Ray Yep, "Man in a Hurry: Murray MacLehose and Colonial Autonomy in Hong Kong" (Hong Kong UP, 2024)

Summary

Podcast Summary: New Books Network Episode: Ray Yep, "Man in a Hurry: Murray MacLehose and Colonial Autonomy in Hong Kong" (Hong Kong UP, 2024) Date: February 20, 2026 Participants: Host – Lukas; Guest – Ray Yep

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Episode Overview

This episode delves into the complex colonial history of Hong Kong through the lens of Ray Yep's latest book, "Man in a Hurry: Murray MacLehose and Colonial Autonomy in Hong Kong." The discussion critically examines the tenure of Governor MacLehose (1971–1982), commonly seen as a transformative figure in Hong Kong’s history, and digs into the nuanced realities of colonial governance—challenging simplistic narratives of either pure subordination or absolute autonomy. With vibrant historical context and personal anecdotes, Yep and Lukas explore how Hong Kong managed its relationship with London, bargained for autonomy, and interacted with wider global politics during a period of rapid change.

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Key Discussion Points and Insights

Challenging the Binary View of Colonial Rule

• Forms vs. Reality: Yep argues that understanding colonial rule purely as subordination (by referencing constitutional documents) is misleading, as the actual power dynamics on the ground were far more interactive and negotiated.
  • “On paper, London can do anything… But I believe that this is not actually how power was exercised on the ground.” – Ray Yep [01:13]
• Interaction, Not Imposition: Instead of direct rule, practices like bargaining, collaboration, persuasion, and even respect (including British recognition of their own limitations) defined the colonial relationship.

The Meaning of 'Respect' in Empire

• Respect as Pragmatism: British respect towards the colony often meant indifference born of limited resources, recognizing that local officials must handle many affairs themselves.
  • “I think respect, when I say respect, is very much an admission of their own limitations... sometimes it’s indifference.” – Ray Yep [04:48]

MacLehose: Image and Impact

• A Charismatic Reformer: MacLehose, a diplomat from Glasgow, became not just a colonial administrator but a local figurehead for reform and optimism—his tenure coinciding with a brighter era in Hong Kong’s modern history.
  • “He gave people a sense of achievement. He is breaking new grounds... and this is the general impression.” – Ray Yep [07:08]
• TV as a Shaping Force: The advent of free television meant MacLehose became a highly visible, almost celebrity figure, shaping public consciousness and perceptions.
• Behind the Scenes: Many achievements attributed to MacLehose involved extensive, often difficult negotiations with London and were influenced by global geopolitics (e.g., the U.S., China).

Situating MacLehose and Autonomy

• Biographical Context: Though not strictly a biography, the book investigates why MacLehose was uniquely capable of pushing the boundaries of colonial autonomy:
  • Prior experience as political advisor in Hong Kong gave him insight into both local and British perspectives.
  • His diplomatic background fostered trust with London and facilitated effective negotiation.
  • "He was the first diplomat appointed to this post. All his predecessors... come from the Colonial Office. They are not diplomats." – Ray Yep [16:20]

Empire as a Dynamic, Negotiated Entity

• Empire as Improvised: Lukas and Yep reject monolithic views of empire, instead highlighting contingency, improvisation, and interpersonal negotiation as central features.
  • “He probably was aware of the leverage available and how you could get things done... But it also depends on when London thinks about the specific situations.” – Ray Yep [20:22]
• Case Studies: The specifics of when London intervened hinged on immediate costs, urgency, political risk (“who paid the bill”), and perceptions about Hong Kong’s capabilities.

The Levers of Colonial Bargaining

• Managing Information Asymmetry: Colonial officials sometimes withheld information or mobilized ‘public opinion’ (often restricted to elite circles) to strengthen their negotiating hand.
  • “At the end of the day, you are people on the ground; you know much better than London… there was information asymmetry in the process.” – Ray Yep [26:08]
• Global Diplomacy Beyond London: Hong Kong occasionally spoke directly to global audiences (e.g., UN, U.S. Congress) to shape events, especially in crises like the Vietnamese refugees.
  • “He basically got a chance to speak in Congress—to meet the key official responsible for the handling of the refugees crisis.” – Ray Yep [29:46]

Autonomy vs. Decolonization

• Decolonization by Stealth?: Some historians see Hong Kong’s gradual separation of interests from London (e.g., monetary matters, defense costs, handling refugees) as an informal form of decolonization that predated 1997.
  • “There’s a clear trend that there’s a decoupling of interests between the so-called Metropole and Hong Kong…” – Ray Yep [33:53]
• No Independence Movement: Despite some grumbling, there was no serious campaign for independence, with most people passively accepting British rule until the 1997 question emerged.

Evolution of Public Opinion and Self-Government

• Emergent, Not Informed: Public opinion became more vocal and demanding in the 1970s, but the public was often unaware of behind-the-scenes struggles over autonomy.
  • “Many of this struggle or fight over colonial autonomy happen... we don’t realize something is going on. Only after 30 years we read the files.” – Ray Yep [40:17]
• Instrumental Use of Protests: When public protests did occur (e.g., Godber/ICAC), they could nudge both Hong Kong officials and London into reforms.

