Aaron Donaghy, "The Second Cold War: Carter, Reagan, and the Politics of Foreign Policy" (Cambridge UP, 2021)

Summary

Podcast Summary: Aaron Donaghy, "The Second Cold War: Carter, Reagan, and the Politics of Foreign Policy"

Podcast: New Books Network
Host: Dr. Luca Trenta
Guest: Dr. Aaron Donaghy
Date: March 1, 2026
Book Discussed: "The Second Cold War: Carter, Reagan, and the Politics of Foreign Policy" (Cambridge UP, 2021)

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Overview of Episode's Main Theme

This episode features an in-depth discussion with Dr. Aaron Donaghy about his book, "The Second Cold War," which analyzes the intensification and subsequent easing of US-Soviet tensions from 1979 to 1985. Donaghy focuses on the interplay between domestic politics and foreign policy during the Carter and Reagan administrations, challenging traditional, “grand strategy” perspectives by emphasizing the crucial influence of political pressures at home on presidential decision-making.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

Defining the "Second Cold War"

• The term refers specifically to the period between the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985—a phase of heightened US-Soviet tensions to be distinguished from both earlier détente and the Cold War's final thaw.
  • "It's a roughly six year period in which relations between the United States and the Soviet Union rapidly deteriorate..." (05:55, Donaghy)

The Foreign-Domestic Nexus

• Donaghy’s central thesis is the persistent and often under-emphasized influence of US domestic politics on foreign policy:
  • Presidents are "acutely aware of public opinion polls, the election calendar and how their foreign policy will affect them politically" (09:14, Donaghy).
  • Policymaking is a balance between international circumstances and domestic electoral, congressional, and partisan pressures.

Notable Quote

“Presidents often tend to be cast as these sort of global statesmen whose outlook is guided by some grand strategy or by some ideological cue. But it very rarely works out like that.” (09:14, Donaghy)

Carter Administration: From Values to Hawkishness

Initial Approach (13:19, Donaghy)

• Carter ran as a moral, outsider president, emphasizing human rights, detente, and reductions in defense spending.
• He sought a new, less confrontational posture, as evidenced in his University of Notre Dame speech (1977).

Domestic Constraints and Shifts (16:57, Donaghy)

• Achievements like the Panama Canal Treaties and Camp David Accords incurred substantial domestic political costs, sapping the capital needed for later initiatives like SALT II.
• Increasing polarization, hawkish conservative and even Democratic opposition (e.g., neoconservatives like Scoop Jackson), and events such as the Iranian Revolution and Afghanistan fueled a harder US line.

Notable Quote

“Carter expended considerable political goodwill over Panama, even though it was a very notable and very admirable foreign policy success.” (16:57, Donaghy)

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (23:43, Donaghy)

• Caught off-guard by the Soviet move, Carter responded with uncharacteristic aggression—initiating military buildup, sanctions, and pulling out of the Moscow Olympics.
• This reaction was shaped significantly by domestic political vulnerability in an election year.

Notable Moment

“Carter actually calls the invasion of Afghanistan the most serious threat to world peace since the Second World War.” (27:50, Donaghy)

Advisory Dynamics (29:11, Donaghy)

• National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's hardline advice aligned with Carter’s 1980 domestic reality, edging out the more moderate Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance.
• Brzezinski’s memos were attentive to the domestic optics of foreign policy decisions.

Notable Quote

“Brzezinski spends [much] time giving Carter advice on the domestic politics of foreign policy...” (29:11, Donaghy)

Reagan Administration: From "Evil Empire" to Pragmatist

Early Approach (32:39, Donaghy)

• Reagan emphasized “peace through strength”: boosting military spending and directly challenging Soviet expansion, viewing the USSR as ideologically and economically doomed.

Style and Delegation (36:29, Donaghy)

• Reagan’s famed communication skills and broad focus on only a few major issues distinguished him from Carter, who was much more hands-on and detail-oriented.
• Reagan was not staff-driven but did rely on trusted advisors—preferring to delegate many details but was firm on his core priorities.

Notable Quote

“He, as you know, Luke, known as the great communicator... He used, for example, humor more effectively than any other U.S. president.” (36:29, Donaghy)

Domestic Movements’ Impact (40:36, Donaghy)

• The Nuclear Freeze movement and similar civil society campaigns influenced Congress and shifted public opinion, leading to resistance against continued nuclear buildup and pressing administration toward arms control talks.

Notable Quote

“The success of the nuclear freeze movement... is really in its ability to erode public and congressional support for rearmament, for the funding of Reagan’s military buildup…” (42:34, Donaghy)

1983: Apex of Tension (43:30, Donaghy)

• Reagan’s hard rhetoric ("Evil Empire"), SDI announcement, the Able Archer exercise, Korean Air Lines 007 shootdown, and the collapse of arms talks marked 1983 as the most dangerous year of the period.

Notable Quote

“1983 was the year that saw Reagan denounce the Soviet Union... [and] a NATO military exercise... misinterpreted by Soviet leaders who suspect a possible US nuclear attack is incoming.” (43:30, Donaghy)

The “Reagan Reversal” (47:54, Donaghy)

• From late 1983 onward, Reagan’s tone and policy toward the USSR moderated significantly, seeking dialogue, easing rhetoric, changing key advisers (George Shultz, Jack Matlock), and emphasizing the “peace” in “peace through strength.”
• This shift was due to both international fears (nuclear war scare) and overwhelming domestic electoral pressures—with approval ratings low, reelection a major concern, and public anxiety about possible war surging.

Notable Quote

“We must strongly position the President on the peace side of the peace through strength formula. We need to launch some foreign policy initiatives that dramatically symbolized peace.” (52:28, Donaghy, quoting Reagan's campaign strategy)

Application to Today's Foreign Policy (55:29, Donaghy)

• Donaghy highlights that domestic political constraints remain central to US foreign policy, but also notes that partisanship and polarization may be even deeper today than during the Second Cold War.
• The legislative branch played a much more significant role in the 1970s-80s than today, following post-Vietnam reforms.

