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Jeremy Black, "A History of Artillery" (Rowman & Littlefield, 2023)
00:38:17
An interview with Jeremy Black
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- [00:00]
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Dr. Charles Cotea
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- [01:31]
Professor Jeremy Black
Welcome to the New Books Network.
- [01:35]
Dr. Charles Cotea
Good day. Welcome to New Books in History, a podcast channel on the New Books Network. My name is Dr. Charles Cotea of the Royal Historic Society. I'm a host on the channel and today I'm pleased and indeed honored to have with us master historian Jeremy Black. Professor Black is Professor Emeritus of History at Exeter University. He is without a doubt the most prolific historian writing in the Anglophone world today. Written well over 150 books and today we're discussing his newest book, History of Artillery, published by Rowan and Littlefield. Welcome, Professor Black. Hello Professor. Why did you write this book?
- [02:14]
Professor Jeremy Black
I'm trying to rethink the literary history in thematic terms. I've done a number of books in chronological terms and in Overall terms chronologically 16th century, 17th century, and so on. And in thematic terms, I've done this as of air power, tanks, fortifications, and so on. And in a sense, this and one which is also just come out on cavalry are part of the sequence. Having said that, they are each designed to stand on their own. And in each case, I've tried to do what is almost counterintuitive in publication. Most books, the authors pick a topic and then say this topic is the most important thing that one needs to connect with, address. And what a surprise they are the people that realize this and they have a radical new interpretation. What instead I've tried to do, and you can see that for example in my books on air power or tanks, is to say, yes, these are important topics and we need to look at them. But we need to move away from a kind of magic bullet approach to military history, or indeed I would say any other form of history. But by its nature, history is a multivalent process that one has to allow for context, conjunctures, various frictions of operational factors and indeed the extent to which the other side has a big potential play. And we need to move away from the magic bullet fallacy. So in my book on artillery, I've argued for the significance of artillery, but I've tried to adopt a broad approach to artillery, including ships, guns for example, and including tank guns and self propelled guns. But what I've tried to do is to not say this is the only way to look at the subject. And may I say, I mean, I've heard a lot of very good interviews on the New Book Network and I think it does a marvelous job. But whenever you hear somebody saying this is fundamental, this is crucial and they have got a radical new interpretation that changes everything, then not only are they almost certainly wrong, but they need calling out as wrong.
- [04:28]
Dr. Charles Cotea
I agree entirely. What was or what were the earlier precursors of artillery in the ancient world?
- [04:36]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, I mean you, you know, as you know, and I've tried to discuss these, the most OB1 is the catapult. I mean, what one's looking here is a ground based weapon that fires projectiles and is fired by more than one human. So obviously we're not talking about a javelin or a bow and arrow or a slingshot, but in practical terms, the projectiles one's referring to, for example catapults, fire, as it were, larger rocks. The actual nature of the ordnance is not different to a slingshot, but what is different is the force that they can apply and therefore the distance and velocity and impact that they can enjoy.
- [05:23]
Dr. Charles Cotea
Who invented the cannon?
- [05:25]
Professor Jeremy Black
No single person invented the cannon. I mean, and indeed it's rather interesting that, you know, as you know, there were frequent attempts in fiction to say that it derives from such and such a, as it were, quasi magical figure. I think it's fairer to say that what one is looking at is a range of practices that really developed, I would argue, gunpowder weaponry first in China. We can't be sure when or how or precisely where it was invented, but it seems to be the case that a formula for the manufacture of gunpowder was possibly developed in the 9th century. That doesn't necessarily mean canon gunpowder bombs indeed could be fired by catapults. And each of the processes of development that one can look at. So the use of gunpowder as a propellant or as explosive, as opposed to as a pyrotechnic composition, which is what you'd get with a firework, and as you know, the Chinese made extensive use of those, requires quite a few, in a sense, thought and mechanical processes. You've got to discover that compacting the powder in a small chamber alters the way the material behaves when ignited. And, you know, if you just spread gunpowder on your lawn, for example, and ignited it, it's not going to have the effect that if you put it in your car exhaust and set light to it. I'm not urging anybody to do any of those, of course not in your own car exhaust. By all means, do it to somebody else if you decide. No, I didn't mean that. Anyway, go on, continue.