Continuities Beyond 1997: Lessons for Today

• Beijing’s Misreading: Post-1997, Beijing interpreted colonial governance as strictly top-down, missing the significant autonomy generated in practice through negotiation and trust.
  • “Beijing thought... they were very generous because they give more concessions. But... formal framework didn’t tell the whole story… there’s a lot of ambiguity.” – Ray Yep [43:56]
• Differing Leaders: Chief Executives post-1997 did not have the same personal trust or experience with the metropole (now Beijing) as colonial governors had with London.
  • “Chief executives... they didn’t have a political career in this Chinese party state... the degree of trust could be quite different.” – Ray Yep [49:58]
• Changing Metropole: The British metropole was distant, weakening, and commercially focused, while Beijing is immediate, powerful, and sees reunification as core. Autonomy’s fate is therefore shaped by fundamentally different conditions.
  • “The Chinese state probably is quite different in terms of state persona... for Beijing, they are probably more motivated to get involved in Hong Kong after 1997.” – Ray Yep [53:46]

The Present Moment & Uncertainty

• Post-2019 Shift: The events of 2019 have “completely changed the game”—now, autonomy is no longer a value or central concern in governance, with an emphasis instead on complete alignment with Beijing’s intentions.
  • “At this moment, autonomy is not the main concern, honestly… the way to survive... is to convince Beijing that we’re 100% following [their] intentions.” – Ray Yep [56:09]

Writing History from Afar

• Perspective and Limits: Yep reflects on moving to the UK, closer to archives but further from lived experience. He notes the upside (greater depth in official records) and the downside (potential narrowing of social/historical focus).
  • “The more you rely on archival material... you focus more and more on the issue of autonomy... [but] I may miss how people actually lived through that period.” – Ray Yep [58:42]

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “On paper, London can do anything… but this is not actually how power was exercised on the ground.” – Ray Yep [01:13]
• “Respect... is very much an admission of their own limitations. Or sometimes it’s indifference.” – Ray Yep [04:48]
• “He gives people a sense of achievement. He’s breaking new grounds. That’s the general impression…” – Ray Yep [07:08]
• “Colonial governors... they will go local. They’ll be more receptive to local concern than the metropole expect, because he is the one on the ground he is to make everybody happy in a colony.” – Ray Yep [16:20]
• “You know much better than London about the reality… there was information asymmetry in the process.” – Ray Yep [26:08]
• “Although we are just a city... because of our status in global finance and trade, sometimes we can go beyond the local limit and play the game in global diplomacy.” – Ray Yep [29:46]
• “There’s a clear trend that there’s a decoupling of interests between the Metropole and Hong Kong… that’s a kind of informal decolonization.” – Ray Yep [33:53]
• “Many of this struggle or fight over colonial autonomy happen… we don’t realize something is going on. Only after 30 years we read the files…” – Ray Yep [40:17]
• “Beijing thought...they give more concessions because... [there’s] a selection process.” But the reality is “the formal framework didn’t tell the whole story.” – Ray Yep [43:56]
• “At this moment…I don’t think that autonomy is the major concern of the local administrations in Hong Kong.” – Ray Yep [56:09]
• “The more you rely on the archival material…it may narrow the possibility of enquiry… but there’s always a chance to write another book.” – Ray Yep [58:42]
• “It is a pleasure that hurts.” – Ray Yep, closing the emotional circle of his ongoing engagement with Hong Kong’s history [60:36]

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Timestamps for Major Segments

• 01:13 – Colonial rule: subordination vs. negotiated autonomy
• 04:48 – The meaning and nature of “respect” in empire
• 07:08 – MacLehose’s public image and impact on 1970s Hong Kong
• 16:20 – How MacLehose’s background shaped his approach
• 20:22 – Interactive bargaining between Hong Kong and London
• 26:08 – Withholding information & information asymmetry
• 29:46 – Hong Kong directly engages global powers, e.g., U.S., UN
• 33:53 – Decolonization as a process before 1997
• 40:17 – The (limited) role of public opinion and transparency
• 43:56 – Lessons and misunderstandings in Beijing’s “one country, two systems”
• 49:58 – Differences between colonial governors & post-1997 chief executives
• 53:46 – Changing metropole, British vs. Chinese state
• 56:09 – After 2019: autonomy no longer on the agenda
• 58:42 – Writing Hong Kong’s history from abroad

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Concluding Reflection

Ray Yep’s nuanced exploration of colonial Hong Kong reminds us that autonomy is rarely explicit or linear; it is hard-won, improvised, and deeply contingent. Through a blend of personal recollection, institutional analysis, and a careful reading of official archives, Yep complicates the popular myth of benevolent top-down reform, drawing out the interplay—sometimes subtle, sometimes overt—between metropole and colony, governor and governed. The conversation closes with the bittersweet acknowledgment of writing history across distance, echoing his parting words: “It is a pleasure that hurts.” [60:36]

Transcript

[Ray Yap]

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[Lukas]

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[Ray Yap]

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[Lukas]

Last chance happening right [e-mail] terms apply. Welcome to the New Books Network Work. Welcome to the podcast. Today I am with Ray Yap and we are talking about his book man in a Married Maclehose and Colonial Autonomy in Hong Kong. So Ray, I want to begin with one of the points that crystallizes at the very end of the book, but runs throughout the chapters, which is your argument that colonial rule is not simply a history of subordination and it would be a mistake of monumental proportions, you say, to look at colonial rule in that way. Can you just tell us a bit about why you think it would be such a big mistake to see colonial in that way?

[Ray Yap]

Yeah. First of all, hi Lukas, thank you for the invitations. I think that there are many misunderstanding about how colony really operate before 1997. I think part of the reason of the misunderstanding, I believe is very much if we look at the relationship between Hong Kong and London in a formal sense, we will probably go to the constitutional documents in letter, patents or instructions and this is a document that basically define the relationship. This is a formal aspect. If you look at these documents that you can see that the Hong Kong relationship to London is very much, as I said, it's very much a relationship subordinations because on paper London can do anything. London can make any law for Hong Kong, they can appoint and remove the governor or overturn our budget, so on and so forth, and governor as an agent of the Queen and basically have no control, there's no limit on his power. So judging just on paper this is how we should understand the relationship between the metropole and the colony. But I believe that this is not actually how power was exercised on the ground or in reality. This make people believe that. People tend to believe that London was highly involved in basically almost all aspect of colonial governance. Some people even go to the extent to argue that in fact most of the policy decision before 1997 was London decisions. Hong Kong just take order very much because of the formal analysis I just mentioned, which I believe is not True. But on the other hand, I think some people go to the other extreme, believe that, okay, Hong Kong has a lot of autonomy in a sense that we make decisions very much on our own. I think the reality is, and this will easily need people to go to the argument that we try to attribute our progress in colonial time, for example, in 1970s, to individual merit, the benevolence of individual official, like in this case, Marie Magny host the Governor in Hong Kong between 1971 to 1982. So my book, the intention is very much try to figure out what exactly happened in colonial time. In short, how the colony really managed the Metropole and how autonomy is earned. This is my intentions of writing this book because I believe the reality of the relationship is somewhere in between. And of course, in this book, I try to identify the major variables through four case studies.

