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Photis Lysandrou, "Dollar Dominance: Why It Rules the Global Economy and How to Challenge It" (Policy Press, 2025)
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Books Network
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welcome to New Books Network. My name is Sashi Kumar Sundaram. I'm a Senior Lecturer in Foreign Policy and security at City St. George's University of Lo London. I'm also the Chair of the Global South Caucus of the International Studies association and here at Citi, I direct the Global Disorder Center. Today we have Professor Fotis Lysandru, whose new book Dollar why It Rules the Global Economy and How to Challenge it from Bristol University Press that was published in 2025. I very much enjoyed reading the book and I highly recommend it both to young and established scholars who look to understand the meaning of dollar and its role in world politics and in international political economy. Before we get into the details, Professor Fortis, can you tell us about yourself and why you wrote this book?
- [03:06]
D
Thank you for the opportunity to talk about my book. I'm a research professor here at City St. George's I'm co director of the City University Political Economy Research center, and my research interests are in the political economy of global finance and the issue of dollar dominance today is very much part of the global political the global financial landscape. Why I came to write this book is my reaction to the stream of predictions about the coming decline of dollar dominance that turned into a flood following Russia's invasion of the Ukraine in 2022. And although that was very It's a very much desired objective that the BRICS group of countries de dollarize the global financial system that wishful thinking cannot substitute for the harsh reality that the dollar will remain secure, its international position will remain secure for a long time to come. And the essence of the book is to explain why it will remain dominant for a long time to come and what must be done to challenge it.
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E
And that is why the book is a fascinating intervention into the existing debates both within the scholarly circle on the end of the dollar, but also in punditry and journalistic debates that we often see in the Financial Times, for example, that the end of dollar and your book effectively challenges that argument with detailed theoretical and empirical arguments. Foot for thought for our conversation today before we start, the world is seeing a huge disorder, particularly in the Middle east, with what is happening in Iran crises. And the core argument of your book, if it can be summarized, is that instability in the world reinforces dollar dominance. So presumably your argument will be that Iran crises helps to strengthen the dollar, which goes against the grain of many scholars who predict that this marks yet another instance of dollar being lost in its dominance. Would you agree that Iran crisis is actually reinforcing dollar dominance and if so, why?
- [05:48]
D
The general point I made in my book as regards the connection between global turbulence disorder and dollar dominance, the key link it runs through the huge flows of international financial flows that really search for safe harbor for search for safe it's the foreign investor flight to safety that is key to perpetually reinforcing dollar dominance, particularly in times of heightened crisis, uncertainty and so on. That was the case following Russia's invasion of the Ukraine. It was the case following the COVID era and it was even the case following great financial crisis of 20078 when people predicted a decline of American power and the dollar. And in fact the reverse was the case. And I believe, and we saw that again following Trump's Liberation Day tariff program unveiled on April 2, 2025. That episode really did see an upsurge in predictions of a coming dollar declining dollar dominance, which has not happened. On the contrary, when the foreign Exchange or the 14th survey conducted by the bank for International Settlements, the 14th survey of daily foreign exchange turnover, it showed that and that survey was launched April 1, a day before Donald Trump's Liberation Day tariffs. When the results were published In September, late September 2025, it showed that foreign exchange turnover had risen by 2 trillion from 7.5 to 9.6 trillion. And the dollar's position had actually strengthened from 88% to 89.5% while other currencies like the Euronson saw a decline. And while the Renminbi saw a modest increase to 8.5%, this out to 200%.
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E
So you see, that is great. But this brings back to a fundamental question. What explains the foundations of dollar dominance in the past?
- [08:20]
D
In the post war period, foundations lay squarely in the physical realm of production and international trade. Since then, the US's position in world trade and production has declined relatively, and I emphasize the word relative, because the US is still a very large economy. But the foundations of the dollar's dominance have moved from the physical realm of production to the financial realm of capital market stocks and international portfolio flows. So it is because at a time when the world's capital markets are now nearly three times the size of world GDP, whereas 30 years ago they were on the par. At a time when the capital markets are growing to a position where they heavily dominate the world's production base, it is the US's commanding share of those capital markets, almost 45% of world equity and world bond stocks, that underpins dollar's dominance. The link between the $2 dominance in the currency sphere and US dominance in the capital market sphere being the heavy involvement of foreign private and foreign official institutional investors in the USA in the US capital market
- [09:55]
E
that is fascinating. This connects very well with the previous point you made on Flight to Safety and how this enormous increase in capital market really is a modern phenomenon. And you say dominance of the United States particularly The American dollar in capital market. What do you mean by capital market? Can you elaborate a little bit more so that we can better understand on this connections between flight to safety, on the one hand, the expansion, the three times expansion of the world's share compared to the GDP and the sort of foreign institutional investors who play an important role. So can we unpack this notion of what do you mean by capital market?
