New Books Network — Podcast Summary
Episode: Christopher Millington, "Murder in Marseille: Right-Wing Terrorism in 1930s Europe" (Manchester University Press, 2025)
Host: Roland Clark
Guest: Dr. Chris Millington
Date: September 16, 2025
Episode Overview
In this episode, Dr. Chris Millington discusses his book Murder in Marseille: Right-Wing Terrorism in 1930s Europe. The conversation explores the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia by Croatian nationalists, the evolution and character of right-wing terrorism in interwar Europe, and broader lessons about terrorism's causes, tactics, and legacies. The episode is rich in historical detail, offering both narrative and analytical perspective on the Marseille assassination and the nature of interwar extremism.
Key Discussion Points and Insights
1. The Background: King Alexander I and His Assassination
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Who was Alexander I?
- King of Yugoslavia (formerly the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) from 1921, belonging to the Karađorđević royal family (01:59).
- Sought to unify the nation's diverse populations under "Yugoslavism," advocating for political and cultural homogenization that effectively suppressed minority identities, particularly Croats and others.
"He seems to have had this vision of a single, united southern Slav people ... summed up in what's known as Yugoslavism ... [amounting] to essentially the forced homogenization of the country's people." — Chris Millington [03:00]
- Ruled as a dictator from 1929, enforcing Serbian dominance in the multiethnic state, fueling resentment and plotting among minority groups.
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Why was he assassinated?
- Two main factors:
- Internal dissent from minorities (notably Croats) opposed to Serbian domination.
- Revisionist aims of neighboring states unhappy with post-WWI borders (e.g., Italy, Hungary), who found common cause with nationalist dissidents in Yugoslavia (04:35).
"Their goals can be best served together if Alexander is eliminated, because they think this will cause a collapse of the Yugoslav state." — Chris Millington [05:31]
- Two main factors:
2. The Ustasha: Croatian Ultra-Nationalists and Their Evolution
- The assassins belonged to the Ustasha, described as ultra-nationalist rather than straightforwardly fascist in the early 1930s (06:05).
- Core beliefs:
- Exclusion/elimination of Serbs from Croatia ("eliminationist" politics).
- Leadership cult, celebration of violence, patriarchal values, blood and soil ideology.
- Developed increasingly fascist characteristics but were defined primarily by Croatian independence drive (07:15).
"I also prefer to describe the group as ultra-nationalist ... it was nonetheless focused on the issue of Croatian independence." — Chris Millington [06:29]
3. Jankapusta: The Terrorist Training Camp
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Ustasha operated camps in Hungary (notably Jankapusta, near the Yugoslav border), supported by revisionist Hungarian and Italian governments (08:45).
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Camp activities included:
- Hard labor, farm work, small-arms and bomb-making training, indoctrination into Ustasha ideology and cult of leader Pavelić (08:50).
- Practice targets included images of King Alexander.
"They also learn ... small arms training, bomb making ... practice using targets such as cardboard cutouts of Alexander himself." — Chris Millington [09:30]
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Sources for reconstruction:
- Primarily Yugoslav intelligence and a key propaganda memoir by Jaelke Pogorelec, the girlfriend of the camp commander, providing a rare "inside" look (10:42).
"It portrays the Ustasha as the puppets of Mussolini's government in Rome and as being anything but Croatian patriots." — Chris Millington [12:19]
- Primarily Yugoslav intelligence and a key propaganda memoir by Jaelke Pogorelec, the girlfriend of the camp commander, providing a rare "inside" look (10:42).
4. The Pathway to Terrorism: Assassins’ Motivations
- The assassination team of five men (plus a woman) were not simply "brainwashed fanatics" (13:32).
- Diverse backgrounds and motives:
- Some, like Zvonimir Pospisil, were politically committed and motivated by anti-Serbian revenge.
- Others joined due to personal hardship (economic migration, persecution).
- The actual assassin, Velichko Kerin, was infamous for his violence but his path was also shaped by early trauma (13:50).
"Politics alone is not enough to prompt someone into violence ... people become terrorists for many different reasons." — Chris Millington [17:20]
- Notable detail: Kerin, described as having a "James Bond villain" persona, had several gold teeth (17:53).
5. The Assassination in Marseille: How It Unfolded
- Operational Details:
- Team entered France from Switzerland; only learned of target on arrival (17:56, 18:05).
- Used detailed press-printed itinerary to plan the attack.
- On October 9, 1934, assassins waited in the crowd in Marseille.
- Kerin jumped onto the King's open-top car and killed Alexander; French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou was also fatally wounded, primarily due to medical mishandling (18:05, 19:40).
- Two women bystanders, Yolanda Faris and Madeleine Marie Durbeck, killed—likely by police indiscriminately firing in the chaos.
