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Martin Whittock
Hello, everybody.
Marshall Po
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Dr. Miranda Melcher
Hello, and welcome to another episode on the New Books Network. I'm one of your hosts, Dr. Miranda Melcher, and I'm very pleased today to be speaking with Martin Whittock about his book titled Vikings in the East. From Vladimir the Great to Vladimir Putin, the Origins of a Contested Legacy in Russia and Ukraine, Published by. Published by Bite back Publishing in 2025. And as this title suggests, I mean, there's clearly a lot for us to discuss here, especially because in, for example, the uk, where we are at the moment, we talk about Vikings here, we talk about Vikings in the Atlantic, and there's obviously lots of interesting history there and legacies that we can trace for centuries afterwards. But sometimes that focus means that we don't look at what the Vikings were doing in the east and it turns out they were doing a lot of things with, again, legacies that can be traced over centuries. So there's all sorts of stories we can get into and also of course, impacts on politics, economics, religion. It's a history very much worth delving into. So I'm very pleased, Martin, that you are here to tell us all about it.
Martin Whittock
Thank you for having me.
Dr. Miranda Melcher
Could you please start us off by introducing yourself a little bit and tell us why you decided to write this book and why you call it about deep stories.
Martin Whittock
Yes, My name is Martin Whittock and I taught secondary school history, that is high school history, for 35 years. Having read politics and political history at the University of Bristol, Always been fascinated by history and during that time I took to writing textbooks and then started writing books for the adult reader with the aim of explaining complex issues for the adult reader by referencing a whole range of different sources and trying to provide an overview of issues so that readers could then go deeper if they so chose. In that time I wrote about a wide range of areas, but I've become increasingly interested in what you might call deep stories, the ways by which we use, sometimes abuse the past in order to frame modern identities. And as a result of that, I co wrote a book called Trump and the Puritans. Looked at the origins of present political phenomena in the usa. Mayflower Lives, which looked at the impact of the Mayflower settlement, both time and later. Vikings in the east, which is the one we're going to talk about today. And prior to that, American Vikings, how the North Sailed into the Lands and Imaginations of America. And one of the things that all these books have in common, very different areas of focus are both the impact of people in the past on their own cultures, but also the way in which we today reference, use, refer to these events of the past in order to frame ourselves and our own culture and say something about ourselves. The way in which the. The past informs the present, as it were. So that's where it's come out of a real fascination with a wide range of history, particular fascination with early medieval history and then latterly, this exploration of what I call deep stories, the way by which the past to frame the present and Vikings in the east, as the title suggests, from Vladimir the Great to Vladimir Putin, is about something that starts in the early Middle Ages and still resonates in the turbulent world of the 21st century.
Dr. Miranda Melcher
Thank you for that very helpful foundation to our discussion. We are going to try and do some amount of tracing over the centuries here today, obviously in less detail than the book, but to give a sense of some of this early medieval history and the legacies that we still have, even if we may not generally be aware of them. So starting then back the furthest point, obviously we should talk about kind of who these Vikings are, where are they coming from? So if they're going east, where are they going east from? And should we be thinking about this as kind of an organised state project of expansion or in these early years, are we talking about kind of small little groups of Vikings going, hey, what's over there?
Martin Whittock
First of all, a little reference to terminology in the book. And today as we talk, we'll talk about Vikings. And that has become very much the label of choice to describe Scandinavian peoples both in the homelands and in the wider diaspora from the middle of the 8th century to about the year 1100. But technically speaking, we should probably call them the Norse, because Viking is something that you did rather than something that you were in, in a sense of being muscular, free enterprise. Young people, mostly men, but women may have been involved as well, who were basically going on raiding, exploration, trading as well. But Viking was very much something that you did rather than what you were. So they came out of Norse culture speaking Old Norse. But today we do tend to use the word Viking to describe the whole experience, although we have to have the kind of health warning that many people at the time would not have considered themselves Vikings, because these women and men would have been traders and farmers and settlers. Settlers, and wouldn't actually have been on the muscular, free enterprise, violent raiding and warfare side of things. And of course, Viking could be something that you did for various phases of your life, for example, to, to amass wealth and. And then to settle down. But having said that, Vikings is. Is a good label because it's one that we all kind of use nowadays. It's used both in academic literature, but also in popular literature too. And so that's what we use today. But I always have to put that one in there because people will sometimes come back and say, ah, but don't you realize Vikings was not culture, it was a particular part of that culture. So that kind of just sets that straight. But it's a useful label, so we'll use it. The people we're talking about moving east are primarily Swedish Vikings, Vikings from the Swedish mainland, the islands, and from Gotland for example, as well. But the push east as, in fact, a lot of the events, the Viking wars comes from A time before there is a, what you might call a settled nation state of Denmark, Norway, Sweden. So state formation comes later than other areas of Western Europe in this period of time, perhaps first to Denmark, then Norway after that, and then Sweden, perhaps later than that again. So we basically have a situation in which we talk about Swedish Vikings, Norwegian Vikings, Danish Vikings, but these are not really people coming from nation states. Now that has implications for the impact of these people because whilst later in the Viking wars, for example, in the UK, what is now the UK and the British Isles, from the sort of 980s, 990s onwards, we see a national state that is Denmark launching Kingdom based attacks on the British Isles, particularly on England in the earlier period. What we're seeing is a much more freewheeling, freebooting movement of chieftains and followers that sometimes coalesce to form larger groups, but are primarily engaged in small scale private enterprise which sometimes comes together in larger units. So when we talk about this movement into the southern and eastern Baltic, and as we'll talk about later on, that push down through the river systems of what are now Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, we're not talking about national invasion forces. What we're talking about are freewheeling pioneers, groups of settlers, those who gather around dominant military leaders, sometimes form alliances with each other, sometimes fight each other, sometimes contest each other as, as well as indigenous peoples, but not formal state invasions. That's the kind of political context, something much more fluid and much more fragmented compared to what will come later on in the Middle Ages. That's the kind of context of the people and of the, the launch pad for these movements to the east.