- [10:42]
D
The capital markets basically divide into two the equity markets, which are shares in major corporations, and the bond markets which are credit instruments. In the bond markets you have on the supply side, governments together with corporations. On the equity side, of course it's corporations. So the capital markets in terms of supplies, what you're seeing is that corporations and governments are increasingly dependent on issuing these securities, these financial claims on their future income streams in order to facilitate their continuity of investment, production, service provision. For that to be possible, for this growth of capital markets to become possible, there needs to be on the demand side, institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies and so on, who need to hold these liabilities of governments and corporations in order to meet their own liabilities to clients, to their clients. So what you have been for the capital market, which is why it's coming in size, is that you have, it's like I think we should bring it here. It's as if the corporations and governments issuing securities, these equities and bonds on the supply side, and pension funds, insurance companies on the demand side. It's as if they're colonizing the future in order to meet the financial pressures and constraints of the present. So the future has been in a sense transformed into a giant warehouse where governments and corporations can deposit their liabilities until their redemption, and where pension funds and insurance companies and even other institutional investors can hold those liabilities up to meet their own liabilities as and when they forward you.
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E
And that is not confined to the present. It had a long history as well. But what is so unique about the American sort of interventions and the American dollar that is actually underwriting all these levels with which institutional investors can actually meet these liabilities, it's through $.
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D
The sheer size of the US capital market is the answer to your question. Currently, if we take equity and bond stocks, they're close to 300 trillion. That's nearly three times world GDP. Going by last year's figures of 110 trillion. The US on its own accounts for an average of 45% of the equity and bond stocks. So the US capital market is huge compared to any other market. Not only is it Huge. It's also fairly integrated. It's integrated because you have universal application of rule of law. In addition to a strong legal infrastructure, you have a very strong governance and transparency structure. There are same tax laws and insolvency and contract laws across the US and on top of that, and this is key, is the homogeneity factor endowed by the fact that all US securities, government bonds, corporate bonds, corporate equities, have the same currency denomination. So the US Capital market is not only huge, it's also homogenous. It's a huge dollar market with depth, with liquidity. And that is the source of attraction of so many of the world's large institutional investors.
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E
Yes, that is an important argument given that today we see Donald Trump effectively undermining all those basis of rule of law, legal infrastructure, transparency, tariffs through tariffs and tax laws. And everything is up for grabs because of of the Trump administration. Nevertheless, we can agree that the trust is undermined in many different spheres, particularly with the rise of the United States under Donald Trump. You're arguing that this dollar dominance of the United States is still strong despite the fact that Donald Trump is wrecking it, wrecking the trust. So there is no connection in some ways, or there is a connection that could be elaborated on. On the one hand, we see that trust is getting undermined.
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D
Yes.
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E
On the other hand, this has got no impact whatsoever on the size. Correct. And the functioning of $. How so? And can you please elaborate on that?
