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Brett Neilson, "The Rest and the West: Capital and Power in a Multipolar World" (Verso, 2024)
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- [00:02]
A
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- [00:58]
B
Welcome to the New Books Network hello everyone. Welcome to another episode of New Books Network. This is your host, Morteza Hajizet. Today I'm honored to be speaking with Professor Brett Nelson about his most recent book that he has published with Vessel Press. The book we are going to discuss is called the Rest and the Capital and Power in a Multipolar World, written by Sandra Mazadra and also Brett Nelson. And Today I've got Do Brett Nelson to talk with us about the book. Dr. Brett Nelson is Professor and Deputy Director at the Institute for Culture and Society at Western Sydney University, and his work has centered on issues of migration, borders, globalization, logistics, digitalization, contemporary capitalism, geopolitics and automation. Brett, welcome to New Books Network.
- [01:54]
A
Thank you for having me, and thank you for inviting me to the New Books Network.
- [01:59]
B
Before we start, can you just very briefly introduce yourself and tell us how the idea of this book came to you?
- [02:04]
A
Well, we're here to discuss the Rest in the West, Capital and Power in a Multipolar World. It is, as you said, a book co written with Sandro Metsadra from the University of Bologna and very involved in movements in the European context. It's the third book that we've written together, so our collaboration goes back 20 years or so. The book really has its origins in the pandemic when not only Sandra and I were locked down, but the rest of the world was locked down and we, like many other people, were trying to work through the condition in which we found ourselves. We didn't have a chance to meet in person until the summer of 2022 when we managed to spend two weeks together. But of course, at that time, the war had already broken out in Ukraine, and that was very much predominating the conversations we were having. So we were looking for through lines from the pandemic through to the Ukraine war. The book was finished in May 2023. So of course it doesn't really encompass the other conflicts that have exploded in the world since that time, specifically the Gaza conflict and more recently the Iran conflict, although there are many others. So we wrote some of the book together face to face, but we also wrote considerable parts of it over the Internet together. We were sometimes getting to a role and working overnight where I would write one section, then I would go to sleep and Sandro would write another section in Italy. So I would wake up and the text would magically appear on the screen. And that's why we like to joke that our working process is better than AI.
- [04:20]
B
That's a very fascinating story. Let us talk about the title of the book, the Rest and the West. You sort of reverse a Stuart Holt's phrase. Can you tell us why you did that? What conceptual shift do you aim to achieve or provoke through doing this?
- [04:44]
A
Well, it's the title of the book, so it's meant to be catchy. And the reversal is meant to draw the attention of a potential reader. I would say that that hook is what we were looking for in the title, rather than a massive conceptual shift. You mentioned Stuart hall, who's the progenitor of this phrase, the Rest and the west, and he coined this phrase, which has been repeated many times after, in the context of a study of diaspora, in the context of race riots in the uk, in the context of a post colonial theorization of changes to capitalism and the world system. He didn't intend the phrase as a mantra for his own analytical approach. It was rather a kind of characterization of an approach that he wanted to oppose. And I think there's something of this in the way in which we reverse the title as well. Having said that, there is something of a conceptually at stake in this reversal. The idea of the Rest, the West and the Rest, as Hall characterized it, was really a way of saying, well, the so called rest here is not just a remainder of the West. The rest is much more complicated and plural and heterogeneous than any kind of definition that would see it merely as having been subtracted or being a remainder from this also homogeneous and amorphous category known as the west, which has its own complex history. So in putting this remainder first, we're also problematizing the idea of the west and we're problematizing this whole rest west binary, which we hope we're not simply reinforcing through the reversal. And there's another thing we're doing as well, because in the classic formulation west and the rest, the west clearly occupies the kind of imperial position. So in reversing this formula, we're also raising the question of whether it's not only the west, but also other powers, other forces in the world today that are wielding a kind of imperial power.
- [07:37]
B
And I'm sure we get to talk about some of these, let's say, rising powers. It's, and I think it's a perfect segue to my next question as well. What I really liked about your book here is that you, you sort of resist that idea that the west doesn't decline, or there's this really Germanic transition as well. But I'm keen to know why you don't subscribe to that. You resist subscribing to that dominant narrative.
