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Odd Arne Westad, "The Coming Storm: Power, Conflict, and Warnings from History" (Henry Holt and Co, 2026)
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Professor Westott
Welcome to the New Books Network.
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Dr. Charles Katia
Good day. Welcome to New Books Network. My name is Dr. Charles Katia. I'm the host on the channel today. We are pleased indeed honored to have with us Professor Westott. Professor Westott is the Alayu professor of History Public affairs at Yale University. He's the author of a number of very well received books, including Long Covid War, which won the ultra prestigious Bancroft Award. And today we're discussing his newest book, the Coming Power Conflict and Warnings from History, published by Yale University Press. Welcome, Professor.
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Professor Westott
It's very good to be here, Schultz.
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Dr. Charles Katia
Professor, why did you write this book?
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Professor Westott
It's a book that was mainly written out of irritation. I was so annoyed with how people in many countries were dealing with the current international situation in terms of it being a cold war, a little bit like the great Cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union. And my view is that that simply is not a satisfactory explanation or model for what we are seeing today. So I wanted to go back in history to find better examples for the kind of multipolar complexity that we are seeing at the moment. And the one that is closest to us, unfortunately, is the one prior to the First World War. So the world at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the
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Dr. Charles Katia
20th century why do you say that great power wars are more destructive than other types of wars?
- [03:00]
Professor Westott
Because of the scale first and foremost. So all wars are terrible, and in all of them, human sacrifice is tremendous and with effects that go far beyond those who are directly affected by the war. But the scale of great power war is almost unimaginable. So in the two first weeks of the Battle of the Somme, during the First World War in 1916, as many soldiers were killed as in all great power wars between 1815 and 1914. So it's the scale of destruction, the scale of suffering that is so striking when it comes to great power wars. And of course, almost no one alive today have experienced great power. We have experienced a lot of other terrible wars, but we haven't seen that.
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Dr. Charles Katia
Why do you posit that among the current great powers and the great powers of circa 1914, that Wilhelmine Germany is closest to the contemporary PRC?
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Professor Westott
Mainly because both of them grew up very quickly as dominant powers within what was then Europe and what is today East Asia, the most important regions of the world in economic and social terms. So it's that remarkable quick transformation where both of these two countries come out of almost nothing in terms of power and then within one generation become the leading power within what is the most significant part of the world that is the most striking similarity. There are other similarities as well in terms of behavior, in terms of rhetoric, in terms of alliance patterns, which I explore in the book. But I think just that remarkable degree of transformation that these countries have been at the core of, that is the comparison that stands out to me.
- [04:56]
Dr. Charles Katia
The other comparison you make is UK circa, I suppose, 1900 to 1914, with the contemporary United States. Why do you believe there is a fruitful comparison there?
- [05:08]
Professor Westott
Well, those two countries were for that time very clearly the leading great powers. Great Britain had been the predominant power, not in absolute terms, but in relative terms during most of the 19th century. The great balancer of power in the 19th century world, the United States, of course, has created most of the international system that we live within today. But what is so striking in terms of that comparison is how both of these countries then gradually, towards the end of that time period, start to withdraw from the system that they themselves have created. This sense that there isn't enough for us in the system that we have been instrumental in setting up, that other countries are supposing them, that other countries are ought to take advantage of, of technologies, of ideas that come from within Britain back then or the United States today, that they're stealing our jobs et CETERA et cetera. And I think that comparison is one of the things that I'm most eager to get across in the book, that it isn't always the case that it's the challenges, the rising powers within an international system that do most to destroy that system. Very often in structural terms, much of the reason for that are changes that are taking place within the predominant powers themselves.
- [06:32]
Dr. Charles Katia
Why do you say that? Oh, I'm sorry. How. How does tsarist Russia fit into this particular context? Because on the one hand, t. Russia was backward in terms of its domestic arrangements. On the other hand, it was viewed in the three or four or five years, I suppose, three or four years prior to 1914 as being the coming great power. In fact, it's in retrospect, remarkable how much this particular image of tsarist Russia used to call as well as the steamroller, was prevalent in most of the European chancelleries, particularly in Berlin.