- [16:14]
D
You're absolutely right. The argument that the loss of trust would be fatal to dollar dominance became particularly pronounced after Donald Trump's unveiling of his Liberation Day tariff program. You are right that Donald Trump's erratic policies, both internal to the US and externally, have undermined trust in his presidency, in his second presidency. And many commentators, including many experts, have seized on this fact to warn of a coming end to dollar dominance. My position is that they are wrong. Trust has nothing to do with the current foundations of dollar dominance because it is not trust, but gravity, the force of gravity that underpins dollars dominance. Whatever Trump's actions, however, much foreign investors dislike, disapprove of those actions, they will not pull their investments out of the US Capital market because of the sheer weight and gravitational force of that market. Let me repeat. The dollar capital market is large. It's homogenous and it has mass. It has mass because the strength of its legal and government infrastructure helped to solidify the prices and hence value storage capacities of US Securities. This aspect of the fact, this aspect that the US Capital market is huge Homogeneous and has mass is something that is irresistible, pours foreign investors irresistibly into their breaks. Who are these foreign investors? They are large pension funds, they are large insurance companies, they're sovereign wealth funds, they are foreign central banks. They go into the US capital market because it allows safe storage of huge pools of funds. It allows them to diversify those funds across a wide risk return spectrum. And crucially, the dollar market allows it to move large pools of funds across different securities according to circumstances freely cost efficiently, without any barriers. You put all these elements together and there is no way that foreign investors will abandon the dollar market on a scale necessary to weaken the dollar's international dominance. So I repeat, trust is being undermined. But there is no link between trust and dollar's dominance today. That has to be made absolutely clear
- [19:24]
E
and that that makes for an innovative intervention. Right. And the flight to safety about how pension funds, insurance company, foreign central banks increasingly resort to the United States and the American dollar, despite the fact or despite knowing that Donald Trump is erratic and unbelievable, the things that he's doing is just not sustainable in the long run. Nevertheless, they still go back to $. And your argument is it is not because of falling or rising trust of the United States, because of the gravitational pull of the size and mass that the dollar has. This then brings in an interesting puzzle. Or the question is if dollar has that much of a gravitational pull because of its size. We also see arguments that other countries like brics, trying to stand up against dollar and creating their own institutional space, or the euro for example, trying to stand. What would your challenge be to those who believe that the gravitational pull of the dollar is undermined today in the long run through alternative other institutions such as brics or China or the European.
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D
The point is there is no alternative to the dollar. As things stand in terms of another currency having behind it a capital market of the size, depth, homogeneity of mass and mass as the dollar. Until another currency meets these criteria, then that currency won't be in a position to pull foreign investors out of the dollar's gravitational field. Let's look at the currencies. Now. The euro is the second largest currency area of the dollar. But the problem with the euro capital, with the capital markets behind the euro, the problem with that is it's highly fragmented. Despite the fact that Europe, the EU's capital markets, the Eurozone's capital markets share the same currency, they nevertheless continue to operate to their own local rules, contracts, tax rules and so on. So it's fragmented. This fragmentation inhibits large foreign institutional investors from making substantial investments in the Eurozone because they can't diversify, they can't trade across different securities freely. And a good example of that is Norway's oil fund, one of the largest sovereign world funds in the world. Over the past 10, 15 years it's been reducing its exposure to the eurozone capital market hikes substantially and moving funds to the U.S. citing the reason as its reason, the fragmentation of the eurozone capital market. So that's the Eurozone. Now let's go to the BRICS countries. The BRICS countries, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and the others that recently joined and their allies are a powerful force in world trade and world production. No doubt about that. And many commentators believe that this should reflect in the currency system. This line of thinking is anachronistic. It belongs to the past. It was the case all through the 19th century, right up to the last quarter of the last quarter of the 20th century. It was true that a currency position in the currency hierarchy was determined by its position in world trade production. So in the 19th century we had the pound sterling being dominant and then from between the wars and then after World War II, in particular the US dollar. But now trade and production have very little bearing on our currency's position in the international currency system. If we take the foreign Exchange turnover figure, 9.6 trillion. This is the world's largest financial market. Only 5% of that volume has any bearing on trade, foreign direct investment or any other real sector activity. And what's the proof of that? Only 5% of the foreign exchange transactions, the daily foreign exchange transactions are accounted for by non financial customers, in other words, multinational corporations. So you can see why the BRICS currencies have such a a low share of daily foreign exchange turnover. The renminbi as I mentioned, only accounts for 8.5% or out of 200%. That 8.5% is less than a tenth the dollar share. If we put all the BRICS currencies together, all of them together with all other emerging econ market economy currencies, the total only comes to 27% out of the 9.6 trillion. All right, 27%. That's less than a third of the dollar's share on its own. So you see there is no challenge to the dollar dominance in the foreseeable future. Not from the Euro and not from the vix currencies. And in fact go back to the euro term, repeat this. The Euro's position, I've mentioned this before, is actually going backwards. In 2010 the euro's share of foreign exchange turnover was 39%. By 2025, the last to come, it had fallen to 28.5%. So the euro share of daily foreign exchange turnover is actually falling. And that's a reflection of the fact that the Eurozone's capital markets remain much smaller than the US capital markets and are more fragmented.
- [26:17]
E
And I find this argument that the disconnect between the historical understanding of the connection between trade and correction on the one hand and currency system that followed is at a break today because there is no connection between trade and production on the one hand and the currency system. Because your argument is do we see a new wave of understanding how capitalism is working as opposed to historically in the sense there's a connection between trade and production on the one hand and the currency system? Today we see something substantially different. And under that condition, then we see that dollar is effectively dominant. There is no other currency with size, depth and homogeneity that can match the dollar. Nevertheless, your book also talks about how do we confront this challenge that is, that is, can you, can you elaborate on, on what are, what are the things that you are, you, you. You see as, as, as a way to sort of confront this really strong gravitational pull of the dollar.
