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Bin Chen, "Hui Muslims in the Shaping of Modern China: Education, Frontier Politics, and Nation-State" (Routledge, 2025)
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- [00:01]
A
Welcome to the New Books Network. Hi, everybody. Welcome to the Chinese Studies Channel of the New Books Network. I'm your host, Yadong Li, a PhD candidate in Socio Cultural Anthropology at Tulane University. In today's episode, we will focus on a new book on nation building, frontier politics, and Islamic communities in modern China. With the unique entry point of the modern Islamic schools, this is a deeply researched and richly contextualized study of Muslim teacher school in Republican China, particularly in the Northwest. Through these institutions, the book opens up much larger questions about Hui identity, educational reform, frontier politics, and modern Chinese nation building. The book we will be discussing today is Hui Muslim in the Shaping of Modern Education, Frontier Politics, and Nation State, published by Rothledge in November 2025. Our guest today, Chen Bing, is Assistant professor at Hong Kong Polytechnic University. He received his Ph.D. from Pennsylvania State University, and his major research interests include China's modern transition and Islam in China. And to begin, Dr. Chen, would you mind briefly introducing yourself to our audience? How did you come to work on Chinese studies in history? And what broader questions have guided your research on modern Chinese history and Islam in China?
- [01:25]
B
Sure. Thank you for having me. Thank you for this opportunity. So my name is Chen Bing. I'm now Assistant professor of Modern Chinese History in the Department of Chinese History and Culture at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. So my initial interest in northwestern China and in this topic really stems from my experience during my undergrad years. So I was born in a county in western Fujian Province, China, where the Hakka people made up the vast majority, actually. So in other words, I grew up in a relatively culturally homogeneous environment. And of course, through my education at school, I knew that China was home to a vast diverse ethnic groups. But as the old saying goes, what you learn from books is always shallow. So I don't really have any concrete understandings of China's diversity at the time. It wasn't until I entered university that I first came into contact with ethnic minorities in China, including the Hui Muslims from the northwest. At that time, students at the university took pride in speaking standard Mandarin. Coming from a small southern county, my Mandarin wasn't perfect, even though I am ethnically Han. And sometimes some students even make fun of my Mandarin back then. But on the other hand, my classmates from the Northwest, those Hui Muslim students, they could speak like perfect Mandarin, but ethnically, they were not Han. So I remember wondering at the time, why is that? And you could say that was the first time I really grappled with the complexity of China's ethnic diversity. But to be honest, back then, I had not yet thought about studying the history and culture of northwestern China. Later I entered graduate school and encountered a series of great works such as Jonathan Lieperman's Familiar Strangers. I then realized that the confusion I felt in college might be simple on the surface, but actually had a complex history behind it. So this inspired me and also pushed me to go back into history to understand how ethnic diversity has shaped modern China.
- [04:08]
A
It's perfect, I think. Thanks for sharing your intellectual academic trajectory with us. And I was really impressed by your initial curiosity of what Han identity means. And I can see this curiosity sustained in your current research about how Huim identity means in modern China and how this kind of ethnic identification perception is changing throughout Chinese modern history. So I'm also very curious about the origin story, the genocide of this book. So why did you decide to focus specifically on Muslim teacher school as your major entry point? And at what moment did you feel that these institutions could reveal a much larger story about Hui communities, identities and further about modern China?