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Professor Westott
That's a really good point. It's a striking one, and it tells you something about how easy it is to get some of the relative constellations of power wrong. You're right. I mean, particularly the German leadership were obsessed with the idea that Russia, in spite of Russia having demonstrated a lot of weakness in the very first years of the 20th century, for instance, in its disastrous war against Japan, they were still obsessed with the idea that Russia somehow was the great power of the future. And this had very fateful consequences in terms of looking at German decision making in the period leading up to late July 1914. This idea that it was quite possible to imagine, particularly from a German military high command perspective, that Germany would never get the better opportunity, if war were to come, to rearrange matters in Europe to their satisfaction than what they had just at that time. This is what is often known as the maximum moment kind of idea. And I'm fearful of that in today's world as well, maybe especially with regard to China, but also with regard to other countries, that there is this sense that at least under certain circumstances, the time for action might be closer to now rather than being postponed into the future.
- [08:35]
Dr. Charles Katia
So that's probably where the context of this famous quote by Bethman Hollweg, the imperial German Chancellor, on July 7, which is one or two days after the issuing of the famous blank check to Vienna, wherein H told his assistant private secretary Riesler, quote, russia is the land of the future, whose great growth and colossal demands dwell upon us everywhere. A terrible nightmare, unquote.
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Professor Westott
Exactly. And yet Russia was the country that got into trouble almost immediately after the War broke out in 1914, and then in terms of its central state, collapsed in 1917. So it is very important this, I think, to think in strategic terms about how we can try to, if not get things right, at least think about them more in terms of the future than just the perceptions that exist at the moment. I mean, I should say for Bethmann Hollweg that he is not the only one who got this wrong at that point in time. He's also not the only one who has got relative constellations of power wrong in great power relations, if you think about it in a longer perspective. But that in itself, to me, is a reason when an acute crisis then comes along, to play for time, not to act prematurely. Because very often it turns out that these overall ideas about relative constellations are actually wrong, and that the outcome then becomes fatally connected to those mistakes that are there from the beginning.
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Dr. Charles Katia
How do you differentiate it at all between nationalism, which was obviously very prevalent in the run up to the outbreak of the Great war in July, August 1914, and the contemporary political trend known as populism?
- [10:24]
Professor Westott
I think they are closely related. I mean, there was a great deal of populism in nationalism in the early part of the 20th century. And I think you find exactly the same thing now in the United States, in Europe, in Russia, in China, in India, in other places. So I think they are in many ways connected. They are connected maybe especially through this sense that other countries are out to take advantage of you or undermine your position or stealing things from you. If you do a comparison to the level it's possible in terms of popular attitudes when it comes to other great powers, by the population of the various powers today and prior to 1914, we actually find that there are higher levels of fear and resentment today than was ever the case before the First World War broke out. And I think that's a reminder in a way of the significance that these political changes also have come to hold. I mean, if you go back a generation from where we are today, we'll find that in almost all countries, the general sense of there being some kind of immediate threat from others was relatively low. And today it's at an absolute peak in terms of what it has been in the 20th century. And that worries me. It's not that these attitudes by themselves create war, but they are part of the structural framework that is there. If a world class crisis were to
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Dr. Charles Katia
come along, what were the three pre1914 strategic considerations in Europe?
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Professor Westott
So the main strategic considerations, I think, were especially connected to the Idea that some level of deterrence would prevent war. I mean, a little bit like how much of our thinking has been since 1945, particularly with regard to Europe, but also to some extent with regard to East Asia. So I think this was the prevailing idea, was that the patterns of alliance that were there would act as a natural deterrent against war. And at the same time, there was this sort of concept overall that great powers would be able to sort out the differences among them on the bigger issues, while smaller countries would then fall into lockstep with what their bigger patrons would want or set the direction for. Now, of course, the challenge with this was that, as I said earlier, there had been no serious attempt at integrating Germany into some kind of general collective European security system in a way similar to what we failed, in my view, to do with Russia and China after the Cold War ended. I don't think in our own day that these arrangements would necessarily have been a barrier against Chinese or Russian aggressive intent, but they would have delivered a kind of framework in which some of these strategic tensions could have been dealt with in ways that are far superior to what we are seeing today. Then, of course, the problem was back then, as is the problem today, that the deterrence part of this, the idea that alliances would have a sufficient deterrent role, turned out not to be the case. As I often say in the book, the reason for war in 1914 was not the existence of alliances. The reason was that people had started to doubt those alliances, to think that those alliances would actually not come into play if a war were to break out. And that was part of the reason why Germany was willing to take these extreme risks that it did in terms of what it did in the summer of 1914.
