Podcast Summary: New Books Network — Phillips Payson O'Brien, "War and Power: Who Wins Wars--And Why" (PublicAffairs, 2025)
Host: Leo Bader
Guest: Phillips Payson O'Brien (Professor of Strategic Studies, University of St. Andrews)
Date: November 11, 2025

Episode Overview

In this thought-provoking episode, Leo Bader interviews Phillips Payson O'Brien about his new book, War and Power: Who Wins Wars--And Why. O'Brien challenges conventional metrics of state power, such as the traditional concept of "great powers," and advocates for a more nuanced framework—"full spectrum power"—to understand why states win or lose wars. They dissect the economic, technological, political, and social dimensions behind military effectiveness, drawing on both historical precedents (notably World War II, the Cold War, and Vietnam) and the ongoing war in Ukraine. The conversation intertwines scholarly critique, memorable anecdotes, and timely analysis of current global conflicts, offering a comprehensive reevaluation of what it means to be powerful in war.

Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. The Flawed Concept of "Great Power"

• “Great power” is a term with “no criterion...that makes any sense” (04:01), O’Brien argues. He finds definitions arbitrary and laments how the label confers an undue legitimacy to states’ interests.
  • Quote: “It’s a great phrase because it’s meaningless, but people fill it with meaning...just because you've called them a great power, their interests are therefore greater.” (02:35–04:19)
• The misuse of the term led to skewed perceptions before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, such as prioritizing Russia’s interests above Ukraine’s.

2. The "Full Spectrum Power" Framework

• O'Brien proposes assessing state power across several domains:
  • Economic and technological might (the most vital foundations)
  • Leadership
  • Societal structure and morale
  • Alliance systems
• This approach avoids simplistic rankings and instead illuminates where states possess true advantages.
  • Quote: “You can be powerful in one element and not powerful in another, and that will let you down.” (04:28)
  • Quote: “This is not a theory that will tell you that...State X is 98% powerful versus State Y, which is 62% powerful...But it will tell you where the power might be or might not be.” (05:27)

3. The Primacy of Economics and Technology

• O'Brien is emphatic: “You cannot be an international power without economic, technological might. That doesn’t mean if you have it, you will be, but you cannot be if you don’t.” (06:54)
  • States often overestimate their power due to misleading metrics (e.g., Russia’s “great power” status despite modest GDP).
  • Population and land mass matter far less than the “ability to equip and regenerate” military forces.

4. Misplaced Faith in Military Metrics

• Counting tanks and aircraft, O’Brien argues, is misleading: “Most of that military equipment will be destroyed relatively soon. So it’s the ability to replace equipment.” (15:37)
  • Societal health (e.g., corruption) and technological sophistication are often ignored but crucial.
  • Ukraine’s resistance in 2022: Corruption within the Russian army hampered performance far more than numbers on paper suggested.

5. The Myth of Decisive Battles vs. Realities of Logistics and Production

• Battles are overrated: “Battles reveal the situation that exists...at a time. But a battle very rarely decides anything.” (17:03)
  • Historic example: Germany’s victory over France (1940) did not seal WWII.
  • Vietnam and the “we never lost a battle” fallacy: Victory in engagements proved “irrelevant” to the outcome. (19:44)
  • Wars, especially today, depend on the “ability to make and adapt during the war.”

6. Leadership and Domestic Politics

• O’Brien insists on including leadership in analyses, despite its intangibility.
  • Quote: “It’s impossible to quantify. But if you do not look at a country's leadership, you will not have an idea really about how its power will be used.” (11:29)
  • He uses regime decisions in WWII and the US power transition (Biden to Trump) as examples of leadership’s outsized impact.

7. The Centrality of Alliances

• Alliances matter more than “great powers.” The Cold War was won due to the US’s robust alliance network, in contrast to the Soviet bloc of “forced allies.”
  • Quote: “There are no great powers, I would say, but you could say they're great alliances.” (11:38)
  • The endurance and utility of alliances are decisive—“the end of the Cold War occurs when the Soviet Union realizes it doesn’t have the economic resources to keep its allies in line.” (13:28)

8. Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War

• Many analysts overestimated Russia’s isolation; in reality, China, North Korea, and Iran have provided substantial support, sometimes outstripping aid to Ukraine (14:00–15:15).
• Ukraine’s situation illustrates the importance of not just aid quantity, but also its effectiveness and restrictions.

9. European Security and Structural Challenges

• Europe has the economic and technological foundation for self-reliant defense, but suffers from weak structural and leadership capacity (23:30–24:46).
  • The US is no longer seen as a reliable defense partner, prompting a reawakening to direct defense investment.
  • The lack of coherent European structures undermines effective support for Ukraine and broader security ambitions.

10. US-China: A Full-Spectrum Assessment

• In a potential conflict, the US would “fight the opening battles...perhaps very effectively,” but lacks the industrial base to sustain a prolonged war against China, which “can just make so much more.” (28:06–29:28)
  • The US's focus on counterinsurgency has left it underprepared for large-scale industrial conflict.

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the irrelevance of "great power" status:
  • “The supposedly great powers that might have actually been great powers like the United States lose wars regularly. The United States lost the Vietnam War, lost the war on terror...I thought we should stop using it because it was an assumption that had no real criteria.” — Phillips O'Brien (03:30–04:19)
• On military metrics:
  • “Counting up equipment and using military metrics seems to me a really poor way of doing it...having corruption in the society had a massive difference in the ability of the Russians to get use out of their forces.” (15:37)
• On battles:
  • “Battles reveal the situation that exists between the militaries at a time. But a battle very rarely decides anything.” (17:03)
  • “We never lost a battle to you,” [said the American]. And Giap was reputedly to say, “That might be true, but it’s also irrelevant.” (19:44)
• On alliances:
  • “Alliances actually determine the course of international affairs in peace and war more than individual states.” (11:38)
• On leadership:
  • “If you do not look at a country’s leadership, you will not have an idea really about how its power will be used.” (11:29)
• On war’s unpredictability:
  • “The big thing I want people to take away from it is that you have no idea what you’re doing when you’re starting a war. So in many ways, don’t do it.” (31:17)

Important Timestamps

• [02:35] — Why the "great power" concept is meaningless and harmful
• [04:28] — Introduction of "full spectrum power" framework
• [06:54] — Economics and technology as the foundation of power
• [09:10] — Human resources as a misleading metric; the Ukraine example
• [11:29] — The unpredictable impact of leadership
• [13:28] — Alliances in history (Cold War/Soviet collapse)
• [15:37] — Counting military equipment vs. real effectiveness
• [17:03] — The myth of decisive battles
• [19:44] — General Giap’s “irrelevant” remark on battle victories
• [21:09] — Ukraine war: current strengths and weaknesses
• [23:30] — Europe’s structural military shortcomings
• [28:06] — US vs. China: opening battles vs. industrial capacity
• [31:17] — The unpredictable, self-destructive nature of war

Conclusion: Core Takeaway

Phillips O’Brien’s core message resounds throughout: the realities of war and power are far messier than headline numbers or abstract status labels suggest. Economics, technology, leadership, alliances, and national willpower converge in unpredictable ways. States—and especially their leaders—regularly misjudge what it takes to prevail in war, with catastrophic costs. His warning is clear: “You have no idea what you’re doing when you’re starting a war. So in many ways, don’t do it.” (31:17)

For further reading and updates, O'Brien maintains a regular Substack covering ongoing developments, especially in Ukraine.