decision making like this is because of what happens during the First World War, because the young men who are they are men who've been trained to run an empire are mowed down in such large numbers, coming out of the great schools, universities, the gene pool of people who you can rely on has shrunk because those men who would have been in their 50s and 60s or 40s and 50s by this time in their prime just are absent. They're ghosts because they're dead. And the costs of the, of the loss of life during the First World War have these long range effects too. But I wonder if you could say a bit more about the legacies of today and what happens to do with choke points and how we have the sort of the crisis that seems so familiar from 1956 happening in 2026, 70 years later.
- [46:49]
Afwa Hirsch
It does feel so familiar, Peter. I mean, 70 years to the year and the first and most obvious comparison is the kind of logistical, territorial nature of this. It's about the dependence on chokeholds in nations that for various reasons become hostile. So when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, it took control of Britain's most vital artery. Today we're seeing a very similar logistical nightmare for countries that depend on oil fertiliser, other goods coming through the strait of the moves. And when I say countries, that's basically the whole world in this globalized economy. Everyone is dependent on that flow of goods. And so the us, Israel, Iran conflict has cut off that flow with massive effects for global containership and potentially skyrocketing freight and energy costs that could trigger a very, very serious global recession.
- [47:45]
Peter Frankenberg
I guess another one is the use of trade and finance, weaponization of economic coercion. That's something that Eisenhower did in 1956. Today I don't think you need to look just at Hormuz and Iran to see something similar by both sides. Obviously the imposition of sanctions by the U.S. for many years on Iran, but on other countries too, around the world like Cuba is one obvious way. But there are all sorts of ways in which states find ways of getting leverage. The ideas about debt diplomacy, the way in which investing or over investing in people's domestic industries means that there are potentially debts that get built up and those could get cashed and called at any time. And also that gives you political influence too. But Suez shows that if you're able to get your own way without sending a single soldier onto the battlefield by weaponizing the use of finance, I suppose also Afro, I don't know how you see 2026 about that, whether we're living through the end of an era. But that's, I guess what happens in 1956, these great wheels turning where Europe essentially slides down the mud hill because it shows that Europeans are more or less toothless to be able to get what they want is that how today feels due to you.
- [48:54]
Afwa Hirsch
This, for me, is probably the most interesting element of the Iran, US Israel war. The US Is acting as it has through most of the latter part of the 20th century, as the greatest military nation. I mean, even during the height of the Cold War, and you know much more about this than me, it was questionable whether the Soviets ever achieved military parity with the US We've been living in what has felt like unipolarity ever since the end of the Cold War. I feel, or I at least question whether this is the moment where it starts to shift, where we start to really see the limits of what the US can do both domestically. Because Trump ran on a platform of ending costly foreign wars. The American people are weary, to say the least, of that pattern of constantly being at war, constantly demanding the lives of, of young Americans, constantly demanding taxpayer dollars from Americans to pay for these expensive, never ending conflicts. And then we have China, which is rapidly emerging as a superpower and has a completely different attitude to global conflict, Peter, and seems very committed to theoretically taking a bit of a backseat while conducting all of these operations kind of behind the scenes in a much more nebulous, you could say, sophisticated way, and then positioning itself as the grown up in the room, as the safe, stable country where global business can go now that the US Is in turmoil, where manufacturing can be protected from these kind of shocks, where political stability is the alternative for the chaos of the American political system. And in terms of narrative, at the very least, China is doing a lot better from this conflict than Trump's America is.
- [50:44]
Peter Frankenberg
I think that's part of my day job. So, you know, maybe to do a separate Q and A on, on this one. I mean, you.
- [50:48]
Afwa Hirsch
Well, first of all, do you agree with my analysis? Because, because you are the expert on this subject.