- [14:28]
Dr. Charles Katia
And what are the three considerations among contemporary great powers?
- [14:33]
Professor Westott
I think the. The biggest strategic consideration at the moment is how to handle the relationship among the established powers, first and foremost, United States, but also to some extent, countries like Japan or the European Union, or for that matter, Russia, though Russia is in many ways a power in decline. And the emerging great powers, China, India and so on, how to organize that in terms of having some degree of acceptance of the kind of relationship that exists among them, in terms of the tensions that are undoubtedly will be, as we are seeing now with regard to Iran, we're seeing with regard to Ukraine. That is the first issue. The second issue, I think, is on the side of the United States and how the United States want to play its international role under these changed circumstances. The United States is still by far the most powerful great power in the world, especially military terms, but also in economic terms when it comes to how the US Economy is actually played out, I think the question is, will the United States continue to work with its friends and allies in Europe and in East Asia and thereby have a more balanced relationship in terms of what happens within those regions? And then thirdly, I think it is very much about the relationship between China and Russia, which, again, is reflective of many of these issues that existed in alliance terms prior to 1914. Today's China Russia relationship reminds me a little bit about the pre1914 relationship between Germany, the rising power, and Austria Hungary right next door, which was a great power in significant decline, which also had quarrels with almost all of its neighbors. And it was, of course, one of these quarrels that led to the actual outbreak of War in 1914. So this is something that China has to handle considerably better than what the Germans were able to do in the early part of the 20th century.
- [16:50]
Dr. Charles Katia
Why do you disagree with commentators like Michael Beckley who argue that the PRC's power contention was on a downward slope?
- [16:57]
Professor Westott
So Mike Beckley is not entirely wrong in saying that. I mean, I think my disagreement with him is mainly about whether we are seeing a world that is bipolar, a kind of Cold War repeat, which would be his principal position, or the. The kind of multipolarity that I believe that we are already in when it comes to China. I think there are some really good points that can be made about China being in a position where it's pretty clear, just like it is, by the way, for the United States, that it will have significant challenges in the future to keeping the kind of relative position that it has among great powers on a global scale. It has an absolutely terrible demographic profile, as you know, much worse than any other country. It has a lot of unresolved problems at home in terms of political governance, in terms of economic governance, for that matter. And it has managed to move into a position of very clear rivalry with many of its own neighbors, not at the same level of disastrous conflict as Russia has had with its neighbors, but still significant tensions with South Korea, with Japan, with the countries around the South China Sea, and so on. So I think there is a point in saying that China, the idea that China will be the superpower of the future is almost certainly mistaken. It will remain a very strong great power, probably one of the two strongest alongside the United States for the foreseeable future. But longer term, I'm not certain about the position of either of those two countries.
- [18:39]
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Dr. Charles Katia
It would appear to be the case that you probably you seem to adhere more to the Fritz Fischer school of German responsibility for the outbreak of the Great War than, say, Sir Christopher Clark's more recent thesis that the outbreak was caused by multiple European great powers acting in, I suppose you can say, all at the same time. Why is that so?
- [21:06]
Professor Westott
That's true. I mean, in the sense of the actual decisions for war. I'm much of a fisherite in terms of my understanding of the factors that drove Germany to be the country that played the key role in the very final phase, meaning the last few days before war broke out. But I also agree with Chris Clark in the sense that, of course, it is a complex international system. I mean, if you think about, in a broader structural sense, and of course also if you think about it in terms of deterrence not working, you can see a lot of responsibility elsewhere as well. I mean, maybe the most fundamental problem that led to the outbreak of the First World War was this inability to integrate Germany, a rapidly rising Germany, meaningfully into some kind of European order, security order. My colleague at Yale, Professor Paul Kennedy, has this in his earlier book about the rise of Anglo German antagonism, where he says that what the Brits were basically telling the Germans back in the late 19th century was that if you could only stop growing little Hans, then everything would be fine. And I think very much that was the problem. Instead of thinking about how Germany could be incorporated meaningfully in terms of resolving various kinds of tensions, in terms of an international system that actually had a chance to working, I think the problem, the difficulty, the challenge very much as Chris Klaue points out, is on the side of the establishment powers, is on the side of France, Russia and Britain.