- [04:53]
B
Yeah, so in fact, my initial goal was not just study Muslim teacher schools. My initial goal was to do a comparative study of three types of modern style secondary schools. I call them secondary schools because they are not university. They sit between primary schools and universities. So they are secondary schools. So those are Muslim teachers schools, Christian high schools and Buddhist academies. I want to do a comparative study of these three types of schools. But one mystery I encountered in my archive research in Nanjing made me realize that our understanding of Muslim teachers schools was quite inadequate compared to our understanding of Christian and Buddhist schools. So that's why I focus on Mustang teachers schools in my later research and also in my monograph. So the mystery is this. In 1933, the Chinese Nationalist government, the GMD, they passed a regulation called the teachers Schools regulation, banning private teachers schools. And the reason they target private teacher schools is that we have to remember that China had been fragile for decades. During the whole world era, the Nationalist government established in Nanjing that by Changai, she wanted to glue the country back together. And they believe that to build a modern unified nation, you had to control education. Specifically the people who teach control the teachers. You control the messaging. That was the idea. So in 1933 they issued the teachers schools regulations and it was a blank kids mandate. Basically all teacher schools must be state run or you will be banned. And no private operators, no religious groups. But at the very same time, the Nationalists, they were secretly and sometimes openly funding private Muslim teacher schools like in 1935. This case is very revealing. Tang Ken, the president of Muslim Chanda Teachers Schools writes a petition to the government, the Nationalist government, asking for money. And what does Tanke Sen say in the document? He admits that we are violating the ministry, the government's regulations. We are still private. We are still private teacher schools, but we need money. Please send money. It was incredibly bold. It's like saying to the government, dear government, we know we were illegal, but please send cash. But that strategy, it worked. I will explain why it worked later. So this is a complete contradiction. On paper, private Muslim teacher schools should not exist. But in reality, the Nationalist government is paying their bills, at least some of their bills. So this is the mystery. And that's the moment I feel like when I find out Tang Kushan's petition. That's the moment I feel like these Masling teacher schools could illuminate a much larger story about Hui communities, about religion and about modern China.
- [08:24]
A
That's a really fascinating moment. And it's really amazing to know that all the story you present in the book begins with an exploration of more general education history. And further, as you have mentioned, the issue of education, I think in modern China is connected to larger politics and also a common concern of intellectual, that is how to save China, how to make China great. Again, this kind of issue. But before we talk about the more specific historical context of your book, first I want to know, for listeners who may have not had the opportunity to read the book, what are the main questions that your book sets out to answer?
- [09:06]
B
So the main question guiding my book is really how and why the mystery that I just mentioned happened. How and why the Nationalist government ignore its own regulation to support private Muslim teachers schools. And what respectively were the Nationalist government and these Muslim teachers schools tried to get out of this relationship? And to understand the mystery, we have to understand the frontier politics in Republican China. So the Nationalist government established in 1927, that base is in Nanjing, and relatively speaking, they had a firm grip on China's east coast. At the time, the wealthy area, but the northwest frontier was not really under their control. I'm talking about Gansu, Ningxia and Xinjiang, the northwestern frontier. And this area was at the time was dominated by Muslim warlords. So if Nanjing wanted any influence there in the northwest, they couldn't just march an army in. It was too costly, too risky. They need an insider, a softer approach. They need allies. And this brings us to a man named Ma Fuxiang, the Muslim warlord. He is a fascinating figure, a powerful Hui Muslim warlord from the northwest, but he was also very politically savvy. He knew he had to play nice with the central government to keep his own position, to keep his own power in the northwest. So he positioned himself as the bridge, the man between the frontier and Nanjing. And as the bridge, Ma Fuxiong will also need to show that he could help modernize the Northwest. Because modernization, that's what Nanjing government really wants badly needing. Therefore, Ma Fuxiang was the one who support the Can Da teachers schools because that Zhengda teacher school is a modern style mastering school. So when Zhengda moved from Shandong to Beijing in 1929, Ma Fushan basically adopted. He built a campus for the school. He also provided funding to keep the school running. And Mao Fuxian wasn't just being a philanthropist. He was using the school to train teachers, modern teachers, and who would then go back to his territory in the Northwest to spread modern education. It become a win, win, win situation. You know, the war law gets influenced and the school gets money and protection. And the Nationalist government also got something out of this. The government got agents of modernization in a region that they could not control. The Nationalist government saw itself as the representative of modern China. And only they can modernize China. And they saw these students trained by the Zhengda teacher schools as people who could eventually translate the state's will to the frontier. So the government in this situation was more than happy to look the other way on their own laws, on their own regulations. To get that Inference, remember Tankersen's 1935 petition to the Nationalist Government for money? And in that petition, Tankersen essentially said that, Dear government, we know we were illegal, but please send money, we need money. Tankersen also mentioned that the school was essential for pacifying the frontier. So he played their own strategic back at the Nationalist government. The Nationalist government, of course, agreed with Tang San. But still, bureaucracies hate contradictions, hates open contradictions. So the Ministry of Education, they pull a chick they couldn't manage 10 da according to the teacher's school's regulation, they will be admitting the government was openly breaking its own law. So they asked Chengda to register under the private schools regulations instead. The Ministry just need the paperwork to keep the money flowing. But the private schools regulation did not apply to teacher schools. So it was selective law enforcement at its absolute finest. So this is the main thing of my book, the guiding question of my book.