- [27:27]
D
In my book, I end the section arguing that the only possible challenge for foresee in decades to come must come from Europe and the Europe. But for that to happen, there's got to be certain reversals of policy in the Eurozone area. Number one priority is that the Eurozone government should agree to a proposal to have a joint eurozone government bond. It doesn't exist at the moment. You have German government bonds being used as very good collateral, as a very good safe instrument. But it's small in size, the German government bond market. And unless you bring the. Unless you have a joint eurozone government fund to serve as a safe haven asset, as a benchmark for measuring risk on all other securities across the Eurozone, you're missing a crucial element that will tie the Eurozone capital markets into a unified entity. That's number one. Number two, secondly, as I mentioned before, the Eurozone capital markets remain fragmented because of differences in terms of solvency, contract laws and so on. Now, the European commission launched in 2015 its capital market Union Project, a project aimed at establishing true capital market. Very little progress has been made on this front. For example, I mentioned the differences regarding contract insolvency and tax laws. But there's also opposition to a joint financial authority that would establish common financial standards and so on this opposition has to be overcome. There has to be a genuine capital market union, not just with a single currency, but also with the same financial rules and standards, same rules of contract, same banking laws and so on. So another hurdle that has to be overcome is that the Europe's corporations continue to rely far more heavily on bank loans to meet their external debt commitments, rather than on bonds. 80%, roughly of their external debt commitments are met through bank loans, 20% bonds for the U.S. it's the exact reverse. So we need the. Apart from other considerations of financial efficiency, a key reason to get the European corporate funding model move closer to the American version is to strengthen the financial base of the Eurozone. This has got to be understood. If this doesn't happen, if we don't move in this direction of strengthening the Eurozone's capital markets along the lines I just mentioned, the Euro is in a dangerous position of being heavily dependent on the dollar. And if Donald Trump decides to lean on the Federal Reserve and get it to stop its central bank swap arrangements with the European Central bank, the Eurozone financial sector and its banking sector in particular will be in serious trouble.
- [31:36]
E
You see, that is.
- [31:37]
D
Yeah.
- [31:38]
E
And that says a lot about the strong connections of weaponized interdependence. The argument about how Europe is on the one hand believing that it has its own strategic autonomy and it can formulate foreign and economic policies according to its values and so on, nevertheless, it is still tightly connected to the dollar and the ways in which how much of the American influence still penetrate the European sort of financial architecture is stark. This brings back to another question which, coming from the Global South I've always had, is that if Euro is not able to match dollar dominance and to have an alternative because of its problems of fragmented Eurozone on the one hand, and its inability to issue government bonds because much of it relies on bank loans and so on. How can Global south countries, for example India or African countries or Latin America, how can they effectively manage the dependency they have on the international financial architecture underwritten by $? Presumably you will say that they just cannot match it. What sort of policy options do you have for these countries in the Global South? Do they have to align towards most strategic autonomy argument towards Euro, or do they have to find alternative ways of managing American power?
- [33:22]
D
Very difficult. The problems facing the Global South. Firstly, because it's been extremely difficult for any group of countries anywhere in the Global south to do what Western Europe has done and form a common currency, it has been considered in various areas, for example the Mercosur group considered currency integration that came to nothing. The Gulf Cooperation Council in the Middle east they considered a Gulf dinar in the early 2000s that came to nothing. And ASEAN over in Asia they there's consideration of a common currency came to nothing. So the problem is when you have your own currencies you are going to be it's like having little boats on the Pacific Ocean and very hard to weather the storms, extremely hard. So the one thing in terms what they're doing now when they trade with each other and with China and they're using their own currencies or they're using the renminbi that gives them a certain degree of shelter from the dollar in terms of the trade arrangements and so on. But it doesn't mean they're independent on dollar. When it comes to the global financial cycle process, global monetary policies changing in line with what the Federal Reserve is doing and so on, it's a manifestation of that that it's still the case that some 65 currencies are linked to the dollars in one way or the other. Even China, that is the lead currency amongst the BRICS country. Nevertheless, China holds an enormous amount of U.S. treasury bonds. Why? In order to keep its own currency within the target range of the dollar. The same with Japan, the yen and so on. So it's going to be extremely difficult. And you see the difficulties when you go to Latin America, for example, difficulties facing the Argentina. That war is proud to try and keep its currency, the peso, keep delink it from the dollar as it did in the early 2000s when it left the currency board. But now the problems are mounting and there has been serious discussion of actually dollarizing the Argentina actually switching to the dollar. I hope it doesn't happen, but there's a real risk. And if that does happen, by the way, it's what I call dollar colonization.
