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Jeremy Black, "The Short History of Russia: Returning to Another Country" (Amberley, 2026)
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- [00:01]
Professor Jeremy Black
Welcome to the New Books Network.
- [00:06]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
Good day. Welcome to New Books in History, a podcast channel on the New Books Network. My name is Dr. Charles Coutteo. I'm the host on the channel. And today we are pleased indeed honored to have with us master historian Professor Jeremy Black. Professor Black is Professor Emeritus from the at the Exeter University. He's without a doubt, is without a doubt, one of the most prolific historians writing in the Anglo poem world today, having written well over 200 books. And today we are discussing one of his newest books, a Short History of Russia, published by Amberly. Welcome, Professor Black.
- [00:39]
Professor Jeremy Black
Hello, Professor.
- [00:40]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
Why did you write this book?
- [00:41]
Professor Jeremy Black
I wrote this book for two reasons. One, I've always been interested in the history of Russia, always taught Russian history as part of my European history teaching, first at Durham and then at Exeter between 1980 and 2020. And secondly, because I've been doing a series of national histories. I've done Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, the United States, France, Britain. And I find it an instructive way to look at history and an interesting way, quite frankly. And part of my task, a pleasant task, is obviously I hope to interest the readers, but part of it is also to interest myself. And I feel that, you know, if you're excited about a book, it communicates very read Italy, whereas too many authors, as far as I can see, write a book which is the footnote on their previous book. Boy.
- [01:32]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
Well taken. Would it be true to say that you do not agree with the geopolitics as history? School of Russian Studies, yes.
- [01:41]
Professor Jeremy Black
And as you will know from we've discussed in the past, my books on geopolitics, I don't agree with the idea of geographical determinism as a whole, so I wouldn't make that specific specifically about Russia. But you're absolutely right. For many people, because dealing with Russia has been complicated, or they've wanted some simplistic account of it. They've argued in terms of some geopolitical drive. You know, the drive towards warm water, for example, has been a classic one, which of course downplays the differences of opinion between periods and within periods.
- [02:17]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
Why do you disagree with those historians, like late Richard Pipes, who regard Moscow as a Mongol successor state?
- [02:26]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, I think there was a contrast between those states which had a Christian role and identity and drew on differing traditions as a result, and those that didn't. And whereas, for example, I think if you're looking at the Carnate of the Golden Horde, you're very much looking in the latter term, there is, I think, an importance in the dimension of Orthodox Christianity within first Kievan Rus and then subsequently within Muscovy, and I think that's actually part of Russian history. There has been a tendency, as indeed in non Russian history, let's be clear, to, to downplay the role of issues of religion, both in terms of the politics of it, personal commitment, social cohesion, sources of identity, and in forms which are ideological and functional. They're not necessarily opposed to each other. And I think one can see that that's misleading and limited. And of course, paradoxically, to do so is to endorse the state atheism of the Soviet Union. You know, it was extraordinarily destructive against the Orthodox Church, killed a lot of people, destroyed a lot of buildings, but ultimately did not succeed in its goal of extirpating and replacing with an ideology of its. Of the same consequence, extirpating Orthodoxy was
- [04:04]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
the spread of serfdom in Moscow in the 16th and 17th centuries, not part of a larger regional wide phenomenon affecting many parts of Central and Eastern Europe, called subsequently the Second Serfdom.
- [04:18]
Professor Jeremy Black
You're absolutely right. The second Serfdom can be seen very much in other areas. I mean, it's particularly associated with Poland, for example, it's associated with Eastern Europe as a whole and there are aspects of it in some parts of Western Europe and as you correctly say, it's linked in part to issues of labour discipline, but it's all social control, whatever phrase you wish to use. And it's also linked in part with the desire to maximise profit in terms of the fact that the Baltic became in the 17th century a very major grain exporting region. Now, I think where you put the emphasis between these varies. I mean, Marxist scholars very much used both, but particularly were interested in the latter one, the idea of spheres of exploitation, etc. Etc. You know, theories which in some respects were variants on central place theory of, shall we say, central zone theories of exploitation and control. I think there is also a degree to which the extraordinary flux of Russia, and not just Russia during the Russian time of Troubles, encourages a commitment, concern, anxiety, drive to exert control, which you see with the new dynasty, the Romanovs, and you see with the nobility as a whole.