[Lukas]

So it seems like you're introducing a series of social processes in addition to the formal relationship. You talk about bargaining, collaboration, persuasion, respect, each of which we can get into. I just want to pause on that last word, respect, which really struck me when I read it. What I mean, what does it mean to respect a colony? I mean, it's. It, you know, at face value, there's a direct hierarchical relationship where. Where, you know, one is superior and one is inferior. So what does respect mean?

[Ray Yap]

I think that in this context, respect basically refer to the. The official at the Metropole admit their own limitations, honestly, because I think the British Empire, I would argue, by and large is the rule on the chip. Put it this way, that is the Metropole really don't want to spend that much resources in the colonies to start with. For Hong Kong people, we think we are the center of the world. We are so important. London may think differently. And London also realized that if you don't invest that much in infrastructure, personnel, resources, the colony and you, in a way, you have to leave the people on the ground to do the things at their own resources. I think respect, when I say respect, is very much ambition of their own limitations. Or in a way, sometimes it's indifference. But of course, in this book I would argue that there are of course, occasion that they would like to intervene in local affairs. So it's not entirely right to say that colonial, the empire or the matriarch leave us alone all the time. Most of the time, maybe. But there are also many, many occasions that it is in their interest to get involved. And this is what the book we try to point out and argue, and also how the colony push back or collaborate. So it is very much an interactive game.

[Lukas]

So the book is not only about Hong Kong and London. It's also about the colonial governor and the local community. So Murray MacLehose, who's the protagonist in this book, he was a Scotsman from Glasgow, and he was governor in Hong Kong from 1971 to 1982. In this period, you were growing up in Hong Kong. And you talk about in the beginning of the book of riding a bus across the Cross Harbor Tunnel a few hours after MacLehos announced its opening. And I want to bring us just to your personal history and use that as an entry point, because throughout the book, you describe the ways in which maclhose was a leader of the local community in various ways. Is that how he was seen at that time when you were growing up?

[Ray Yap]

I think the 1970s was basically my teenage time, right? So exciting by nature. You're exciting and you're teenagers anyway. But I think the general mood in Hong Kong in the 60s is quite different from the 70s. 1960s is my father, by the time my father returned to Hong Kong after the war. And I think 1960 is a time it's very difficult period, partly because the Hong Kong government didn't think about social welfare, Social Security, social service that much until by late 1960 or early 1970s. So people were very much on their own. I recall my father telling his story that when he arrived from Guangdong, like most of the people in Hong Kong, that the first place they went to is to find the uncle, another Yap who came to Hong Kong a few years before him. So the uncle will find him a job in his shops. And I grew up in a family of seven people. We live in one of these partition housing in Western District. So you have to find a way to survive because there are no government to turn to. And also 1960s is a period of turmoil and confrontations. We have 1967, right in Hong Kong. You have Cultural Revolution in China. So it's not an easy time for the Hong Kong community during this period. But 1970s is a bit different, that things starting to improve. Partly because the colonial government pay more attention to the welfare of the local people after the riot. And also because Hong Kong economy start picking up and even the radicalism in China, even the Cultural Revolution fade out a bit. So things are getting much calmer. And China also look to the outside world and try to resume some normalcy with the rest of the world. So I think it's exciting time. There's a lot of optimism during that period. And also at least until late 1970s. We don't have the 1997 issue on Horizon yet. So that kind of uncertainty and worry surrounding the 1997 future of Hong Kong didn't emerge yet. So 1970s was very much a good year. I think this is what people grew up in the 70s associated with some kind of optimism. We are in a good mood and Magnehow is right in the middle of it. Because one thing I think changed our perception of Magneho is we don't have a free television until late 1960s or early 1970s. Before that, people don't watch TV that much, right? But 1970s we have TVB. It's free broadcast and Magne Ho is always on the news. And Magne Ho is kind of a personal image. It's quite charming. It's a tall Scott and always the, well, clombed hair. And when compared with your predecessor, it's quite different. DeWitt Tran for many people is quite a grumpy man. And I think that make some differences. Emanuel is always in this opening ceremony and this thing and that thing. So I think he give people a sense of achievement. He is breaking new grounds. So I think that is the general impression of Magne Hoy. But of course, as I try to point out in the book, we just see part of the story because I would say that for many of the achievement or a policy decision he made, there are in fact many, many difficult choices. And the choices did not only concern his personal belief or the colonial administration calculation. It also concerned London. London agenda is always in the equations and they're always bargaining, negotiation and altercation along the way. So I think the book tried to bring back these largest pictures. Because London does not only represent British interests. London calculations also reflect Britain or Hong Kong relationship with the largest world, the United States, China, Europe and through London. This pressure would translate in the discussions. And this is how Hong Kong engaged the world. So I think the book is about how to put Hong Kong in the context of the British Empire, but also in the large. Also try to contextualize Hong Kong with a larger picture of global politics.