- [07:10]
Dr. Charles Cotea
What was the earliest conflict in which the canon, to employ vernacular expression, was a game changer?
- [07:19]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, that's again an excellent question. And one of the problems we've got is that for a lot of 15th century conflict, what we know is rather limited. What I would say I'm not trying to hedge. What I would say is that you can point to cannon making a significant impact in sieges before you can in battle. Now, in a siege, you've got a target that is fixed, you can bring up your cannon to relatively near it, and you can deal with the low rate of fire of cannon of that period, as well as the difficulty of adjusting range. So, for example, just give you an example. On the island of Lesbos in 1462, the Ottomans wrecked most of the walls of the fortress of Mytilae and it then surrendered. Similar approach worked on the island of Euther in 1470 with the fortifications at Negroponte. And what you've got there as the Ottomans, who of course, had battered the walls of Constantinople in 1453, being able to use artillery but to move it by sea, which is a classic way of dealing with its weight and the difficulties of moving it by land in that period. And one's talking not just simply the weight of the cannon, but also the weight of the cannon balls. The largest of the cannon at the siege of Constantinople in 1453 fired a 600 pound stone ball, 272 kilograms. Now that you know that quite a lot of damage to a wall. But it would be wrong to say that artillery was the only factor in the fall of Constantinople. And I think there are other factors that are worth bearing in mind, including numerical superiority of the Ottomans, their ability to throw troops into breaches, and their willing once breaches are made, and their willingness to take heavy casualties, and ultimately that they only needed to break through one breach for Constantinople form. But, you know, when we're talking about cannon taking over, you've got to be aware that the sort of medieval form of catapult known as the trebuchet continued to be used quite extensively in the 15th century and into the 16th century. And in part, obviously, as with any weapon system, it's because people have in effect are used to it, but in part, also there are the limitations of the heavy and cumbersome nature of large siege pieces and also the fact that you need to find developed gunpowder and that in making a cannon you've got enormous problems. You need to hammer a length of wrought iron together to ensure that the seams are able to withstand the pressures generated within the barrel. Again, I don't urge you to practice this at home, but you can understand the principle. And continuous firing meant that guns became hot and that has problems. You might get an ignition of gunpowder that's still left there because it's not properly being swapped out between rounds. And in the meantime it's not exactly easy to use. So what you're really benefiting from is the slow motion of a siege. So, you know, for example, the Ottoman capture of Rhodes, which is a very well developed fortified position. The Knights of St. John, the hospitables, very brave defendants. But, you know, it fell in 1521. And the battering principle works. But, you know, as I mentioned, it's not a magic weapon, gunpowder, and it requires a whole process of skills which are not easy to bring together. So gunpowder itself, which is a mechanical mixture of a number of ingredients, of which the most important is saltpetre, is used at a time when mechanical processes for mixing don't really exist. And on top of that, it's difficult to keep the powder dry and there not just because of rain, but because of humidity, for example. Well, particularly, and you know, that's, you know, Those sort of things affect the reliability of the gunpowder.
- [12:07]
Dr. Charles Cotea
Is that why gunpowder or artillery did not give Charles the Bull the victory at Nancy in 1477?
- [12:16]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, that's a very good question. I mean, again, I mean, a lot of these battles we have accounts of how far they, as it were, ex post facto hindsight formulations. I mean, my own personal view is that you should see Charles the Bold as having a relatively effective mixed armed army in which artillery plays a role, but that he hadn't sufficiently adjusted to the potential enjoyed by opposing pikemen. And I think that, I mean, if anything, what you see, and this is ironic because this is a period generally regarded as the rise of gunpowder, particularly handheld gunpowder, as well as cannon. It's actually also in some respects, the late 15th, beginning of the 16th century. You can now adopt a contrary analysis and focus instead on the right of the pike.