- [08:16]
A
Yes, we do talk about an unraveling of US hegemony. We take that concept from the world systems theorist Giovanni Arighi, who was really diagnosing it from the time of the 1990s. However, as you say, we avoid very rigorously claims for a decline of the West. This is a phrase which obviously has echoes in the early 20th century theses of Oswald Spengler. And it's a claim that can easily become flooded with civilizational viewpoints, arguments that emphasize so called Western values, so called Western civilization facing a decline in the face of other cultures and other ways of organizing societies that exist around the world. This is an exquisitely reactionary claim which we do our best to avoid. So the concept of hegemony is widespread one, but a complex one. But it does imply that the power, the stronger power, is able to bring others around to its way of thinking. It's able to bring others to ascent, to its aspirations, its desires, its wills, its vision of molding a world. And it's perfectly possible that hegemony is in decline where other forms of power are not in decline. It's perfectly possible that a power like the US loses its kind of cultural power of suasion over the world, but maintains military power or economic power, or the financial dominance to the dollar system, and so forth. It's perfectly possible that it resorts to coercive or dominant forms of power rather than hegemonic power. So we are completely conscious of this as we make claims around an unraveling rather than a decline of US Hegemony. We don't argue for a straight hegemonic transition, because that's not the way we see the organization of power in the world today. We don't see the organization of power as purely based around an international system or relations between states, but even within that international organization of the world, we don't see a kind of bipolar system whereby countries are kind of arraigned under two different powers, let's say the US and China. We would not say that countries like India or Indonesia or South Africa are simply kind of vassals of China. So we see a more kind of complex, multipolar arrangement of power, and one in which not only states are active, but also what we call the operations of capital. We're attentive to patterns of finance. We're attentive to the workings of logistics and supply chains. We're not simply trying to collapse the transitions in today's world onto a story about a simple passing of the baton from one power to another. That doesn't seem to us an adequate way of describing the changes in today's world analytically, but nor does it seem to us an adequate way of doing so politically.
- [12:42]
B
Another part of the book that I really liked was your idea of that the state of crisis is not really an exception. A lot of people, especially these days with the conflict in the Middle east, the closure of stratoformos, which has disrupted the whole supply chain of oil, are talking about the time of crisis. But again you, you talk in the book that crisis is not really an exception, but it's a normal operating condition of capitalism. I guess to the people who are more, let's say, literate in the side, in the operation of capitalism, history of capitalism, that's not a surprise. But to a lot of uninitiated, the lay person maybe might be a surprise. Can you elaborate on that idea of crisis being an integral part of capitalism and not an exception?
- [13:33]
A
Okay, well, as you mentioned, it is a constitutive idea in, let's say, 19th century economic and political economic theory and thinking around capitalism. In the works of Marx, for instance, we find strong arguments about periodic crisis being a normal part of, of a capitalist cycle. It's linked into ideas of over accumulation, overproduction, because capitalism is always pushed towards profit. So a surplus needs to go somewhere and it often doesn't find an exit. It's linked also to this idea of the tendency of the rate of price profit to fall. But these are all theories that see crisis as a kind of normal part of capitalism insofar as they are inevitable, puncture Points that pop up for structural reasons every few decades or so. There are other theories that talk about this so called business cycle, the dynamic of creation and destruction, or the, you know, the kind of time cycles of capitalism, which relates to the idea, the very common idea of the business cycle. But what I think we observe in the contemporary world is a speeding up of this kind of cycle to the point where it can no longer be called a cycle. We see a concatenation of crises. This is associated with the advent of so called financialization in capitalism. We see increasingly recurrent crises that somehow happen for different reasons, but leave no time for a kind of development or recovery in their wake. And we see, at least since the 1970s, periods of long term stagnation in the global economy. That said, we don't see crises merely related to the economy these days. We're dealing with crises of the environment, crises of health, migration, famed as a crisis, and so forth. So we see what we describe in the book as a concatenation of crises. But I also think we see a kind of, conceptually this idea of crisis stretched to a kind of breaking point where we question its utility. So after 2007, 2008, the economic crisis, we feel that this concept begins to lose its grip. Which is why we call our opening chapter yet another Crisis. This was a title we came up with during the pandemic, which was frame as a crisis, which certainly has something to do with capitalism and the way that moves people and things around the world and patterns of contagion. However, we are skeptical as to whether this notion of crisis, when it has become so normalized, allows us to understand the ruptures and difficulties and complexities we encounter in the contemporary world.