[Lukas]

Before launching into the analysis about autonomy in the book, I just want to pause a little bit more on the characterization of Maclehos as a hero, which is quite a common occurrence both in your book and in other books. So on the one hand you have a charismatic, charming, well dressed governor. On the other hand, this is the 1970s. A lot of the world has been going through decolonization. Whereas you have this governor from very far away coming over from Britain to be the head of the Hong Kong government at that point. Do you remember whether there was any tension between those things or did people kind of accept that he was doing good things and he had a legitimate kind of role to play as the leader of Hong Kong?

[Ray Yap]

I think people, as I said in early, let's say in early 1970s, I think we're in a stage of recovering from all the disturbance like the 1967 riot, right? And I think the world is also moving very fast in a way, in a positive direction, even in a global context, let's say, because PLC eventually established formal relationship with the west in the United States in particular. Bear in mind before that, in my early childhood years, if I can remember many of this media in Hong Kong, in Hong Kong, the thing is the media is highly politicized, right? You have a lot of pol communist paper and pro Taiwanese paper, the pro communist paper. I think they have a huge circulation in Hong Kong as well. They keep spreading the image or the message that I remember quite vividly. They keep saying that the third World War is inevitable. It is quite a concern for young people like me. What do you mean by war is coming? This is the sentiment at that time. If you have any interest in world politics or anything outside China, outside Hong Kong, this message keep appearing in your mind. But once China resume this kind of go back to the world stage of diplomacy, this thing gradually faded. So I think that's. It's not just because of magnehost, but I think the whole world around us in early 1970s is quite different from the 1960s. So it's not just because of the personal charisma of magnitudes. I think there's a general feel good factor. And then you have all these landmark events in Hong Kong, the establishment of icac, so on and so forth. So I think there is in Our Collective Memory, 1970 for some people seems to be the golden era of change and reform. Although this is debatable, we are not saying that Hong Kong suddenly become a paradise, certainly not. But you see changes, you see some progress. Whether this is untimely, a good, this down to London, Hong Kong or whatever, it doesn't really matter. It's people in general feel that, okay, we are on the right track.

[Lukas]

Great. So we've got matlehose situated in between quite a lot of forces. We've got Hong Kong, local, Britain, China, the world. But for a moment, especially because this is a biography, I think it would be worthwhile to focus on the individual because there are many factors going into this relationship. But one of them that you also mention in the book is that there was a relative lack of intimidation that Maklajos felt by the constitutional asymmetry in power. So that formal inequality that you mentioned at the beginning was obviously a factor, but it didn't determine everything that michaelhos did and he would try to push back. Could you give us an insight from his biography or other context of why he was less intimidated than one might have been or expected?

[Ray Yap]

Firstly, the book does not intend to be his biography, put it that way. In fact, I didn't say much about the person. In fact, I wrote much about trying to pick up some four case study to illustrate the relationship or the so called autonomy of the colony. That's what the book is all about. But I think Magni Ho's got some thing that the Hispanic sets doesn't have. Firstly, I think he knew, of course he's not the only one, but he got the experience or he knew Hong Kong before he became a governor, right? Because he served as a political advisor to the colonial administrations 1959-62 and the political advisers basically the Foreign office equipment to the Hong Kong government. His role is to be a bridge between the colonial administration and London. So he is quite well aware of the argument of both sides. This is his job to facilitate communication to start with. And for Hong Kong. One of the major challenges of course how to handle China. And this is in fact very much the political advisor job. So he got an advantage in that sense. And also he was the first diplomat appointed to this post. All his predecessor in fact mostly come from the colonial office. They are not diplomat. I think this is an advantage because in a sense that he knew better than his predecessor the language, the rapporteur and the logic of his colleagues in a foreign office have I think in a way that will facilitate your communications and I think even more importantly it helps to build up the trust of your colleagues in London. He probably has a better rapport with his so called superior of boss in London than his predecessor, Derek Chan. Derek Chan has infamously have a very bad relationship with his colleague in London. And the manga is probably at least in the beginning, the colleagues in Foreign Office believe that okay, we probably may have an easy time with Marine Magni Host and they will change, although the turnout is not exactly like this because I think most colonial governors we call it, they will go local in the sense that they probably will earn more receptive to local concern than the Metropole expect because he is the one on the ground he is to make everybody happy in a colony. And most governor probably believe that how you can get your job done as a governor is to try to win the cooperations and confidence of your local audience, not only to your boss or colleagues back home in London.

[Lukas]

We heard you.

[Ray Yap]

Nine years of bring back the snack

[Lukas]

wrap and you've won. But maybe you should have asked for more.

[Ray Yap]

Say hello to the hot honey snack wrap.

[Lukas]

Now you've really won. Go to McDonald's and get it while you can. It seems like there are a few ways for us to think about what an empire was. You know, we can think of it as quite a monolithic entity, or we can think of it as a much more improvised and kind of heterogeneous mix of people and institutions. I wonder, is it the case that that prior experience that MacLehose had gave him a knowledge of that second understanding of how colonial rule worked in the British context? And was that one thing that helped him understand what levers and what buttons to push to increase the voice that the Hong Kong government had in the British context?