- [13:11]
Dr. Charles Cotea
Now, is that why you downplay the importance of artillery in, say, Charles VIII of France's invasion of Italy?
- [13:20]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, I do downplay it, you're absolutely right. But also, I think the empirical research indicates that works by people like Simon Tepper indicate that many of the bold claims made have to be handled with considerable caution.
- [13:37]
Dr. Charles Cotea
Why do you regard or why do you say that in the 17th century, artillery did not play a central role in. In military conflict?
- [13:45]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, I think there are many military conflicts. I mean, some military affairs, obviously siege God is extraordinarily important. But I wouldn't say that if you're looking at the most important outcome, military outcome of the century, which is the overthrow of Ming China, the world's largest military power, by Manchu invaders. I mean, that's not due to artillery. And I think one's got to be very careful downplaying the continued vitality of, as it were, more traditional military systems. Now, the more interesting transition is when you get mounted archers replaced by mounted people carrying firearms, generally pistols of some type, carbide, some type. That's an interesting transition. But canon themselves are not crucial, for example, in the. I'm not saying they play no role, that would be mistaken. But they're not crucial in the overthrow of the Ming or in the subsequent revolt of the three Feudatories, which, as you know, is the key campaign in China in the 1670s. And I would also suggest that although cannon are important in siegecraft in India, as in Aurangzeb's campaign, they don't play a comparable role in battles. And I take it further that it's generally agreed that many of the great sieges were determined, some of them by artillery. But many of them were determined by other factors, such as either betrayal on the part of somebody, one of the defendants, or the arrival of a relieving army and the issues that that posed as indeed with the failure of the Ottoman Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683. So one has to be cautious. I'm not saying artillery doesn't play a role. What I'm trying to do, to loop right back to the beginning, is to say you can understand the role better if you put its usage in context. And I would say that remains equally the case with forms of conflict at the present day, including forms of weaponry.
- [16:06]
Dr. Charles Cotea
Why did the west dominate the use of cannon in the 18th century?
- [16:10]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, the west dominates the use of cannon in the 18th century because of the continued importance for dynamic non Western military figures like Nadir, Shah of Persia, for example, in the 1730s and 40s, or the Kunlung, Emperor of China in the 1750s. Of other forms, other arms, if you like. Obviously both of them had cannon, but both of them put more of an emphasis on mobile forces. And I think one has to note that many of the European forces, the mobility when they're effective, is provided not by long range power projection on land, but by long range power projection at sea. And at sea, of course. And the Europeans are the dominant naval powers. We'll talk about that in just a second. At sea, of course, you often have on one warship, you can have 64, 74, you can have more guns. Many did have more guns. And that could be not too different from the total number of cannon in a significant army force. And of course, the ships are essentially mobile cannon carriers. Now, it's an interesting question which has been discussed and could be discussed further as to why naval powers of the 16th century. One can think, for example of China, Korea and Japan, all at the time of the Korean war of the 1590s, do not sustain that development or do not develop it towards long range naval power. So, for example, the Ottomans deployed a considerable number of ships to support their conquest of crete from the 1640s to the 1660s. It took quite a long time, the siege of Gandia, but did not have a similar power projection by sea at a great distance. Now, you can present that as either failure or you can present that as choice. And you could argue that there were other elements that seemed to them more significant, but that helped to ensure that the importance of cannon at sea, helped to ensure that the Western powers were the most important cannon powers.
- [18:48]
Dr. Charles Cotea
Who would you say which power best employed the Cannon in the pre1789 period.