- [17:29]
B
I really like that idea of yet another crisis. You're right, because it doesn't seem to stop, it just keeps coming. You know, we have the financial crisis, for example, 2008, then you had the pandemic and oil crisis. But anyhow, going to the idea of pandemic, it's. You talk about how the pandemic reshaped borders, but it did not end globalization. Can you talk about this part of the book, please?
- [18:06]
A
Sure. I mean, I think the pandemic was one of these events. It had a before and after, and as such it comes in a chain of events. We might think about the, you know, the terrorist attacks of September 2001. We might think about again the 2007, 2008 economic crisis. But you know, in association with these events, they're regular claims that it was the end of Globalization, these claims we are skeptical about. We think that, you know, there are certainly very important changes in today's world that have bought forms of organization and exchange that are quite different from what was labeled globalization in the 1990s. But when we hear that tag phrase the end of globalization, what we're really hearing is a claim that it's an end of a form of economic globalization that existed in the 1990s. Even that claim, I think is, is difficult to sustain. In the pandemic, for instance, we saw populations restricted largely within national borders, but also very often sub nationally. We saw increased risks for migrant populations that were crossing borders or having to return home within national spaces. But we also saw this kind of general economic paralysis. We saw a kind of supply chain paralysis where various industries and goods and the whole kind of articulated logistical system that became important to global production from the 1990s even earlier was held up at least for a couple of months. You see two shocks, the China shock and then the shock that hit the rest of the world if you're trying to track global flows in terms of shipping volume. But this, I think only confirms the continuing existence of global processes, the continued importance of cross border flows in today's world and in today's economy. The fact that the COVID moment, the COVID paralysis, was such an important one in terms of the economic shock in the early pandemic goes to show that economic integration still is important. So we can talk about the shifts and the different kind of quality qualities of global processes in today's world and how they have shifted over the past decades. But I think to claim that today we are facing the kind of end of global processes because there's been a pandemic or because someone puts up a tariff. These are not kind of magical processes that somehow just conjure away patterns of exchange and trade and reliance within production processes and supply chains that are very embedded, that have forms of path dependence through certain parts of the world, like East Asia. If we think of the case of silicon chips, these are not processes that are easily reversed or magically disappeared at will.
- [22:22]
B
And you mentioned logistics with, with, with, with the pandemic and also with the current conflict in the Middle east, there has been a lot of disruption in the logistics. But why do you think logistics is so central to understanding capitalism today?
- [22:41]
A
Well, you know, logistical processes are essential forms of coordination to the current world system. If you think that at a certain point, conceptually we distinguish production from circulation as clear phases of an economic cycle, that kind of business cycle that I was talking about before the turnover time of capital is another way of describing this. You know, one would produce goods under conditions of social cooperation in a factory, and that was conceived as the moment in which value was added. And then that good would have to be transported to a consumer. That transport was considered a kind of sunk cost, you know, that had to be built into the price, but the profit was already added. In today's world, where we've evolved such complex supply chains which pertain within the world of production, not only in the world of distribution. So to bring together the manufacture of a commodity like a silicon chip or a laptop computer, you've got source products flowing in to the manufacturing process from all corners of the world. Critical minerals already kind of manufactured, circuit boards and so forth that are being pieced together in plastic cases. It's a complex process. And the techniques of coordinating this in a way that is efficient and in a way that renders profit are highly computerized and highly mathematized, but also have to fit themselves over a kind of social space, over a kind of political space in which there are constraints and perhaps also opportunities provided through spatial technologies like special economic zones for manufacture. So we see in this process the processes of production and circulation really kind of collapsing in on each other. And logistics is one way of conceptually specifying this collapse. It's quite important in the world today because we can track logistical processes materially. They can be studied, you know, through visiting places like shipping ports or data centers. I've done a lot of this kind of research myself. But they can also be approached through the software processes, through those mathematical abstract processes that are involved in tweaking and optimizing these kinds of concatenations. So I would say that logistics provides a certain analytical slant on contemporary capitalism. I wouldn't go as far as saying that capitalism has entered into a logistical stage, or we live in a logistical capitalism, because there have been processes of logistication, no doubt, but they overlap and intersect with processes of financialization, processes of extraction, in which not only extraction of raw materials, but of data, the extraction of rent through platform economies and so forth have become very important in today's economic world.