- [13:50]
A
It's wonderful. I think it's really fascinating to see how you use this kind of storytelling way to tell us about the general, not only the general background, but also the main question you want to explore in the book. But the thing is, we have already talked about Hui Muslim and their identity in modern China. And as we know, the Hui are certainly not strangers to scholars of modern Chinese history. For example, we can see scholars like Drew Glad Landley, Jonathan Lippman, as you mentioned, and also David Atwell. They wrote intensively about the Hui identity in modern China. But as we all know, this might be the most complicated ethnic group in the PRC's minzu identification process. Like you mentioned before, it's a mystery. So I can see your book repeatedly highlights the complexity of Hui as a social category, its internal diversity, its ambiguity and idea of a dual belonging to both Chinese and Islamic words. So how do you understand Hui identity in the Republican period? And how does this kind of complexity help explain the choices that Hui elites and intellectuals made in relation to the school you mentioned, to the state?
- [15:04]
B
Yeah, this is a profound question. The Hui identity issue is really complicated. Actually, in all of my publications about Hui Muslims, there was always a paragraph or a footnote talking about the complexity of Hui identity identity. In the book, I view Hui identity in the Republican period not as a fixed definition like today. In today's China, when you say you are Hui, that meaning it's more or less fixed. It means you belong to this ethnic identity, ethnic group. Some will argue that in today's China, Hui is no longer. Is no longer this term that means Islam. But I think in the Republican period, that was not the case. Hui as a term and also as an identity does not have a fixed definition, but a concept that I define, a concept that I would call it, that has this terminology slippage. And this is crucial for understanding the choices that those historical actors made, those Hui Muslim made in Republican period. So I think in the 1920s, the 30s, just to elaborate on the complexity of the Hui in that period, depending on the context, when you say Hui, it could be mean a religion which is Islam. It could also mean an ethnic group. And also it could also mean a territory which refer to the northwestern frontier. And so it's quite ambiguous. But I think in the Republican period, in early 20th century, this ambiguity was not a problem to be solved, was not simply a problem to be solved. It was the reality. Because it's a reality. It could be a tool that facilitates cooperation. People live with the ambiguity of the time. So, for example, this slippage, this terminological slippage, in my book, I argue that it allowed for a relationship of convenience between the Nationalist state, Muslim warlords and intellectuals, Hui intellectuals. The Nationalist government could claim that by supporting these schools, these Muslims teacher schools, they were securing the territory of the northwest. And warlords like Ma Fuxiang could support these schools to boost their status as the bridge between the frontier and Nanjing. And Muslim teacher schools could to use the political and financial support to keep their school open and pursue their educational reform. And this would become possible in this relationship. Everybody was saying that they were supporting the Hui, but to the three parties, Hui means very different things. So the complexity of Hui identity allowed, like Muslim teacher schools to navigate a difficult political landscape. And Hui Muslims used the government's anxiety about the frontier to secure funding for the school, allowing them to survive and pursue their own version of modernity. And also, the complexity of Hui identity also allowed Muslim warlords and the Nationalist government to claim what they want to get what they want.