- [18:55]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, there is often discussion about the improvement of cannon after the Seven Years War, the Gruberval system by the French. It's worth bearing in mind they didn't actually use the cannon very much. I mean obviously they were at war with Britain. From 1778 to 1783. Cannon play a part in, for example the successful siege of Yorktown in, in 1781. We don't actually know what would have happened if, shall we say, the French had deployed their cannon in 1787 in the Dutch crisis against the invading Prussian army in the Netherlands. We don't know what would have happened. So it's a bit tricky, a bit difficult to say that. And certainly in their own way, the Austrians, the British, the French all had effective artillery in the late 18th century.
- [19:50]
Dr. Charles Cotea
How important was artillery to the success of Napoleon Bonaparte?
- [19:56]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, Napoleon is good at the tactical deployment and placing of artillery on the battlefield. He's good at institutional changes to use his cannon as an offensive force. He makes them as mobile on the battlefield as possible utilizing horse drawn limbers. He's good at massing his artillery background. In 1809 he has a battery of 112 guns to reorganize his attack on the Austrians at Borodino. There's about 200 French cannon. Waterloo, of course he'd large cannon force as it said, you know, I'm in cannon Waterloo. I think he's got 247 cannon and the British have got about 157 and the Prussians 134 numbers themselves don't tell you very much because Napoleon's Grand Battery also is, you know, quite significant. It includes 1812 pounders for example. But I think the point is that cannon can provide you with a tactical advantage on the battlefield. It is not necessarily a determinant at the tactical level, let alone a determinant of the operational level. At the operational level, cannon is most useful if you have a successful mobile siege force which you can sustain the usage of and provide the necessary logistics for it. And as you may know, I recently brought out a book on logistics because in the sense the other side of the history of artillery is the history of the relevant logistics. But it's no accident that Napoleon fails. And as you will know from my work on my strategy book on Napoleonic warfare, I mean Napoleon's basic flaw is that he cannot move tactical skill and a degree, not always, not universal, of operational effectiveness into strategic advantage. And having more, fewer cannon doesn't really change that situation. Had he won it all to lose. It wasn't going to necessarily do him much good against the Austrian and Russian forces invading eastern France.
- [22:16]
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- [23:18]
Dr. Charles Cotea
How do you explain the evolution of artillery in the hundred years after the Battle of Waterloo?
- [23:25]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, I've got a couple of chapters on that and I obviously draw attention to artillery and I would say, and you know, in part, in going right back to my War in the world 1450-2000 book where I critiqued the notion of an early modern military revolution, I did argue that if you wanted to emphasize technology, and I think, you know, you have to do that within constraints, the 19th century where you have a mass production, you had standardization, you had the effective use of of iron and the developing use of steel. All of those provide you with major opportunities. So in the case of artillery, you've got breech loading rifled guns used on both land and at sea, you've got rapid firing field guns, you've got new propellants, new fuses, steel coated projectiles. All of those increase the lift lethality of artillery. But ironically of course, because these are being matched by other rival powers in arms races, quintessentially on both land and sea, that actually means that the relative capability advantage of an aggregate change is much less. And indeed that is to play out in World War I.
- [24:49]
Dr. Charles Cotea
Which leads to my next question, which is which of the powers in the Great War best employed artillery?