Dr. Miranda Melcher
Yeah, that's very helpful context so that we don't fall into the trap of. Because later on it is big state projects. We assume that it's always been the case because as you've explained, that's definitely not what we should be imagining in this sort of earlier stage. And you mentioned there that these trading groups, these, you know, smaller different groups trying, aiming for different things, expand not just kind of immediately east of Sweden, but then further down along the Baltic coast. That's starting to get into longer journeys. So what were those processes like? Did they have maps? Was it walking? Was it dragon boats? I mean, what were those processes of exploration and expansion like for the people.
Martin Whittock
Doing them in terms of their knowledge of the East? There is a working knowledge of the east because of Long's last, long established trading with the east, although often not documented. So we know, for example, up until the middle of the 8th century 750s, there already is a significant trading activity happening from the east. And we have a flow of Islamic silver, for example, moving north and northwestward through the river systems in exchange for forest goods and also for slaves as well. So we know that there is an established connectivity, and the kind of connectivity that occurs means that a lot of this knowledge will have been held by particular traders, passed on to others. Now, what we don't have is we don't have surviving maps, we don't have surviving accounts from this earliest period, certainly not from the Scandinavian side. But we know it's happening because of the spread of artifacts. And then somewhere in the middle of the 8th century, because of changes in the Islamic caliphate, a shift of power from Damascus to Baghdad, this is disrupted. So in the 750s, 50s or so, this is disrupted. And what this does is it disrupts the flow of silver into Scandinavia. So up until that point, we should perhaps think more of Scandinavians involved in supplying goods and people, because this is. This is slave trading as well to middle traders, who would then have moved them down to the river systems, but not had direct contact with the Islamic world. But. But as this begins to break down the flow of silver, this causes real problems in Scandinavia, because silver is needed in gift giving, it's needed in fueling the power and wealth of elites. And what we see is from about the 760s, 770s onwards, we see an attempt by Scandinavian traders, who already were active in the southern Baltic and the southeastern Baltic, begin to push further down through the river system, and it seems, wanting to make direct contact with the Islamic caliphate in order to maximize their profits. And so, for example, from about the year 800, we then see vast streams of silver once again flowing north, as evidenced by hordes of Arab Durham coins unearthed on the Baltic island of Gotland, also in Sweden. And whilst there is some fluctuations in this trade, this will continue, sometimes up, sometimes down, but will continue to be a major flood flow of wealth until about 10:30. And that will then plug the Scandinavians into the western end of the Silk Roads. But in doing this, they are very much Eastern pioneers who are carving out their own experiences, no doubt using local knowledge, no doubt working with those who've gone there before, but in many ways feeling their way. And the kind of technologies that will have been used will have been not the dragon proud longships of Hollywood imagery and mythology, but certainly to start with, we have ocean going basically much, much, much chunkier, boats deeper, drafted with a hold that will be used for trading activities. Around the Baltic. But then as they move into the river systems, these have to be adapted. And we have have clues, evidence in the sources that this leads to, the use, for example, of log boat traditions. So we know, for example, as they push down into Russia, there are documented sources that talk about these Norse traders buying unfinished log boats large enough to take a master the sails. These are very large boats in terms of logs, but nothing like the kind of ships that could have been constructed for use on the open ocean. Buying them from indigenous peoples, finishing them themselves, and then using them to move further on down to the river systems. And they would then have been easier. Still a huge amount of effort to port these over things like cataracts, for example, and from one river system to another. We also have evidence from a number of trading settlements for skis and for sledges. And it's worth remembering, of course, that the Scandinavians were not only skilled sailing peoples, not skilled at boat building and boat construction, but also being very, very familiar in moving over the landscape in winter. So we need to think about them using the river systems, but not necessarily always in the summer, because recent experimental archaeology has shown how, how rapidly these distances can be covered on sledge if we are using the frozen river systems and across the frozen countryside. So a number of different methods are used to push into the heart of the continent, using log boats, using larger ships at river mouths, and then almost certainly using sledges. And quite a lot of this movement may have happened over winter. So we need to think about one or two seasons of travel being in any cycle of movement into the continent, gaining of the silver in exchange for forest products, and then bringing it back to the north again. But basically from 800 onwards, and certainly by the 850s, there seems to be direct trade, direct trade face to face trade between Scandinavians and both indigenous peoples of Eastern Europe, but also Islamic traders pushing their way up from the Caspian, for example. And so by the 920s, we have Islamic accounts of traders meeting Norse Rus traders who are selling in some of these accounts, a whole range of products, including female slaves on the banks of the river Volga. But that's direct face to face trade between these Norse traders and Islamic traders. But that took perhaps a century to really get in place. But it was in order to plug into the direct source of this trade, and at the same time, also via the Black Sea, to plug into directly source acquisition from the Byzantine Empire as well. That takes about a cent to set up. But this period primarily from about, about 780s to the 880s is this time of dramatic plugging into the wealth of the Byzantine world and the Islamic Caliphate directly by Norse traders who will form eventually the communities that we now call the Rus.