[Ray Yap]

I think this is one side of the equations, right? He probably was aware of the leverage available and how you could get things done. But I think it also depends on what London think about the specific situations. Right? This is what I try to point out in the books that I think is very much, when did London want to intervene or get medal in the Hong Kong situation? It's very much firstly depends on, I would say the course of inactions that London will ask themselves that, okay, if I don't do anything in this specific case, what is implication for us? I think sometimes it's concern very tangible and immediate costs, like who paid the bill. Let's say in the case of Vietnamese refugees, if Hong Kong didn't go to take up the refugees in Hong Kong, Britain may have to take it. So they say, okay, in this case, we have to get involved to make sure that these people don't come to Britain. So this is very immediate, very tangible because concern, money, concern the cost of supporting the influx of refugees. But in many cases it's political because the Hong Kong affairs sometimes end up with some kind of scandal, embarrassment in London, bearing in mind that Whitehall has parliament to respond to and the local public. For example, like the case of the Ice Age in Peter Godberg, the Peter Gotbert case is a huge embarrassment to the British government because Peter got the event while he was under investigation. He fly back to London, to Britain, and he was a free man. Although the Hong Kong government tried to exude him back to Hong Kong. And also that there are local politicians in Hong Kong make a successful campaign. This person is Elsie Elliot Yipsa Yan as people in Hong Kong know that he managed to invite some British MP to come to Hong Kong to understand the situation. When they go back to Britain, they ask questions in Parliament. They also arouse media interest. So these are political calls. London will think about what happens if you don't do anything. So this is the first so called variables I would say that will motivate London to decide whether we should get involved. And I think it's also second thing is about urgency and necessity. Sometimes they believe that maybe we can let's take a wait and see issues that okay, this issue is important, but this may not be the right time or there's no urgency to handle that. This is another case, I quote in the book when Maclean Holtz tried to raise the issue of land lease in new territory beyond 1997. This is of course the important issue. But London at that time didn't think that the time is right. In a way, Beijing was not ready. So London was not very particularly enthusiastic. Although they endorsed Magnet's idea. You can try, but they didn't get very much involved, at least in 1979. Right. And lastly, when we talk about the necessity, it also depends on London's judgment that whether the colony can solve its own problem. Right. Sometimes it's purely about who paid the bills. Like the case of social reform. As I argue in my book that London was very keen to introduce a series of social reform in Hong Kong. But at the end of the day, Lyndon realized that Britain is not going to pay for all this. At the end of the day, it's Hong Kong's government money. So they probably don't push too hard. Although they are very keen to all these changes. And similarly in the case of Peter Godbert, eventually the Hong Kong government think that okay, we try to pm all this embarrassment or the crisis of Pettigor unfolding into a larger embarrassment. Hong Kong government decided that okay, we can speed up the process of creating the ICAC Independent Commission against Corruptions. It helps silence the resentment at the local and metropolitan level. So Hong Kong proved that okay, we can key up our mess so you don't have to get involved. So I think these two variables determines the scope of autonomy together with the response or strategy of the governor and colonial administration together. I think this is very much interactive games on determine how autonomy could be earned.

[Lukas]

So we've got these two sides of the Coin we've got the cost of inaction and the urgency or the exigency. I mean, part of the political judgments that are going through these games relies on what information people have in front of them. And you know, you've already alluded to a shifting landscape of information in terms of media, television, press, travel, communication. How much was the colony able to manage the information that the Metropol received and use that as a kind of bargaining or a part of its persuasion?

[Ray Yap]

This is a good question because I think this is one of the tactics the colonial administration could use, withholding information. Because at the end of the day you are people on the ground, you know much better than London know about the reality. And also given the fact that, as I said in the beginning, that the attention to Hong Kong is not as great as we thought, right? Because after all, we are one of the many colonies. We are one of the many agenda issue that the Foreign Office or FCO have to consider at any time. So their attention span could be much shorter than we thought. This is in a way to our advantage. Right. And although we have a mechanism to make sure that London have a mechanism to make sure that they are well informed, like our Governor have to report to London from time to time. And also we are visiting MP and Minister to come and get a sense of what really happened. But by and large I think there was information asymmetry in the process. If we can play it carefully and we could be in our advantage. And one of the informations or in fact one of the local concern the governor usually will make use of or in a way mobilize is public opinion. Although public opinion in colonial time is not really like something we have today. The people protest, free media, so on and so forth. Because we're talking about the 1970s, right? It is quite different from what we see in 21st century in terms of the vibrancy of civil society. And this is in a way to the advantage of the government. Because at that time for the colonies, what constitute public opinion by and large, the voices of the Chinese elite sitting in Exco and Latchco, that Executive Council and the Legislative Council, these people are handpicked by the governors. Most of the time they are sitting on the side of the governors. So in many occasions the governor will try to make a point against London by saying that the local people didn't think this way. Our excellent member didn't agree with what London have in mind. So I think this is one of the leverage that the governor can make use of. And for the four cases you can see the governor play this game very often.

[Lukas]

So you've mentioned withholding information and also mobilizing public opinion in relation to London. There's also something else that came to mind that appears in the book which is directly speaking to a global audience. So you mentioned that, for example in the case of the United nations, but there may be others too. So on that specific point, that's interesting because it exceeds the sovereign colonial relationship as an exclusive one and under some arrangements that might be seen as subversive or kind of overstepping the bounds of sovereign rule, et cetera. In the 1970s, in the case of MacLehose, did that come up and how was that boundary of sovereignty managed when it was Hong Kong speaking directly on the global stage?

[Ray Yap]