Notable Quote

“Domestic politics have always shaped American foreign policy in all sorts of ways... I do think…divisions are more deeply entrenched today than they were before, even in this period that I looked at in the ‘70s and ‘80s.” (55:29, Donaghy)

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Timestamps for Important Segments

• Donaghy’s Motivation and the Foreign-Domestic Nexus: 02:20–05:37, 09:14–12:45
• Second Cold War's Periodization: 05:37–08:27
• Carter’s Early Foreign Policy Philosophy: 13:19–16:31
• Domestic Politics and Bipartisanship (Panama/Arms Control): 16:31–19:07
• Neoconservatives and Intra-party Dynamics: 19:23–20:17
• Pivot After Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: 23:43–28:09
• Advisor Influence – Brzezinski vs. Vance: 29:11–32:16
• Reagan’s Initial Approach and Style: 32:39–36:29
• Impact of Domestic Protest Movements (Nuclear Freeze): 40:36–43:05
• 1983: Heightened Tension and Nuclear Scare: 43:30–47:32
• Reagan’s Shift to Moderation and Reasons (Domestic/Electoral): 47:54–54:18
• Continuities and Changes in Modern US Foreign Policy: 55:29–58:17

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Memorable Moments & Quotes

• On Carter’s shift post-Afghanistan:

  “Carter and Brzezinski see Moscow’s actions through the prism of the Cold War as a grand design for global Expansion... Carter really stakes his credibility on a hawkish and alarmist response.” (27:30–27:55, Donaghy)

• On Reagan’s campaign strategy:

  “We must strongly position the President on the peace side of the peace through strength formula.” (52:28, Donaghy, citing James Baker’s advice)

• Host Dr. Trenta’s reflection:

  “I particularly dislike the rhetoric that the United States is currently very polarized... whereas there was an era before in which this was not the case.” (54:18, Trenta)

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Conclusion

This episode provides a nuanced, archive-based exploration of how domestic political imperatives—from public opinion and election cycles to congressional and intra-party forces—drove dramatic reversals in the foreign policies of the Carter and Reagan administrations during the Second Cold War. Dr. Donaghy’s account enriches our understanding of these pivotal years and demonstrates the continuing relevance of the “foreign-domestic nexus” in contemporary US foreign policy.

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For More:
Read The Second Cold War: Carter, Reagan, and the Politics of Foreign Policy by Aaron Donaghy (Cambridge University Press, 2021). (58:17)

Transcript

[A]

Hi everyone. I want to tell you all about another podcast I think you'll enjoy. College Matters from the Chronicle College Matters is a weekly show from the Chronicle of Higher Education, and it's a great resource for news and analysis about colleges and universities. You'll hear sharp discussions with Chronicle journalists offering fresh perspectives on the latest salvos from the Trump administration and keen insights about how faculty and students are adapting to technological changes. College Matters also features incisive interviews with newsmakers, including recent conversations with Chris Eisgruber, Princeton University's president, and Rick Singer, who is best known as the mastermind of the Varsity Blues admissions scandal. Check out College Matters wherever you get your podcasts.

[B]

Welcome to the New Books Network

[C]

welcome to New Books Network. My name is Luca Trenta. I'm an associate professor in International Relations at Swansea University in the UK. Today we welcome Dr. Aaron Donaghy. Dr. Donaghy is Associate professor of History at the University of Limerick. Previously, he was an European Union Marie Curie Global Fellow at Harvard University and the University of Nottingham, and a visiting scholar at Harvard center for European Studies. He has also held research fellowships at Cornell University, the University of Cambridge, and a Government of Ireland Postdoctoral Fellowship at University College Dublin, where he taught modern history. Tanahy is the author of the British Government and the Falkland Islands, 1974-1979, published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2014, and is now working on a study of American policy during the Bosnian war of the 1990s. Today, though, we are covering his latest book, the Second Cold Carter, Reagan and the Politics of Foreign Policy, published by Cambridge University Press in 2021. Aaron, welcome to the show.

[B]

Thanks, Luca. It's great to be with you.

[C]

I have to say I really enjoyed the book. It was a throwback to some earlier studies of the Carter administration I did. And so I wanted to ask you, how did you come to study this period? How did the book come about?

[B]

Well, there were a few reasons why I wanted to write the book, Luca. One was the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy, which is something that always interests me, and that's something that we see and acknowledge all the time in our everyday lives. We discuss it over the table with respect to current affairs, but it's something that's often absent, I find, from history books, particularly those that are written for an academic audience. So I wanted to delve into this foreign domestic nexus. That's one thing. But in terms of this particular era and these two presence, there are a couple of reasons why I wanted to research this topic. Firstly, how do we Move from this era of severe east west tension with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the threat, vast military buildups, particularly Ronald Reagan's, and these huge anti nuclear protests across Western Europe and America. How do we move from that to a scenario where the Americans and Soviets are talking again, they're reaching agreements over things like nuclear weapons and where the Soviets are willingly relinquishing control over eastern Europe. So 1983, for example, is regarded as the most dangerous year of the Cold War. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, it's the year of sdi, it's the year of Reagan's Evil Empire speech, the INF deployments in Western Europe, the nuclear war scare, and yet within four years, Reagan and Gorbachev are signing the INF agreement and two years after that, the Cold War is over. So how and why did this transition take place? Why does the Cold War intensify in the late 70s and early 80s and why do tensions then start to recede? That was another thing I wanted to explore. And then the other reason that led me to write the book was to try and explain the foreign policy shifts that take place during the Carter and Reagan years. So here you have two presidents, one a Democrat, the other a Republican, who begin their terms by pursuing a very particular Cold War approach. And yet by their final year they have in many ways reversed course, adopting an approach very much at odds with what went before. So Jimmy Carter moves from a sort of values based approach, moral based approach, based on things like human rights, on detente, on limited defense spending, to becoming a full fledged coal warrior in 1980. With Ronald Reagan, it's in many ways just the opposite. He arrives in office as the sort of quintessential anti Soviet hardliner, publicly denouncing the Soviets to becoming something of a peacemaker in 1984, reaching out to Moscow in search of bilateral agreements, reversing sanctions, and inviting their Foreign Minister Gromyko to the White House. So what leads both Carter and Reagan to adopt policies in their fourth year in office that were so at odds with the course they had earlier pursued and on which they had really staked their reputation? That was also something that interested me.