- [05:48]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
What was the time of Troubles?
- [05:50]
Professor Jeremy Black
The Time of Troubles is the term used to the period really from Ivan IV's death until the start of the Romanov dynasty. So it includes, for example, Boris Godunov's period of control and it includes a number of pretenders, as I write about in the book, what I would say. I mean, it's difficult. There are specifically Russian elements to it, to wit, in particular dynastic discontinuity, issues of leadership, the pressures Russia is under as a result of war with both Sweden and Poland. But there are also, as you know, wider issues in Europe and more generally as a whole in that period. This is an age known as the Little Ice Age. It's a period of falling agrarian profitability, productivity, enormous social strain as a result. And historians often speak of the mid 17th century crisis, looking at the 1640s and to a lesser extent, the 1650s. But you could also argue that there's a very widespread crisis in the 1590s and 1600s. And you know that that in all sorts of places, for example, in France, in Sweden, the Low Countries, requires attention. So there are particular Russian elements. But it's more general.
- [07:24]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
Why was Mikhail Romanov chosen as Tsar in 1613 by the Zemyskaya Sabor? Why not a more prestigious family?
- [07:32]
Professor Jeremy Black
I think it's because, as you say, there was no inevitability about it. But in Russia, once you have discontinuity, you push to the fore, as in Poland in that period, as in Sweden in the 1590s, what you might call an elective component. And the elective component rewards the individual who is, in part, somebody who can take control of the situation, but in part also is the solution to other people's needs and anxieties. And I think that that element is well worth considering. And, you know, Michael, as it's known, he was well manipulated by the Szakassky faction, and they, in a sense, were looking for somebody they could push it forward. Mikhail himself, as the son of the Patriarch of Moscow, Fyodor Romanov, has a degree of legitimacy in ideological terms. And, you know, he appeared to be a consolidator, and I think that was quite significant. And of course, the fact that he's the son of the Patriarch of Moscow contrasts very much with the Polish candidate Vladislaw, the eldest son of Sigismund III of Poland, who'd been acclaimed as tsar. But of course, he was a Catholic.
- [09:03]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
Why? And how did the Russian state manage to impose hegemony over much of east and Central Europe from the second quarter of the 18th century till 1989?
- [09:15]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, partly it was the strength it could deploy, partly it was its ability to ruthlessly mobilize resources. There's a variant on that with the French Revolution in its most Jacobin phrase in the mid-1790s. Partly, of course, it is the collapse due to other wars, Napoleonic wars and then the First World War of Alternative power systems and the degree to which what develops to the west of Russia then the Soviet Union is a form of vacuum or vacuum maybe going too strong, but a form of weakness. So you can think, for example that The Poles in 1920 made a strong, robust and successful defence against Soviet Soviet expansionism, Battle of Warsaw and so on and pushed the Soviets back and Poland ended up with eastern frontiers further than they are now. But of course Poland as a result of the German attack and then obviously the Soviets joined in in 1939 was in a far weaker situation subsequently and therefore not able to prevent the Western movement of the Soviet Union. I mean it's worth bearing in mind that Soviet troops are in Berlin, Vienna, Prague, Budapest in 1945 in Warsaw. Obviously it's worth bearing in mind that they get Farther west in 1814, 1815 as I discuss in the book. So you don't need communism to explain the westward movement of Russian power, but it's clearly an a factor in the mid 20th century.
- [11:09]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
Why did Catherine agreed agree to partition Poland when Poland was already a Russian client state?
- [11:16]
Professor Jeremy Black
I think partly because Poland as a Russian client state did not do what the Russians wanted. And you see that 1768 onwards very much the case. And of course for the Russians, I mean they'd already had this situation in Sweden with King Adolf Frederick putting in clients as rulers doesn't mean that the client necessarily does what they want. And that I think was a very serious issue. But partly also it became very apparent that Prussia was going to move and that in that context the Russians would have had the choice between opposing and fighting Prussia or taking part. And in 1772, which is the year of course of the First Partition of Poland or what becomes the First Partition of Poland, the Russians are already in an intractable war with the Turks. They're doing well. But the war has started in 1768. By 1771, 1772, it's extraordinarily costly. It's about to be joined by the crisis of the Pugachev rising within Russia. This is not a scenario which is going to encourage you to wish conflict with Prussia and or Austria. So in many senses cooperating with them seems the obvious thing to do and a way as well to consolidate the extent to which Russian forces within Poland fighting the Confederation of Bar have already done well. But that situation, that success needs consolidation.