- [26:57]
B
And I guess it was a few years ago that a ship was stuck in Suez Canal and just created again another global crisis. And it just goes to show how. How important that whole supply chain is to the flow of capital. And let's talk about the role of gender and feminism again, that's something you don't disregard in the book. You talk about feminist social reproduction theory and how it changes the traditional Marxist accounts of labor. Why? Why did you decide to bring this aspect into the discussion in your book?
- [27:39]
A
Well, you know, we started talking about the title of the book, the Rest and the west. And many people can think from the title of the book that this is a book about geopolitics. And indeed it is in some ways. But because we're attentive also to geo economy and shifts in the capitalist world system, we have to engage also with this topic of reproduction, which is an area that had important forms of theorization and politics emerging within its regard, let's say from the 1960s, 1970s. To come to the core of your question, how does it change traditional accounts of labor? Well, traditional accounts of labor tend to distinguish labor that is productive, that produces profit, from labor that is non productive, that does not produce profit. And a traditional understanding of so called reproductive labor, which was understood for many years as a kind of women's work work within the household, the work of care, the work of bringing up children, the work of looking after workers who might be coming home from a factory or another workplace and feeding and nourishing them. This was considered non productive labor that was a necessary kind of prop or backup to the productive labor that would produce profit. Now that claim was really bought under theoretical pressure in the 60s and 70s, particularly with feminist movements that said that this kind of housework should be paid. So the wages for housework movement is something that many listeners will be familiar with. But this theoretical pressure is intensified, I think, to the point where this whole boundary between productive and reproductive labor has come into question. So we have theorists, people like Silvia Federici, who will say so called reproductive labor is directly productive. We have to theoretically consider this kind of labor as subject to certain patterns of exploitation. And that has to be the conceptual starting point for any kind of feminist politics that flows from an analysis of reproduction. So much as I talk, when I talked about logistics, about production and circulation merging, we also see a kind of growing in distinction between productive and reproductive labor. And that raises for us the whole analytical question of the relation between circulation and reproduction. They're both conceived as circular processes, but bringing them into some kind of analytical alignment is a difficult conceptual and theoretical task which we take on in this book. I won't go into details about those theoretical arguments, but it's enough to say that we see the importance of circulation and reproduction in today's economy as really redefining processes of production. But we also see them as key to the kind of attempts we see within the Geopolitical space of states, powers and other forms, forms of political organization, whether that be international organizations or whether that be corporate bodies and industry groups having a vested interest in controlling these global processes, these supply chains, these operative spaces, which become kind of choke points or extremely important locations in the world economy. We see reproduction much as we see circulation as an analytical conduit between the geopolitical and geoeconomic aspects of our argument.
- [32:50]
B
At the beginning of the interview, referred to when he said that you met with. With. With the. I'm sorry, I forgot the first name of the. The Sandra. Sandra, yeah. You talked about. Your conversation was dominated by war. And again, in the past few years have been a number of wars. You know, in mainstream media, these wars are usually, you know, describing that kind of Cold War narrative, a new Cold War narrative. But you don't again, subscribe to interpreting these conflicts as a new Cold War. And you don't talk about wars. You talk about regimes of war, which is an important distinction. Can you talk more about this? But what do you call regime of wars? And why do you resist talking about a new Cold War between the west and the rest, let's say.