[C]

Yeah, absolutely. And I think you mentioned this. When we say second Cold War, what years are we talking about? You mentioned in the previous answer, sort of what comes after that is the end of the Cold War. What comes before, what years are we talking about?

[B]

Yeah, that's a very good question. Historians sometimes refer to the period between 1979 and 1985 as a second Cold War or a new Cold War. And really, it's meant to capture this acute period of east west tension that is sort of sandwiched in between the era of detente in the early 70s and then the end of the Cold War in the late 80s and the second half of the 1980s. So it's a roughly six year period in which relations between the United States and the Soviet Union rapidly deteriorate when nuclear tensions rise and we see mass social movements emerge on either side of the Atlantic. Typically, we consider the starting point of this second Cold War to be the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, which really in many ways kills off any lingering detente between Washington and Moscow. Arguably, the endpoint then is the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev as Soviet leader in 1985. This new and completely different kind of Soviet leader, certainly, I think with the first successful summit between Reagan and Gorbachev in Geneva in late 1985, this second Cold War comes to an end. And it's worth remembering as well, Luca, that the Cold War, it lasted for nearly half a century. The Cold War, as we know it lasted for nearly half a century. But the conflict between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, it really waxes and wanes at various different stages. You have moments of crisis and tension, for example, in the late 1940s and the early 1960s over Berlin and then Cuba. But we also have periods of relative peace between the two superpowers for large parts, for example, of the 1960s and 70s. And, you know, as historians, as academics, we often sort of debate these periodizations. You know, when does a particular era begin? When does a particular era end? The Cold War, for example, has no precise beginning or end dates. Does it begin sometime in the waning days of the Second World War, or is it sometime later with the, you know, the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine? Did the Cold War end with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, or did it end only with the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991? So we debate these sorts of things quite a bit.

[C]

It's quite interesting that you say that because, for example, currently in intelligence studies, some people are dating the Cold War back to the early 1900s, and some other people on the opposite side are suggesting that the Cold War never actually ended.

[B]

Yes. Particularly in Asia. Yeah, exactly. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[C]

Overall, the argument of the book I find, which is an argument that I very much share, is that domestic politics and domestic political pressures tend to influence the extent to which a president is willing to take certain risks, especially on the global stage. How does this influence happen? How do domestic politics, pressures, groups and so on, influence foreign policy on the global stage?

[B]

Yeah, I mean, I think it begins firstly with the recognition that presidents and many of the key decision makers are politicians. And this sounds obvious, but all too often, Luca, you'll find that books about foreign policy, and particularly scholarly books, again, don't treat them as such. Presidents often tend to be cast as these sort of global statesmen whose outlook is guided by some grand strategy or by some ideological cue. But it very rarely works out like that. Most presidents, for example, are acutely aware of public opinion polls of the election calendar and how their foreign policy will affect them politically. And that is very much factored in to their risk calculus. Presidents, particularly those serving in their first term, such as Carter and Reagan in this book, make decisions on international issues based at least partly on political considerations. And this sometimes will mean subordinating principles or ideology, whether that's human rights, whether that's reciprocity or whatever. The second thing then is that some foreign affairs issues are in a way both international and domestic, in the sense that they often have national or domestic repercussions as well as overseas. And parenthetically, I happen to think that the foreign domestic nexus now in our sort of interconnected world is arguably even greater than it was in the 1970s and 80s if we consider things like wars, immigration, trade issues, tariffs and so on. And I take heart from Robert McMahon's formulation, he was a very famous, very eminent scholar, that U.S. foreign relations history is very much a Janus face field. In other words, it looks inwards as well as outwards. And I think that's how policymakers work. They analyze the context of home and abroad, they weigh up the costs and benefits. And it's really only by examining this full landscape, international and domestic, that we can really understand how presidents operate. You know, what influences their risk calculus, why do they choose certain policies and discard others, or as in the case of this book, why they decide to change course at a given time. And yeah, and I think decisions are usually. They usually filter through a process, and that includes domestic pressures, things like public opinion, partisan politics, electoral strategizing, and personal ambition as well. And in the case of Carter and Reagan, I think it also includes congressional constraints and interest groups, because this was very much the post Vietnam era, a time when power was invested in the legislative branch and their capacity to influence foreign policy. So for Carter and Reagan, success rested partly on their ability to really master this international domestic nexus, managing these legislative demands, monitoring Public opinion anticipating partisan challenges really becomes as much a part of their thinking as does attitudes in the Kremlin or elsewhere. And so in this book I look at interrelated themes like credibility, risk and timing, which I argue are essential in explaining why Carter and Reagan change course in foreign policy when they do.

[C]

Yeah, I mean, absolutely preaching to the converted here. I'm very fond of the idea that actually domestic politics influences foreign policy to a large extent. If we start moving to the two major case studies in your book, the Carter and Reagan administrations, you did anticipate some of this at the start, but how does Carter posture as president emerges? What did Carter envisage for his foreign policy as sort of when his presidency started?

[B]

Yeah, very important. Carter's pollster, named Pat Cadell, once said that if it weren't for the country looking for something different in 1976, Carter could never have gotten elected, that no one would have paid attention to him. Now, I think that's very harsh. I suppose there is, though, a ring of truth to it in the sense that the broad American public were fed up with the political establishment after Vietnam and Watergate and the CIA scandals. And Carter was very much a political outsider. He offered them something different, certainly something very different from the Nixon and Kissinger years. I think there was a sense after Vietnam that American foreign policy should be guided by a moral compass, that there should be an emphasis on a values based approach to dealing with the world. And Jimmy Carter certainly promised that moral leadership. He leans heavily on moral principles and he very much makes human rights the fulcrum of his election campaign against Gerald Ford. And this is something that he deeply believes in. Although having said that, Carter was in fact quite a critic of the Helsinki Accords the previous year. But civil rights and then human rights are things that he very much believes in. Now, when Carter begins his presidency, he does pledge his commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of his foreign policy. But he also pledges to a large extent to commit to detente. And in a sense, luca, these two goals do clash. So, for example, in his first few weeks as president, he invites Soviet dissidents to the White House and he publicly attacks the Soviet Union for their poor record on human rights. And this will do nothing to endear him to the Soviets, with whom he's trying to work to achieve agreements over things like strategic nuclear weapons. The other aspect as well is that Carter is pledging to do things like curtailing defence spending, limiting military intervention overseas, working to reduce the nuclear threat. He has little time for the Sort of Cold War alarmism, this anti Soviet hysteria which grips so much of American politics. He claimed that America when he takes office is now free of that inordinate fear of communism. And in fact he gives a speech I think was at the University of Notre Dame in May 1977 that really reflects these points. Carter's basically saying, look, it's time to embrace a new approach. This old fashioned containment idea is outdated. Not everything can be defined by this US Soviet rivalry. So let's tone down the obsession with anti communism, reach out and pursue d' etat with the Soviets. But by the time we get to 1980, many of these aims are not so much discarded as they are inverted. And I finally should just say as well that as you no doubt know, Carter does take a hands on approach towards a number of other issues beyond the Cold War, you know, from Panama to the Middle east to various parts of Africa. So he was by no means just a Cold War president. Although that's really beyond the scope of this particular book.