I think in the case of the so called Vietnamese refugees Crisis Starting in 1974, I think magneholes played this game of global lobbying quite well because one of the major stakeholders in the whole crisis is United States, right? Because why the people left Vietnam is because end of the defeat, the American defeat in Vietnam. So the people just try to leave the country, stay away from communist rule and they go everywhere. And Hong Kong is one of them, the destination they choose. But American also acknowledged that they have the major responsibility, but they have a different game plan of how to solve the prices. So. So the story is American probably want Hong Kong to play a role, to take up a substantial number, at least provide as a holding place for these refugees. But Hong Kong probably don't want to do that because financially is a huge challenge. And London, Britain as well. B.C. american is one of the major allies in post war years. So they need to respond to the American concern. And Britain also as a major player of, although not one of the superpower after the war, they are still a major power that they American also expect that they have some obligations to help to contribute to prices. So for London this is very much a serious game that if Americans want the rest of the world to take up more refugees, Britain had to take up some, Hong Kong will take up some and then see this in many occasions. This is a zero sum game. If more and more refugees could stay in Hong Kong, then less refugees may come to Britain. Hong Kong probably didn't like it, didn't want this. So on the one hand they tried to bargain with London about the cause, about the number of refugees that the Britons should take up. But on the other hand they also try for to do the lobbying. MacLehos himself do a lot of overseas research in the United States. In particular, he basically got a chance to speak in the Congress. I mean the committee in the Congress to meet the key official responsible for the handling of the refugees crisis. And also United Nations. And this was done in the United States as well as Hong Kong. Because Hong Kong was also American. Was one of the major trading partners of Hong Kong at the time. Right. So there's a lot of communication with U.S. consul General. So I think that this is. They tell you something about the uniqueness of Hong Kong. Although we are just a city, right. We are just one of the British colonies. But because of our status or role in the global finance and trade, sometime we can in a way go beyond the local limit and play the game in the global diplomacy for our agenda. So I think for the case of the Vietnamese refugees crisis, Hong Kong government tried their very best at all level to try to make the case of the Hong Kong situations.

[Lukas]

What you just described in terms of global diplomacy for a Crown colony, let's not forget. I mean, it's quite striking because of the degree of voice that that reflects. And that makes me want to understand autonomy in relation to decolonization. They may not be the same thing, but how do you understand the two in relation to each other? I mean, are these case studies showing a kind of decolonization in fact, if not in name?

[Ray Yap]

I think Hong Kong. Some historians will argue that the decolonization Hong Kong start much earlier than 1997. Because that decoupling of interest between Britain and Hong Kong after the post war years. Right. That we know the the questions about. In fact, if you look at the post war history of Hong Kong in terms of relationship with London, we have a lot of argument over the devaluation of pound sterling that hurt Hong Kong interest. Because the Britain is thinking about its own trade deficit issues. And we have a lot of debate about the cost of supporting the British garrison in Hong Kong. And then of course, and then as we just said, the Whitney Emmerich refugees crisis. So I think that this is a clear trend that there's a decoupling of interest between the so called Matripol and Hong Kong, the colony of Hong Kong. And finally, relationship is so tense. At one point, I think one of the household name in Hong Kong politics, Sir Zhong Si Yun, the senior unofficial members of exco. At one point he made a suggestion that maybe the House of Lords should appoint a member representing Hong Kong. On the ground that he argued that the Hong Kong voices and Hong Kong interests were not well represented in the British policy process. So we should have one member at the House of Lords. Of course, London didn't take that idea. But you tell me something about that relationship. So this is in a way that. That's kind of informal. Decolonization has been going on ever since the post war years. And with that, with this more and more, the conflict between the two parties after the war. And you can see that Hong Kong is more motivated to defend their own interests, of course, within the boundary of real politics. And that in turn is determined by the various variable I mentioned earlier or in the book.

[Lukas]

So these boundaries of real politics. One option that isn't really on the table at this point is decolonization in the more textbook sense, let's say, towards independence, et cetera. So I wonder if I could push you to go from what happened in the 1970s to what might have happened in the kind of counterfactual way if Maclehose was less successful. And if there had been more of a continuation of the social and political issues in the 1960s. Might there have been a greater movement locally towards decolonization in the more textbook sense?

[Ray Yap]

I think even by the time we start thinking about seriously about the future of Hong Kong, at least to my knowledge, that there was never a very strong and persistent voice calling for independence or decolonization. Even during the negotiation process, there were voices. There are people here and they're saying that do we want to go independent? But I don't think this is a serious options that people will consider. I think what will happen that one thing we have also bear in mind that starting from. Although as I said that in the beginning, that 1970s is a time that people in general feel more optimistic about everything. But at the same time, we are also. The local population also become more vocal. We expect more. And we also have this. The expansions of higher education or schooling activities in general. I think with the improved literacy in general, we have. Will encourage a different sense of civil rights. Right? So I think that this is how Hong Kong society has become since 1970s. So I think whether Maghull succeed or fail in his fight for autonomy is one factor. But I think by and large, people were asking for more in the 1970s. But whatever they have in mind, I don't think that, as I said that I couldn't recall there was a serious debate about let's go independent, let's get out of this British Empire. I think the Hong Kong people take it quite passively that we never thought seriously about at least the layman. The business people may have a different concern for laymen, for young people like us, we never thought about 1997 very seriously because in our textbook it's very funny they mentioned about 1997 but it stopped right there. Didn't say anything about. About that topic. So people will in general forget about it. So that's what the. The Magni Ho's visit to Beijing is so shocking for, for everyone. Because all of a sudden, okay, this is happening. Yeah,

[Lukas]

the. I guess maybe an intermediary scenario for us to consider short of independence is more the intersection between public opinion and democracy. So you mentioned how for Matlihos, in terms of how he communicated with London, public opinion primarily meant the Chinese elite that were appointed in EXCO and Ledgeco. But of course public opinion is a double edged sword because as you said, people want more, they expect more. So how did these negotiations over colonial autonomy intersect with this changing sense of who the public was and the capacity of the Hong Kong public for self government?