Dr. Miranda Melcher
Yeah, so it's exactly that formation that I think we should go to next because obviously if this is all taking a century and there's lots of silver going on, like this is not, not a small group kind of doing a one off thing, there are incentives to make this a protracted long term investment. So how do we get to the point of the Rus of a recognized settled state coming from these Norse traders?
Martin Whittock
Okay, well, we certainly see significant increase of Norse style artifacts showing up on trading sites, trading settlements in what we now call north western Russia. And some of these may have got there by trade and not necessarily being accompanied by Scandinavians. But the large amount of items that begin to turn up there clearly show that these are directly brought there by Scandinavians. And so although there'll be mixed relationships with the local Slavic peoples, for example, and other peoples of the western steppes, so we are seeing actual people from Scandinavia appearing here. And by the late 840s, the director of Post Intelligence in the Baghdad Caliphate, a man called Ibn Cordoba, records that a group of newly arrived foreign traders had turned up in Baghdad on camels. Now, what this means to say is there is a community forming which he calls the Rus. And it's this formative period of the Rus that really is critical. In the 12th century, a Russian source, so significantly later, the tale of bygone years, sometimes called the Russian Primary Chronicle, talks about Viking adventurers who are variously called the Varangian Rus, who used force to subjugate the Slavic and Finnish tribes living southeast of the Baltic. Now, according to this source, which gives a spin, a very positive spin on the Scandinavians, when they're forced out, warfare then breaks out amongst indigenous peoples, and the indigenous peoples then call these people back to bring order and to provide dynastic control. Now that clearly is later spin designed to enhance prestige and legitimacy of the later dynasty of the Rus. But in this earlier stage, what we see is basically adventurers, Scandinavian adventurers, coming in small groups with armed followers setting up trading settlements. So the Russian Primary chronicle talks about people, semi mythological, no doubt, but probably based upon real people. A man called Roerich, for example, who sets up a trading post in Novgorod, a man called Cneas in Belozero, and a man called Truvor in Izborsk. And although the chronicle dates have to be regarded pretty broadly, we're Talking about a period that is envisaged as having taken place somewhere in the eight hundred sixties. What then follows from this is that the chronicle then says that having established themselves at these trading bases, trading with locals, no doubt a mixture of both peace, peaceful and tribute, taking from. From local people. Two other Rus leaders, who it names Askold and Dur, travel further south through the river Dnieper or Dnipro in Ukrainian, and established their rule in a settlement later known in Russian as Kiev and Ukrainian as Kiev. And it's likely they took control of a trading post of the Khazars at what we now call Kyiv in what is now Ukraine. And this is then brought into the orbit of the northern trading settlements by conquest, we're told. So this is Norse on Norse violence somewhere in the 880s. So it's something of a Wild east. You know, if we think of that situation in, in the American west of the Wild west of, of a whole mixture of different people carving out opportunities, sometimes working with native peoples, sometimes subjugating and. And taking tribute from native peoples, sometimes using violence, sometimes using diplomacy, we see a whole bunch of little trading settlements forming on these river systems, having different levels of relationship with the indigenous people. Sometimes it's violent, sometimes it's trading, sometimes it's a form of subjugation that leads to tribute being taken. But eventually, by the 880s, there's a little network that links Novgorod and Kyiv is being joined up, up by more successful and one also might assume, more aggressive members of this little confederation who then start to form one interlinked community, the unity of which will be very much open to question, but will eventually be brought under the overall control of princes ruling from Kyiv. But we must think about a situation in which those in Novgorod and elsewhere have quite a large measure of independence, but are increasingly brought under the control of the rulers who from the 880s are ruling in Kyiv until by the middle of the 10th century, we can talk of something which we call the princedom of the Rus, covering a huge geographical area and being polyfocal in many ways, but nevertheless coming under this overall arching control of the rulers of Kyiv.
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Dr. Miranda Melcher
Very interesting to hear this development and evolution. And it's, of course, never one thing. There's Never sort of a. And this moment is a state going forward. It is always about these different relationships and how they develop. And of course, that continues even once there is this sort of known, settled state. So, thinking about some of these relationships, of course, we also, at this time, one of the big players is the Byzantine Empire, the capital of Constantinople, of which there is much literature and history written. How did this Norse Kiev, Rus, how did the state relate to the Byzantine Empire being kind of right there over the horizon, super shiny, has all the things, but is also really different. What were those interactions like?