[C]

But I mean, but this is quite interesting in a sense because some of those foreign policy achievements and some are very important achievements historically both in terms of Panama and Camp David, but they do seem to come with sort of major domestic political costs. Sort of bringing together a coalition that supports those achievements seems to have consequences for other goals.

[B]

Yeah, absolutely. I mean there's a number of, I suppose there's a number of problems facing Carter. One is that partisan divisions and ideological divisions are deepening, very much deepening. After Vietnam you've got liberals calling for a sort of more moral values based approach, less defense spending, less military interventions. And then you've got conservatives who feel that the Soviet Union has taken complete advantage of detente, ignoring their obligations to Helsinki and they're embarking on this new military buildup. The Soviets are actually begin placing new heavy missiles in Eastern Europe just as Carter takes office. So securing bipartisan support for sort of contentious foreign policy issues gradually becomes more difficult, particularly as we move towards the 1980 elections. And a good example of this is the Panama Canal issue that you referenced there, which occurs early in his presidency. So here for example, Carter is asking moderate Republicans to in some ways risk their own political positions for an unpopular cause within their party. And a large number of senators who vote in favor of the Panama treaties actually lose their seats in the 1978 midterm elections. And it therefore becomes much more difficult to persuade moderate Republicans to cross party lines and vote for another contentious partisan issue like SO II with the Soviet Union, which is subject to a barrage of criticism from hardline Republicans, conservative Democrats, special interest groups like the Committee on the Present Danger. So Carter expended considerable political goodwill over Panama, even though it was a very notable and very admirable foreign policy success. You know, this phased transfer of the Canal back to Panama. But in fact, a number of moderate Republicans who actually back Carter on Panama, like Howard Baker, like Henry Kissinger, had told Carter privately that they wouldn't be prepared to support or at least endorse SALT II no matter what it contained. That they had really already gone as far as they could in reaching across the political aisle.

[C]

We're talking a bit about how the mood switches, but just wanted to mention you mentioned the Committee on Present Danger. There is also the emergence of this new sort of political force which is seemingly oddly placed within the Democratic Party at the start as well.

[B]

Yes, absolutely, yeah. I mean, I was just going to say, yes, the neoconservative movement, I was going to say the national security establishment is very divided over this issue. But as you say, Luca, this isn't just a partisan debate, it's an inter party debate because you have got these hawkish Democrats like Scoop Jackson, Henry Jackson, and many of them are in the Committee in the Present Danger who are urging Carter to do things like increase military spending and are pushing back against the idea of detente. And Carter, of course needs these conservative Democrats and indeed conservative Republicans to ratify any arms agreement that he might eventually reach with the Soviets, as he does in 1979 with the Sol II agreement. So it's a very delicate balancing act that Carter has to deal with. He's placed in a very difficult situation, no doubt about it.

[C]

Yes. And I think we are moving towards what you say is the moment in which there is a switch. It certainly comes in a moment of crisis for the United States. You have the Iranian revolution and the hostage taking and so on. But I think the book makes a persuasive argument that there are also a lot of changes within the domestic context that bring to this change in general mood. Can you talk about that a bit?

[B]

Yeah, I mean, if we're talking about. So there's a couple of things there. I think if we're talking about the hardening of the Carter administration's policy, I think this was definitely a gradual rather than a sudden one. So even before the sort of hawkish policies in 1980, which we'll get to, I think Carter had already been moving, albeit slowly and in a moderate way in that direction. So for 1979, for example, he pledges to increase defense spending by 3%. He authorizes the MX missile system. He plays the China card. Part of the reason for that, as I mentioned, is this sheer pressure that Carter is under from the neoconservatives, including those in his own party, to toughen the US defense posture and abandon the pursuit of detente to make the case for a stronger SALT II agreement. There's a widespread feeling among conservatives in both parties that amid detente, the Soviets had moved ahead in the arms race, conventional and nuclear, that the United States had sort of gone soft and that the Soviets were carving out new spheres of influence in developing world. And of course, these cries reached fever pitch when the Soviets invade Afghanistan just a few months after signing the SALT II treaty. The other point that you mentioned there, Luke, as well, of course that really needs to be stressed is Carter's domestic is the domestic political situation in America and Carter's own political position, which deteriorates badly in 1979amid the effects of the energy crisis, inflation and unemployment rise, along with gas shortages and Carter's own public approval ratings, I think it sinks to about 28% in the middle of that year. And in those circumstances, the American public really became less concerned about say, civil liberties in faraway lands or complex elaborate arms limitation agreements. So you have mounting accusations of weakness and ineffectiveness from his political opponents, particularly after the Iran hostage crisis. And Carter really comes under mounting pressure to demonstrate his toughness and decisiveness both at home and overseas.

[C]

Yes. On the hostages, it's quite interesting because something I dealt with in the past there is the whole discussion of Carter almost becoming a prisoner of the hostage issue, whereas Reagan facing other, not similar, but not too dissimilar either. Hostage issues didn't actually make a political issue with them and they did not and he did not suffer in equal amount. Something that I thought in the book was very effective and I hadn't entirely realized was how quick and aggressive the Carter administration reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is. Can you tell us a bit, can you explain a bit how this reaction is so strong and so abrupt?