[Ray Yap]

First of all, many of this struggle or fight over colonials autonomy happen when they happen. We don't realize something is going on. That's the thing. Only after 30 years we read the files, we know that there was in fact a lot of fighting going on between Hong Kong and London. That's why back to your original. The first question you raised in this interview that what did people think about Magni Hose? We, I think most of the time people think that okay, it's very much because of Magneho's benevolence. He introduced all these changes. But as I point out in my book yes or no. Because magnet in a way respond to London, say hey, you're asking too much. That's much more than I want to do in terms of social reforms. Right? So we don't have the information what is going on for most of the time, right? We don't know that there was in most. We don't know what is the calculations of London and Matthew Hills when they visit Tang Xiaoping. We have no idea. So firstly, the people don't know much about what is going on. Right. Because this is not really a transparent process in the 1970s and particularly in terms of relationship between London and Hong Kong, we know very little. We only know that there's an MP and there's a minister under Secretary coming to Hong Kong. Make some miss some press and say a few words at the airport. That's it. Right. So this is the first thing. But public opinion in a way matters because as we said that for example, like in the case I mentioned in the book in terms of icc, that was when Peter Godbert went back to London or Britain. That was in fact we saw very much the first wave of public protests in Hong Kong in Victoria park that many people assembled. I think this is probably one of the biggest demonstrations in 1970s or in post war years that hundreds or even thousands of youngsters gathered there and and demand the return of Peter Godbert. That probably will mobilize the general resentment. But this is also a push for London and Hong Kong. You should do something before the situation Gatlar will control. So I think public opinion is emerging. But public opinion could be one of the lavish that with the governor play carefully and tactfully that may help him to make his case and achieve what he want to do.

[Lukas]

So I want to pick up on this point you raised earlier about how it's really only, you know, it's almost 30 years after the handover that we, you know, now you're going back to the declassified records and reconstructing this history of the 1970s. One way of looking at the colonial period is to say that, you know, the past is past and we're now many years after the handover and that's now, you know, all done and dusted. But you do something slightly different because towards the end of the book you bring up important ways in which there are continuities as well as comparisons before and after 97. Why do you choose to look at that boundary as an open one well than a closed book?

[Ray Yap]

I think this is very much due to the fact that I am not trained as a historian. I'm a political scientist by training. That is my limitations. And that also always drive me to the direction of asking the question about power relationship. In this case the power relationship between the colony and the metropole and the colony and the local community. That probably is the background of my whole inquiry into the process. So I come with the questions or the interest is very much motivated by how the chief executive of Hong Kong survived the metropole. I look back in the past because as I said in the beginning, I believe that the Beijing formula of one country two system in terms of the relationship of the Central People's Government, that is Beijing and the Hong Kong sao. I think the whole arrangement they create is very much model on the P 1997 order. That one on paper is the Metropole in fact could have absolute control on local situations. As I said in the beginning, if you look at the royal patterns and and the left of instructions that the metropole can, as I said, make all the law, override the budget and appoint orders of the Chief executive and senior official. Beijing thought that they were very generous because they give more concessions because let's say the chief executive, that is the governor. Before 1997, Hong Kong people had no say about the choice. We don't even know who are the potential candidates. We just saw the newspaper that, okay, this is a new governor. Beijing after 1997 say, hey, you have a selection process, you have 800 or 2,000 member committee. Somehow it represent a public input. At least you know who they are. Some people that represent you guys can make a vote, right? And for Latchco is the same right that at least half of the before 2019, half of the seats are elected by direct vote. One man, one vote. So Beijing thinks that this is the big concession. You even have your court of final appeal in Hong Kong. This was something not imaginable before 1997. So you guys should be happy. We are very generous. This is what I would believe. This is Beijing perceptions of how things was like before 1997. But as I said in the book, and I tried to make a point that this is not true, this is not entirely correct because the formal framework didn't tell the whole story. There's a lot of ambiguity and there's room for bargaining and there's a scope of autonomy, which is very much a result of the interaction between both sides of the equations. I think this is something. This is a gap of understanding of Beijing policymakers. And I think that will create a lot of trouble in handling the relationship between Hong Kong and Beijing after 1997. But I think the book also tried to point out another thing, because it's not just about how Beijing managed Hong Kong after 1997 from the experience of colonial time. It's also about how the local administration handle the metropole. I think for us or the governor, the key concern for them is how to serve the British interest in Hong Kong. But the question is, what is British interest? You have to identify it, make a case, and try to figure tactfully with the language and logic that your counterpart in the matchbook could understand. And most importantly, you have to find a way to build a trust from them so they know that you won't go too far. So they have confidence that whatever you do, you argue, you push back, you fight. At the end of the day, we are still on the same page in terms of serving British interests. So I think all the government trying to do that, I think this is the same challenge for the Chief executive after 1997 Fair Jaw is to serve national interest in Hong Kong. But what excites that national interest, it is down to the wisdom of that person to identify it and make a case of it. I think for a very long time, maybe this is a lesson for Hong Kong people as well. For a long time, we believe that the national interest in Hong Kong is economic development. But 2019 PO B tell us that Beijing PO B have some other issue in mind. But I think this book tried to uncover the concern of both sides of the equations before 1997. That I think is still relevant after 1997. Of course, what happened after 2019 have created different dynamics and different concern and calculations. But still, this is very much the motivation of why I write this book in the first place.

[Lukas]

The history of colonial autonomy is not only worth thinking about for itself, but it's got these lessons for kind of post 97 politics. You talked about differences in how, for example, you understand the history of colonial autonomy and how Beijing policymakers might understand that. But there's also, as you said, there is the Chief Executive in Hong Kong in terms of how they've been able to absorb the lessons from the colonial period or not. Has this been an issue where they misread the history? Or has it been other things like putting the lessons to practice?

