This week we talk about Venezuela, Maduro, and international law.

We also discuss sour crude, extrajudicial killings, and Greenland.

Recommended Book: The Keep by F. Paul Wilson

Transcript

Back in mid-November of 2025, I did an episode on extrajudicial killings, focusing on the targeting of speedboats, mostly from Venezuela headed toward the United States, by the US military. These boats were allegedly carrying drugs meant for the US market, and the US government justified these strikes by saying, basically, we have a right to protect ourselves, protect our citizens from the harm caused by these illegal substances, and if we have to keep taking out these boats and killing these people to do that, we will.

There’s been a lot of back-and-forthing about the legitimacy of this approach, both in the sense that not all of these boats have been shown to be carrying drugs, some just seemed to be fishing boats in the wrong place at the wrong time, and in the sense that launching strikes without the go-ahead of Congress in the US is a legally dubious business. There was also the matter of some alleged follow-up strikes, which seemed to be intended to kill people who survived the initial taking-out of the boats, which is a big international human rights no no, to the point of potentially being a war crime.

All of this happened within the context of a war of words between US President Trump’s second administration and the increasingly authoritarian regime of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, who followed the previous president Hugo Chávez as his hand-picked successor, and has more or less completed the authoritarian process of dissolving, coopting, or diminishing all aspects of the Venezuelan government that might ever check his power, which allowed him, in 2024, to bar the very popular, now Nobel Peace Prize winning candidate María Corina Machado from running, and her sub-in candidate, like previous Maduro opponent Juan Guaido, seems to have won the election by a fair bit, and in an internationally provable way, but Maduro’s government faked results that made it look like he won, and his single-party rule has since continued unabated.

Or rather, it continued unabated until the early morning of January 3, 2026, around 2am, when US Operation Absolute Resolve kicked into action, leading to the—depending on who you ask—justified captured or illegal kidnapping—of Maduro and his wife from a stronghold in his country.

And that’s what I’d like to talk about today: the operation itself, but also the consequences and potential meaning of it within the context of other important things happening in the world right now.

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Maduro is immensely popular with about a fifth of the Venezuelan population, but essentially everyone else is strongly opposes him and his iron-fisted rule.

It’s estimated that between 2017 and 2025, just shy of 8 million people, which is more than 20% of Venezuela’s 2017 population, has fled the country in order to escape a tyrannical government and its failed policies, which have collapsed the economy, made getting working and feeding oneself and one’s family difficult, and made crime, conflict, and the state-sanctioned oppression of anyone who doesn’t kowtow to the ruling party a commonplace thing.

Trump speculated about the possibility of invading Venezuela even in his first administration, and part of the overt rationale was that it’s run by a failed government that most of the locals hate, so it would be an easy win. That justification shifted to orient around immigration and drugs by his second administration, and then more recently, Trump has said publicly that the real issue here is that Venezuela stole a bunch of US company-owned oil assets when it nationalized the industry back in the day, and those assets should be recaptured, given back to the US.

Operation Absolute Resolve took months to plan and only about two and a half hours to complete. By most objective measures it was a spectacular military and intelligence success, especially considering all the moving parts and thus, all the things that could have gone wrong.

The operation apparently involved at least 150 aircraft of various sorts, a spy within Maduro’s government, and months of surveillance, which helped them establish Maduro’s habits and routines, and that allowed them to map out where he would be, when, and what to expect going in to get him. All of these patterns changed in September of 2025 when US warships started massing in Caribbean, as Maduro started to get a little paranoid—justifiably, as it turns out—and he started moving between eight different locations, seldom sleeping in the same place more than one night in a row.

He was eventually grabbed from a military base in Caracas, Venezuela’s capitol, and to make that happen the US military assets in the area had to take out local aviation and air defenses so that US Delta Force troops could be carried in by helicopter. Several air bases and communications centers were taken out by missiles, and fighter jets were bombed on air base tarmacs. Trump alluded that a cyberattack of some kind might have also been used to take out power in the area, though satellite imagery suggests bombs might have been used against a power station to make that happen.

The operation apparently went almost exactly as planned, though a helicopter was damaged and the Delta Force team killed a large part of Maduro’s security team when he refused to surrender. A few US soldiers were wounded, but none were killed, and Venezuelan officials said, in the aftermath, that lat least 40 Venezuelans were killed throughout the country during the operation. Maduro and his wife were swept from the base before they could lock themselves in their safe room, and they were tucked into the helicopters which headed out to sea, landing them on the USS Iwo Jima, which is an assault ship.

All of this took a matter of hours and, again, is generally considered to be an objective success, in terms of precision, outcome, and other such metrics. Morally, legally, and politically, however, the operation is receiving a far more mixed response, and that response is continuing to play out as Maduro works his way through a bizarre version of the US justice system where he’s being sent to court for drug dealing.

In the US, Trump supporters have generally said all of this was a good, smart move, though some maintain that US involvement in any kind of international conflict is a waste of time, effort, and resources, and they worry about getting bogged down in another Iraq or Afghanistan-style conflict.

Everyone else is generally against the effort, even those who admit that Maduro was a tyrant who needed to go—it’s good that he’s gone, but the way in which it was done is not just questionable, but worrying because of what it says about Trump’s capacity to unilaterally launch kidnapping missions against the leaders of other countries. Not a good look, but also kind of scary.

Internationally the response is generally aligned with the latter opinion, especially in other countries that Trump has at some point threatened, which is most of them.

Governments in South and Central America have been especially concerned, however, because one of Trump’s newer messaging efforts has revolved around the concept of a Western Hemisphere basically owned and protected by the US. Do whatever you want in the rest of the world, basically, but everything over here is ours. This has raised the possibility that an emboldened Trump might attempt similar maneuvers soon, including possibly claiming the Panama Canal for the US again, or grabbing the leaders of other Latin American countries he doesn’t think are kowtowing enthusiastically enough; toeing the new international line that he’s drawing, basically.

He’s also renewed messaging around the possible purchase or capture of Greenland, which has been raising alarm bells across Europe in particular. Greenland is considered to be a vital strategic base for US security, and it would grant potential access to an abundance of also strategically and economically important minerals, both on land and underwater, but Greenland is an autonomous territory of Denmark, and most European leaders have said something along the lines of “if the US takes action to militarily claim Greenland, that’ll be the end of NATO,” an organization that was originally founded to help protect the world, and Europe especially, from military conquest from the Soviet Union, but which, at that point, might be recalibrated to protect against incursions from the US, as well.

NATO has been mostly funded and perpetuated by the US until recently, however, so there’s a chance that something else would need to replace it, if the US is no longer providing nuclear deterrence as the ultimate whammy against a potential Russian invasion of its European neighbors.

The UN has also indicated that they consider this operation to be a violation of international law, and have called it a dangerous precedent—because one nation capturing the leader of another nation, unilaterally, kind of negates the purpose of negotiations and the whole concept of international law. That kind of use of force is meant to be granted by the UN, not attempted secretively and outside the bounds of international processes for such things.

All that said, the Trump administration seems to be leaning into the victory, gleefully talking about next-step potential targets, the most likely of which seem to be in Iran, a long-time US opponent, and a target of this administration last year, when the US attacked Iranian nuclear facilities alongside Israel.

There are ongoing, very large and seemingly significant protests happening across Iran right n...