- [36:20]
E
Yeah. And a particular form of neocolonization. And we see that on the one hand on the physical realm there is an actual interventionism and colonization or the imperial narratives that comes back again and again that what's happening in Venezuela, what's happening in Iran and so on. But many people miss the financial dollar colonization that you talk about. And in the financial realm it is much more serious where at least in the physical realm there is an appearance or a semblance of autonomy, ability to rhetorically assert positions and policies and talk about multilateralism and so on. In the dollar realm or in the financial realm they are totally colonized. Would you say? Are there any room available to confront this total colonization.
- [37:18]
D
If countries like less emerging market economies, the larger ones, if they're capable, they can hold dollars of U.S. treasury bonds as reserves. That then gives them certain leeway in terms of policy making. But the countries that, the smaller countries, the poorer countries, that cannot accumulate reserves, what they have to do is keep an eye on US Monetary policy and follow and it's an example. Why do they have to do that? Well, right at the beginning of our discussion, this interview, we spoke about a flight to safety in the US but where does a lot of that money come from? Where's it poured out? And the answer is DMEs. Whenever there's a period of turbulence, uncertainty, a crisis, you will have vast amounts pulled out of the smaller emerging market currencies and then goes to the US that will then help the US conduct policy during the crisis. But it constrains the ability of emerging market countries to conduct policies when there is capital flight. There's further downward pressure on their currencies as a consequence of the flight, which then leads to an upsurge in inflation. And coming back to the problems of the Iran crisis. Now it's going to be the emerging market economies that are going to be hurt badly because if they're oil dependent, it's going to be devastating for their domestic economies. They're going to suffer high inflation. When you add capital flight to safety on top of that, put these factors together and we're heading into very worrying times for smaller economies and their currencies.
- [39:28]
E
Yeah, and that is a very important point given that there's a concern to study disorder, crises and uncertainty. But understanding from your argument disorder is actually good for the United States because there's a lot of capital flight from smaller and poorer countries that goes away from these countries when there's a crisis or disorder towards the United States because of its gravitational pull. According to your argument. And how does it square with this general understanding? At the surface level, when we see disorder, uncertainty and crises, people say, or scholars also say that this marks the end of dollar. But if disorder is actually enabling the strength of the dollar and enabling the strength of the United States power at the cost of smaller and medium sized countries and poorer countries, then there is a cycle or a vortex that connects back all the time to American power. How can we understand this?
- [40:36]
D
I come back to the point that the shit size, depth, mass of the U.S. capital market acts as a shock absorber for the U.S. you know, if there is uncertainty, if the dollar's exchange rate fluctuates against other currencies, you have movements within the US capital market, movements of funds out of corporations that have been adversely affected by a crisis, towards corporations that benefit from any disturbance. But these movements, because they occur within the dollar universe, there's no underlying negative impact on the underlying economy, the real economy. So the sheer mass size of the capital market enables the US to to absorb shocks in the way other areas, other currency areas, other countries cannot. I wouldn't say that crises are good for the US What I'm saying is that crises are more easily absorbed by the US than other areas because crises do affect certain constituencies in the U.S. working people and so on, while at the same time benefiting others. And if you want to see how Iran crisis is leading to a distribution of costs and benefits, while there are costs to the US consumers at the petrol pump and so on. Definitely. But you look at the benefits to the US banks, JP Morgan Chase, Manhan had just announced bump of profits, in fact profits which have reached enormous levels because of their ability to speculate on the currency markets, to take advantage of the fluctuations. So in the US you see the oil companies making profits, the banks making profits, and of course Donald Trump's family and associates making profits because they were able to to invest in certain financial instruments just before the war and so on. So we don't know the motives behind the US Israeli war on Iran. With clear motives, they keep changing. But what we do know is that the rest of the war, for the rest of the world, there are no upside benefits to the costs which are huge. While for the US there are certain upside benefits that offset the cost. Let's be clear about that. They are benefits. Yes.