- [33:44]
A
Okay, so let me split that into two parts. I'll talk first, first about the concept of regime of war, and then about our reservations surrounding the notion of a new Cold War. Regimes of war is a concept that we use to think about the ways in which war is not merely restricted to military activity, but also to think about how military activity these days is also not restricted to war. So we see all sorts of developments in today's world which we could characterize as preparation for war. We see an increase in military spending, for instance, in Europe under pressure from the US this is not kinetic war. This is part of what we would call a regime of war. But we also see a multiplication of what we could characterize as war, which is not military activities. We see so called chip wars, trade wars, finance wars. These we could already conceive as part of war, even if they're not involving physical combat or aerial combat involving military forces. We see things like foreign interference legislation. We see actions like the cutting of Internet cables. All of these are not necessarily military actions, but they have warlike implications for different populations and territories. And we also see the processes of technological militarization and civilianization kind of scramble. So, you know, we often hear the narrative that something like the Internet was, you know, invented as a military technology that then spread out into civilian society. We hear the narrative that something like barbed wire was invented in an agricultural Context, but then became an important part of a military infrastructure with a complex history over the 20th century. These processes are much more entangled and complicated to analyze in the world today. We have this idea of, you know, civilian military, dual use technologies, which is often floated around in the context of this so called silicon chip war, for instance. And then the regimes of war concept also has implications just for ordinary life. You know, if I were to find myself at a petrol station in Sydney, the city where I live today, I would be paying a much higher price for petrol than I would have three months ago. That has to do with the war. But it's not kinetic military engagement that's happening. That's at stake at the petrol station up the road from where I live. That's part of a wider regime of war. And we think that this wider analytical remit is very important in order to get at the changes war is making in the world today. Now let me turn quickly to the Cold War question, because the concept of a second Cold War or a Cold War 2.0, as some people put it, has been a kind of favored analytical trope for describing what is happening in the world today. We, you know, have reservations about this, this concept. I mean, even if we wanted to posit, as often is the case, a kind of Cold war between the US and China, you know, there are a lot of differences between China and the USSR as it was before the end of the 1980s. Now, China does not have a bloc of countries associated with it. It's trying to increase its rapport in the global South. It has important economic and commercial activities in Africa, for instance, in Central Asia. But to talk about a bloc in the way we talked about an Eastern bloc during the Cold war of the 20th century, I think is an analytical misnomer. Perhaps we're seeing movements in that direction, which I think would be elements to be analyzed as they unfold in the future. Where we see the, you know, a multipolar world kind of congealing into blocks. We see elements of that way of thinking, for instance, in the, you know, the U.S. defense strategy, the so called new Monroe Doctrine of increased influence and power in Latin America. But to think about a world consisting of blocks at the present stage, I think is an analytical and political era. And the other point that's very clear is that the ussr, even in its heyday, had nothing like the economic power of contemporary China. You know, the, the, the way in which supply chains, you know, not only for critical economy, critical commodities like rare earths, or, you know, fault of A tape panels, New kinds of batteries pass through China, but for, you know, regular industrial goods of all stamps and the capital export of China associated with this is, is far more significant than the position of the USSR in its heyday. So I think to map the concept of a cold war over the present situation, I can see why people want to jump to it. It's an easy grab. But when we begin to drill down a little bit further, it's a difficult and problematic claim.
- [40:53]
B
Yeah, and that idea of regimes are worth. Like I said, I really found it fascinating and you beautifully explained it why you prefer that term then. We have talked about a lot of these issues and problems. Let's talk about the backlash and how socialist struggles are also rising up against the system. And what I found again new in your argument was that you describe these social struggles as forming poles. And again, it goes with the title of your book as well, Multipolarity. Why do you describe social struggles as poles? And how does it help us better reframe the current challenges that we have?
- [41:36]
A
Well, the last chapter of the book is called Poles of Struggle. So you're right, we do frame social struggles as poles or as forming poles involved in processes of pole formation. However, I wouldn't say that we see a kind of one to one correspondence over the the way we think about multipolarity in terms of our reinterpretation of mainstream geopolitics. I think certainly social struggles are important within processes of pole formation, whether they're contesting that formation or somehow mutating and changing it. So the example of Hong Kong, for instance, is important here. And the changes that happened in Hong Kong and the struggles, you know, associated with the democracy movement in Hong Kong prior to the pandemic, you know, they can be understood within a process of pole formation in which one would have to include the financial position of Hong Kong, the logistical position of Hong Kong, the role of Hong Kong as kind of filtering flows between the mainland of China and a globalized economy would be part of that picture. But we're not posing a one to one kind of correspondence between poles of struggle and these more kind of identifiable geopolitical and geo economic structures, as is evident in that Hong Kong example. I think we're trying to say that struggles themselves have a complex topography and topology, particularly in a world where communication infrastructure is such an important element to political organizations, such an important part of the ecologies in which social movements find themselves operating. And this means that political struggles are hardly ever isolated to a discrete national space. We take the Example of feminist struggles in Latin America, particularly the Neo Nomenos movement, which did have some kind of initiation in the Argentine space prior to the Milei era, but continues on, contesting some of the wine back against social reproduction practices and initiatives in that particular national space. But what was interesting about this movement was the. The way in which it spread not only its patterns of solidarity, but its patterns of mutation and bleeding across borders, not only across Latin America, but for instance, also into Southern Europe. Spain and Italy and Greece in particular, were places where. The constitutive kinds of strategies and claims and discourses of this movement spread very quickly and very effectively. So when we talk about poles of struggle, we're really not trying to map it over some kind of mainstream geopolitical map, but which simply trying to say that the most important struggles in today's world are not taking, for instance, the form of struggle that, let's say, like the mid 20th struggle, mid 20th century struggle for decolonization, international frame that hit a peak after the second World War, we see these struggles as much more diffuse and more powerful for their diffusion.