Martin Whittock
Clearly, there are a number of things that dominate the Scandinavian imagination. One of those is the Islamic caliphate that we've spoken about a little earlier. But one of them is the Byzantine Empire as well. So, for example, we have runestones in Sweden which talk about the lure of gold. One, for example, at Gripsholm Castle reads, tola had this stone raised in memory of her son, Haralda Ingvar's brother. They traveled valiantly far for gold, and then the east gave food to the eagles. They died in the south, in Cirqueland. So we know, for example, the Islamic caliphate is a great attraction, and that's drawing people from Scandinavia towards the Caspian Sea and the River Volga. But the other great attraction, the other great attraction is that of Constantinople, the great city Miklagath. This really dominates imagination in the north as well, because this is where the Roman Empire continues, and indeed will continue until it eventually falls to Islamic armies in the 15th century. And so this concept of where Rome continues with its fabulous wealth, with its control of the silk trade, for example, we've talked about the silver trade, but also the silk trade is very, very important as well, with its pivotal role in the Mediterranean trade. This also has a huge grip on the Scandinavian imagination. And we know that just as relationships with the Islamic caliphate, the Abbasid Caliphate, involve both peaceful trading, but also raiding and attacks, there's never one strategy. So the same thing applies to the relationship with Constantinople as well, that we see raids on Constantinople in the. In the 8th century, late 8th century and 9th century, attempting to actually take by force the goods that are there in great profusion, but also using force to try to create trading arrangements. So it's kind of negotiation by violence as well. And what this eventually creates is a situation in which that the Rus create trading relationships with the Byzantines, which are strictly controlled from the Byzantine side, because they know that these traders can often turn into raiders and be very, very volatile and very, very violent. So there are controls over how many can enter the city, under what circumstances, how much they can buy, how much they can export, for example. But what starts off as being primarily a violent interaction turns into a trading interaction which sees reciprocity on both sides, because clearly for the Scandinavians, they are plugging into the wealth of Byzantium, which can then flow north across the Black Sea and back to Scandinavia. But for the Byzantines, they are gaining allies north of the Black Sea and in the Crimean area, who they can use as players against steppe peoples, nomadic steppe peoples who have been raiding and attacking Byzantine settlements on the northern shores of the Black Sea. So there is a reciprocity in this arrangement. And we also see young men, primarily young men, moving down to the river systems to take service in the Varangian guard, a name derived from something like those who swear loyalty of the Byzantine Empire. And if you go to Hagia Sophia today in Istanbul, you can find carved in runes on the balcony there, the marble balcony, the name of one of these Norse, almost certainly a Varangian Halfdan. And it's a bit. It's effectively he's carving there, saying, Halfdan was here. So there is this arrangement that both gained from it. Soldiers, expertise in fighting are brought into the Varangian guard, and also wealth by trade moves northward to the Rus, which eventually is sealed by marriage and. And eventually by the conversion of the Rus leader, a man called Vladimir, later remembered as Vladimir the Great, to Eastern orthodox Christianity in 988. And that is both a political and a diplomatic arrangement as well as a religious settlement that binds the two ever closer together.
Dr. Miranda Melcher
There are so many reasons for these groups to be interacting, as you've been outlining, and trade is definitely a really huge part of that, not just the kind of silver that comes with it. But I wonder if there's any further details you want to tell us about, given that. For example, my favourite chapter, certainly that gripped my imagination reading the book was the title Vikings on Camels.
Martin Whittock
Yes, it is extraordinary. I've mentioned before that we have this quite intriguing reference from the Islamic Caliphate from the 840s, which talks about Rus traders turning up in Baghdad. And that is really quite extraordinary and certainly not how we imagine it. So a man called Ibn Khordadba was the Director of Post and Intelligence in the Baghdad Caliphate province of Jabal in northwestern Iran. And he records that people he called the Ar Rus have brought merchandise to Baghdad on camels. Not only that, but he. He, he interrogates more intelligence reports that he has, and he also records, and others do as well, that Rus Traders who are talking about Norse traders from what we now call Russia and Ukraine, had also been noted further east in Persia, that some had sailed through the Persian Gulf, where they had reached lands described as Sindh, India and Al Sin, which may mean as far as Tang, China or at least the Kaganate of the Uyghurs. So what we are seeing here is a quite extraordinary reach of the Rus into the western ends of the Silk Roads, through the Caspian Sea, down into what we'd now call Iran, but also further east as well. There's also reports of them turning up in Egypt. So these are small groups of traders, sometimes on the Caspian Sea area, where some of them take part in terrible violence against Islamic communities on the Caspian Sea. But many others are more interested in creating trading connections and trading relationships. And this is why we can find, for example, a figure of Buddha that turns up in Sweden that was almost certainly made in the Swat Valley of Pakistan. That doesn't mean to say necessarily the Rus went there directly, but they certainly were in connection with people who are bringing in such items, including silk, including other items of Asia that are moving along the silk roads towards the Caspian Sea area, towards the Baghdad, towards Byzantium, towards Constantinople. And it's into that western end of the silk roads around where the Volga flows into the Caspian that we see this direct trade with this much larger trading network. And it really is quite extraordinary. So we're used to thinking about out the Viking world as being very much a sort of a northwest European world, but this challenges us to seeing it as something that connects right across into eastern Eurasia. And of course we also know. But this is another topic, another conversation, perhaps it also reaches North America around the year 1000 as well. So it's a staggeringly complicated world that connects, if you like, Newfoundland, eventually with the Caspian Sea and even perhaps the Khaganate of the Uyghurs in this huge Viking network, this huge Norse trading diaspora.
