Katharina Stevens, "The Ethics of Argumentation" (Routledge, 2025)

Summary

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Podcast Summary: New Books Network

Episode Title

Katharina Stevens, "The Ethics of Argumentation" (Routledge, 2025)

Air Date

August 5, 2026

Host

Tom Disena (Oakland University)

Guest

Kat (Katharina) Stevens – Philosopher, Argumentation Theorist, University of Lethbridge

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Episode Overview

This episode explores the central ideas of Kat Stevens' book, "The Ethics of Argumentation." The conversation delves into the often-overlooked ethical dimensions of argumentation theory, challenging traditional, function-driven, and idealized models of argument. Stevens pushes for a morally grounded, pluralistic, and context-aware approach—one that foregrounds the moral responsibilities of arguers and the social and power dynamics that shape argumentative exchanges. The discussion covers distinctions between types of arguments, critiques of "single set" and adversarial models, the centrality (and complexity) of ethical reasoning in arguing, and the implications for critical thinking pedagogy and social justice.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

Introduction to Argumentation Theory

[03:23]–[05:23]

• Argumentation theory is an interdisciplinary field, spanning philosophy, linguistics, communication, and rhetoric. It covers both descriptive and normative approaches.
• Stevens aligns with the normative tradition: concerned with how we ought to reason together, not just how people do.
• The University of Windsor is identified as pivotal in the development of informal logic and argumentation theory in North America.

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Distinguishing Arguments and Arguing

[06:24]–[08:02]

• Stevens explains the distinction between "argument 1" (an argument as a set of reasons, e.g., syllogisms) and "argument 2" (argument as an interpersonal exchange).

  “When I give you an argument like, all men must die. Socrates is a man. Socrates must die. ...that’s what O’Keefe calls argument 1. ...When you tell me, that is nonsense... Then we're in an argument 2."
  —Cat Stevens [06:24]

• Arguing 1 = presenting reasons.
• Arguing 2 = engaging in back-and-forth, often collaborative or adversarial.
• Highlights everyday confusion: arguing as bickering vs. structured reasoning.

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Function Claims and Normativity in Argumentation

[08:24]–[11:15]

• Many normative theories make “function claims”—arguing is defined by what it is supposed to achieve (e.g., knowledge, agreement, persuasion).

• Stevens critiques these function claims:

  • They often fail to show why not pursuing the prescribed function is morally significant.
  • Argues that arguing inherently communicates an intention to pursue certain functions (like reasoning toward truth), so failing to do so is deceptive.
  • Deception in arguing is unethical—not merely failing at the activity, but misleading others about your intentions.

  "If you argue with someone and you're not pursuing [the expected function], you're making them believe that you're doing something that you're not even trying to do, and that's deceptive.”
  —Cat Stevens [10:32]

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The Morality of Deceptive Argumentation: Worse Than Lying?

[11:50]–[17:23]

• Stevens claims deceptive arguing (pretending to provide genuine reasons or openness to assessment, while undermining this) is often a greater moral wrong than lying.

  “Where lying uses your trust in the other person in order to falsify your picture of the world, deceptive arguing also tries to use your respect for your own ability to reason to better undermine your picture of the world. And that's why I think it's worse, if that makes sense.”
  —Cat Stevens [16:49]

• Deceptive arguing exploits not just trust but the target’s self-respect and autonomy as a reasoning agent.
• Not all deception is wrong (e.g., wearing eyeliner) – but deceptive arguing affects the epistemic autonomy that argumentation presumes.
• Discussion expands the analogy to “gaslighting”: undermining the target’s faith in their own rational faculties.

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The Problem with “Single Set” (Ideal) Argumentation Theories

[21:03]–[26:41]

• Most argumentation theories are built on “single set” models (one model for all arguments, e.g., adversarial/DAM theory).
  • Proponent/opponent dynamic: “If you have a knight for one claim and a knight for the opposite claim, when the dust settles, only the good arguments are left and the truth will shine.”

  —Cat Stevens paraphrasing [22:24]

• Stevens critiques this: People, contexts, and power dynamics are too varied for one model (DAM, inquiry, or coalescent) to suffice.

  “Single set models... assume a world in which all arguers are a certain way and then they give you a normative theory that would work if the world was actually that way. But then when you carry it into the actual world... you basically just get a bunch of destroyed furniture. That's what it comes down to.”
  —Cat Stevens [26:41]

• Analogy: A handbook for training cats that ignores catness is useless; single set theories ignore real-world diversity and power.

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Multiset Normative Theories and Applied Ethics

[27:47]–[32:37]

• Stevens advocates “multiset” theory: multiple normative models and corresponding sets of norms, adapted to context, goals, and participants’ capacities.

• Choosing the appropriate argumentative model is itself an ethical decision, shaped by power, context, and justice.

• Social power differentials (e.g., between shy and domineering, or privileged vs. marginalized) deeply affect argument roles and possible models.

• Applied ethics comes in at the meta level: we must constantly assess which model is fairest, given the real participants and stakes.

  “We accept that there are several different models of how we can argue and create a different set of norms for each... The applied ethics of arguing deals with the kinds of considerations ...in order to determine which of these is the one that we should choose.”
  —Cat Stevens [29:32]

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The Opening Stage and Why It's Not a Panacea

[35:08]–[40:44]

• Some theories rely on an “opening stage”—arguers agree on ground rules before proceeding.
• Stevens highlights the problems:
  • Consent in the opening stage is not always meaningful due to power imbalances (“people give consent to all types of things that they would rather not give because they can't afford to make someone mad.” [36:41])
  • Agreement at the start doesn’t account for evolving needs, emotions, or emergent asymmetries as the argument unfolds.
  • Infinite regress problem: disputes about how to argue can lead to arguments about argument norms.
  • Reopening the opening stage during an argument is fraught—especially risky for less powerful participants.

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Power and Rule Manipulation

[41:20]–[43:31]

• Establishing ground rules often entrenches existing power; those with more power control the negotiation terrain.
• Any argumentative rule or tool can be weaponized (Akin’s “owl of Minerva problem”): fallacy names, for example, can be used to silence rather than improve discussion.