- [19:12]
A
Excellent. I think your opinion that ambiguity in the Hui identity was not a problem in Republican China, but a potential resource to be utilized for Hui intellectuals and students. It's very powerful and is very interesting. And as we can see from your book, you describe a broader context in which Hui reformers sought both to modernize their own communities and to secure a place for their Muslims within a changing Chinese nation. So you frame this as a due awakening to modern Chinese nationalism on the one hand and to global Islamic reform currents on the other. So how would you characterize this dual awakening, which is a very impressive concept, and how do they shape debates over education, curriculum, language of instruction, and also the Hui's proposed future for their community?
- [20:07]
B
Yeah, so my discussion of dual Awakening, I didn't come up this time by myself. My discussion of dual Awakening, it's really inspired by Bando Benight, the author of the Daw of Muhammad. And for me, the dual Awakening, it's really the heartbeat of the Hui educational reform movement in the early 20th century. It describes the conviction held by Hui intellectuals like Bao Ting Liang and Tang and Ma Songting that a Muslim religious awakening and a Chinese national awakening, they were not contradictory, but actually mutually supportive. And to understand this, we have to look at the threat Hui maxing faced in the early 20th century. On the one hand, you have the rise of in the early 20th century. On the one hand, you have the rise of a narrow Han nationalism with slogans like expel the barbarians. I know that the Hui Muslims, they were not directly targeted by this slogan. But still, the rise of this version of nationalism still threatened to exclude the Hui Muslims from the new Chinese nation. At least the Hui Muslims saw it as a threat. So Hui reformers realized that to survive, they couldn't leave the modernization of China solely to the Han majority. They wanted to prove to show that one could be a modern, patriotic citizen through the practice of Islam, not by abandoning it. And on the other hand, Hui Muslims also look globally. They saw how Muslims in Egypt, Turkey and Russia, they were modernizing to resist Western imperialism. And so Hui Muslims argued that if they remained uneducated in modern subjects, if the Hui Muslims rely only on traditional scriptural whole education, they will become a weak link in the Chinese nation. So this shaped the debate over education in a very specific way in the 20th century. So to the Hui intellectuals, it wasn't enough to just send Muslim children to state schools. Instead, they built separate Muslim teachers schools. The goal was to create a new kind of leader, the new ima, or teacher, who was fluent in both Arabic and Chinese and who could teach both the Quran and mathematics, if you will. Hui Muslim intellectuals in the early 20th century were essentially arguing that by becoming better, more modern Muslims, they were strengthening China. So this is the dual awakening. This dual awakening was their strategy to carve out a safe space for Hui Muslims within the modern Chinese states.
- [23:24]
A
Perfect. So I think basically to sum up, duality is a key word in your book and also in your argument. Because of this dual belonging and dual awakening education, and in particular the Muslim teacher school, must have a double task and a double implication for China and for Muslim Muslim, for the Islamic world. And two of your key case studies are the Chengda Teacher School and the Shanghai Islamic Teacher School. So could you briefly introduce each of this institution, although you have already talked a little bit about it before our current discussion. So what does the different relationship to world laws, to merchants and the national estate reveal about the diversity of Muslim educational reform and its embeddedness within China's frontier politics?