Dr. Miranda Melcher
With camels.
Martin Whittock
With camels, according to the director of posts.
Dr. Miranda Melcher
Yeah, it's a great mental image to counteract all the dragon boat, or at least add to all the dragon boat images that we might otherwise have with all of these trading connections and routes. Then to what extent are we looking at this as sort of Viking and Norse culture assimilating and blending sort of to become something new or blending entirely into local cultures, for example, Slavic cultures with like languages and names and gods changing, or do we see sort of merging such that some of these connections with Norse language or gods are still there? What does this mean?
Martin Whittock
Kind of culturally, the people involved are very chameleon and very flexible. It's interesting, for example, that that that man Ibn Khudadba that wrote about them coming to Baghdad says that they claimed to be Christians. Now, they almost certainly weren't Christians at this time, but they'd realized that they could negotiate better trading arrangements by claiming to also be People of the Book. They realized that within the Islamic context, by claiming to be People of the Book, Christians, Jews, Muslims, People of the Book, they could have better trading arrangements. At the time. They're almost certainly pagan. But what this signals and flags up is these people are very flexible in terms of culture, they are very flexible in terms of identification and how they identify themselves, and they're very pragmatic as well. Now, what this means is that in this area of the Rus, what starts off as being little Norse trading settlements scattered down through the river systems of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, rapidly become increasingly integrated into Slavic society. For a start, there simply are not enough Norse to maintain a solidly recognizable Norse communities. And therefore it's not surprising that the written sources show increasing tendency for them to adapt. In Kiev, Rus, for example, local Slavic deities, this is before they then convert to Christianity. So there is a flexibility going on here as they seek to come to terms with the locals to their own advantage. So we know, for example, at Kyiv, in the generation before the adoption of Christianity in 988, we know, for example, that the rulers there are starting to give their children Slavic names and they are worshiping Slavic gods. Gods. So what we're seeing is a hybrid Norse Slavic culture emerge, which isn't surprising given the large number of Slavic peoples and the small number of Norse, which increasingly become more and more Slavic as time goes on. And yet the connectivity takes a very, very long time to forget. So that, for example, the daughter of Harold Gobinson, killed at Hastings in 1066, according to one account, marries into, in exile, marries into a ruler of the Rus in Kiev. That's a huge connectivity. We know, for example, that the children of Edmund Ironside, after He died in 1016 and England was conquered by Canute, are sent to Sweden to be killed because they are part of the previous dynasty. Canute wants them out of the way. King of Sweden, according to written sources, won't do it. They get sent on evidence suggests to the Rus and eventually end up in Hungary again. This connectivity continues right through into the the 11th century. Harald Hard Rada, for example, who died the Battle of Stamford Bridge in 1066, the battle before the Battle of Hastings of 1066 had earlier seen service within the Varangian guard of the Caliphate. Sorry, beg your pardon, of the Byzantine Empire. The Varanging Guard of the Byzantine Empire. Now, what this means is that although the state of the Rus is becoming increasingly Slavic, it is still very much aware of its northern roots and connections, which will continue right the way through till about 1100. There will be these echoes of northern connections, even though the state itself is increasingly becoming Slavic.
Dr. Miranda Melcher
This is really interesting to trace these specific instances and kind of go, ooh, okay, so what's then happening there? And these connections really are quite clear when you're mapping them out for us to see. So thank you for doing that. If we look then at sort of things that don't go so well, we've been hearing about the success of trade routes, of establishing states, of integrating with different communities of these really long trading networks and connections. Obviously some things go wrong. And I think this starts to get into what you were saying at the beginning of not just kind of what actually happened in history, but what do we say later happened in history. So if we're looking, for example, at Russian historiography later on, the sort of thing that goes wrong is often talked about as the Mongol invasion just being the absolute worst, every possible bad thing and horror. Was that actually the case in the short and long term? That it was just. Everything about it was completely horrific.
Martin Whittock
I think it's fair to say that in the first half of the 13th century, a catastrophe occurs to Kiev Rus and to these trading settlements we've talked about. There is a sweeping in of the power of, of the Mongol invaders who Destroy Kiev in 1240 and bring extremely high levels of violence and destruction to anybody who stands against them, such that by the 1250s, 1260s, this whole system of Kiev Rus has been devastated and largely destroyed. Now, this is often described in Russian historiography as the, the Tata yoke, or the, or the, or the Mongol yoke. The idea being that this then lasts until eventually it's. It's overthrown by native Russian rulers, eventually the rulers of, of Muscovy preeminently. But it's more complicated that as well, because after the initial destruction, and I think it's fair to say there is a very, very high level of destruction and loss of human life. Those who come to terms with the Mongols find that they have a relatively significant amount of local autonomy as long as they pay tribute, as long as they recognize the authority of, of the great Khan and the other khans. As it begins to fragment. And we see evidence, for example, of Russian rulers acting alongside Mongol rulers in order to subjugate other local rivals. So something of a Pax Mongolica does eventually emerge, which again connects up Eastern Europe with a huge range of communities stretching right across Asia. So although, though we're right to point out the extreme destruction that happens in the 1240s to Kyiv and leaves Kievan Rus devastated, out of which later Russian rulers will attempt to reintegrate that into their rule, that what comes after that is more complicated. And we see a whole bunch of city states basically vying with each other and also vying with at times the Mongols, but then reigning their ambitions back, et cetera, as they seek to establish themselves as players once again in areas that we'd now call Russia until basically by the 16th century, we effectively have Russian rulers, particularly based on Moscow, who've asserted themselves, who've played the game very skillfully, and who are now becoming significant players in their own right in the lands that were once under the total control of the Mongols of the Khanates. So it is a much more complicated picture, but it is less left. It has left Russia with this image of the Mongol yoke with which to contrast that period with the more positive side. And again, this is political spin again, which emerges with the independence of Muscovy eventually asserting itself. But of course that's written in order to buttress the whole mythology of Muscovy. So time and again we are seeing the past used in order to support the political spin of the current writers.