- [46:19]
B
And if I ask one, maybe final question, so if we live in a world that is shaped by all these war economies or war regimes, climate collapse, again, the resurgence of authoritarianism, what do you think a viable internationalism might look like to help us overcome some of these challenges?
- [46:44]
A
Well, the topic of internationalism is a vital one, and in the book we argue that it's one of the most important ones, if not the most important one, for contemporary political organization and action. That said, we don't know if internationalism is the right word to use, because internationalism has a certain 20th century history. It has its tragedies and failures as well as its triumphs in the 20th century. So we use the term internationalism in a way that is couched but is also hopeful. In a period in which we see all sorts of national revanchism. Solidarity in this context becomes a really important issue and a very tricky one as well, because how does one express solidarity these days with a movement or a struggle that's taking place in some other part of the world, some part of the world where you may not live, you may not know people you know, you may have contact over the Internet, you may have information flowing through various media sources, some of which you feel more trust for than others? Solidarity in today's world is a practice that's, you know, redolent with the perils of speaking for others. In claiming solidarity for a struggle, one could be understood to say, well, I'm taking the place of these people who are struggling. Or solidarity can just be, you know, like putting a post on social media or something. It's measured through clicks and likes. This, we don't think, is an adequate definition of solidarity or an adequate practice of solidarity. We think that an internationalism has to lie in the recognition of resonances between struggles. It has to rely on the recognition that the struggles that one may be involved in in one's local space or immediate social networks have affinities or differences with struggles taking place in other parts of the world. And in this way, one can begin to think of a kind of material substratum to struggle. If struggle was to be articulated, particularly in connection to, say, these logistical and financial processes that we've been discussing, we would have to think about how the infrastructures that stitch up today's world, that make the kinds of operative spaces I was discussing earlier on in our conversation might come into play in a scenario of struggle and solidarity. So, for instance, when we see port workers in one part of the world going out on strike with port workers who are on strike in another part of the world, there's an infrastructural connection between these populations, between these struggles. But it gets more complex than that because often the connections that exist in today's world, particularly connections through digital technologies and server client relationship, are between populations and workforces that don't necessarily know that they're bought interrelation. You know, a data center in Singapore may be running servers that are operating in Indonesia, but also in Vietnam. The clients may exist in those different national spaces and the people working at either end that may be in, you know, extremely precarious kind of platform gig labor kinds of positions, are completely unaware of the relation at that level. So unmasking these kind of material conduits of relation and connection in today's world. I was talking about this a little bit when you asked me about the importance of logistics, today's capitalism. But unmasking and bringing people to an awareness of these connections is perhaps a fruitful line for thinking about how new solidarities might be built and how a new internationalism might function.
- [52:05]
B
Dr. Bright Nelson, thank you very much for taking the time to speak with us about your work. Really enjoyed reading the book and speaking to you about it. And I really encourage our listeners to read the book. It's highly accessible book and with lots of, lots of relevant and contemporary relevant comments and insights about contemporary challenges in the world. Thank you so much for your time.
- [52:25]
A
Thank you for having me thank you
- [52:27]
B
for listening to this episode of the New Books Network. We are an academic podcast network with the mission of public education. If you liked this episode, please share it with a friend and rate us on your preferred podcast platform. You can browse all of our episodes on our website New Connect with us on Instagram and Bluesky with the handle ebooksnetwork, and subscribe to our weekly Substack newsletter at newbooksnetwork.substack.com to get episode recommendations
- [52:55]
A
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