[B]

Yeah, I actually didn't anticipate that before I began the research. It was something that really surprised me. But Afghanistan really wasn't on the Carter administration's radar at all before December 1979. Even when Afghanistan's civil war is worsening, there's no sort of sense of impending, there's no sort of sense of major urgency about this. There was some very limited covert action, to be sure, providing non military aid, but really nothing beyond that, and with the possible exception of Brzezinski, and I say possible, the current administration accepted that Afghanistan lay in the Soviet and not in the American sphere of influence. And I think there were a few things. One is that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it completely kills off Daytone and it ends any hope, and I think it was already struggling, but it ends any hope of Congress ratifying the Sol II treaty. And this was intended to be a cornerstone of Carter's election campaign. Secondly, the Soviet action, I suppose in some ways it vindicates the criticism leveled at Carter by his political opponents like Ronald Reagan, who argued that detente was always a flawed approach, that the Soviets could never be trusted, that Carter was perhaps naive, and that the only way to deal with Moscow was through a position of military strength. I suppose the other crucial element is that the Soviet invasion comes just weeks after the Iran hostage crisis, which really becomes the all consuming news story of the year. And this sort of feeds into the perception of Carter being maybe a sort of a weak or ineffectual president. The other critical element here, though Luca, is timing. So 1980 is a presidential election year and the Soviet action occurs just as Carter's election campaign is getting underway. And at this time the polls had Carter trailing to Ted Kennedy for the Democratic nomination, let alone Ronald Reagan in the national stakes. So his response to this Soviet invasion is made very much through the prism of the 1980 presidential election and inside the Carter administration, with a few exceptions, domestic factors, color perceptions of the Soviet motive and the countermeasures that were deemed necessary. Now it's generally accepted, and you probably know, that the Soviet motives for invading Afghanistan were primarily defensive, that they were worried about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism on their southern border, that they feared this new and rogue Afghan leader, Amin, who they felt was moving closer to America. And also that now having lost Iran, that Washington might use Afghanistan as a new staging post to monitor Soviet affairs. And this in essence was the Cyrus Bands argument. He was the Secretary of State. But in the political climate of 1980, in the heat of election season, and with Carter already vulnerable to accusations of weakness, naivety, none of those arguments would pass muster. And so for Carter, viewing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a symptom of Soviet behavior rather than a defensive maneuver is really the risk averse decision. And so these wider forces, things like Afghan nationalism, radical Islam, Soviet security interests are very much downplayed. And Carter and Brzezinski see Moscow's actions through the prism of the Cold War as a grand design for global Expansion. And of course, to have suggested anything other than that would have exposed him to further charges of softness and naivety. So the need to demonstrate strength really becomes the common denominator of all Carter's countermeasures and the new policies towards the Soviets. In 1980, Carter really stakes his credibility on a hawkish and alarmist response. He authorizes new weapons systems, he isolates the USSR diplomatically, imposing all sorts of sanctions, pulling out of the Moscow Olympics, and exaggerating the threat to national security. In fact, Carter actually calls the invasion of Afghanistan the most serious threat to world peace since the Second World War. So the Soviets are very much taken aback by the scale of the US response, and they in turn harden their own position. So basically, US Soviet relations become more or less non existent after the first few weeks of 1980.

[C]

There are two names that you mentioned in your answer right now, and I will try to play devil's advocate here. We talked about international events, domestic factors and so on. But one could argue that one of the issues that plays an important role is also the role of Carter's advisors. And progressively, Carter seemingly comes to trust Brzezinski more than he trusts Secretary of State Vance. As I was reading your book, I was listening to a podcast about the latest Brzezinski biography by Edward Luce, which I've not read yet, which seem to be very, very positive about Brzezinski's role. But in your book he seems to get it wrong quite a few times, and yet Carter seems to trust him more than Vance anyway. Is there an issue there of the administration's policy hardening because of trust and who the President comes to trust?

[B]

Yeah, so I think it's a bit of both. I think it's the domestic political context and it's the influence of Brzezinski. This is sort of the classic historian's answer, but I think it is a bit of both. Carter does trust Brzezinski more. Partly, I think, Luca, because Brzezinski's advice very much aligns with this changing political context, the changing mood, and what Carter feels would work best for him domestically in 1980. There are earlier instances where he sort of takes Cyrus Vance's advice in terms of U.S. soviet relations, but that doesn't happen after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And one of the most notable things reading the Brzezinski Files in the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library is the amount of time Brzezinski spends giving Carter advice on the domestic politics of foreign policy. There are these weekly National Security Council memos that he sends to Carter. And so many of them are concerned the political optics or potential domestic benefits of particular foreign policy options. You know, we tend to think, and I haven't read Ed Lucent's book yet, but we tend to think of Brzezinski as a, you know, a sort of grand strategist, someone guided by ideological convictions, anti communism and a keen appreciation of geopolitics. But he's also extremely aware of this, of this foreign domestic nexus. And when the Soviets invade Afghanistan, Brzezinski tells Carter quite bluntly of the domestic political dangers of appearing soft or of falling short of imposing severe countermeasures against Moscow. So Brzezinski sees the Soviet invasion as an offensive move, the first step towards seizing control of the Middle east, capturing the oil fields, establishing a presence along the Indian Ocean. Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of State, saw it completely differently. To him, as I mentioned earlier, the Soviet move is very much a defensive one to protect the Soviet security interests and one that was very much confined to Afghanistan. And what I found in the files when I was researching this is advance. He's quietly trying to nudge Carter to continue a dialogue with the Soviets in January and February 1980 to explore possible ways out of this mess. Because it's quite clear early on that this war is going badly for the Soviets. But Brzezinski would have none of this. And when he learns that Carter is considering sending an emissary to Moscow to negotiate with Gromyko, the Soviet foreign minister, Brzezinski, he sends Carha this very sharply worded memo, basically saying, if you do this, you'll be projecting an image of weakness. Can you imagine the field day that your political opponents like Reagan will have with this? He says it will be politically devastating at home for you. And so that's more or less the end of the story after that. Brzezinski, Carter sides with Brzezinski. And he makes a statement saying that, look, the sanctions against the Soviets will stick. Then he pulls the US out of the Moscow Olympics, and as I say, US Soviet relations really are non existent

[C]

thereafter, which to a certain extent still does not help Jimmy Carter because he loses the elections to Ronald Reagan. If I can ask a symmetrical question, what type of candidate was Ronald Reagan? What ideas did he have as he was coming into office? You mentioned some of this at the very start, but maybe some additional elements might come up.