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Role Ethics and Role Shifting

[43:49]–[50:26]

• “Argumentative roles” (e.g., proponent, opponent, negotiator, deliberator) are socially learned and shape both behavior and expectations.
  • “You start according to the norms associated with the role that will most likely get you what you want... the other person... recognizes that.”
• Argument type (e.g., deliberation, negotiation, adversarial) is often established implicitly through behavior, not explicit agreement.
• Role shifting: moving from one type of argument to another as context or needs change.
  • “Licit” shifting: open and warranted. “Illicit” shifting: covert or manipulative.
  • Sometimes shifting is morally necessary if the initial model fails to serve both parties.

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The Complexity of Ethical Arguing

[50:50]–[53:41]

• Arguing ethically is necessarily complex, due to human diversity, stakes, and power asymmetry.

  “We have to kind of start from the acknowledgment that human communication is an incredibly complicated thing ... even more true for arguing, because arguing is human communication under special circumstances, namely under circumstances of either insecurity or disagreement.”
  —Cat Stevens [51:16]

• Marginalized groups have developed sophisticated strategies to manage power in arguments out of necessity; now Stevens calls on everyone—not just the vulnerable—to practice this complexity for the sake of justice.

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Implications for Critical Thinking Pedagogy

[55:13]–[58:56]

• Most critical thinking textbooks teach a single set, often adversarial, model. This privileges the already powerful and disadvantages others.
• University access (and thus exposure to these models) often tracks social advantage.
• Teaching one "right way" of arguing disproportionately empowers those culturally adept at adversarial reason-giving, reinforcing social inequities.

  “If you all have the same single set theory, then now you teach all these students that there's one good way to argue and the other ones aren't as good... this has one consequence among others, which is that... it doesn't actually work for everyone, but some people are better at doing it than others. And those people also happen to be the ones who could afford going to university. You get a problem.”
  —Cat Stevens [56:32]

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Stevens’ Current and Future Work

[59:15]–[61:22]

• Stevens is now researching “voice allocation” in argumentation—how roles and argument structures grant or limit what people can do with language, e.g., the phenomenon of “silencing.”

  “Anytime we make meta level decisions about how we're going to argue, we allocate voice... So that's what I want to talk about: how to do that in a morally good way.”
  —Cat Stevens [60:38]

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “Deceptive arguing ... uses the other person’s self-respect for their own ability to reason in order to better mess with their picture of the world... that’s why I think it’s worse [than lying].” (Cat Stevens, [16:49])

• “Single set theories are ideal theories...they assume a world in which all arguers are a certain way and then they give you a normative theory that would work if the world was actually that way. But then when you carry it into the actual world... you basically just get a bunch of destroyed furniture.” (Cat Stevens, [26:41])

• “We accept that there are several different models of how we can argue and create a different set of norms for each... The applied ethics of arguing deals with... which of these is the one that we should choose.” (Cat Stevens, [29:32])

• On fallacy-mongering as silencing: “Every single fallacy name that has ever been invented was meant to help people argue better. But people will look at this and say, 'Look at this ad hominem.' I can use that to shut people up and I will.” (Cat Stevens, [43:12])

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Suggested Timestamps for Major Segments

• [03:23] – Introduction to argumentation theory and background
• [06:24] – Distinction between arguments as objects (argument 1) and exchanges (argument 2)
• [08:24] – Function claims and their limits
• [11:50] – Deceptive arguing as more serious than lying
• [19:28] – Deceptive arguing as gaslighting
• [21:28] – Critique of single set theories/adversarial models
• [27:47] – Multiset theory and applied ethics
• [35:08] – Problems with the “opening stage”
• [41:20] – Power and rule manipulation; the owl of Minerva problem
• [43:49] – Role ethics and shifting between types of argument
• [50:50] – The complexity of ethical argumentation
• [55:13] – Critical thinking education and the problem with single-set theories
• [59:15] – Stevens’ next project on “voice allocation”

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Tone and Language

• Academic, lively, and reflective.
• Stevens combines analytic rigor with humor and everyday examples (“cats are evil devils”; negotiation over dogs). Disena keeps the discussion relatable through real-world anecdotes (contract negotiations; partner conversations).
• The dialogue remains accessible and engaging for a multidisciplinary and public audience.

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Summary Takeaway

Kat Stevens’ "The Ethics of Argumentation" challenges the field to center the moral responsibilities inherent in arguing and to reject one-size-fits-all models that ignore diversity and power. She argues for a pluralistic, adaptive, and deeply ethical approach to argumentation, with profound implications for pedagogy, social justice, and everyday reasoning. This episode offers a thought-provoking and practical guide to thinking—and arguing—better.

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Transcript

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welcome

[Cat Stevens]

to the New Books Network

[Tom Disena]

welcome to the New Books Network. I'm your host, Tom To Senna from the Department of Communication, Journalism, and Public Relations at Oakland University. My guest today is Cat Stevens, the author of the Ethics of Argumentation in the Ethics of Argumentation. The book offers a new approach to the theory of argumentation that conceptualizes argumentation as a fundamentally ethical activity whose norms are grounded in and must be selected according to moral reasons. Current normative approaches to argumentation do not treat ethics as an integral part of argumentation theory. This is at least in part due to a methodological commitment not to address internal states of the arguers, such as intentions and beliefs, which makes moral theorizing about argumentation difficult. The ethics of argumentation is essential reading for researchers and graduate students in a wide range of disciplines, including philosophy, communication studies, linguistics, and rhetoric, who are interested in argumentation, critical thinking, and social epistemology. My guest today is Kat Stevens, a philosopher and argumentation theorist working at the University of Lethbridge in Alberta, Canada. She is one of the editors of the journal Informal Logic and one of the directors of the Critical Thinking and Citizen Engagement Lab at the University Of Lethbridge Gat Stevens. Welcome to the New Books Network.

[Cat Stevens]

Thank you so much for having me.