- [12:57]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
Would you agree with the characterization of 18th century Russia as the quote, autocracy tempered by assassination, unquote?
- [13:06]
Professor Jeremy Black
I certainly think there is an autocratic element to it. I'm well, familiar with that quote. My own view is that it's autocracy compromised by distance. In other words, you can issue an instruction in Moscow, in St. Petersburg, subsequently in Leningrad, and you can discover that in Tashkemt it doesn't work. And you get, for example, the extraordinary degree of corruption around the Soviet cotton harvest, of course, famously in. In Soviet Central Asia. And that's despite the extent to which the autocracy under the Soviets is far more pointed. I mean, in a way, you can be executed, disappeared, or sent to a psychiatric, you know, to be driven mad in a way that the tsarists just didn't do. I mean, they might send you into internal exile in Siberia, but there is no brutality under the tsarist compared to that under the Communists. But the Communists found it very difficult to get their instructions observed. So I would say it's not assassination that tempers it, it's distance. It's the problems of control.
- [14:27]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
Why did Russia not develop Alaska as a real colony?
- [14:32]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, I suggest in my book, and I've written separately on the struggle for mastery in North America, of course, I suggest that in the case of Alaska, there are specific problems, not least the availability or the lack of availability, I should rather say, of grain, which is a big problem. It helps to explain Russian interest in California, but that doesn't yield the resources. It's to do also with the distance, which I think is a very significant factor. It's to deal with the difficulty of operating across Siberia, developing governmental or economic links with Alaska, which again, is considerable. I mean, we're talking about links before, obviously, the transcontinental railway. And it's the fact that in the period of the 19th century up to 1867, there are far more opportunities to be gained from expansion elsewhere, whether it's into Finland, whether it's into Russia again at the end of the Napoleonic wars, whether it's into the Balkans, Bessarabia, for example, in 1812, Central Asia, or by the 1850s, into the Usuri River Valley and what becomes the Russian Far East. So all of those offer much greater advantages and are also much closer. I mean, if you wish to develop a Pacific possession, which is an island, Sakhalin, for example, is easier to get to once you've got Vladivostok than obviously the Curios, sorry, than the Aloysians.
- [16:12]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
And why did Bonaparte wish to invade Russia in 1812, and why did he fail?
- [16:18]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, he wanted to invade Russia because. Well, there's two different ways of looking at this, and I tried to have a shot at it. In my book on the strategy of the Napoleonic wars, one, you could argue that there are rational interpretations for specific actions on the part of Napoleon. So the obvious one in this case would be that Alexander is breaching the trading system that Napoleon has devised in order to limit British commercial pressure in Europe and the ability of Britain to go on fighting. So, you know, there's a rational interpretation. And to argue that, linked to that, there is a specific concern that the Entente created with Russia first under Tzar Port and then at Tilsit with Alexander I in 1807 has been attenuated, and that the only way to deal with that is probably to deliver a very sharp rap over the knuckles. So that's one argument. And you could, I suppose, argue that there's an analogy with those people who've sought to claim that in 1914 or 1941, German aggression towards Russia has rational explanations. But I think I would focus more with Napoleon, with Wilhelm ii, with Hitler, on cultures, political cultures which preferred conflict and action to the attempt to settle matters by quid pro quo's compromise or matters short of war. So there is a bellicosity on Napoleon's part, I would argue, that helps to explain the war rather than the actual specific factors that people focus on. And as you know, Charles, I've written books on the causes of war, and I've argued that the major explanation of the causes of war is what I call war warfulness, or we would call it more commonly, bellicosity. Why did it fail? Well, obviously there are the specific reasons that people, again, can focus on the actual miscalculation and mishandling of the 1812 Offensive to Moscow and the consequences of it. I would say that again, this only takes you so far. I would say there's a parallel to 1941, 1942, that there was no adequate strategy, that there was operational planning with the presupposition that it would lead to an inevitable political consequence of strategic resolution, in which, as it were, there was a dictated peace, and that this was an absurdity. It did not describe the enormity of the task nor the nature of the political system that the aggressor was up against. I would also add that Napoleon, like in fact Hitler and indeed Kaiser Wilhelm, goes to war as the head of an alliance, and the alliance does not equal the ambitions of the chief protagonist. So good, so good, so good.
