More or Less (BBC Radio 4)

Episode: US-Israel war with Iran—Do the Gulf States Have Enough Interceptor Missiles?

Date: March 7, 2026
Host: Charlotte MacDonald
Guest: Kelly Grieco (Stimson Center, Washington D.C.)

Episode Overview

This episode examines the high-stakes missile exchange in the Middle East involving the US, Israel, Iran, and the Gulf states. The focus is on whether the Gulf states possess enough interceptor missiles to defend against Iran's barrage of ballistic missiles, exploring stockpile estimates, interception rates, and the “race” between Iranian missile supply and Gulf states interceptor reserves. The program dissects publicly available numbers, scrutinizes claims of 100% interception, and questions how the balance of munitions may shift as the conflict continues.

Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. Current Situation: The Missile War in the Gulf

• Overview of the recent conflict: On February 28, the US and Israel attacked Iran’s missile infrastructure, prompting Iranian retaliation with missile and drone strikes across the region, especially targeting the Gulf states. ([01:18])
• Magnitude of the attacks:
  • US and Israel struck approximately 2,000 targets in Iran.
  • Iran has fired over 500 ballistic missiles at Gulf states. ([02:14], Kelly Grieco)

2. Intercepting Ballistic Missiles: Complexity & Cost

• Ballistic missile defense is highly challenging:
  • “You're basically trying to shoot a bullet with a bullet.” — Kelly Grieco ([03:04])
• Sophisticated, costly equipment required:
  • Example: One Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptor costs about $4 million. ([03:04])

3. Evaluation of Interception Rates

• Gulf states self-reported successes:
  • Kuwait: Detected and intercepted 178 missiles
  • Qatar: Detected 101, intercepted 98
  • UAE: Detected 196, intercepted 181
  • Bahrain: Destroyed 74 missiles
    ([03:39], Charlotte MacDonald)
• Dubiousness of claimed interception rates:
  • “These are very high rates...these systems, particularly the Patriot systems...have become really good.” — Kelly Grieco ([04:19])
  • Warning: During conflicts, numbers can be misinterpreted or inflated—often, debris is misidentified as intercepted missiles. ([04:26], [04:38])

4. Interceptor Usage & Stockpile Estimates

• Multiple interceptors are standard for each threat:

  • “The standard practice is to use two interceptors per incoming missile threat in order to make sure that you have a high probability of kill.” — Kelly Grieco ([05:09])
  • Sometimes a third interceptor is fired if the first two miss. ([05:09])

• Gulf States’ stockpile estimates are rough and classified:

  • Analysts use US congressional sales authorizations as a proxy.
  • “Historically...countries may actually purchase like 60 to 80% of what they're authorized for.” — Kelly Grieco ([06:12])
  • Research suggests the upper end: ~1,800 interceptors among all Gulf states. ([06:28])

5. Stockpile Depletion Calculation

• Back-of-envelope math suggests heavy depletion:

  • If two interceptors are fired per threat, around 59% of stockpile may be depleted.
  • If it averages 2.5 interceptors per threat, closer to 73% depleted.
  • These figures presume maximum possible initial stockpiles, which is very unlikely.
    ([06:49], [07:10], Kelly Grieco and Charlotte MacDonald)

• Restocking is not easy:

  • Only about 620 Patriot interceptors were produced globally in 2025.
  • Global demand (including Ukraine conflict) outstrips supply; production can't ramp quickly. ([07:10]–[07:48])

6. The “Race”: Who Runs Out First?

• Critical question: Will Gulf interceptors last longer than Iran’s missile supply? ([08:00])
• Iranian missile stockpile and launchers, as estimated by Israel:
  • Pre-war: ~2,500 missiles; ~200 launchers.
  • “The IDF has suggested...they think they've destroyed a bit more than half of these ballistic missile launchers after an initial wave.” — Kelly Grieco ([08:12])
• Recent reduction in missile attacks may indicate either a reduction in capacity or a strategic pause by Iran.
  • If single-digit daily launches persist, Gulf states may avoid running dry. ([08:57]–[09:09])

7. Drones: A Complicating Factor

• Drone strikes are a different problem—stockpile math doesn’t apply here.
  • Drones like Iran’s Shahed are far easier to produce and disperse, even “in a garage.” ([09:42])
  • Defending against drone waves may prove much harder in the long run.

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Kelly Grieco on missile defense difficulty:

  “You're basically trying to shoot a bullet with a bullet.” ([03:04])

• On multiple interceptors per threat:

  “The standard practice is to use two interceptors per incoming missile threat in order to make sure you have a high probability of kill.” ([05:09])

• On depletion rates:

  “If we assume...twice as many for incoming threats, that would be about 59% of their inventory gone...if more like 2.5 interceptors [per threat] then...about 73%.” ([06:49])

• On global strain for interceptors:

  “The lines are really long of countries that are asking for them. And who gets priority, of course, is tricky as well.” ([07:48])

• On Iran’s missile production vs. drone manufacturing:

  “Someone could be, you know, assembling one of these drones in their garage.” ([09:42])

Important Timestamps

• [01:18] - Context and summary of the current conflict
• [02:14] - Scale of US/Israel and Iranian missile strikes
• [03:04] - Explanation of ballistic missile interception difficulty and costs
• [03:39] - Self-reported Gulf state interception numbers
• [04:38] - Why interception figures are probably inflated
• [05:09] - Typical interceptor missile usage per incoming threat
• [06:28] - Estimated Gulf states interceptor stockpile (~1,800)
• [06:49]–[07:10] - Calculation of interceptor depletion (59–73%)
• [07:48] - Challenges resupplying interceptor missiles globally
• [08:12] - Israeli assessments of Iran's missile and launcher losses
• [09:42] - Commentary on ease of drone production and its implications

Conclusion

The episode provides a sober, numbers-driven perspective on the missile defense situation in the Gulf, suggesting that while interception rates are high, the stockpile of interceptor missiles is likely being depleted at a worrying rate. Restocking is hobbled by global conflicts and limited production, meaning that unless Iran’s offensive slows due to loss or destruction of their own launchers, the Gulf states could eventually run short. The situation with drones, meanwhile, presents a longer-term challenge of a totally different scale.

For more fact-checks and insights into the numbers shaping world events, tune in next week or contact the More or Less team with your questions.