[B]

Yeah. So Ronald Reagan, in many ways a very different character to Jimmy Carter when he takes power. Of course, there is still a perception in some ways of American decline in Fact, I would say it's even more that way as we get to 1980, 1981. And if you think about the period just before Reagan takes office, you did have this very gloomy period for America. You had the memories of this painful defeat in Vietnam. You had the Watergate scandal, you had the energy crisis, the gas shortages, you had rising inflation and unemployment, you had the Iran hostage crisis and so on. So there is, as I also mentioned, there's this perception that the Soviet Union is now ahead of the United States in the armist race, that it's more active overseas, particularly with this invasion of Afghanistan. So I think what Reagan, when he takes over, is very much looking to bulk bolster American power and prestige and to make America, as he would see it, respected again. But unlike Carter, who in many ways tries to take on different issues simultaneously, Reagan is really laser focused on just two or maybe three things when he becomes president. Firstly, trying to revive the American economy through things like cutting taxes, reducing government regulation. Second, he wants to shrink government at home, reducing the size and influence of the federal government, cutting social programs, things like this. But in foreign policy, which is really what we're concerned with here, his aim is to defeat communism overseas. And his strategy to defeat communism was known as peace through strength. And Reagan had long argued that the Soviet Union had taken advantage of detente. And for years he'd been calling for a new U.S. military buildup because he felt that this was the only way in which you could actually extract meaningful concessions from the Soviets. But he also sees Soviet weaknesses. So Reagan argued that the Soviet system was ideologically bankrupt and that it had economic problems which would not be able to sustain a sort of protracted arms race. And so he reasoned that, look, if the United States is willing to outspend the Soviets militarily, sooner or later Moscow will be forced to negotiate seriously over things like arms control and nuclear weapons. So for Reagan, only through a position of supreme military strength could America set the terms of negotiations and bring the Soviets to the table. So Reagan sets out to achieve peace through strength. And most of his foreign policy initiatives around the globe were seen through the lens of anti communism. So this represents really, in many ways, Luke, a more hardline approach. Gone is Nixon's elaborate detente, gone is Carter's emphasis on human rights. Yes, it's true Reagan would champion the cause of freedom in Eastern Europe, but the broad effect was to abandon many of Carver's policies. Rather than pressuring, for example, pro American dictatorships to improve their human rights records, his administration would Demonstrate a willingness to cooperate with them in order to oppose communist advances.

[C]

Maybe we can say something more about Reagan as president as opposed to Carter as president. Probably. They could not be more different in terms of presidential style. I'm guessing attention span and a way to deal with various domestic and foreign policy topics. What have you found in your research? How different is Reagan? And is the difference an advantage or is it actually a weakness?

[B]

They were very different. So I think there are benefits and drawbacks from Reagan's presidential style. He was, as you know, Luke, known as the great communicator. You know, he had this ability to simplify messages and engage audience in speeches. And of course, these were skills that he had honed over decades. He was an actor then a very prominent, well, a prominent public spokesman and then a politician. So he had these skills. He used, for example, humor more effectively than any other U.S. president. And he would often begin addresses or speeches by telling anecdotes or a joke. And so this sort of demeanor also helps Reagan reach across the political aisle as well as form relationships with the media. Unlike Carter, as you alluded to there, Reagan didn't agonize over policy papers into the late hours of the evening. He didn't burden himself with mastering endless details about policy issues. And he very much delegated these responsibilities to his cabinet. And in a way, he was quite reliant on his staff for advice, particularly in foreign affairs. But he wasn't staff driven. And I make this distinction, I think Richard Reeves in his book noted this as well, is that Reagan still did retain strong independent views on certain issues, like strategic defense, maybe Central America, and he was prepared to air them when he saw fit. And I think the fact that Reagan personally focused on a relatively small number of issues, those that he felt mattered most to him or to America, allowed him to maintain his priorities and maybe perhaps avoid getting distracted. But there were downsides to this too, no doubt about that. So on some complex issues, he, as I mentioned, struggles to master the details of policy. And he wasn't a hands on president in the way that Jimmy Carter was. In other words, he tended to distance himself somewhat from the policymaking process, basically taking a back seat until the moment for decision had arrived. You know, you fellas work it out as a sort of typical Reagan line at cabinet meetings. And I don't want to exaggerate that too much because, you know, Reagan was, I think, in many ways less passive than people think. And there were a number of issues which really did animate him. I think one, one thing that we historians look for LUCA when we visit these presidential libraries is the handwritten notes of presidents on the files and memos, you know, things like speeches and letters are great, but they're carefully packaged and prepared. But handwritten notes really does give us a glimpse of what presidents are thinking in real time. Carter, as you say, you know, he reads everything. He would constantly write notes and thoughts in the margins of the files so we can see what he is really thinking about things with Reagan, in many ways, it's the opposite. His handwritten notes are relatively scarce. And so in fact, our best window, I think, into Reagan's contemporaneous thoughts are his comments at the National Security Council meetings where the record of meeting is transcribed and we have verbatim Reagan's input here.

[D]

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[C]

One of the actors that emerges is also in the Reagan years is also domestic pressure groups, for example, against nuclear weapons and so on. How do these domestic civil society groups influence foreign policy in the Reagan years? What are their methods to pressure the U.S. government?