[Tom Disena]

So usually I start these discussions by asking authors what brought them to their topics, but I think you talk a little bit about that in the conclusion to your book. So I want to start instead, for listeners who may not be familiar with argumentation theory, if you could sort of sketch out a little bit about what's at stake here.

[Cat Stevens]

Okay, sure. So argumentation theory is an interdisciplinary field that is kind of comprised of philosophers and linguists, communication scholars, rhetoricians, everything that. Every direction from which you could approach argumentation. And they study argumentation very broadly conceived as the giving and receiving of reasons. And there's a normative side to it and a descriptive side to it. And I belong to the normative side. So there's the question, how do we reason together? Well, basically, one thing that you might actually already know argumentation theory from is the critical thinking introductory courses. Not all, but a lot of those textbooks come from argumentation theorists or are written using tools that argumentation theorists have developed.

[Tom Disena]

So it's interesting because you talk about that very specifically in the conclusion, and we're going to get to that. I'm not familiar with those kinds of textbooks. I'm sort of. My training is in rhetoric, and so I became familiar with the field of argumentation because of the close proximity my institution had to the University of Windsor, where I think they started, do a lot of work in informal logic and argumentation theory. And so I appreciate your sort of sketching out what's going on in this particular part of the field.

[Cat Stevens]

Yeah. So the University of Windsor is where the subfield of argumentation theory started, informal logic, which is kind of a strange name because informal logic isn't just about logic. The philosophers there started argumentation theory in the Americas, basically, and that's that part. And that's where I did my ma. That's where I got my training.

[Tom Disena]

Okay. I have a close friend who I did my. Who was at the. At Wayne State University, who then moved over to the University of Winster to do an MA in argumentation theory. Takuzo Konishi.

[Cat Stevens]

Oh, yeah, yeah, I know him. He's wonderful.

[Tom Disena]

Yeah, he's a great guy. All right. So one of the things that I struggled with in thinking through our talk today is to distinguish, for people who are only listening to us, the difference between arguments and arguments and arguing and arguing. You render this visible through the idea of argument subscript one and argument subscript two. And I'm wondering, how do you think we ought to. Well, first let's talk about what that distinction is, and then let's maybe have a discussion about how we should differentiate the two for people who don't have access to superscripts and subscripts on their audio processing.

[Cat Stevens]

Yeah. So when I give you an argument like, all men must die. Socrates is a man. Socrates must die. Then that's what o', Keeffe, the guy who made this distinction, calls an argument 1. And then when you tell me, that is nonsense, Cat, there are immortal men. And then I'm like, what are you even talking about? Then we're in an argument, too. So we're exchanging arguments one and. And the way I use arguing one and arguing two, which is not how everyone uses it, because o' Keeffe's paper, short and not incredibly detailed, is that arguing one is when I use one of these arguments to at least pretend I'm giving a reason. And arguing two is what we do together. So if I argue one in an argument two, that I'm also arguing two at the same time, if that makes sense.

[Tom Disena]

No, it makes perfect sense, and it's a useful distinction. And I just. So from here on out, we will. When we need to differentiate by just saying one and two, we could do

[Cat Stevens]

that, or we could say arguments as objects and arguments as exchanges or argumentative exchanges. I think there's probably a ton of ways to do this.

[Tom Disena]

Okay, very good. Again, I think it's an important distinction to draw, but it's not one that's immediately clear for a lot of folks.

[Cat Stevens]

Yeah, and then there's the third kind of arguing with just fighting.

[Tom Disena]

Yeah, right. Which I think too often people associate with just bickering. So in the first chapter, you make a case for function claims as a foundation for normative argumentation theory. Let's talk about what function claims are and why it is inherently deceptive to argue without pursuing argumentative functions.

[Cat Stevens]

Oh, okay. So the way I set this up is basically trying to say something like, look, if you want to make some kind of normative theory about how you should do something, then you would have to tell people why doing that thing the way that you say they should do it is actually better in a kind of. In a meaningful way, in a way that means more than just my way is better. And so most argumentation theories, most normative theories that try to justify this do this through function claims. So they just set a goal or a good or a valuable thing that arguing is supposed to accomplish, and then they kind of advertise for their norms by saying, if you do it the way that I tell you to do it, then you'll accomplish this better, more reliable, or sometimes even if you don't do it that way, you won't accomplish it at all. And the usual functions, there's several different functions that many theories use. There's kind of epistemic goods like knowledge or understanding, and then there's agreement. So if you argue like I tell you, you reach agreements, and then there's persuasion. If you argue like I tell you, people will believe what you want them to believe. I think one problem with this is that in order for this kind of function claim to actually show that, you should always argue the way that the theory tells you to. You can't. It's not enough to show that arguing that way will produce some good because there's lots of activities where that produce one good, but it's totally fine to do them in pursuit of another one. The example I use in the book is reading. So you can, like, you can generate epistemic goods through reading, but there's nothing wrong with reading a crime novel just for the fun of it. So you have to actually show that if you don't pursue that function, and therefore if you don't follow those norms, you're doing something meaningfully bad. And I don't think that the function claims of normative theories that are on the market have actually done that. They just have. They just stop there. And so what I try to do in the book is to say, look, I can show you that there are argumentative functions, that if you don't pursue them, you're doing something morally bad. And you're doing something morally bad, because the activity of arguing communicates indirectly that you're pursuing those functions. And that means that if you argue with someone and you're not pursuing them, you're making them believe that you're doing something that you're not even trying to do, and that's deceptive. And then I spend a lot of time trying to explain why this kind of deception is bad.

[Tom Disena]

Yeah, and you do. And I think very, very clearly and in some ways, I think in ways that won't appear obvious to a lot of people. And you lay this out in the second chapter of the book, where you describe the moral foundations for normative argumentation theory, and you set up a set of wrongs that arise from what you're calling deceptive arguing. And this includes the claim, and I think this might be challenging for a lot of people, that deceptive arguing is A more serious moral wrong than lying?

[Cat Stevens]

Yeah.

[Tom Disena]

Again, I don't know that that's a claim that's going to be obvious to a lot of folks. So why don't you explain that a little bit?