- [19:34]
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- [19:45]
Professor Jeremy Black
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- [19:47]
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- [20:01]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
Well taken. Do you agree with Paul Schroeder's thesis that the 1815 settlement was an Anglo Russian co hegemony?
- [20:11]
Professor Jeremy Black
I think a co hegemony is going a little far. I mean, if I was, you know, sitting there in Turin or Milan or Navy Naples and remember Austrian armies suppressed movements in Piedmont and in Naples in the early 1820s, I would say, well, no, I mean, you know, I mean, Schroeder a nice man. Very nice man, Paul Schroeder. I think he overly took the view from Vienna and didn't understand or adequately. I mean, he was very hostile to British interests. But I think, no, I wouldn't say that it was an Anglo Russian hegemony. I would say Russia and Austria were both key members of what you could conceptualize, what was conceptualized as a holy alliance. And the major questions for these powers was how to maintain their interests and their ideological hegemony that they managed obviously to incorporate France in their system in the late 18 teens, 1820s, which was why of course, they supported the French invasion of Spain to put down Spanish liberalism in 1823. And that in a sense Britain was not as key a role as it might have liked, that it was an important maritime power, but precisely because it didn't wish to engage in a central role, not still less to take part in what you might call as an anti liberalism. It was not an Anglo Russian co hegemony. I would say it's closer to being a Austro Russian one.
- [22:00]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
Why did Russia lose the Crimean War?
- [22:04]
Professor Jeremy Black
It lost it up to a point, obviously. I mean, partly it was because it was a more limited war. I mean, both the British and the French did not fight that war in order to drive the Russians from Crimea. Still less did they try and stage the war by in some way doing a repetition of 1812. So the goals were more limited and the means were more limited. That I think was very important to the degree of success that the Allies had. In the terms of the Russians, it was very hard to deploy sufficient power to Crimea. They were fighting essentially on their own, a coalition which included, as you know, the Ottomans and the Piedmontese and which involved conflict, the White Sea, the Baltic, major military confrontation, though not war along the the main frontiers in Eastern Europe. It involved conflict, of course, in the Black Sea region, conflict in the Caucasus and conflict in the Far East. Now, all of that posed a major challenge for the Russians, I would say, lose only up to a point. They were pushed into delivering a peace which they wouldn't have particularly liked. And of course, Sevastopol, their principal naval base in the Black Sea, fell. But the attempt by the British and the French to use naval power to produce an enormous impact on St. Petersburg and on the main Baltic naval base at Kronstadt did not have comparable success. So, no, I'd be cautious. I mean, it's not a defeat like 1917, nor a partial defeat which obviously is subsequently turned into a victory like 1941. So I think one has to be cautious in these terms.
- [24:15]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
How important an event in Russian history was the assassination of Tsar Alexander II by the nurodnaya voja in 1881?
- [24:23]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, I mean, I think we can discuss with all of these kind of episodes that if only X had remained in power, you know, it's the equivalent to the one about if Kaiser Wilhelm hadn't succeeded till much later because his father had remained alive or. I was once giving a lecture, I was asked to give a lecture on France and World War I, and somebody at the beginning of the front row suddenly said, surely if the path of true love had taken place, there wouldn't have been World War I. And I was rather fortunate. I can think on my feet. And I said, no, I think you'll find that if Crown Prince Rudolph hadn't died, whether by murder or more probably assassination, there would still have been World War I. And the man said to me, were you wrong? And I just thought, well, there you go, that's what happens. So you could argue that there would have been more liberalism. You could argue that that might have drawn lance, the boil, et cetera, et cetera. I think you've got to be very care drawing a line from the 1880s to 1917. There are so many more immediate factors to consider, the Russo Japanese War being one, but I would obviously put the emphasis primarily on World War I, and I think that's the key factor.
