Podcast Summary: New Books Network

Episode: Jack B. Greenberg and John A. Dearborn, "Congressional Expectations of Presidential Self-Restraint"
Host: Lily Goren
Date: November 5, 2025

Overview

This episode of the New Books in Political Science podcast features a conversation between host Lily Goren and scholars Jack B. Greenberg and John A. Dearborn about their co-authored book, "Congressional Expectations of Presidential Self-Restraint" (Cambridge UP, 2025). The discussion explores how Congress has constructed laws and norms around the presidency with the expectation that presidents will sometimes refrain from using the full extent of their powers, the developmental and institutional factors shaping these expectations, and the contemporary challenges posed by recent events—especially during and after the Trump administrations.

Episode Structure & Key Insights

1. Origins of the Book and Collaboration

• Research Motivation:

  • Jack Greenberg was intrigued by the concept of presidential self-restraint but struggled to define an external benchmark. He credits John Dearborn for suggesting the angle of Congressional expectations as a clearer metric.
  • Quote (Greenberg, 03:11):
    "What if instead there were a clear external benchmark for what self restraint would mean? What if you were to bring Congress into the fold here...?”

• Development Process:

  • The project began as a paper for the 2022 APSA conference, then expanded into a short book to accommodate more detailed conceptual analysis and case studies.
  • Adjustments in 2025 included updates based on developments in Trump’s second administration.
  • Quote (Dearborn, 04:53):
    “We thought it was going to be an article...but... we had more to say that would make it, frankly, a little bit too long for an article.”

2. The Cambridge Elements Series

• Format and Appeal:
  • The series allows authors to tackle complex topics with depth and empirical detail, but with space constraints (~30,000 words), promoting concise yet comprehensive arguments.
  • Fast turnaround aligns scholarly work with real-world developments.
  • Quote (Greenberg, 07:55):
    “You want to bring in the history that's important, but you want to do so insofar as it's going to motivate the specific social scientific claim..."
  • Quote (Dearborn, 09:38):
    “They want to be able to take elements that have a kind of contemporary connection and get them out there..."

3. Defining Presidential Self-Restraint and Congressional Expectations

• Core Concept:
  • Congress often passes laws that formally allow presidents certain powers but expects that presidents will not use those powers indiscriminately.
  • Example: The FBI Director’s 10-year term is a statutory signal for insulation, but the President still has the authority to dismiss at will.
  • Quote (Dearborn, 11:52):
    “Congress is indicating they don't generally want the President to fire this person, but they are still acknowledging the President has the formal authority... relying on the President not to use legal authority that they acknowledge he possesses.”

4. Institutional and Developmental Arguments

• Tripartite Structure of Analysis:
  1. Presidentialism:
     • Growing societal and congressional deference to presidential power over the last half-century.
     • Quote (Greenberg, 18:39):
       “Congress is less willing to stand up for its own institutional prerogatives, is willing to cede power to the executive.”
  2. Polarization:
     • Increased party polarization means Congress is less likely to check a president of its own party.
  3. Constitutional Formalism:
     • Judicial embrace of “unitary executive theory” limits Congress's ability to constrain the President, making norms and self-restraint more vital — and more precarious.
     • Quote (Dearborn, 15:10):
       “To the extent that the courts embrace the notion that there cannot be any restrictions on the President's ability to fire...that actually makes Congress even more reliant on this concept of self restraint.”

5. Case Studies & Concrete Examples

• Methodology:

  • Focused on appointments, as it is a key area where Congress sets powers and expectations.
  • Devices examined include fixed terms, qualifications, removal reporting requirements, and percentage caps on political appointees.

• Notable Cases:

  • FBI Director: 10-year term as nominal insulation; recent firings illustrate breakdowns in expectation.
  • Office of Personnel Management Director: Similar use of fixed term.
  • Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Statutory experience requirements, but recent appointments override them.
  • Inspectors General: Advance notice for removals; Trump administrations’ mass firings illustrate disregard for expectations.
    Quote (Dearborn, 29:18):
    "Past examples of presidents trying to push the envelope on this have either met pushback themselves directly or has resulted in Congress trying to make adjustments..."
  • Senior Executive Service: Cap on political appointees (10%) routinely tested by every administration.