[Cat Stevens]

So I think I tried to make this case in two different ways, because what I do in the book is I basically adopt a kind of moral pluralism. And people have told me that's a cop out. And in a little bit it is, because it means that I don't commit to Kantian ethics in the beginning and then say, this is how it goes. What I'm basically doing is I'm saying, here are three moral values that many people agree are important, and I'm going to show you how from each one this follows, and then you can choose which one you like. And I think the. The best argument I have for why deceptive arguing is in a sense worse than lying is the autonomy argument. So we generally think that. So first of all, we can kind of assume deception is always wrong, but I actually don't think it necessarily is. And the book example works now because you can look at me and I'm currently wearing eyeliner. And that's a deception because it makes you believe that my eyes are bigger than they actually are. And even now that I've told you, you still believe it. It's an incredibly effective deception. But I don't think there's anything wrong with it, in part because eyeliner is really visible, and so you can kind of clearly see that. And if this ever becomes really important for you in your life, you can deal with it through your reasoning. So there are kinds of deceptions that are just innocuous, but lying isn't one of them, at least not usually. And one of the reasons why we think that lying is wrong is because it is disrespectful to autonomy. So there's a big tradition of people that think that we should respect other people's autonomy and that this cashes out in respecting other people's right to use their own reasoning in order to determine their lives and not to undermine that. And lying undermines it because lying is designed to make someone else have a false picture of how the world is. And that messes with their ability to reason. And that's why lying is wrong. And I think deceptive arguing, which is arguing where you're not, where you're pretending to, but not actually attempting to give a good reason, or arguing where you're pretending to give a good reason and encourage the other to test the reasoning themselves. But then you put kind of hurdles in the way to that testing. So for example, you use a fallacy that you use a fallacy from popular opinion that makes it so that even though the other things, they're testing your argument, there's this psychological pressure because all your friends believe this too, to not actually test it so well. So things that undermine this kind of thing, when you argue deceptively, you're pretending to do these things, but you're not actually so, so you're using a fallacy either in order to make something look like a reason that isn't one, or to make something look like a better reason than it is, or to give someone a reason but stop them from evaluating it themselves because you think they're too stupid to realize what's really going on. And I think what this does is it also attempts to falsify someone's picture of the world in many cases. So it often does the same thing as lying, but it also does something else. And that has to do with the reason why we often think that arguing is incredibly autonomy affirming. We often think that arguing is incredibly autonomy affirming because when I argue with you, then the way I present my claims kind of communicates to you that I might be wrong. And you need to test for yourself whether you think my reasons are good and, and you're only supposed to accept my conclusion if your own mind confirms for you that this is a good argument. So arguing kind of sends like a big message that's like here I'm trying to influence what you believe. Use your own defenses, do your own thing, only believe this if you can figure it out yourself. That's what arguing does. And that's why we think it's so autonomy affirming. And now we can already see why deceptive arguing is, is supernicious. Because when you argue deceptively, you're kind of still sending this message that says if you take, if you use my claim, then you will do it on the basis of your own evaluation. Your own mind has figured this out. If you can't find a reason why this is a bad argument, then you should accept the claim based on your self respect, your respect for your own reasoning capacity. And then you undermine this ability to reason, for example, through a fallacy. And what you do thereby is you basically use the other person's self respect for their own ability to reason in order to better mess with their picture of the world. So where lying uses your trust in the other person in order to falsify your picture of the world. Deceptive arguing also tries to use your respect for your own ability to reason to better undermine your picture of the world. And that's why I think it's worse, if that makes sense.

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episode is brought to you by Claude by Anthropic. Claude is the AI for minds that don't stop at good enough. It's the collaborator that actually understands your entire workflow and thinks with you. Whether you're debugging code at midnight or strategizing your next business move, Claude extends your thinking to tackle the problems that matter and finds connections you might have missed for problems worth solving. Get started at Claude AI Spotify.

[Tom Disena]

It makes perfect sense. And I know this is probably a bit beyond the scope of your book, but. But I would throw it out anyway. It strikes me that what you've just described, that sort of undermining of the other person's ability to use their own sense of reason to come to a conclusion, makes it very much akin to the this word is very much in vogue right now of gaslighting. That deceptive arguing is almost a form of gaslighting.

[Cat Stevens]

I mean, I think that's an interesting and astute observation. And I also think that it can have one of those effects that gaslighting has. Right? One of the effects that gaslighting has is that you make someone believe that they're crazy and they can't trust themselves and they can't trust their own ability to reason. And if you argue deceptively, especially if you do it well, if you use fallacies and then you let them notice, right, you let them know that you are so much smarter or so far above them that they can't keep up and they can't defend themselves. They will start to distrust themselves. They will lose trust in their own reasoning capacities. And I think this is one of, and I think people actually do this, these the other way around where they don't show people that they have deceived them, but they show them. Look, the media is trying to deceive you. You fell for this. How silly you are. You can only trust me. This is a trick that you can use in order to make people kind of detach themselves from trusting all the sources that they usually trust and then only, only trust you, but because they don't believe in their own capacity to distinguish between what's reliable and trustworthy and what's not anymore. So, yeah, there are very dangerous tactics based on this that are possible.

[Tom Disena]

So in the third chapter you get to what I think and maybe it's just sort of inside baseball for the field of argumentation, but it seems to me to get to sort of where the heart of this is with the idea of single set theories. And so tell our listeners a little bit about what are single set theories and what in specific is the problem with ideal theory.

[Cat Stevens]

Sure, that's. Yeah, that is the, that's basically the heart, the central argument of the book. So I'm going to go back to critical thinking textbook. Sorry. So if you read a typical critical thinking textbook, what you get is not openly like a theory about how people argue with each other. What you're going to get is like tools for identifying different types of arguments and then evaluating them and so on. But behind those tools is the assumption that when you argue with someone, then you are against them. There's a proponent and opponent, they argue against each other. And there's often this picture that the reason why that's good is that if you kind of have a night for one claim and then a night for the opposite claim and they fight it out, when the dust settles, only the good arguments are left and the truth will shine. That's the idea.