- [25:52]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
Why did Russia lose the Russo Japanese War?
- [25:56]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, they lost it overwhelmingly at sea. They lost it less overwhelmingly on land because they were pushed back in Manchuria, as you know, particularly at Mukden. But the Japanese capacity to deliver a blow that would knock Russia out on land was severely limited. And Japan was, by 1905 rather as it was to be in China by 1939, running out of resources. So what I would argue is that key elements included the success of Japanese military intelligence and helping to sow dissidents within Russia. I would say that the fact that the prestige of Russian power took an enormous knock in the naval campaigns and in the fighting on land, I would say those are, again, more important than what you might call a mental body blow. I mean, remember, the fighting on land is taking place a long way away from the centers of Russian power.
- [27:10]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
Why did the first Russian Revolution of 1905 not result in the downfall of the Tsarist regime?
- [27:16]
Professor Jeremy Black
Oh, it was too weak. And I don't think that that was in any way the intention of most of those people who were pressing for change. They wanted a more what you might call reform monarchy. And that was, in fact, the direction of travel of a number of the changes in the 1900s. You could see the same thing, if you like, in the Ottoman Empire in 1908 with the young Turks. I think one has to be very wary of taking a view of history, which is it should have gone to where we are now, and if it didn't, it was a failure and. Or it should have gone, in the case of Russia, to, let's say, a Soviet Revolution, or it should have gone to the equivalent of the Kerensky spring Revolution in 1917, and the failure to do so equates with failure. I think that misunderstands the situation in 1905 and exaggerates the scope and scale of those radical dimensions to it.
- [28:25]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
Why did the czarist regime collapse in February 1917?
- [28:29]
Professor Jeremy Black
Oh, because they were doing extraordinarily badly in the war and because Nicholas II wasn't up to it.
- [28:36]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
Why did the Bolsheviks win the Russian Civil War?
- [28:40]
Professor Jeremy Black
I think the Bolshevik victory in the Russian Civil War comes from two separate factors. One needs to look at the fighting between Russians and one needs to look at the eventual lack of success of external intervention. In the first case, you have a number of factors to consider. The central place which the Bolsheviks hold in Moscow and Leningrad, their control over most munitions production, their control over the rail system, the large numbers of people they can forcibly recruit, and also many of the deficiencies of the white side, which particularly include the inability to actually coincide offensives against the Communists. I think that's very important, as well as actually political factors that much of what had been Russia is more interested in separatism, as in Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Caucasus Republics, which don't sustain that and indeed Central Asia, than it is in actually producing a, as it were, white success. And then there is the degree to which external intervention, Whilst very extensive 14 countries was either very limited in its goals. I mean, the largest country that sent troops was Japan and that obviously had very limited geographical goals, or was suffering enormously from war weariness, which very much, I think, was the case with Britain and France, but also to an extent, with Canada and with America, indeed, and Romania for that matter.
- [30:23]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
Why did Stalin emerge victorious in the power struggles of the 1920s?
- [30:28]
Professor Jeremy Black
Partly happenstance, partly he was able to maneuver adroitly, taking advantage of other power struggles, partly because, as it were, it wasn't organized round a stop Stalin basis, because there were several different groups competing with each other. And I think that that is, in fact, very important. We know, as I was saying earlier, we know that Stalin was to come to power. We know that he was to be a murderous and vicious leader. But it's very easy, therefore, to assume that that was the central narrative. But, you know, for example, there were many people who disliked Trotsky other than Stalin. Bukharin, for example, allied with Stalin not only against Trotsky, but also against. I think you're right. I'm right in saying Kamenef and Zinoviev. So that what you've got is you've got a real complexity between 1924 and. And more particularly 1930. And the argument is that the Communist Party organization was only really under Stalin's control by 1930. So it requires a number of different struggles, and it requires Stalin's ability and luck in playing off the rivalries between the others.