- [43:39]
E
And that also meant, when I meant global disorder benefits the United States. I'm talking about the small oligarchic circles in the United States, including private corporations and high net worth individuals and others who continue to benefit from these crisis
- [43:58]
D
as it's being shown now.
- [44:00]
E
Yeah, and working class or the common people have always been at the receiving end of the problem, no matter what. This brings us to the last two theoretical questions that that is central to your book. One is, and you mentioned that in the beginning colonization of the future.
- [44:20]
D
Yes.
- [44:21]
E
Much of the strength of the dollar and capital flight and people who go back to the United States in terms of flight to safety and the strength of pension funds, insurance companies and others who are still resorting to the United States and American dollar. They all the common denominator that connects all of them is a particular understanding of the future. And you say, you argue about the colonization of future. Can you elaborate in brief terms, what is it?
- [44:53]
D
In the past, the dependence of governments corporations on the capital markets was either temporary, large but temporary. For example, issuing bonds to finance railway project or issuing bonds to finance war, and so on. So there was very little dependence on the capital markets in the past to the extent that we see today. Today we have dependence on the capital markets, large and permanent because of the rising financial pressures bearing down on gallants corporations that are today the major supplies of goods and services in domestic economies. In the case of corporations, the pressures are to do with intensified competition, rapid technological change and so on. In the case of governments, demographic change is a big driver. Population aging, rising dependency ratios, which then puts real pressures on government finances. And there's only so much they can tax. So they're increasingly resorted to bond issuance. Not only rising volumes of bonds, but also lengthening maturities. So we now have government of bonds that stretch from not only 2 to 10 years, but also 20, 30 and even 50 year bonds which were introduced, for example, by France and Italy during the COVID crisis. So what are they doing? They're issuing securities, bonds on the debt side, equities also. What are they doing? They're issuing these instruments which are claims on future income strength. So governments corporations are raising money today, cash today, but repaying at intermittent points in the future. Who's holding these claims, bonds and equities? In the main, it is large institutional investors like pension funds who have to meet their commitments to the REITs for people who are retired or need health insurance and so on. Now, pension funds, institutional investors can hold a variety of assets. They can also hold real estate, cash, gold. But the exigencies of their role as intermediaries means that at all times the bulk of their asset holdings have to be in the pool of securities, equities and bonds. Assets that combine safe store of value with liquidity, tradability. See, so between them, this is what I mean, that between governments and corporations issuing securities. On the one hand, pension funds, insurance companies holding securities on the other, between them, they are colonizing the future, annexing the future as an adjunct space. All right, to take the financial pressures of the present. Now, a lot of people say, well, how can you colonize the future, turn into spatializing if the future is unknown, if it's unknown, there's uncertainty, if there's uncertainty, there is risk. With all these factors, how then can you spatialize the future? And my argument is that with the new constraints introduced, like shareholder primacy, transparency and so on, what's happening with all these measures and restraints being imposed on security issuing organizations, corporations. What is happening is that while uncertainty and risk can never be eliminated, they can be sufficiently managed as to make the future inheritable. That's what's happening. If that wasn't happening, we would not see security stocks grow to three times the size of world gdp. You see.
- [49:30]
E
Yeah.
- [49:30]
D
The only reason they can carry on growing is because of the new structures in place. Which brings me to why the US is so absolutely dominant as the supply securities. Because not only on the supply side do you have the US corporations more dependent on capital markets for their funding needs, but it's also because in the US the constraints from organizations to ensure regular cash flow and the solidity of securities is most advanced. It's the country where shareholder primacy has really taken hold across the whole domain, the whole country, the whole marketplace, financial marketplace. So you have a certain solidity which means these stocks can grow and they will continue to grow. We are the world population continues to grow, primarily not through aging. We have the pressures of climate change. We have all of these pressures which mean that world's capital markets will continue to expand because the future will continue to be colonized, to take the rising, to absorb, accommodate the rising financial pressures of the present. And with that will come a continuing strengthening of dollar dominance.
- [51:08]
E
Dollar dominance. That is really interesting. And this brings back to some discussions that are ongoing currently among different quarters of those who are studying critically of dollar dominance and so on. And your work effectively is not only a contribution, but really makes an important and a superb intervention into the debate. So thank you very much and I really enjoyed the book and the conversation. And this is only a brief 40 minutes of the large interventions and theoretical and empirical interventions that you bring in the book. And it was great talking to you. Thank you very much for this.
- [51:49]
D
Thank you very much for inviting me.
- [51:51]
F
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