[Tom Disena]

It's a nice way to put it.

[Cat Stevens]

Yeah. This is called Dan Cohen, an argumentation theorist who likes to make jokes almost more than theory, actually call this the DAM theory, the damn theory of argument, the dominant adversarial model. And there's lots of normative theories that are built based on this model. So then you get a normative theory that gives you a logic. So a theory about what good inference looks like, a rhetoric, a theory about what it looks like to formulate your arguments well, and dialectics theory about how arguably should behave towards each other. And that's kind of the set of norms that you need to make a normative theory of argumentation. And you get one that is built around the assumption that all arguing fits the damn model or should fit the damn model. And that's the majority of normative theories. There are also others. So there are theories that assume that all arguing should fit what's called, called an inquiry model, where the arguers just collect all the reasons together, throw them on a big heap, and then work together to figure out which ones are good and which ones are bad. And then there's what's called the coalescent model, which is based on the idea that the arguers are whole people and they will explore each other's systems of belief and then find the ways that they can come to agreement through kind of authentic self and other revelation. Each one of these models assumes that there's this one way that arguing should always look like and that we should make logical and rhetorical and dialectical norms in order to create the best way to do that in this model. And my main argument basically is that people are just too different and the situations in which we argue are so different that there isn't one model that will always fit. Sometimes we should. It works well that we argue adversarially sometimes, like if the dust settles, the truth will actually shine. Sometimes we should explore each other's personalities in order to figure out what we authentically believe. Sometimes we should just collect all the reasons we have. And the reason why we shouldn't pick one of those and say this is the best one, is because in order to play the roles that each of these models require of arguers, the arguers need to have a set of abilities and they need to have a set of kind of contextual things around them that are just true. So for example, for the DAM model, imagine yourself as incredibly shy, and when there's any sign of adversariality, you immediately start to shiver in a corner and cry. If that's the case for you, then it's just not going to happen that when the dust settles, the tooth shines because you're not going to win. You're just unable to win in this type of argument. And so if we want to get to the reasons you might have, we're going to have to pick another model. And for that other model, we're going to need another set of norms. So single set models are the one or single set theories are the one that assume that there's one model for which we can make one set of norms. And then we can just say whenever you argue that's how you should do it. And I think they don't work. And I think they don't work exactly. Because arguers are too different. They are the shy ones. They are the ones that are currently not in a position to authentically show what they actually believe. There are the ones that are too invested in a claim in order to really do the inquiry. This, this is just the case. And, and these single set theories are Milesian ideal theories in the sense that what Mills, this Mills, sorry, describes as an ideal theory is it's a theory where the norms are built on an already idealized picture of how the world is. Basically, if you imagine, imagine you made a theory about how to train cats that abstracts away from the fact that cats are evil devils

[Tom Disena]

just as, hey,

[Cat Stevens]

wait a minute, it's just like, assume that all cats are nice and will never try to scratch up your furniture. And now I'll give you a training handbook that will work for those cats. If you carry that training handbook over into the world and try to train an actual cat with it, all you get is like destroyed furniture. That's an ideal theory. And my claim is basically single set theories are ideal theories. They assume a world in which all arguers are a certain way and then they give you a normative theory that would work work if the world was actually that way. But then when you carry it into the actual world, where argus are really, really different, you basically just get a bunch of destroyed furniture. That's what it comes down to.

[Tom Disena]

Aside from disparaging cats, that's a very good example. All right, so you propose in place of these single set theories, a multi set normative theory. Here, if you would, I'd like to turn to your book and ask you to read the paragraph that we discussed earlier from page 107.

[Cat Stevens]

It's my pleasure. Thank you so much. Okay, so it starts with. But epistemic goods are not the only goods that arguing can generate. I can't actually read non deceptive arguing creates results that possess moral legitimacy over and above and, and sometimes even independently of epistemic validity. In chapter two, I argued that by realizing the moral functions, arguing can connect its result to a complex combination of self respect and the mutual respect of the argues for each other as reasonable autonomous beings. Since these results are an outcome of the common, mutually respectful enterprise, they do not belong to either one of the arguers. But to them together. Because of this, reciprocal arguing too can justify acceptance of its result, even if uncertainty persists from an epistemic point of view. This is because the moral legitimacy that non deceptive reciprocal arguing to creates enables the arguers to continuously express respect by adhering to its results. Where action needs to be taken or commitments need to be made, this can allow arguers to act or commit without thereby imposing their view of the world and what is right and wrong on each other. Importantly, arguing provides this moral legitimacy to a higher degree the more the arguers have invested in the openness and meaningful reciprocity of their arguing. This is so because the greater the investment, the greater the expressed respect.

[Tom Disena]

So I think that paragraph does a lovely job of sort of setting up a lot of what's at stake in this chapter. And so I'd like you to talk a little bit about what we mean by multiset theories and how they intersect with the idea of an applied ethics.

[Cat Stevens]

Sure. So a multi set theory would basically just mean that instead of having this one model of how arguing should always be and then creating those three kinds of norms for that one model, we accept that there are several different models of how we can argue and create a different set of norms for each. So instead of only having a set of norms for the DAM model, or only having a set of norms for the inquiry model, or only having one for the coalescent model, we would say all of these are valuable sometimes. And what we should do is we should create norms that will help arguers that are arguing in this model to do the best job they possibly can. The problem is, of course, once we've done that, now the arguers will have to choose which model they're supposed to be in. And that choice isn't just one about what you feel like right now, because we've already seen that there are stakes. So we have. We imagine our super shy arguer, or the arguer that is really committed to a claim. We can also talk about or think about the ways that systemic injustices can impact arguers such that they can't play a certain role as well as another. So some arguers, when they try to argue adversarially, might get judged or be unable to make their points well just because of their social identity. So all of these things factor into which argumentative model is actually the one that will serve the arguous best right now. So that decision has to be made. And that's where I think the applied ethics comes in. It comes in at the meta level, at the level where we decide how we should conduct our argument. And it's not the case that very often this just comes out of the situation. Like imagine the two of us wanted to get a dog together. We could make our decision about which dog to get by deliberating or doing an inquiry together. We could make it by just looking at which dog breed you want and which one I want, and we do two of the dam model argument types together. We could negotiate the whole thing. You could say, look, if you get a West Highland terrier, I'll walk it right. Those kinds of things we could do. So most of the issues we argue about we could argue about in different ways. And the applied ethics of arguing deals with the kinds of considerations we should get into in order to determine which of these is the one that we should choose. And I argue that unfortunately for that, we can't have a simple set of rules because that reasoning gets incredibly complicated, especially under conditions of kind of limited resources where we have only so much time or only so much emotional energy. And so on.