- [24:56]
Professor Jeremy Black
The British in 1918 on the Western Front to smash through the German defences. And that's fundamentally they master the three dimensional usage of artillery, particularly helped by aerial reconnaissance and Far more important than tanks. And, you know, obviously to deal with trenches, you need heavier, high trajectory pieces capable of plunging fire. Now, the British are not alone in producing those, but the British do, in 1918, had a very effective use of systematic coordination, precise control of infantry, and a very much larger number of heavy artillery batteries. They got 440 by November 1918. And I got a good quote from chapters I was reading in the archives. Lieutenant Colonel Percy Worrell. He wrote that the repeated German attacks on his infantry battalion made from April 13, 1918 onwards were, quote, mowed down by a controlled fire. A good system of observing was established, communication maintained, and the artillery and machine gun corps did excellent work in close cooperation. It was seldom longer than two minutes after I gave X two minutes, intense when one gunner responded with a crash on the right spot. And I cannot speak too highly of our artillery support. You know, this business of sort of ringing up, you know, with reference to precise map references. And that would not have been possible in 1914 either in terms of the use of information, the speed of the use of information or the availability of the lethality of the support. And obviously the scale was very significant, but the usage was also very impressive. If I might just give one again, this is from private papers of the grandson of the individual Alan, who owns them, lent them to me. Alan Thompson, who was an artillery colonel, wrote to his wife Edith about the attack on November 1st of the British 4th Division on the Western Front. Zero was a magnificent sight as my headquarters was on high ground in rear of the batteries and I could see the flashes from guns and the shrapnel bursts from Valenciennes in the north, stretching as far as one could see southwards. The gradual decrease of the Huns shellfire told us that our lads were getting on all right. Now, that's a very, very interesting sort of writing to his wife in those terms. But actually, if you read the infantry reports of the units that were counterpointed to the artillery, they comment very frequently. I mean, for Thompson, for example, the brigadier general he was supporting added quote, the infantry always knew the guns were close behind and ready to help them when required, and so on and so forth. I mean, they worked it out. It took time to work out, but they worked it out. And it required enormous industrial capacity, which we don't have today, of course, both in the manufacture of guns and in the manufacture of the armaments. And as you will know, there were shell crises for all of the powers. And what obviously people focused on is, in the case of Britain, the shell crisis earlier in the war and not how the shell crisis was resolved.
- [28:48]
Dr. Charles Cotea
Was that why the artillery was referred to as, quote, the King of Battles unquote, during the Great War?
- [28:55]
Professor Jeremy Black
Yes, and I think it's reasonably clear it was. It killed the largest number of combatants. It was more effective than the machine gun. But obviously the machine gun was the one that people tended to talk about because it was in a sense more novel and also more frightening in a way. But yes, the artillery was really significant. What was instructive, of course, is that there was not the same effectiveness at sea. You have the aftermath of the naval race and the formidable fleets at Sea. Sea, for example, the Grand Fleet and High Sea Fleet in 1916 at the Battle of Jutland, but without having the comparable effect. And again, we could discuss why that was. Fire discipline was an issue. They were only actually able to bring their guns to bear for very few minutes. But obviously on land there was much more preparation, again against essentially static targets.
- [29:59]
Dr. Charles Cotea
Why do you say that, Quote, overall artillery superiority was a key element in the Allied victory during World War II.
- [30:08]
Professor Jeremy Black
Oh, again, I mean, I try to go through this in quite some detail. I think it's the major strength in the Soviet army. And I think the British and the Americans were very keen on using big artillery bombardments to accompany their offenses. And the Germans, they used large scale artillery when they could. Stalingrad in the Battle of the Bulge they had a 90 minute barrage at the start. They had no real answer. And if you look at, for example, late 43, the Soviet arm attacks on the Eastern Front are benefiting directly from the lack of adequate artillery support. For the Germans, German artillery was a hot potch and you know, the field guns suffered because many were horse drawn. The Italian artillery on the whole was old and had too little ammunition. And the Japanese again didn't have artillery to match that of the United States. So, you know, there are some very impressive Allied guns. The American 105mm and 155mm howitzers for example. The British don't have a really effective modern heavy artillery, but their 25 pounder proves highly versatile. So, you know, there are some very, very, very good guns on the Allied side.
- [31:40]
Dr. Charles Cotea
Which power.
- [31:41]
Professor Jeremy Black
And they know how to use them. Sorry, sorry, you can say. Yeah.
- [31:44]
Dr. Charles Cotea
Which power do you believe made the best usage of artillery during the Second World War?
- [31:50]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, I think the Soviet in 44, 45 make a very good usage of artillery. Of course the Soviets don't make real usage of artillery at sea. And at sea, both the British and the Americans, I would Say the British more, because the Americans put more of an emphasis on their carriers than their battleships. As per force, the Battle of the Pacific develops. The Americans have very good artillery and support of their troops advancing in the Battle of Europe. That begins with the D day invasion in 44. And the American guns were well used and of course supported by excellent aerial reconnaissance as well.