[B]

Yeah, I think that's a great question. I mean, I focus mainly, I suppose in this book on the nuclear freeze movement, which is this anti nuclear campaign which really gathers pace in the early 80s. And the nuclear freeze movement basically called upon America and the Soviet Union to adopt an immediate mutual freeze on all further testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons. That was their goal. So it had less ambitious or radical goals compared to some anti nuclear groups in Western Europe like the cnd, which really targets unilateral disarmament. But the nuclear freeze movement, LUCA worked from the premise that the best way of making an impact was to push the movement from the margins towards the political mainstream, working within the system rather than alienating it from the system. And this meant getting the attention of Congress, which it did very effectively in the first two years of Reagan's term in 1981 and 1982. And in fact it eventually results in a nuclear freeze resolution in the house in 1983. This was a movement, a coalition of all sorts of people, and although it was affiliated with the Democratic Party, it was officially bipartisan. They felt that was important. But they really also tap into this shift in public opinion, which by 1982 is very much in favor of a freeze in nuclear weapons. And the momentum of the freeze campaign really takes the Reagan administration by surprise. The Democrats win big in the 1982 midterm elections and Reagan's approval rating sinks to, I think it's the mid-30s, about 35%. Granted, the unemployment situation probably has more to do with that. But the success of the nuclear freeze movement, to your question is, is really in its ability to erode public and congressional support for rearmament, for the funding of Reagan's military buildup, which is, of course, pivotal to Reagan's Cold War strategy. So it forces Reagan from 1983 to be much more attentive to public opinion and domestic concerns. One other spinoff, parenthetically of the nuclear freeze movement kind of ironically, was his Strategic Defence Initiative, which comes about in part because he can't gain congressional support for some of his more controversial defense programs.

[C]

You've anticipated something that I wanted to ask, actually, because before we get to Reagan's conversion in a sense, or he is turning towards more moderate policy, we have a major year of tension. The most dangerous year, as you mentioned earlier on in the discussion, 1983. How do we get there? How do we get to this peak of tension?

[B]

Yeah, I mean, the principle that the Reagan administration began with in terms of U.S. soviet relations was this notion of reciprocity. So no detente, no summit meetings with Soviet leaders or negotiations over nuclear weapons until the Soviets demonstrate goodwill and improve their behavior. Reagan, in fact, doesn't even send an ambassador to Moscow for the best part of a year. Reagan is also very blunt in his rhetoric. In his first press conference, for example, he accuses the Soviets of lying and cheating. So almost immediately the Soviets are hostile. This is not a new Richard Nixon. And they're hostile as well, of course, because Reagan is also embarking on this, on this huge military buildup. Reagan's rhetoric, I think, is definitely a factor. He gives a speech to the British parliament in 1982. He talks of leaving Marxism, Leninism on the ash heap of history. Later, of course, he refers to the Soviet Union as an evil empire. There's also loose talk, I should say, among hardliners in the Pentagon like Weinberger, about winning a nuclear war. So U.S. soviet relations really are practically non existent in the first couple of years in the Reagan administration. To your question, yeah. Some historians refer to 1983 as the most dangerous year of the second half of the Cold War, largely because escalating US Soviet tensions really raised fear of a possible nuclear war. So 1983 was the year that saw Reagan denounce the Soviet Union, as I mentioned, as a naval empire. And he ups the military ante by unveiling a proposal for, a proposal for a Strategic Defense Initiative. You have the destruct the Soviet destruction of a Korean airliner that kills 62Americans including a member of Congress. Reagan will order the invasion of Grenada and the overthrow of its pro Marxist government. And then in November you've got this conjuncture of events that really sees U.S. soviet relations rapidly deteriorate. There's a NATO military exercise spanning Western Europe. It's codenamed Able Archer, which is misinterpreted by Soviet leaders who suspect that a possible U.S. nuclear attack is incoming. And they start placing their forces on the nuclear alert. And then two weeks after that you've got the American INF missiles arriving in Western Europe. This in turn leads the Soviet Union to storm out of INF talks and withdraw from the start negotiations. So by the time we get to the end of 1983, for the first time since the late 60s, there is no arms control talks, no strategic arms control talks taking place at all between the two superpowers. But I think I would highlight Luca Reagan's proposal for a Strategic defence initiative in March 1983 because this, this really does unnerve the Soviets. This was a plan for a space based missile defense system that was designed to protect America from a nuclear attack. And SDI was viewed by the Kremlin as the latest in this string of provocative American moves, but one that was more dangerous and uncertain. You've got the possible militarization of space and the departure from traditional nuclear deterrence. Soviet leaders, I think it was Andropov at the time, had to grapple with the question was the United States really willing to abandon this concept of mutual assured destruction? And then the other reason the Soviets were worried about SDI of course was the sheer cost of having to compete in a new arms race. One that now could be extended to the skies, into space. And that this would put a serious strain on, on the Soviet economy and its ability to compete in the arms race, particularly since it's having to prop up all sorts of client states around the world. So there is a huge amount of tension and uncertainty in 1983.

[C]

And yet we move fairly quickly towards a de escalation. Reagan has his own conversion. And so slowly but surely, at least in the direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, Reagan's foreign policy becomes more moderate. How does this happen?

[B]