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[Tom Disena]

so throughout your book I kept sort of in the back of my head keeping there were sort of two applications that kept recurring to me. The one I think appears frequently. You just mentioned the conversation about the dog, which the way you describe it in the book is kind of a conversation between what appears to be some sort of an intimate couple who have to decide what kind of pet that they want. I'm sure there's absolutely nothing personal in that at all. So I was imagining throughout the book sort of conversations with my partner. Right. And how those take place. The Other one, and this is a little more formal, is I have been tasked over the last several years with negotiating contracts on behalf of the faculty, with our administration. And this is where I want to get to your next chapter, because it has to do with this idea of the opening stage. If I understand it correctly, argumentation theory has this notion of an opening stage where a lot of these issues are resolved before the arguing begins. And you suggest that there's all kinds of problems with this idea of the opening stage. And so let's talk a little bit about why the opening stage isn't a solution to some of the problems that adhere to these multiset argumentation theories.

[Cat Stevens]

Yeah, so the opening stage. So the idea of the opening stage appears in at least two of the really influential normative theories of argumentation. And the idea is something like, okay, so we know that we have to make some choices about how we're going to argue. And instead of just letting that happen, what we're going to do is we're going to make those explicit. So we would, before we start the negotiation about the discussion or conversation about the contract, we would say something like, so how should we do this? Do you want to do it as a deliberation? Do you want to do it as a negotiation? Who should be the proponent? Do you want to be the proponent? Or should I be the opponent? But then the opening stage often also includes things like arguments by analogy. Okay, or are we not going to do that? Our narratives going to count as a narrative argument? Or are they just going to be anecdotal asides? So all of these, these things are supposed to be decided in the opening stage and in general. So what I didn't want to say is like having conversations about how we should do things is a bad thing. That wasn't the intention. The intention was to point out that normative argumentation theories often treat the opening stage as if it can replace the need for arguers to morally reason the whole time through over whether the way that the argument is going is okay. So the idea is something like, oh, if we can reach a consensual agreement on how this should go, then that's great, because now I don't have to think about all this nonsense anymore. I can concentrate on the money question or the door question instead of thinking about whether the way that we're doing this works. So the opening stage is supposed to basically take the burden off the arguers to have to think about the meta level questions about how the arguing should proceed. And that's where I see the problem, and I see the problem kind of over and over again. At first, I think the opening stage, this idea that the opening stage is that the consent that is reached in the opening stage can just do away with all problems, ignores the fact that when arguers have really different amounts of social power, people give consent to all types of things that they would rather not give because they can't afford to make someone mad. So, and that means that if you are the one with a lot of social power and you would actually like the argument that you're going to have to proceed according to the best norms available, then you should think morally about what those best norms are and not just rely on the fact that if the other one consents, it's going to be fine. The other thing is. So that's the first problem. There's also the problem that because there are so many different things that have to be decided during the opening stage, and because those decisions could be contentious, there is a kind of regress problem, right? You're supposed to decide how to argue in the opening stage, but if you disagree, then you would have to argue about that, and then you need another opening stage, and so on and so on. And that regress problem kind of phases out at the status, because it's not just about should this be a negotiation or not, but also should this kind of argument be allowed in that negotiation? So it gets huge. So those are two important problems. And then there's the problem that even if you decide things during the opening stage while you argue, it might turn out it's not working the way that you think it should. Right? Arguments are kind of famously unpredictable. We can, you know, we can start arguing with our kids about how long they should be allowed to stay out at night, and suddenly it turns into the question of whether they should renounce their faith. And no, I'm so. And so the kind of. The norms you agree to here might really not serve you when you get there. Or it turns out that a topic you thought you could handle just fine is astonishingly emotional for you. So you don't want to be super authentic, or all kinds of things can happen that would require for norms to be shifted. And normative theories often propose that that should mean that we can reopen the opening stage. But there's a huge problem with reopening the opening stage. I don't know if you ever tried to talk about the way that an argument should go during an argument. It's not a good idea. No, it never goes well. People don't take kindly to it that in the middle of disagreeing about something, you're also like, by the way, I don't like you the way you're doing this. I'm really upset about this right now. Then the temperature rises incredibly quickly, which means that the reopening of the opening stage is really only an option for people who are in the better social position across a power differential. We really don't want to ever do this if you're the less powerful person. So I don't think that the opening stage as an idea, as good as it is to sometimes talk about how things should go, it can't replace arguers taking the moral obligation to have the argument in a way that allows everyone to participate meaningfully seriously throughout everybody. Like this responsibility just can't be taken off people's shoulders by putting in a procedure.

[Tom Disena]

Yeah. It's interesting to go back to the. And you're right about, like, having the argument about the argument is never a recipe for success. Right. You're never going to get anywhere with that. But thinking about the opening stage, one of the rules, it's not trying to think of the right way to phrase this. One of the beliefs, maybe that's the best way to say, is that frequently contract negotiations begin with what are called establishing ground rules, which is very much akin to this idea of an opening stage.

[Cat Stevens]

Right.

[Tom Disena]

And this is where I think this chapter is so important because it's the one where the idea of power becomes most explicit and the people who are on the side of employees, the unions, will say, reject ground rules from the get go. Like, do not allow employers to establish ground rules because ground rules always favor the more powerful party. And sometimes they will still try to do that. It sounds nice to like, okay, we got a nice set of rules that we can all live by now, but it almost inevitably ends up shifting the dynamics so that people can't take different positions throughout the course of the talks.