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Martin Whittock
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Martin Whittock
Cut the camera. They see us.
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Martin Whittock
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Dr. Miranda Melcher
Yeah, that. That's really key to emphasize. And I think we want to go into a bit more sort of why this particular version of the story came out, because it's a whole bunch of things. It's Mongol, Yoda folk. It's also the myth of the Holy Ruse, the idea of the ungrateful West. How did those develop out of this?
Martin Whittock
There are a whole range of. Of issues and motifs that will resonate for centuries and, and that still resonate in Russia, Ukraine today, that find their roots in. In this period. The first is the concept of. Of holyros. This idea that Kyiv, Kyiv the Golden before its destruction is this holy state of Eastern Orthodoxy and that when it's destroyed, its legacy moves to Moscow. And in fact, the patriarchs in Moscow are called by their Kievan titles for some time before they eventually change that to include Moscow in the title. And then when Eastern Orthodoxy falls to Islamic control in the 15th century, that burnishes this by saying, well, basically everything that was once Byzantine, the holiness of the Eastern Roman Empire has been bequeathed to Kyiv, and via Kyiv's destruction and then the conquest of Constantinople, people that have been bequeathed to Moscow. So there's this mantle of holy rust, this sense in which, you know, the west is seen as being barbarians, heretics. Real Orthodoxy resides only in Eastern Orthodoxy is very much within this belief. So that Moscow then becomes inheritor of all of this and sees itself as being the repository of holy Eastern Orthodoxy. And that'll be carried forward right through into the 19th century by the tsars when they were claimed to be protected writers of Christians in the Ottoman Empire, for example. So that's. That's one strand that flows through this, and that's very, very important. The other strand is a sense of. Of extreme suffering from which it is claimed. And there's some evidence for this, that Western Europe has been shielded by the activities of the East. The idea that by absorbing violence from the east of steppe people sweeping in that. That has, in a sense, kind of shielded the west from the worst of this violence. But that often is associated with the concept. But the west is not really grateful for this. The same kind of thing will then continue rolling forward again when it's Russia who basically absorbs the huge violence of Napoleonic invasion, for example, which then leads to the end of the Napoleonic Empire. But are they really credited for that? In the First World War, our images dot dominated by the Western Front. And yet there's this huge suffering on the Eastern front in the First World War. In the Second War, something like nine out of 10 German soldiers who die in the Second World War are killed by the Red Army. The Red army absorbs and the Russian community absorbs incredible losses. More than 20 million dead. And yet does the west really recognize the fact that in the Russian point of view, you, it's the Russians that won the Second World War? Now there's truth to all of these things, and there's also things to be contested there as well. But the roots go right back to this period of time when Russian, Russian image makers are saying we are the shield of Europe and yet no one really, no one really credits us with it. And it's run on and run on alongside this image of Holy Russia. And at the same time, as Mongol power lessens, so rulers of Muscovy increasingly begin to enhance their power and secure control over the Ukrainian lands by continual references to what had come before and saying they're the inheritors of that. And we might want to explore in a moment exactly how they did that in the 16th, 17th and 18th century while referencing these, these very, very old motifs.
Dr. Miranda Melcher
Yes, that is exactly what I would like us to do now, please, if you would be so kind.