- [50:53]
Peter Frankenberg
Look, I think that, that you have seen from Beijing's point of view, it's about managing risk and that that comes across three different architectural spaces. One is what is the, what are the risks to China directly from what happens in Iran, whether it's to do with energy supply and related, related events that come from compression on place like honors. Second, that narrative is obviously important, but third, I think it's about how China sees how the best way that it can play its cards in a changing world. And you're right, there is a degree to which China does that slowly because there are no real obvious benefits from taking a strong position on who's taken over in Iran. I guess there's the same story with Russia, where the benefits of China are probably greater than the downsides. And I think the calculation in Beijing is that its ability to clip Russia's wings is probably very limited. So I think it's partly to do with that. I think China's geography makes a difference. Iran sits strategically in a neighborhood of not just the Gulf, but the Caucuses, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Pakistan and the Indian Ocean too. Iran's great rival, of course, has been Russia, as well as the Ottoman Turks over many centuries. China has a different geographical hand of cards to play. And to some extent, China is kind of constantly trying to navigate the world by working out what its best options are. Now, I don't think that requires to see a master plan. It doesn't need you to be a chess player. It doesn't mean that you're smart and thinking. It just means you're dealing with what grown ups call diplomacy. You're trying to work out what it is that you could benefit from, where the opportunities are. So I think sometimes we set this up as a binary of there are two different political systems. I think it's about evaluation of risk and time will tell, I think, about whether the risks that Trump has taken will pay off. It looks certainly when we recorded this in March 2026, that those downsides are extremely high for the global economy. But these things, they can settle down quite quickly. But I think China's natural instincts are to stay within its own ecosystem and leave everything alone. And actually, one of the things, as a historian that you'll note about China, is that you don't often find Chinese travelers outside mainland China. There's some movements in the 19th century, mass migrations to places like United States and so on, but China tends to stick within itself, whereas diasporas are slightly different from other parts of the world. So I don't disagree with your analysis, afwa, but I think that it's not a clash of civilizations or there's a binary way and they're reacting to each other. China plays its cards the way that it does, full stop, but for sure, one of the things that we'll learn from watching what plays out in Hormuz is how do you use economic coercion effectively against your allies, your rivals, your partners, but because you get real time access to see how that can be done.
- [53:44]
Afwa Hirsch
And from contemporary legacy perspective, for me, Suez also stands out as a masterclass in to coin and invert the name of the famous book how to Lose Friends and Alienate People. The US has over decades built up a role as the kind of convener of nations on the international stage. You know, at the center of all of these alliances, NATO, the G7, the United Nations. And this is a conflict in which the US Is after the fact, just like Britain did with Suez, asking for help and support from other nations and finding crickets, really, because nobody is in a rush to get involved in this Trump administration's actions. And I think that is maybe even more than the economic consequences, a really, really damaging thing to witness for Americans to see about itself how much it's lost the goodwill and support of other nations. But for the world stage to realize that America is not a reliable ally, I think the consequences of that could be as lasting as the damage that was done to Britain by deciding to bypass all of the international conventions and even its international relationships by launching this attack on Suez. And, of course, you know, it remains to be seen how much that's true, but my prediction is that it might be a turning point for America's relationship with its allies and its own realization of how weak those relationships are becoming.
- [55:11]
Peter Frankenberg
Look, I'll say two things. First, in the case of Suez, the US Intervention was greeted with huge relief and glee across large parts of the Arab world because the US Was standing up for Arab interests. And I think that that went down extremely well as it happened, because the US Sometimes throws away its advantages. That went wrong when NASA tried to get support to build both nuclear reactors, but also the Aswan dub, where funding came from the Soviet Union, and that that opportunity was perhaps lost. Maybe NASA played his cards quite well, or bet. I think. Look, I think in today's world, from the West, US Intervention in Iran looks reckless. I think it's important to underline that for many Iranians in Iran, as well as in the diasporas, as well as for lots of people in Iran, the Middle east region, or West Asia, whatever you want to call it. I'm not mad on any of those words. The intervention in Iran has had more support publicly than perhaps we might think here because of the way that the Iranian regime has behaved over the last 47 years, the building of proxies, the way in which it values life of its own citizens, the way it intervenes in other states, too. So although it's true that Trump has looked reckless and seems to be losing friends on the global stage, there's support is maybe not the right word. But I think that there are people who are secretly, reasonably and openly reasonably pleased that there has been a proper intervention that has, that will concentrate in the hope that a new Iran emerges, will be more moderate, more liberal, more open and less volatile. And time will tell whether that calculation looks right. But there's no question for large parts of the world, the unilateral intervention by Israel and by the United States between particular look like, as you said Afra, that they're unreliable allies and friends. But we shouldn't forget that the role that Iran has had within its region, that there are people who are cheering this on behind the scenes as well as in front of them as well.
- [57:05]
Afwa Hirsch
Thanks for listening to Legacy.
- [57:07]
Peter Frankenberg
Don't forget to hit subscribe on your favorite podcast player. You can also watch all of our episodes on YouTube, so make sure you are subscribed there too.
- [57:15]
Afwa Hirsch
And of course we're on all the socials. The links are in the show notes for this episode or just search Legacy Podcast. And don't forget if you love Legacy. To join our Subscribers club, just go to Legacy supportingcast FM and you can enjoy early access, fewer ads, Q&As and amazing bonus content.
- [57:39]
Peter Frankenberg
I'm Peter Frankerpen.
- [57:40]
Afwa Hirsch
I'm Afwa Hash and we'll see you on the next episode of Legacy.
- [58:04]
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Afwa Hirsch
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