[Cat Stevens]

Yeah. And then in addition to that, so in addition to the way that I've described how establishing ground rules can go wrong, there's also the fact, there's what Scott Akin calls the owl of Minerva problem, which is basically every sharp tool can be used as a weapon. No matter how much you wanted your plowshares to be just there for the fields, if you take them off and hit someone over the head with it, they're going to bleed. And so every single argumentative rule can be turned around to hurt someone. We can see this all over the place. There's so many kind of conceptual tools that people built in order to

[Tom Disena]

make

[Cat Stevens]

it so that there's less epistemic injustice, or make it so that people argue with each other better. Every single fallacy name that has ever been invented was meant to help people argue better. But people will look at this and say, look at this ad hominem. I can use that to shut people up and I will. So there's also that right. In addition to what I have been describing in the book, there's also the fact that any rule can be turned around and abused. Sorry.

[Tom Disena]

No, no, you're fine. That's a great observation. In the last chapter, I guess for the conclusion, you put forward the idea of role ethics for object level arguing. What do we mean by these terms and how do you see it working with the idea of role shifting?

[Cat Stevens]

Okay, so I think, if I may, I'll just explain what an argumentative role is to start with. So we all know how to take and play roles. Like if I tell you now, I'm going to be the student and you're going to be the teacher, then you know what kinds of goals you're supposed to adopt. This kind of behavioral stereotypes, you know, you're supposed to fit into this. Norms, you know, apply to you. Now this is. Those are just social roles and we learn a lot of them through socialization. And this is why when I talk to you about negotiations and inquiry and the DAM model, I don't need to explain much because you can already do this stuff. You know how to play those roles. If I said we're going to negotiate now over which dog to get, you would know how you're supposed to behave and what norms apply to you. And I think that instead of having an. Like, I'm pretty sure that when you argue about things, you usually don't establish what kind of argument you're going to have. You just start. And then at some point you and the person you're arguing with both know what type of argument you're in. And that's because you start according to the norms associated with the role that will most likely get you what you want. So if you're like really confident that you're right and it's very important to you that the other one accepts it, you'll start in a damn model type proponent role, following those norms. And because the other person also knows how those roles look like, they recognize that this and they also know what other role, like opponent or silent audience will fit this. And they know what won't fit this. And if they answer In a way that fits. Then very quickly it's established this is the kind of normative structure we're arguing in. These are the types of behaviors that are acceptable. These are the kinds of arguments that are usually made. And then people start to rely on that in order to determine how they should behave, but also in order to determine how they should treat, treat the outcome of this thing. So, for example, you wouldn't treat the outcome of a negotiation in the same way as you would treat the outcome of, say, a deliberation. If we negotiate which dog we should get, then you're not going away saying, oh, we've really made progress on finding out who the objectively best dog in the world is. You'd just be like, we figured out how to make a compromise here. And so if your friends want a dog, you won't tell them to get the same one, for example, right? So that's how people use this. So the way that we actually select the type of argument we have is through role taking and then role assigning. And that means that the way that we make meta level decision is through object level behavior. If I argue in a way that to you is recognizably proponent, like, so I state my claims really assertively and then I just follow them up with three reasons. And then I say, and if you now want to object X, you are wrong because of Y, then this kind of object level behavior, behavior that's just about the thing that we were arguing about, tells you something about my meta level intentions, what kind of argument I want to have. So the applied ethics of argumentation, even though it's about meta level decisions, grabs at the object level where we behave according to what we want to happen at the meta level. And therefore the ethics of argumentation isn't just about meta level decisions, it's about object level behavior. Because object level behavior influences or determines matter level decisions. That's all about how we establish what normative structure we're in now. Then I brought up earlier that it can happen that we've been arguing for a while and it turns out it doesn't work. We, for example, we've been deliberating over the dog for a while and we just get nowhere and we don't have that much time. I don't know, the breeders are closing at 6 o' clock. And so then now it becomes clear that there are reasons why we should have a different type of argument. And going from one type of argument to a different type of argument, that's what Douglas Walton has called Shifting. So you can shift from a deliberation into a negotiation, and you can do this. Douglas Walton has the distinction between licit and illicit shifting. Licit shifting happens when you go into a different argument type, and that allows you to accomplish the goal you had from the very beginning. Better A. And everybody knows that this is what's happening. No one gets confused about what we're actually doing. Illicit shifting happens when you shift into a different argument type, and it either kind of obstructs the goal of the whole thing, or you do it covertly so that the other one doesn't notice. So if people, for example, slip covert threats into deliberations, and then the other one thinks they're still in a deliberation and they're still figuring out which the objectively best dog is, but without noticing it, they're now reacting to a threat. And that messes with not just the outcome of the deliberation, but you also don't get a good negotiation outcome because the other one doesn't even know they're negotiating. So those are illicit and illicit shifts. And then I add to that the necessary shifts, which are when you notice that we all thought we could do this adversarially, but one of us is crying, so probably not. So we really, if we want to get a good outcome, we need to shift. If we don't shift, the truth will not stand shining after the dust has settled. So those are the kinds of shifts. And the need for shifting becomes obvious also at the object level, for example, because things aren't going anywhere because people are clearly getting upset, all those kinds of things are the signs that shifting is necessary. And then also shifting is very often just accomplished through behavior change. At the object level, I can also start negotiating in a way that's very, very obvious to you. And when you then follow me into the negotiation, and we both know that this is a negotiation now and the outcome is going to be a compromise and not the truth. And there's not necessarily anything wrong with that, but it has happened at the object level without anyone ever going into the meta level and actually saying we should negotiate.

[Tom Disena]

Now, I guess the only. And I think you addressed this, but the only question that occurs to me is that does this render this applied ethics overly complicated? That all of this role shifting makes it difficult for us to have the arguments because the terrain is kind of always moving on us?

[Cat Stevens]

Yes, I think so. I think that I just tend to think that arguing is incredibly complicated. I mean, human communication is incredibly complicated. Have you ever tried to have A serious conversation with someone over email, that can go wrong. Really clear, people, what the hell's going on? Sorry, I just swore.