• Contrast Cases:

  • Examined when Congress provided “for cause” protections—such as for the CFPB director—only for the Supreme Court to invalidate these constraints, thus moving reliance back to self-restraint.

6. The Problem with Reliance on Norms

• Norms Are Fragile:
  • As Presidents test or disregard norms, Congressional expectations of self-restraint prove unreliable, especially under polarized conditions or when courts limit statutory constraints.
  • Quote (Greenberg, 37:08):
    “Any... lingering faith... that the president will be self restrained, ...is something that Congress can in any way bank on moving forward.”
  • Past restraint may have been effective but is no longer a safe assumption.

7. Contemporary Developments (Trump Administrations)

• Erosion of Norms Accelerated:
  • First Trump administration challenged these expectations; the second administration, according to the authors, has escalated disregard for both formal and informal checks.
  • Quote (Dearborn, 33:55):
    “By the time... we had to make our final submission... it felt like... we have an example of almost all of our cases here already in like month one.”

8. Broader Implications

• A System at Risk:
  • The authors suggest that the U.S. constitutional system is not functioning as envisioned by the Founders, given the collapse of effective Congressional checks and the formalist turn in the judiciary.
  • Quote (Greenberg, 42:17):
    “Even if we had... a renaissance of assertion of institutional prerogative in the legislature... the arrangements that the legislature would likely advance would... not pass constitutional muster.”

9. Forthcoming Research

• Jack Greenberg:
  • Book project on presidential domestic policy leadership and the self-assertive practices of presidents from Nixon to Biden (and Trump 2.0).
• John Dearborn:
  • Book project on presidents and the civil rights bureaucracy, arguing that civil rights policy drove assertions of direct presidential control and early formulations of the unitary executive theory.

Notable Quotes (with Timestamps)

• On Defining the Core Concept:
  • Greenberg, 11:16:
    "The way we define presidential self restraint is that there will be formal power that is available to the President that Congress is expecting the President will not fully deploy..."
• On Inspectors General:
  • Dearborn, 29:18:
    "[T]here have been efforts where Congress actually really stepped in and tried to reinforce this norm through changes in legislation... But... in the second Trump administration, the firing of just a ton of IGs across the board and just the total disregard for the advance notice requirement..."
• On Norms and Congressional Strength:
  • Greenberg, 37:08:
    "This isn't a testament to the strength of Congress as an institution. Far from it... we say that's just like not something that Congress can in any way bank on moving forward."
• On the Judiciary:
  • Dearborn, 38:46:
    "...in the wake of a case like Trump v. United States, Congress' tools to potentially reduce the reliance on self restraint, at least in the realm of appointments, probably in some other areas too have really been eviscerated."

Key Takeaways

• Congress’s reliance on presidential self-restraint is a systemic vulnerability—once respected, it is now increasingly and unapologetically disregarded.
• Recent political and judicial developments have structurally limited Congress's ability to check the President, making reliance on presidential self-restraint increasingly untenable.
• The authors' developmental account traces the growing dominance of the presidency, the corrosive effects of polarization, and the judiciary's embrace of the unitary executive theory.
• Empirical examination of appointment-related statutes and recent political events vividly illustrate the fragility of Congressional protections based on norms.
• Both interviewees are pursuing further research on presidential power and the administrative state, highlighting the ongoing relevance of these constitutional questions.

For Listeners Who Haven’t Heard the Episode

This episode is a timely, accessible, yet rich deep dive into the often invisible yet crucial layer of American constitutional norms: Congress writes laws assuming presidents will sometimes hold back even when empowered. As “self-restraint” erodes, listeners gain a clear, empirically grounded picture of what this means for U.S. governance, why these problems are intensifying, and how the system may be at a tipping point—both legally and politically.