Martin Whittock
Okay. So after destruction of Kyivan Rus State by the Mongols in 1240s, Russian rulers based eventually in Moscow reference these origins when trying to enhance their power and secure control over the Ukrainian lands. It seems strikingly, for example, during the reign of Ivan IV, known as Ivan the Terrible, who died in 1584, who in 1547 took the title Tsar, first title of use of Tsar and Grand Prince of all Russia. The idea being that all Russia means both his territories and the lands that to the south are no longer under his control. And in the propaganda efforts of Ivan IV, the 10th century ruler of the Rus, Vladimir the Great, was a very useful weapon to deploy against Catholic Poles and Lithuanians who'd come to occupy the western regions of what had once been Kyivan Rus. And this all occurred as the rulers of Muscovy began to expand their area of control southwards into frontier lands that since the fall of Kyiv, Rus and later withdrawal of direct Mongol rule had been contested with the Mongols and then ruled by Lithuania. Poland had experienced incursions from Tata ruled Crimea. Crimea had seen communities of militarized semi independent settlers formed from mercenaries, runaway serfs, and others benefiting from loose or little government control in this wild frontier area, which is now largely the area we call Ukraine, and who called themselves the Cossacks. So what we see is rulers of Muscovy looking south into an area that they call Little Russia, calling themselves Great Russia or Great Russians, and saying we should be ruling there for the simple reason that we were once part of that much larger state, and we've become the inheritors of that. So, for example, between 1591 and 1637, there were five major Cossack rebellions against Polish rule in the area we'd now call Ukraine. And a very large one broke out in 1648, which, when the Cossacks found their Tatar allies had deserted them in 1651 to survive, they turned to Russia for a system. And this is absolutely key, because in 1654, they swore an oath of loyalty, their hetman, their ruler, to the Russian Tsar. And it seems clear that the hetman, the Cossack ruler, thought the arrangement would secure him continued semi independence in what is large Ukraine today, and protection against Poles from the West. And later, Ukrainian writers view the whole revolt as a creation of an independent Hetman state. Great. But the Russians view things very, very differently. Historically, they viewed this as being the wild south, as they saw it being finally brought back in under Tsarist authority. In other words, Kyivan Rus finally being restored. For them, it was a union. And it's clear because in 1654, the tsar changed his royal title from autocrat of all Russia to autocrat of all Great and Little Russia, Little Russia being the area we now call Ukraine. So this is a key part of this. The geopolitics of Muscovy, as it reasserts itself over lands to the south, but claims these lands should be ours because they were once ours. In the same way, Empress Catherine the Great dissolves the last vestiges of Cossack independence in 1781 and annexes Crimea in 1783. And this is presented as a union of lands that were once united, but have now become disunited because of the Mongol invasions, but finally have been united again. So this concept of Holy Russian Russia, this concept of the ungrateful west, the concept that Russia must do it on its own, this concept that rulers of Moscow are right and proper rulers in Kyiv and right down to the Black Sea, that's in. In their take on it, is rooted very much in this early period of the Norse Rus, although increasingly the Norse get sidelined, and the Rus are seen as very much an indigenous Slav Slavic creation, the Rus do not come back onto the scene until later in the 19th century.
Dr. Miranda Melcher
Well, and not just in the 19th century, in the 20th century too. So why do we see these more recent revivals of the Smith?
Martin Whittock
Yeah, this is sometimes called the Normanist debate. Since the 18th century, the credit that foreign Viking incomers. So. So the Rus were credited with a great deal, but the idea that they were based on foreigners in creating Kyivan Rus has fluctuated over time. In the mid 18th century, foreign involvement in the formation of Russia became intellectually unacceptable. And we find people being significantly sidelined academically for saying this. German scholars, for example, are working in Russia, find themselves in deep trouble for saying, we think there were external forces that led to the formation of the first Russian state. But it became more fashionable again in the late 18th and then 19th century. Basically, from Catherine the Great straight onwards. She herself was German, married into Russian royal house, and all the czars after her married into German royal families. And actually they relished tales that Russians needed the strong hand of autocrats to bring order. And they reached back to those traditions of the Russian primary chronicles, saying these foreigners were brought in in order to control the violence of this disparate state that could not rule itself. These are all much within the spin of Ross and how it explains itself, that really is very, very useful for later czars who say, yes, and autocracy is still needed, and they don't see a problem with marrying into German royal houses or celebrating at times their Germanness as well as their Russianness, although that can sometimes be very controversial, because they are plugging into an idea that that autocracy was brought in from outside because it was necessary. Now, understanding in the 1930s, promoting that idea would and did bring a death sentence, because the idea that foreigners were necessary to create Russia in any way, shape or form was obviously very much unwelcome. But curiously, although the Bolsheviks were atheistic, the baptism of the Rus was regarded as progressive by Stalin, who also wanted to use the image of, though not the foreign connection, because it orientated Russia towards Europe, the source of industrialization in the Marxist view of history, rather than Asia. So although Ukrainian national identity was crushed under Stalin, and although the idea of foreign involvement was brought very much under control under Stalin, nevertheless, Kievan Rus, even in its Christian form, was useful in order to talk about. About what created Russia and what orientated it towards Europe, which is quite intriguing. And then 1954, the unification as it was and is still presented in Russia of Ukraine, with Russia in 1654 was celebrated by the giving of Crimea from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to Ukraine, which it would remain part of Ukraine until annexed by the Russian Federation of Putin in 2014. It's quite intriguing even under Gorbachev, as things are beginning to break apart in the then Soviet Union in May and June 1988. The millennium of the Christian conversion of The RUS in 988 was still being celebrated even in this officially atheistic state, as part of a religious revival and an attempt to boost Russian self awareness at a time when perestroika and glasnost were proving very, very difficult to make work in the collapsing Soviet Union. Vladimir Putin has done the same since then. Talked about Crimea having sacred meaning for Russia in 2015 because he's talking about Vladimir the Great being baptized there, Crimea being the spiritual source of the formation of the multifaceted but monolithic Russian nation. Note those words, multifaceted but monolithic. Basically, Putin is saying there was once one Rus and there'll be one Rus again. And he's referring to the baptism of Vladimir the Great on Crimea in 988. Since then, in 2016, he put up a massive statue of Vladimir the Great in Borovichskaya Square in central Moscow. Moscow unveiled by Vladimir Putin. Significantly, on Russian National Unity Day, a national holiday revived by Putin in 2005, again the Rus are being used to say that Ukraine is not never was an independent state. It should be part of the, remember that phrase, multifaceted but monolithic Russian nation and even as late as 2024 war. In conversation with Tucker Carlson, Putin then started referring to the Norse roots of the Russ. So the Norse are now back on the scene again. Why are they back on the scene again? Because it's a way of claiming that Russia is now the legitimate heir of ancient European traditions, not the liberal west, which in Putin's view has gone weak, has become liberal, has become secular. So, so extraordinary bringing together of the Russian primary chronicle, there were European input into the formation of Rus. The concept of holy Russia is now being once again promulgated by Putin, who's saying that Russia is now the repository of true European values. And therefore Vikings have a walk on part to play there. Because it is part of the argument that Russia is indeed a European state, in Putin's view, the only one that really stands up for European values now. And he said the same thing in 2024 at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum when he said, as for the elements of European culture, it is not we, Russia who are losing those Genes and elements of European culture, but that part of Europe called Western. And in the current Putinist narrative, the Viking founders of the Ross have once more been annexed to the latest expression of Moscow based Russian nationalism and imperialism. Things have come full circle to a most extraordinary degree.