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Dr. Charles Katia
In your treatment of the German decision makers in the July 1914 crisis, you seem to give primacy to the role of the Emperor, William ii, as opposed to the Imperial Chancellor Thobel von Beth van Hodweg. Why is that?
- [23:16]
Professor Westott
First and foremost, because the Kaiser was the supreme commander of the German military, of the German army, and in terms of the final decision making power, power over the question of war and peace, it was his. Now, the Chancellor, as we know, played a very negative role with regard to this. And there were clearly people within that military establishment that were trying to push the Kaiser along in terms of making his decisions, the decisions that they wanted in the latter stages of the crisis to be for war, at least a war against Russia presumably, but not certainly followed with a war against France. Even to the point that some of these were distinctly disloyal. I mean, not forwarding to the Kaiser in time information they had that could have led him to have more doubt about the direction in which he took. But he was the ultimate decision maker. When you get to those final 48 hours, it's only he who could have done the sensible thing, which is to play for time, rather than pushing ahead with the mobilization, which, of course, people were telling him what was absolutely necessary and could not be called off. Only he would have had the authority to do that.
- [24:39]
Dr. Charles Katia
What, for you, is the key variable that policymakers need in order to avoid another crisis akin to that which occurred in July 1914?
- [24:47]
Professor Westott
So I think there are two things that stand out to me. One is the need to resolve, at least in their active phase, the current wars that are going on on a global scale. I mean, like in Iran and like in Ukraine, there is this general sense that these wars can be kept isolated, which I think we had after the Cold War ended with a lot of international conflict. I'm not so sure that that's the case anymore. And I think the Iranian conflict now shows that in full. If a world class crisis that we cannot foresee at the moment were to come along, these ongoing wars would contribute significantly to the levels of fear and resentment and willingness to take action that you get among great powers themselves. The second aspect that is really needed today, I think, is a better understanding of the strategic motivations that are there on the side of other great powers. There is a great lot of talking among great power leaders today, but very little actual understanding. And this is again, very similar to the situation before the First World War, where the heads of state knew each other quite well. Three of them, the German Kaiser, the Russian Tsar, the British King, were cossets. They knew each other intimately, but they were still incapable of understanding what the broader strategic aims of the other side actually were. And I think we are in a similar situation today. So if you put that in addition to all the other tensions that are growing with regard to trade, with regard to technology, with regard to infrastructure and energy issues, with regard to questions of immigration, terrorism, you get a mix, a very combustible mix that remind me very much of the situation before 1914. And if we are going to try to at least move in a direction of more stability, we need to do it by dealing with these basic questions of instability and fear that exist today.
- [27:04]
Dr. Charles Katia
If you wanted people to take one thing away from your book, professor, what would it be?
- [27:08]
Professor Westott
The need to think about how we create peace, not just prepare for war. Although I'm in no way a pacifist, I believe that countries have the right to defend themselves and they have the right to prepare militarily for the eventualities that they are afraid of. But we also have to think about how we can move away from the threat of great power war. And we only do that by thinking positively about the potential for compromise, the potential for finding some degree of stability among great powers, which do not mean the same thing as accepting the viewpoints of others, or accepting their formal government or their modes of behavior, but finding ways in which we can avoid these various aspects of conflicts coming together in a way that could really lead to a global disaster. That's what I want to get people to understand that in many ways my view is that the hour is getting late, that if we do not act on some of these matters now, we may not have all that many possibilities, opportunities in the future to move in the direction of a more stable world situation.
- [28:21]
Dr. Charles Katia
On that observation, I would like to thank you very much, professor, being so kind to speak with us today. This is Charles Coutillo. You've been listening to New Books in History, a podcast channel, New Books Network. Thank you professor, very much.
- [28:32]
Professor Westott
Thank you so much. It was a great conversation.
- [28:46]
Dr. Charles Katia
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Dr. Charles Katia
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