- [32:06]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
What exactly do you mean when you state that the Stalin regime suffered from, quote, grave problems in its capacity to govern, unquote?
- [32:14]
Professor Jeremy Black
Oh, I think there's no doubt at all about. It suffered from grave problems in its capacity to govern. It had a massive lack of reliable information coming into it, which meant that planning were. And you know, the Soviet system relied on planning. Planning was extraordinarily weak and fallible. It suffered from the degree to which Stalin, if you were interviewing him now, would have told you this. He found it that the Communist Party itself, the bureaucracy as he saw it, which he both needed, but he found repeatedly unreliable and unwilling to do as he wanted, which, of course, is one of the reasons that he turned to violence. It suffered from the consequence of his own paranoia, which is the problems that might have been soluble, not least in terms of following different solutions in particular parts and particular sectors. He wasn't willing to do that, and he put down difference as a cause of threat. So, yes, I would have thought that Stalin, you can see it in the Moscow trials of 36 to 38. He's very much anxious about the situation with potential opponents. He's very much anxious about the Leningrad Party in particular. And he's apt to say that there was what the rightist and leftist deviation, which is a marvellous way of encompassing just about everybody who is seen as unreliable. And he felt that he had to kill the old Bolsheviks in order to establish an effective and controllable state bureaucracy. But once he'd established that, he then couldn't trust it, which was why he needed successively to get rid of heads of the nkvd. And he also believed his own propaganda about there being anti Soviet elements. So if you've got inborn class enemies, so you know, formerly rich peasants and you believe that these people are class enemies, then you jolly well have to deal with them. And that then becomes a self fulfilling prophecy. You have class enemies and you get bloodletting and that bloodletting creates more anxiety, more concern that you're not being violent enough. So to a great extent I argue that the totalitarian dynamic, which I think there's no doubt that's there was a response to the very problems created by the Soviet political and governmental system and the nature of Stalin's form of government. And I argue in my book that Stalinism saw itself as modern but in practice it was pre modern, dependent on myth and faith and therefore likely to fail. And indeed it did fail. I mean, if you think of the enormous brutality and what is striking is how little return was produced. I mean, you know, obviously you could draw attention to all sorts of indicators. You know, I talk about the extension of the railways and you know, you could talk about the extension of, you know, tank production or electricity production. But I discuss in the book, for example, the magnetic mountain, you know, you know, which becomes Magneto Gorscombe, which there's an excellent book. Now I remember being fascinated by this when I was at high school and you know, one very much wrote about it then. I mean these were, you know, it was a marvelous Soviet achievement, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. But I was, you know, reading about the railway production that was put up to, you know, to supply it with coking coal, which I can remember as a schoolboy, you know, drawing a little map about and all the rest of it. And the fact of the matter is the railway was very slow. It took a long time to construct. They put down the track without ballast and the speed limit was 10 kilometres an hour. There were repeated accidents, major problems with capacity, etc. Etc. Etc. So it was a shambles. Now obviously it's a shambles that can be made effective by shooting a lot of people and saying we've achieved our quotas. But actually that doesn't describe the result you want.
- [37:06]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
Do you agree with Jeffrey Roberts argument that Stalin was sincere in his opposition to Hitler's Germany prior to August 1939?
- [37:15]
Professor Jeremy Black
No, I think Roberts is rather foolish I have to say. I mean, you know I actually see Roberts as a Stalin apologist and I was you know, quite shocked that some of the stuff he published. So no, I don't. I think that Stalin is fundamentally a person who trusts nobody else. If they're on the left, they're probably going to be suffering in his eyes from Trotskyite delusions, sentiments, entryism. If not be looking to anarchists, if not looking to leftist or rightist deviationists, they're going to be otherwise possibly bourgeois political parties or they're just going to be hostile because they represent national interests that are ethnically or geostrategically hostile. So no, I actually think that Stalin had a policy of against everybody and I think he found the prospect of allying with those who might be ideologically opposed something that he was quite willing to do if necessary. Of course he was not in any way alone in that.
- [38:36]
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- [39:02]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
why did the Stalin regime not collapse in the summer of 1941?