- [32:35]
Dr. Charles Cotea
How did the usage of artillery evolve during the 40 some years of the Cold War?
- [32:41]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, during the Cold War you get a move varies by power and it varies by tasking towards missiles. Surface to surface. Missiles are important, as are of course surface to air and of course at sea. And the biggest change of all, I would say, is at sea, the end of the age of the battleship. I know the Americans still have one or two battleships in their reserve fleet, but essentially the end of the age of the battleship and where the battleship keeps going. It's being repurposed as of Lebanon by the Americans in the 80s for the use of missiles, although they're still using their guns a bit. But if you take that change, that's very significant indeed. On land, artillery still plays a role. For example, artillery is important in the, let's say wars like the Nigerian civil war of 67 to 70 or the Egyptians when they attacked the Israelis in the omphal war in 73 benefited from the use of the heavy artillery. Or the British campaign to recapture The Falklands in 82 benefited from their artillery, their 105 millimeter guns. And of course you've got smaller use of artillery pieces by insurgency campaign. So the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland improvised waters, for example. But I would say that what you don't have is battle on the scale of World War II. The nearest equivalent would be the Iran Iraq War of 1980-88, where interestingly enough, I mean, artillery is used. Interestingly enough, one of the major uses of artillery is, is as it were, the Iraqi use after the failure of their initial attack of their tanks, as it were static artillery pieces or relatively rarely moving artillery pieces. And that's an instance of the way in which people have to get their guns from somewhere.
- [34:55]
Dr. Charles Cotea
Why has artillery not been seen to play a key role in the post1989 period?
- [35:00]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, I think we might not take that point of view. If we were looking at the Ukraine war of 2022-2023. I certainly think that where you had fast moving conflicts like the one in Congo in the late 1990s or indeed the two Gulf wars, there was an emphasis on firepower provided by more mobile Methods. So in the two Gulf wars, primarily it was American air power and tanks. In the conflicts in Africa, it's generally been mortars or very light pieces, heavy machine guns, for example, moved by trucks, lorries, in British terminology. The actual deployment of a classic artillery force is now less common. But obviously what one saw and has seen in Ukraine is where you move towards more static front lines, which is the position at the present moment that artillery is used both to engage as a offensive tool and to engage as a defensive tool. And its ability to act in both those respects is very significant, has always been very significant as a form of. At the tactical level.
- [36:31]
Dr. Charles Cotea
Speaking of the Ukrainian war, anything in terms of the artillery aspect which you would characterize as revolutionary in terms of.
- [36:38]
Professor Jeremy Black
Usage in the Korean War? No, no, I wouldn't.
- [36:41]
Dr. Charles Cotea
I meant the Ukrainian war.
- [36:43]
Professor Jeremy Black
Oh, the Ukrainian war. No, no, not at all. I mean, I think that you have more real time intelligence offered, you know, as it were, the interplay between sensors and shooters has improved and obviously you're using more drones as platforms. But I wouldn't actually say that there has been anything revolutionary.
- [37:06]
Dr. Charles Cotea
If you wanted people to take one thing away from your book, what would it be?
- [37:10]
Professor Jeremy Black
What I'd like them to take away from the book and each of the books that I have been writing as that these topics are important in helping to explain the complexity of war, of military effectiveness and of victory. And. And that taking only one of them away, as if that explains everything, would be a mistake.
- [37:33]
Dr. Charles Cotea
On that observation, which I would like to agree with entirely. I would like to thank you very much, Professor Black, for being so kind to speak with us today. This is Charles Coutillo. You've been listening to New Books in History, a podcast channel, New Books Network. Thank you, Professor Black, very much.
- [37:50]
Professor Jeremy Black
Thank you.
- [37:56]
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