- [24:10]
B
Yeah. Thank you. So these two schools, they are perfect representatives of the diversity within the Hui educational reform movement. Hui muslins in the Republican period used to say that the north has Chanda, the south has the Shanghai Islamic teacher schools. So I didn't pick them randomly. So the Chanda Teachers Schools was very much a product of political patronage. It was founded in Jinan in 1925, but moved to Beijing in 1929. Its survival and success were closely related to the support of the powerful Muslim warlord we mentioned, Ma Fuxian and his son. Later, because the Ma family and the Nationalist government wanted to project influence into the northwestern frontier, they turned Sanda into a training ground for teachers testing for their region. And this strategic value is also why the nationalist government exempt Sanda from the 1933 bans on private teacher schools on the other hand, the Shanghai Islamic Teachers school founded in 1928 had a very different character, had a very different story. So it was led by Imadar Sen and backed mainly by wealthy Muslim merchants in Shanghai like Ma Jingqing. While Chengda was training teachers for the frontier, especially after they moved to Beijing, the Shanghai school was focused on cultivating new IMAs and sending students to Al Azhar University in Egypt. So the Shanghai school lacked the political protection of warlords so it was more vulnerable. In 1929 it actually had to change its name to Islamic Classic Research Society just to survive government's regulation on religious education. So in that year, the government issued this regulation asking schools to stop teaching religion. So the Shanghai Islamic Teacher Schools they changed their name because in that way they could told the government that hey, we are no longer in school. We are a society, a book club and a society and associations of private citizens who is practicing their freedom of faith instead of a school that teach religion. So you have to change its name. But Senda didn't have to change its name. In 1929, Sunda continued to call itself Teachers Schools Tenda Teacher School and continue to receive government funding and the two schools. The two schools trajectories diverged sharply when the war with Japan broke out thanks to its high level political connection Chen Tao successfully relocated to the interior to Guilin and continue operating the Shanghai School. Because they do not have the war law support the government support that can da enjoin it collapsed in 1937. Of course, the story of Shanghai School doesn't end there. Darpusen later petitioned Chiang Kai Shed and the school was essentially reborn as the Pyongyang Islamic Teacher Schools in gansu because by 1938 the Nationalist government desperately needed a Hui institution in the Northwest to compete with the Japanese and also the Communists for Muslim loyalties for Muslim support. So in my book comparing then reveals that Muslim educational reform was not monolithic. It could be warlord led or merchant led. But ultimately both trajectories point back to frontier politics. Whether it was Chengda in the 1930s or Pyongyang in the 1940s, the Nationalist government support these schools when and only when they served the strategic agenda of securing the frontier.
- [28:56]
A
Thank you very much for, you know, trace the two Muslim teacher schools trajectory and I can see Chengda really had this state's full support. But for the Shanghai School, they really need multiple ways to survive. Basically, I think Chengda really attracted my attention because Chengda was found in Jinan as you mentioned, which is my hometown and I noticed its original address was not too far from my home. So I think the original mosque has already been dismantled and a new mosque is built nearby. So unfortunately we cannot see the original side of Chengda today, which should be a very important site for today's Islamic Anne. Muslim. Exactly, exactly. And we can also see, as you already mentioned, frontier politics is very important in your analysis and we can also see the term in your book title. And from the late 1930s to Chinese resistance against Japan bring new pressures to, you know, frontier politics and also new opportunities to Muslim teacher schools. So how did the Japanese invasion and wartime politics change the position of the schools Especially in relation to Northwestern frontier concerns and the Nationalist government strategy of pacifying the interior before resisting external enemies.