[Tom Disena]

It's okay. Worse has been said.

[Cat Stevens]

So I think we have to kind of start from the acknowledgment that human communication is an incredibly complicated thing and we use a large part of our mind power to just figure out what is going on. And this is just. And this is even more true for arguing, because arguing is human communication under special circumstances, namely under circumstances of either insecurity or disagreement. And those make us nervous. So it just is a complicated thing. And I think it has always been the case that less powerful parties had to figure out how to argue in such a way that it doesn't upset more powerful parties when they are in an argument. And since even the most privileged of us once in a while have to argue with someone who's more powerful than we are, we probably all have at least some practice in this. Oppressed arguers have more practice in this as an advantage that no one wants. So I think we can kind of ask, is this getting too complicated? And the answer on one level is to say, no, you've already been doing this in order to protect yourself. Now I'm just asking you to do it in order to protect others as well. That's kind of the answer to the arguer who asks, this is going to be too complicated. But then on the other hand, the argumentation analyst could ask, isn't this going to get much more complicated? And there, I just have to admit, yeah, it does get much more complicated. If you have a single set dam theory and you're an argument analyst, you can just look at things and say, well, here are my 50 norms and they're broken. And so this is bad. That's relatively straightforward. If on top of that, you have to evaluate whether the correct norm set was chosen and whether this thing that looks like a fallacy really was an attempt at shifting into a different argument type, and whether that attempt was legitimate or not, things get much more complicated. But maybe that's good, because then we can employ more analysts.

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[Tom Disena]

right, so let's get to the conclusion, because here you suggest some implications of your theory for critical thinking education. And in some ways I think this takes us back to where we started because it makes a good case for the importance of what you're trying to do here. So let's talk about why normative argumentation is so important to the practice that study and teaching of critical thinking.

[Cat Stevens]

Yeah, so I think one of the consequences of the fact that so far we've had so many single sets theories and argumentation theory and that argumentation. I mean, it's not the case that argumentation theorists are the only ones who make critical thinking textbooks, but they do make critical thinking textbooks. And even those people who make critical thinking textbooks that aren't argumentation theorists usually assume that arguing will always happen to according to one model. And it's most often it's the damn model. But there are also books that try to teach a different model. But the outcome of this is that critical thinking textbooks usually assume a single set theory. They might not. Some textbooks teach some rhetoric, some only teach logic, like broadly construed as like what a good argument one looks like. Very few actually teach dialectics, but there's always in the background this theory of what the model is. So if you, for example, take an approach to teaching fallacies that tell students that when they see an argument, they should go through the list of signs that this could be a fallacy, and if it's one, they should reject it, then you have the dominant adversarial model at the back of your mind, because what is kind of in the background is the assumption that there's a battle going on. And what you're trying to do is collect weapons you can use in your, in your battle. And so most critical thinking textbooks assume a single set theory. And what this means is that when you teach students how to argue with these textbooks, you teach them a single set theory. And this has one consequence among others, which is that students that if you all have and the DAM model really is by far, far the most often taught one, if you all have the same single set theory, then now you teach all these students that there's one good way to argue and the other ones aren't as good. If you add to that that like whether you're going to have a critical thinking course at university depends on whether you go to university, and whether you go to university depends on your socioeconomic background, there's a picture of what good arguing looks like. It doesn't actually work for everyone, but some people are better at doing it than others. And those people also happen to be the ones who could afford going to university. You get a problem because we measure not just what is actually going to happen, but also what ought to happen by who wins arguments. So it's a big problem if we don't acknowledge that making meta level decisions about what kind of arguing we should be engaging in is part of the responsibility of arguers because it trickles down into giving us a picture of what good arguing looks like. That most often the already powerful can realize better than the less powerful. And I'm kind of hoping that I don't need to argue with that.

[Tom Disena]

No, you don't. But I'm grateful for you articulating that again, I think for our listeners, an important takeaway from your work. Well, Cat Stevens, thank you so much for your time today. Before I let you go, can I ask, what are you working on next?

[Cat Stevens]

First of all, thank you so much for having me. What I'm working on now is on voice allocation and argumentation. So you know the concept of silencing, the idea that we can make it so that people can't do with their words, with their utterances, what they would like to do by making it so that the audience won't understand them as doing that. So I could try to reject something and somehow you just don't recognize this as a rejection. Like I say, no, I'd like not to have tea, and you're like, oh, great, take some. You're just being modest or something. So that's silencing and that's wrongful. But this idea that we influence what kinds of things people can do with their utterances, I don't think that that doing that is always wrongful. I think that anytime we make meta level decisions about how we're going to argue, we allocate voice. We make it so that the arguers that get certain roles now can do some things and can't do other things. When we've decided that we're negotiating and I'm a negotiator, one thing that is going to be really, really hard for me to do is to give you an argument from negative consequence. As in when I say, look, if we do that, I have to tell the supervisor, it's always going to be a threat. It can't be a genuine, I have no other choice, I'm so sorry thing anymore without me doing much, much more work. So I think that this kind of stuff that I've been talking about in the book, this normative designing of the conversations we have in arguments, those allocate voice and that means they take voice away and they give you access to things that they can do. And then that's what I want to talk about, how to do that in a morally good way.

[Tom Disena]

Well, I will look forward to when that comes out and hopefully we'll get a chance to talk again. Once again, my guest today has been Cat Stevens, the author of the ethics of from the Rutledge series Studies in Contemporary Philosophy. My name is Tom Disena and you are listening to the New Books Network.

[Cat Stevens]

Thank you for listening to this episode of the New Books Network. We are an academic podcast network with the mission of public education. If you liked this episode, please share it with a friend and rate us on your preferred podcast platform. You can browse all of our episodes on our website, newbooksnetwork.com Connect with us on Instagram and BlueSky with the handle ew booksnetwork, and subscribe to our weekly Substack newsletter at newbooksnetwork.substack.com to get episode recommendations straight to your inbox.