- [39:07]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well it nearly did of course and Stalin had as you know, a big crisis of confidence when Minsk fell. I think in part the mechanisms of it were not so well articulated as to have a central nerve. Whatever Stalin might like to think about it that was going to collapse it. In other words there was a considerable degree of autonomy again autonomy can limited by the nkdv. You can always shoot generals you don't like but a considerable degree of autonomy of just fighting on and the capacity to just fight on as I think very important and of course what it leads to is Stalin taking steps to try and control the collapse or the apparent collapse. So as you may know there is a, a moment in Moscow where the NKVD in mid October has to ruthlessly maintain a murderous order and kills a lot of people at that stage. But I think that Stalin is as much struggling to maintain central control over the opposition to the Germans as, in a sense, he's struggling to maintain central control during the purges of the 30s. And prior to that.
- [40:46]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
What explains the Russian military recovery after 1941?
- [40:52]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, as I've argued in my stuff On World War II, I think the German operational particularly, but also strategic levels of war making are nowhere near as impressive as the number of people have thought. The Germans are losing troops and tanks at a greater rate than they had anticipated on the Eastern front from day one. And I think that the Soviets are able in 1942. They still take very heavy casualties, particularly around Kharkov in the spring and then in the dawn in the summer. But they are benefiting by that stage, by the fact that the Germans by the spring of 42, just are not in a position to advance along the entire front very differently to the situation in 41. And that makes it. Easier is the wrong word. That makes it less difficult for the Soviets, of course, to respond to the Germans. And the Germans anyway, mishandled badly. Operation Blau in 42. It's strategically and operationally incoherent. And they then are to go on to mishandle the kursk offensive in 43. So partly it's Soviet achievement, though I think Soviet operational art, it's generally argued, doesn't really reach its apotheosis till 44, 45. But it's also, you know, German failure.
- [42:33]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
What explains Khrushchev's turn against Stalinism in 1956?
- [42:39]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, Stalin's dead, of course. I don't think Khrushchev would have done it while Stalin was alive. I mean, not. At least not unless he'd already seen the bullet enter his skull. I think the. Again, first of all, Khrushchev comes to the fore, rather as Stalin has come to the fore less murderously, of course, by playing successfully the struggle between a number of differing interests that are there and in fact, struggles that had begun before Stalin died with the Leningrad affair of 1949, 1950, when a lot of key figures go. And in 1954, even more. 55, Milenkov loses his power struggle with Khrushchev. And for Khrushchev, in part, he manages to discredit his opponents by presenting them as survivals from the Stalinist system. I mean, Kaganovich and Molotov being classic examples. So there is a political advantage to turning on Stalinism. Khrushchev also thinks that this is a way to strengthen the Communist bloc. De Stalinization, he thinks, will be A way to move away from the heavy industry focus to try and woo the working class by providing a guaranteed tomorrow A4 which would produce better living conditions and win popular support. I think that's all important. But the key thing, you know you're referring to the famous report on the cult of personality and its consequences sort of thing you wouldn't read today because of course, no modern politician has the cult of personality. I think the argument that he made that the party had deviated from what Khrushchev called its historic course is a specific way to weaken Kaganovich and Molotov. Because although Khrushchev had been in the purges, involved in the purges, they had been much more so.
- [44:59]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
What explains the economic difficulties that the Soviet Union experienced during the Brezhnev period?
- [45:05]
Professor Jeremy Black
Oh, entropy, I think the inherent failures of planned economies which we're seeing in the world today, the extent to which there's no real role for capitalism or entrepreneurialism. There's central direction, state planning, particularly golf plan. The state planning commission in the Soviet Union was very poor. And I think it's worth bearing in mind that the Soviet Union is doing badly in the 1970s, despite the enormous hike in the price of oil from 1973, which greatly helped Soviet finances.
- [45:51]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
What explains the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991?