- [30:10]
B
Yeah, so the Japanese invasion indeed changes everything and had a profound impact on Republican China. So in my specific case, the Japanese invasion raised the stakes and for a couple of years at least it transformed the Japanese invasion transformed those Muslim teacher schools from educational institutions into frontline access for the national survival. First, the invasion forced a physical relocation that aligned with a physical relocation of Zhengda that aligned with the Nationalist government's retreat to the interior. Zhengda refused Japanese inducements to stay in Beijing and move to guiding in the southwest. The Japanese actually tried to keep Tian Da in Beijing but they failed. And Chengda's relocation was supported by Muslim General, another well known Muslim General Bai Chongxi. The Shanghai Islamic Teacher Schools was effectively destroyed but its principal Dapusen was able to re establish it as the Pyongyang Islamic Teacher School in the Northwest with the support of Chiang Cak Sheets and this placement in Pingliang. The placement of Dabu Sensei School in Pingliang was no accident. It was a direct response to the frontier politics. I already mentioned this a little bit but by the late 1930s the Nationalist government was terrified of losing the Northwest. They were facing a three way tug of war for the loyalty of the Hui Muslims. The Japanese were setting up a puppet Muslim organizations in occupied areas in particular in North China. The Communists they were actively recruiting Hui youth in Yan and the Nationalists, they were trying to hold on to that region. So Chiang Kai Shep personally approved the re establishment of Double Sense school in Pyongyang because he need a pro government Islamic stronghold right on that doorstep of the Communist base. The government later actually deployed students from the Pyongyang school to suppress and pacify Hui rebellions in the Haiyuan and Guyan region between 19 and 1941. And because these students could quote the Quran and speak the religious language of the Hui Muslims. For some of them become rebels. And so the Nationalists believed that they were more effective at propaganda and military recruitment and than standard government officials. So the war initially brought a, I think a golden period if you will, a golden period of opportunity where the state was incredibly generous towards Muslim teachers schools. To win over the Hui Muslims, the government suspended its regulations again giving these schools money and autonomy to operate because they needed these schools to prove that the Nationalist government, not the Japanese and other parties, was in control of China's frontier.
- [34:01]
A
And then as you show in the book, these schools will gradually draw into the national state's project of nation building and more centralized control over teachers education, not only about Hui but also all around China. So over time this school became part of a a much more integrated standardized system for Nationalists. So how did this process of nationalization affect Muslim teacher school and their graduates? What kinds of fractions emerge between Hui intellectuals own visions of the future and the state's agenda for uniformity and control?
- [34:36]
B
Yeah, so this is where the story takes a turn. In the 1930s, the relationship between Nationalist government and Muslim teachers schools was a partnership by and large. But around 1940 and 1941, the Nationalist government shifted its strategy. As the war with Japan dragged on, the Nationalist government moved from influencing the frontier to wanting direct control over it. And they no longer wanted like autonomous Muslim airlines. They wanted obedient state organs. So when the Ministry of Education finally enforced the regulation, the teacher school regulation and nationalized Chanda and the Ping Liang school, the friction was immediate and intense. The core tension was that the Nationalist state wanted standardization. Why Hui intellectuals wanted distinctiveness. I give you an example. A major conflict erupt over enrollment of those schools newly nationalized mastering teachers schools. The Ministry of Education ordered the nationalized to admit Han Chinese students, which they didn't do before the nationalization. The Ministry argued that national teachers didn't need to be Muslim in order to teach Muslims. Trandat leaders of course protest, arguing that to be effective in the Muslim frontier, teachers had to be Muslim to gain the community's trust. But the state just ignored that. An even deeper friction occurred over Richard the state mandate, the court of Sun Yaseen. But this requirement, the court of Sun Yat Sen. This requirement for a long time was not enforced in mastering teacher schools, but after they were nationalized and they require students to bow three times to Sun's portrait before Hui intellectuals and students. This looks dangerously like idolatry, which is not allowed in Islam. And Sandhar's president Tanker Sen tried to negotiate a compromise where students would show respect using Islamic ritual instead but the ministry refused and the Ministry said that national riches supersede the religious ones. So the impact on the schools and the nationalization the impact of nationalization on Muslim schools and students they were very profound and the division of the dual awakening producing students who are simultaneously divine religious leaders and modern citizens was dismantled essentially after nationalization and under the new national system reduces training was sublimely and at the Londong School which was called Pingtiang School before the nationalization at the Longdong School the new president Ma ruling actually separate the students One group learned to be secular teachers and a separate marginalized group learn religion they no longer producing the new Imad who could bridge both worlds so ultimately nationalization create a paradox by drawing these schools closer into the state apparatus to control the frontier the Nationalist government actually destroyed the unique characters that made these schools effective and influential in the frontier regions in the first place. So it's quite ironic indeed.