"I think it's important to remind people of those names because ... they are forgotten about, probably because the French authorities knew they'd been killed by the police and wanted to keep it quiet." — Chris Millington [21:18]
6. Security and Failures
- Major lapses included:
- Lack of coordination between Parisian and local Marseille authorities
- Inadequate police presence (one officer per six metres of crowd)
- Route was too long for available security; black colonial troops not used due to diplomatic sensitivities
- Crucially, police cyclists escorting the car were dismissed "to not block the public view" (21:52).
"So it's difficult to get around the fact that there were these very serious security failings." — Chris Millington [23:44]
- Millington draws on the IRA’s aphorism post-Brighton: "We only had to be lucky once, but you have to be lucky always." (24:58)
7. Aftermath: Arrests, Confessions, and Trials
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The assassins’ escape was botched; they had no getaway plan, could not speak French, and were quickly apprehended (25:14).
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Willingness to confess:
- Possible combination of coercive interrogations, desire to "propagandize" their cause, calculation of possible leniency, and a sense of abandonment by their leaders (25:31).
"The interrogations provide an opportunity for this man to propagandize. Remember, they are terrorists. They want to promote their cause." — Chris Millington [26:35]
- Possible combination of coercive interrogations, desire to "propagandize" their cause, calculation of possible leniency, and a sense of abandonment by their leaders (25:31).
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Two trials (Nov 1935, Feb 1936):
- Defended not as "terrorists" (not yet a legal category in France) but as conspirators to murder (28:45).
- First lawyer (Georges Desban) attempted to derail the trial; was ejected from the case and disbarred (29:38).
- Defense eventually focused on portraying defendants as noble rebels against oppression; jury convicted but accepted extenuating circumstances, sparing them the death penalty (31:45).
- Civilian deaths (the two women) were hushed up, not included in the charge sheet.
8. Broader Lessons on Right-Wing Terrorism
- Continuities between past and present:
- Fascist regimes in the 1930s used both public violence and clandestine terrorism, sometimes with transnational backing (not just street brawling).
"This is an act of state sponsored terrorism. It's sponsored by Italy and Hungary. It operates thanks to a transnational fascist network in existence in Europe." — Chris Millington [33:10]
- The personal "pathways" into terrorism matter—biography, ideology, social context intertwine to produce violence (34:10).
- Women played direct roles in terrorist groups, challenging stereotypes (34:45).
- Right-wing terrorism often aims to eliminate minorities or established political targets—parallels with current trends (35:30).
"Right wing terrorists today, like their counterparts in the past, are eliminationists. They attack enemy groups, usually minorities, or they attack the political establishment." — Chris Millington [35:30]
- Fascist regimes in the 1930s used both public violence and clandestine terrorism, sometimes with transnational backing (not just street brawling).
Notable Quotes
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"I don't use the word fascist really to describe the group, because I thought that to do that might erase the fact that the group's politics evolved over time." — Chris Millington [06:07]
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"This booklet [by Jaelke Pogorelec] becomes very famous after the Marseille attack, not only for what it reveals about the Ustasha, but because the press make a great deal of the fact that it was a woman who wrote this book." — Chris Millington [13:15]
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"People become terrorists for many different reasons, and politics is only one of them." — Chris Millington [17:44]
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"We only had to be lucky once, but you have to be lucky always." — Irish Republican Army mantra, echoed by Chris Millington [24:58]
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"It's sponsored by Italy and Hungary. It operates thanks to a transnational fascist network in existence in Europe." — Chris Millington [33:15]
Timestamps for Major Segments
- [01:51] — Introduction; who was Alexander I and why was he assassinated?
- [06:05] — Who were the Ustasha?
- [08:45] — Jankapusta training camp and sources
- [13:50] — Assassins’ backgrounds and motives
- [18:05] — The assassination: how it happened
- [21:52] — Security failures in Marseille
- [25:31] — Arrests, confessions, and trial strategies
- [32:48] — Lessons about right-wing terrorism, then and now
Memorable Moments
- The image of would-be assassins practicing on cardboard cutouts of the King, and the king’s itinerary being printed in the newspaper, laid bare both the meticulousness and recklessness of 1930s political violence.
- The tragedy of civilians forgotten by history—the two women bystanders who died, overshadowed by diplomatic and political fallout (21:18).
- The surprising fact that "terrorism" was not yet legally codified as a crime in 1930s France (28:45).
- The connection drawn between interwar right-wing terrorism and contemporary patterns of violent right-wing insurgency.
Conclusion
Dr. Chris Millington’s exploration of the Marseille assassination provides a nuanced, multi-dimensional account of one of Europe's pivotal interwar terrorist acts. The episode ties personal trajectories, political ideology, and state failure into a compelling narrative, raising vital questions about the nature and legacy of right-wing terror—historically and today.