Dr. Miranda Melcher
Yeah, this is really showing how the past is influencing the present. To take it one step further, is there anything looking forward into the future you want readers and listeners to consider based on this history?
Martin Whittock
I think the main thing that people need to recognise and I think to reflect as they look upon this, is that we are deeply indebted to our history. We are at times constrained by our history. Our options are limited by our history, but we are never prisoners of our history. And I think that applies not just to this current war going on between Russia and Ukraine, which is often rooted in history and a version of history that says an independent state of Ukraine cannot exist because it should be reabsorbed back into Russia. But we can see that in echoes right across our contested and turbulent world. World. The past is very much with us, and that's not surprising because it affects who we are and what we are and our character. But I think the key thing to remember is, in my personal contribution towards this, is we are not prisoners of our past. We are still people with agency and we still have the right and the opportunities or should do to decide what we will make of our past and what are the past we will co opt and what are the past we will walk away from in order to make our future. At the moment, many people talk as if we are prisoners of our past, but we are not. We have agency. But what we will also see in the continuing Putinist narrative, particularly the focus on Russia, is what it means to be Russian. And it will be very interesting to see to what extent this medieval history continues to. To play a part within the current manifestation of Russian nationalism in order to explain what Russia is and in order to justify what Russia is doing. And it really is quite extraordinary, the resonance of the medieval past with the violent, turbulent present. And that's something to watch out for, even while we recognize the fact that we are not prisoners of our past.
Dr. Miranda Melcher
Yeah, definitely something to pay attention to. And can I ask then as a final question, what you might be doing in the future? You gave us at the beginning, such an introduction of the ways in which this interest in deep stories and the way history is used has taken you to a bunch of different projects. What might be next for you?
Martin Whittock
I'm currently tentatively working on a project called the Invention of the English looking at how a millennium period from A.D. 600 to A.D. 1600 basically created almost all the component parts of what we now understand by England and Englishness in all its complexity and in all its contestedness as well, which later history has run with, and which is very much part of the contested debates within England today and within the United Kingdom over what it means to be English and the role of England within the United Kingdom, which is where I live and where I write. So so this particular project that I've just started and I've started collecting information on is something along the lines of the invention of the English or the creation of the English or the English the first 1,000 years, as it were. And looking at how this formative period from A.D. 600 to A.D. 1600 put in place all the component parts of what we now call Englishness and English culture, which later generations then ran with in a whole range of different directions, but were rooted in those foundational experiences.
Dr. Miranda Melcher
Well, that certainly sounds intriguing. So best of luck with that project.
Martin Whittock
Thank you very much.
Dr. Miranda Melcher
For any listeners who want to learn more about the book we've been discussing today, the book is titled Vikings in the From Vladimir the Great to Vladimir Putin the Origins of a Contested Legacy in Russia and Ukraine, published by Byteback Publishing in 2025. Martin, thank you so much for joining me on the podcast.
Martin Whittock
Thank you very much. It's been great to be with you.
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Podcast: New Books Network
Host: Dr. Miranda Melcher
Guest: Martyn Whittock
Episode: Vikings in the East: From Vladimir the Great to Vladimir Putin – The Origins of a Contested Legacy in Russia and Ukraine
Date: October 19, 2025
Publisher: Biteback Publishing
In this engaging episode, Dr. Miranda Melcher speaks with historian Martyn Whittock about his new book, "Vikings in the East". The conversation traces the extraordinary Norse influence on the lands that would become Russia and Ukraine, beginning with early medieval Viking—specifically Swedish Norse—expansion, and extending to the cultural and political legacies that persist in Russian and Ukrainian identities up to Vladimir Putin’s present regime. Whittock discusses not only the remarkable history of the Viking presence in the East but also how these ancient narratives continue to be invoked and contested in modern politics.
For listeners:
This episode presents a sweeping, accessible look at how early medieval Norse adventurism and commerce fundamentally shaped the identity, politics, and contested narratives of Russia and Ukraine. With a focus on myth, adaptation, and the power of history, Whittock’s analysis is essential listening for anyone who wants to understand how the past still shapes the most urgent political questions today.