[Ray Yap]

I think there's one major difference between colonial governors and chief executive after 1997. If you look at all the colonial governors, they are from the British side. They have served in the British administrations in different departments, unit. But somehow they work in the British administrations one way or another. London probably think that, okay, this is one of us. They may have different tactics, Persona, character. They may push back. Some of them, they believe may be pushing too hard. But at the end of the day, we can trust them. But chief executive is quite a different animal. I don't know whether some of them are party members or not. I don't know. I have no knowledge of that. But even if they are, they didn't grow up or they didn't go through the. They didn't have a political career in this Chinese party stage participate, right? Unlike, for example, the governors in the Chinese provinces, they have to go through. They may start on the county level, perfectual level, so on and so forth. So they learn the game in early years, right? Throughout the whole career, they load the logic, limitation, constraint and opportunity to how to make your case. But our chief Executive, even if they might be the party members, they don't have this experience and know how. And I think at the end of the day, that the degree of trust could be quite different. I mean, the Beijing confidence in the Chief Executive. And also bearing in mind that at least on paper, I don't think Beijing, at least as outsider, I believe some of the appointment of Chief Executive are not the first choice of Beijing. Look at the case of Donald Trump, look at the case of Carrie Lam, right? And. Or even in the case of Cy Leung, people will argue that the original choice, the first choice is somebody else, Henry Tang, not him. So if you look at after 1997, probably only Tong Cheehua, maybe John Lee are the original choice. But all other CE appointment may be a result of the circumstantial environment that they have to make that appointment. So I think there are some differences between Shew Executive and colonial governors. That probably is something we have to put in mind in understanding the relationship between the metropole and the local administration after 1997.

[Lukas]

So in terms of the practical lessons that you suggest towards the end of the book from this history, there are these differences you mentioned about the Governor and Chief Executive, but it seems like there are more differences beyond that. It's also about who and what the metropole is. As you've mentioned, you've got the difference between the declining British Empire that only has a peripheral and primarily economic interest in Hong Kong seems very different than than the Chinese state, which is separated from Hong Kong only by a very thin river, and whose interests are not just economic, but there's an unapologetic push towards being reunified. Does that make the comparison kind of less useful? I mean, it seems difficult to sustain the comparison in my mind sometimes given how different the metropoles are.

[Ray Yap]

I think this for any comparison, you probably can find differences on the object of comparison. They are not 100% identical, to put it that way. And I agree that the Chinese state probably is quite different in terms of state Persona, put it that way, that they are more status in approach. And I think for Beijing, they are probably more motivated to get involved in Hong Kong after 1997 after all. Because I always feel that that national pride issue is always there. They always want to prove that, okay, there will be life after the British are going. So they try to make sure that we, everything, everything will be all right, we will maintain prosperous and stable. And so they're willing to get involved whenever they're ready. But if you look at the post1997 history, that there are variations in terms of the involvement, right? Many people argue that the first let's Say the first five years of Tong Chiwai administration, Beijing seems to be quite willing to stay at the back. They don't want to get involved that much. So I think this is very much the evolving process that how Beijing as a metropole handled Hong Kong after 1997. And so I think Beijing is also learning the game. And I think the same applies for these SAL administrations. So my book is tried to focus some, like metadata, lessons that could be learned from that experience, whether there's some factor we may have to consider when we try to understand what is going on. I'm not saying that this is a perfect comparison, but I'm just saying that some of these concerns, I would argue, is still valid and useful for our understanding.

[Lukas]

You mentioned a bit earlier that after 2019, the questions and the problems have evolved and changed. Could you say a bit more about that in relation to this history and this theme of colonial autonomy and what questions may have been closed down? What question may have been opened up?

[Ray Yap]

No, I think 2019, as we said, that it's completely changed again, because I think at this moment the Hong Kong government didn't. Autonomy is not the main concern, honestly. I think the administrations believe that the way to survive the time is try to convince Beijing that we're 100% following the central government intentions or sometimes they may even overdo that. So at this moment I've, at this moment, I don't think that autonomy is the major concern of the, of the local administrations in Hong Kong.

[Lukas]

There was space within the British Empire as it evolved for autonomy itself to have a value, not an unlimited one, as you say. You know, the metropole has its interests and Hong Kong's autonomy was very much circumscribed within that. But if we look at how the British Empire evolved over centuries and also in the specific period you look at, there were ways to make the case for the political, social, economic value of odney. Can you foresee that case being made in Hong Kong's future?

[Ray Yap]

The challenge is I couldn't foresee the political future of China at the moment. So I don't have a crystal ball. And, and I think it's a big ask to foresee what happened in China in five years time, not to say more distant futures. And at the moment, I think the Hong Kong politics is basically determined by the political outlook in China. So I think I have no, I couldn't comment on this point, unfortunately.

[Lukas]

I just wanted to ask before we conclude the interview, about what it is to make the arguments you make in the book from your current location. So in the acknowledgments, you talk about moving from Hong Kong to Bristol and you're now reflecting on Hong Kong's history from abroad. How does that geographical movement and dislocation shape the way you think and process this part of Hong Kong history?

[Ray Yap]

The advantage of relocating to UK that I probably is closer to the Archives. Right. The National Archives at kum. But that could, in a way, shape the outlook of my book. Because the more you rely on the archival material, it's the official one, you focus more and more on the issue of autonomy. I may miss something in a process. Right. Because I may miss the angle of how people actually live through that period. As you ask in the beginning, how people in Hong Kong. A few about Matmiho's in 1970s. This is very much about social history, the live experience. If you are far away from Hong Kong, it is difficult to access to that kind of data or material. So I may have to rely more on these official documents deposited at the National Archive. And most of the communication are in fact the exchange between the colonial officer matlihost in particular with Foreign Office or fco. Right. And that will probably will. On the one hand, you could have more depth in the analysis in one direction, but on the other hand, that may narrow the possibility of inquiry. So I think there's a good upside and downside, but. Yeah, but I think this applies to all research anyway. Yeah. But there's always a chance to write another book. That's a good thing. Yeah.

[Lukas]

Thank you so much. So I thought we might end just with a couple lines from the end of your acknowledgments. So you were at the end of the acknowledgments. It's a privilege to be able to continue writing on Hong Kong's history. It is a pleasure that hurts. And it's been a great privilege to talk to you today. So thank you very much.

[Ray Yap]

Thank you. Thank you very much and happy New Year.

[Lukas]

Thank you.