- [45:55]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, it's not inevitable. I've argued in this book, and I've argued in my book in the Cold War, that although the Soviet Union had economically clearly failed, the political consequences of that were unclear. I mean, after all, Cuba has been clearly a basket case for many years, but it hasn't had a political equivalent to the fall of the communist regime. So I would actually argue that if you're looking for the fall of communism, partly it's changes within communism, particularly the rise of Yeltsin, his falling out with Gorbachev, and Yeltsin's determination to put a kind of Russia as the central theme and to be willing to break up the Soviet Union accordingly. And that I think is more important than the moves in the other republics, though some of the other republics, the Baltics actually, of course go first. So I think those are consequential. I think the weakness of the counter revolutionaries, I think that's very important. The failure of the so called Gang of Eight in their coup in Moscow on 19-8-91, I think that directly spurs the playing through of the disintegration. And to an extent, you know, I dislike saying this, but to an extent Putin is correct in feeling that there was a loss of nerve at the centre. I would put it differently though. I would say actually Yeltsin didn't have a lack of nerve. He knew what he was doing. And what was interesting is that his opponents, and you know, Gorbachev had opponents within the Politburo, were never able to organize themselves or to play the politics successfully. So it's different from the situation we were talking about earlier in the 1920s and the 1950s.
- [48:11]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
What explains Putin's rise to power and what exactly is Putinism?
- [48:17]
Professor Jeremy Black
Well, I do try and discuss Putin's rise to power. I mean, one needs to be realistic here. There's a degree to which this is a. A movement which is both anti democratic and quite willing to use force and violence to terrorize opposition, to suppress dissent, and yet also in some respects draws on tranches of support within Russia, not least a desire for great power status, a desire for stability, however understood, and the support of the Orthodox Church. I mean, it's worth bearing in mind that initially, I think Putin's popularity was relatively high. But the 2011 legislative elections which his party, United Russia won, are generally held to have been highly fraudulent. And it's arguable that he moved to be a more interventionist, in part, rather like Napoleon in a way, in part to try and disorientate others, to address unpopularity and to try and wrap himself in a nationalist image. And I mean, if you look at 2014, when he seized the Crimea, this pushed his approval ratings up by about 20%. I mean, it was presented as a rejection of recent humiliation. And Putin did well at presenting himself in that life. I mean, obviously he completely and utterly messed it up with Ukraine in 2022 because he'd gone for a short war policy which may well have won him sustained popularity. And he's ended up with an inexorable struggle which is causing enormous strain in Russia, causing terrible strain in Ukraine, of course as well, and which is exacerbating the existing failures, living standards, but also the very basics of demographics.
- [50:57]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
If you wanted people to take one thing away from your book, professor, what would it be?
- [51:01]
Professor Jeremy Black
Oh, this is. It's absolutely fascinating. The history of Russia is fascinating and very important. I mean, I would like to think all of my national histories are fascinating, but let's be clear. The history of Russia is more important than the history of Portugal. So just as the history of America volume is more important than the history of Spain volume. So I think it's a fascinating book. I think Amberley has done a good job with it and I Very much commend it to the readers.
- [51:28]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
On that observation, which I like to agree with entirely, I'd like to thank you very much, Professor Black, for being so kind as to speak with us today. This is Charles Coutillo listening to New Books in History podcast channel on the New Books Network. Thank you, Professor Black, very much.
- [51:42]
Professor Jeremy Black
Thank you. And one last thought just for listeners. I think there is still a role for national history. All too many historians, in my view, are obsessed with identities or obsessed with refighting issues of the past which they see as causing whatever they think is terrible at the present day. And all too many historians spend their time ignoring political realities, political exigencies, the facts and consequences of war. I think that's very unhelpful. People live in countries, they are affected by states. It is foolish in the extreme to turn away from the national perspective on history. And that is what I have tried to do with this volume. It's tried to do. It's what I've tried to do with previous ones. And I have two forthcoming ones, I hope. I mean, you know, I'm still working on them, one on the Low Countries and one on Scandinavia. And I hope again to show the importance of the national perspective. And, you know, I hope people listening. I'm not saying they should go and buy my book. They could probably get it in a decent library. But I hope people will at least consider that throwing away the national perspective, perspective on and of history is one of the ways in which so many modern academic historians, and I have to say popular historians, disparage the past and misunderstand the present.
- [53:15]
Dr. Charles Coutteo
Quite well taken, which. And I agree with it entirely as well. Thank you, Professor Black, very much.
- [53:20]
Professor Jeremy Black
Thank you.