Yeah. So even now I think there's been relatively little on what we might call Reagan's conversion or Reagan's reversal or Reagan's Turn. And that again was one of the motivations, I think, for writing the book to find out how and why this happened. There was a book written by Beth Fisher called the Reagan Reversal and another broader study on this written by the Washington Post journalist Don Oberdorfer. I think it was called the Turn. And these books were written in the 1990s, long before the declassification of archival material in the Reagan library. Anyway, they essentially pinpoint the Abel Archer Crisis of late 1983, this so called nuclear war scare, as the moment when Reagan pivots to a more moderate, certainly less hardline policy position in 1984. Now, I think there's a lot in that we know from Reagan's diaries as well as intelligence reports that he was gravely worried about the situation. He genuinely could not believe that Soviet leaders actually thought America might be willing to launch a first nuclear strike against them. And I agree with much of that. But there are two other things that I argue in the book. Firstly, that Reagan was already beginning to moderate his position even before the November crisis. I think the Reagan term begins a little earlier. And secondly, that the domestic political turns played a far greater role in Reagan's thinking than these other historians have suggested or acknowledged. So, for example, in 1983, Reagan does seek to negotiate a dialogue with Moscow. He becomes more receptive to the idea of modifying the US approach to arms control. He opts for a very restrained reaction to the Korean airline disaster. And as the year progresses, he displays this sort of newfound aversion to publicly attacking the Soviets. The reference to an evil empire in March 1983 is really the last we ever hear of of Reagan's anti Soviet rhetoric. So 1983 really is the year in which Reagan departs from the rigid views of the hardliners who had previously held sway and he aligns himself more with the moderate pragmatic wing. And it's worth remembering, Luca, that Reagan makes major changes to his foreign policy team between late 82 and October 83. George Shultz, very much a pragmatist, arrives as Secretary of State. And Reagan really elevates him to the top of the policy making structure. In 1983, Jack Matlock becomes the NSC adviser on Soviet affairs in place of the very hawkish ideologue Richard Pipes. And Reagan chooses Robert McFarlane, not Sinkerpatrick, to succeed William Clark as the National Security Advisor. So even by the time we get to this Abel Archer crisis, this nuclear war scare in November 1983, the attitudes of Reagan's top foreign policy advisors really bears little resemblance to those who were in place at the start. And of course, they're urging Reagan to give assurances in public and private about his willingness to improve relations with Moscow. And Reagan is absolutely on board with all of this. I think it reflects his own moderate views and a genuine desire to improve relationships, but also his pragmatism, which I think many Reagan scholars continue to downplay. Reagan has an increased sense of his domestic imperatives now. He's running for reelection in 1984, and it's very clear to him and his advisors in 1983 that public fears about a nuclear war and his handling of US Soviet relations is the single biggest threat to his hopes of winning that election. Public approval of Reagan's handling of foreign affairs is consistently low. And in fact, if you look at his election campaign plan, which is largely written by James Baker In October 1983, Baker was this very talented, pragmatic chief of staff, someone who Reagan deeply trusted. And he writes this election campaign plan with Reagan. And Baker's advice is clear. He says we must strongly position the President on the peace side of the peace through strength formula. We need to launch some foreign policy initiatives that dramatically symbolized peace. And so in 1984, US policy really moved to the center with much greater urgency as the need to avert a major crisis with the Soviets combines with Reagan's domestic imperatives. If Reagan's ambition of reducing nuclear arms is to be realized, he's going to need to win a second term. And his media political interests would be served by forging a more flexible and constructive approach with Moscow. So Reagan begins to emphasize the peaceful side of peace through strength, a candidate who could be peacemaker and statesman. What you see then is Reagan's public tone towards the Soviets shifting dramatically in 1984, with the emphasis very much on peace and cooperation. And of course, this is a. A big change from the first couple of years of his presidency. In the spring of 1984, he launches an internal review of the administration's policy towards the Soviets. And he decides to adopt a more flexible approach in negotiations with Moscow. And interestingly, when you read the files in the Reagan library, Reagan stresses the need to start building a record of agreements with the Soviets, a sure sign that the election campaign and public opinion is on his mind. And despite the Soviet boycott of the Olympic Games in Los Angeles, he begins pursuing talks with The Soviets on a wide range of bilateral issues, economic, military, cultural and political, which are in place by mid summer. So the Reagan administration begins reversing many of the sanctions that were imposed by carver back in 1980. And then Reagan also invites the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to the White House in September, six weeks before the election, which is his first ever meeting with a top ranking Soviet official in almost four years as President.

[C]

I always found quite interesting this issue that towards the end of the first term and in the second term, Reagan's foreign policy becomes more moderate towards the Soviet Union, but it seems to me becomes more hardline on other issues, say counterterrorism for example, or Central America and so on. And it might have to do with partisanship, how partisan, for example, an issue like Central America is as opposed to Nicaragua and so on. And speaking of partisanship, I particularly dislike the rhetoric that the United States is currently very polarized or very partisan, whereas there was an era before in which this was not the case. But to what extent can we sort of apply the same perspective that you have on your book on the influence of domestic politics to the current environment and current foreign policy? Just a note, as we are recording, I think Democrats in Congress have asked for any decisions on a war against Iran to pass via Congress. So I think that is quite interesting as well.

[B]

Well, you're absolutely right, I agree with you Luca. Domestic politics have always shaped American foreign policy in all sorts of ways. As I talk about in the book, particularly post 1945. You can go back further than that. Having said that, I do think it's the case that ideological and partisan decisions are perhaps ideological and partisan divisions are more deeply imprenched today than they were before, even in this period that I looked at in the 70s and 80s. I think that's probably true and I have no doubt that perhaps the advent of social media has contributed in some ways to that. I think it does make the quest to build domestic support and bridge political divides a good deal more difficult. Aspects like compromise, bargaining, the mutual give and take which have long been central to U.S. foreign policy. I think that's becoming increasingly difficult. I think that's much of this has been lost in recent years. I suppose one major difference today is that the legislative branch as you alluded to has been largely marginalized from the foreign policy making process. Back in the 70s and 80s under Carter, under Reagan, Congress did have a major say. This was the post Vietnam era. It was the era of the War Powers Act. Very much an emphasis on sort of curbing exclusive presidential control of foreign policy. And in the book, for example, I talk about this. I talk about Carver's battles to ratify the Sol II treaty. And I think we also saw it with the Reagan administration's creative efforts to get around the Bowland Amendments in their bid to find ways of supporting the Contras in Nicaragua, in Central America. And I think Argobee, and I know you've written about the Balkans, I think Argobee, that process did continue into the 1990s. Really it was the events of 911 that saw the diminution of congressional authority with respect to foreign affairs. And I think in many ways the trend has just accelerated since then. We'll see with respect to Iran what happens. At the same time, I think some things also remain. The American political system overall, relatively speaking, I think it's still very decentralized even compared to the parliamentary democracies of Western Europe. I explain in the book, for example, how easy it was and how quick it was for the grassroots anti nuclear movement to access political elites. And of course in the United States you've also got this never ending cycle of election campaigns which I think will continue to have a major bearing on on how presidents deal with foreign affairs.

[C]

Well, Arun, thank you so much for the episode. This was a great pleasure. Once again, Aaron's book is called the Second Cold Carter Reagan and the Politics of Foreign Policy. It's published by Cambridge University Press. Get the book. It's a great read. I would recommend. Thanks again for being with us.

[B]

Thanks very much, Luca. It's a pleasure.

[C]

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