- [38:53]
A
So I think this is where your book is about nation state building in this shift we can see the dual belonging and dual awakening was still there with Hui people But they were basically a little bit silenced in the standardized and centralized process of nation state building by the Nationalists and continue to the PRC period. So you end the book by tracing some unexpected legacies of these institutions before and after, you know, the establishment of the prc so basically, you know, we can see some Hui Muslim intellectuals trained by the school they become bureaucrats or become, you know, new intellectuals for diplomacy in the Middle East. So looking across the whole period, you cover what do you see as the most important, maybe most interesting long term legacies of Muslim teacher school for Hui communities, for Chinese frontier politics or for the modern Chinese state?
- [39:47]
B
Yeah, I think the most important like the long term legacy of Maslin teachers schools is that they really demonstrate China's ethnic diversity could bring tangible benefits to the country's modernization. Let me explain. So between the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the key reason why Muslim communities wanted intellectuals they wanted to establish teachers schools that was to preserve and promote the characteristics of their community. Speaking Arabic was one of the characters that Hui Muslims wanted to preserve and promote. Of course, there are also other things they would teach in the teachers schools but speaking Arabic was quite important so Arabic language program was quite important in Muslim teachers schools but at the time in the early 20th century, we have to remember there were no obvious tangible benefits that come with learning Arabic other than for we Muslims to keep their characteristics. But Fast forward to 1914 and this is why I pushed the story to 1914 beyond 1949. And Hui Muslim's Arabic skills suddenly become very important to the new China. The new China was under a Western diplomatic embargo. Hui Muslims at the time used the Arabic skills to help to break this embargo. They become translator of Mao Zedong, Zou and Lai, these top leaders of prc. Essentially they helped the PRC government to establish formal relationships first with Egypt and later with many other Arabic and African countries. Many of these countries, they were now key bell and roll partner countries. And Hui Muslims contribute to this later development. And I think this is the most important long term legacy and that at first learning Arabic is just to preserve, just help to preserve ethnic identity. But 18 years down the line and they become these useful tools for a nation state. Quite unexpectedly, this shows you the diversity could really bring some tangible benefits.
- [42:40]
A
So as we are approaching the end of today's podcast, can you share a bit about your current and maybe your future projects?
- [42:47]
B
Yeah, so this might surprise you. My current and future projects are about historical video games. This is inspired by a book called Playing with Religion in Digital Games. The book is about how video games represent religion. And my current project is about how the history of modern China, modern Chinese history was represented, was played in video games. But sadly I don't have much to share at this point. Maybe in a few years we can come back and do this interview again. I look forward to it.
- [43:25]
A
I'm also really looking forward to it. It sounds amazing and I really want to know more about how religion and video game and history studies can combine together and I think it must be a very interesting work.
- [43:38]
B
Yeah, it's also quite new to me.
- [43:42]
A
As a project due to academia and also to our readers, I think. So Dr. Chen is a really interesting and illuminating conversation. Thank you very much for sharing your thoughts with us today.
- [43:54]
B
Thank you, thank you, thank you for having me.
- [43:57]
A
So Today we've discussed Dr. Chen Bing's new book, Hui Muslims in the Shaping of Modern China. A book that refuses to treat Hui Muslim communities as marginal footnotes to mainstream Chinese history, but shows how these were deeply embedded in some of the co projects of modern China such as education reform, nation building and international relations. Meanwhile, the story of Muslim teacher school contributes to broader debates well beyond the Hui or Islamic studies. It speaks to questions that matter across Chinese history. How school systems create subjects, how frontier politics fold local elites into nation scale projects, and how minority intellectuals navigate loyalty and critique simultaneously. And if we look beyond China. I think this book also resonates with broader discussions about how Muslim minorities in different empires and nation states have used their resources, and particularly education, to claim space within the nation while also sustaining transnational religious horizons. So you'll be listening to the Chinese Studies Channel of the New Books Network. I'm your host, Yadong Li. We hope to see you next time.