T. V. Paul, "The Unfinished Quest: India's Search for Major Power Status from Nehru to Modi" (Oxford UP, 2024)

Summary

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Podcast Summary: T. V. Paul, "The Unfinished Quest: India's Search for Major Power Status from Nehru to Modi" (Oxford UP, 2024)

Podcast: New Books Network
Host: Dr. Sashi Kumar Sundaram
Guest: Professor T.V. Paul
Date: May 14, 2026

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Overview of the Episode

This episode of New Books Network features an in-depth conversation with Professor T. V. Paul about his latest book, The Unfinished Quest: India's Search for Major Power Status from Nehru to Modi. The discussion explores India's decades-long effort to attain major power status on the global stage, and why, despite significant progress, this quest remains incomplete. Topics span India's historical and contemporary international relations, the theory of status in world politics, domestic politics’ influence on global strategies, the challenges posed by global institutions, and the ongoing tension between rhetoric and achievement in India’s rise.

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Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. Origins and Rationale for the Book

• Professor Paul was motivated to provide a theoretical and conceptual basis for understanding India’s rise, noting most prior works were descriptive rather than analytical.
• He draws from international relations literature on status, status acquisition, and accommodation, noting a lack of this lens in recent discussions of India’s global trajectory.

“Many of the conflicts India have had over the years, in particular with China, with Pakistan, and most importantly with the United States had some major reason, status reason behind them and that is not understood properly among both policymakers and scholars.”
(Paul, 06:15)

2. Why the Quest Remains ‘Unfinished’

• Progress has been made, but major global institutions and peer groups remain exclusionary; gaining acceptance is both a material and recognition-based struggle.
• Critical missed opportunities, particularly at pivotal moments (e.g., U.N. Security Council formation in 1945 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the 1960s) left India outside “elite clubs.”
• Status is presented as a zero-sum property among great powers, making accommodation for newcomers difficult.

“It’s like golf clubs or ... white men’s clubs ... closed for newcomers. This ... influences upon the established power’s dominant status. And nobody wants to give up easily their acquired status.”
(Paul, 09:13)

• India’s approach to nuclear weapons—delaying a test until 1974—led to sanctions and exclusion from the Nuclear Club, stalling India’s ambitions for decades.

3. Institutional Rigidity and Strategies for Change

• International institutions are rigid; status recognition occurs mainly after major systemic crises or wars—otherwise, newcomers are locked out.
• Countries like India have sought to innovate institutionally (e.g., BRICS, G20) as workarounds to established order.
• Asymmetric strategies (e.g., nonmilitary expansion, soft power rhetoric) have been used, but their effectiveness is limited by economic and political constraints.

“A great power can inflict pain on others without receiving equivalent pain... So India has a lot of trouble with that, but it has assets...”
(Paul, 27:15)

• The Trump administration’s undermining of multilateral institutions and weaponized interdependence further complicated the ascent of rising powers like India.

4. Domestic Political Rhetoric vs International Behavior

• There’s a stark tension between domestic nationalist rhetoric (particularly Hindu nationalism/Hindutva) and India’s international behavior, which remains pragmatic/realist.
• The civilizational rhetoric serves domestic electoral purposes but fails to translate into lasting international influence or attractive soft power.
• India’s diplomatic corps is under-resourced and less influential than previously, reflecting a hollowing out of institutional capability.

“What is missing in the Indian system today is ... you don’t have ... the kind of diplomats you had during the Nehruvian period... The depth of Indian elites’ understanding is rather limited...”
(Paul, 36:42)

5. Contrasts with Other Powers and Missed Opportunities

• China’s ability to mobilize society for status—through propaganda and historical reckoning—is contrasted with India’s lack of domestic mobilization.
• India has not built effective coalitions among Global South states, missing its chance to play a leading role in multilateral negotiations (e.g., Iran mediation, Global South initiatives).
• Domestic social challenges (poverty, inequality, caste hierarchies) and closed intellectual climate undercut India’s credibility and attractiveness.

“Without improving the human development index, who will respect you if you have massive poverty in your midst?...”
(Paul, 53:35)

6. The Need for Open Engagement and Intellectual Reform

• Professor Paul emphasizes India must engage openly with global scholars, intellectuals, and journalists—including critics—rather than stifling debate:

“You need to convince these opinion makers of the world that India deserves a place ... Why do you have to be so thin-skinned about criticism?”
(Paul, 58:44)

• An open, pluralistic India—leveraging its civilizational tradition of debate—would enhance soft power and global recognition.

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Memorable Quotes and Moments

• On Status and Club Mentality:
  “Status is often viewed as a zero sum property ... the newcomer either has to win a war and in the post war settlement get its status accepted.”
  (Paul, 08:58)
• On Rhetoric vs Mobilization:
  “Indian elites aim to convince Indians that the world thinks highly of them. But they have made inadequate efforts to mobilize Indian society in a way that would actually heighten India’s status abroad.”
  (Sundaram quoting Paul’s book, 57:26)
• On Inclusion and Soft Power:
  “India’s greatness, the civilizational greatness, is the inclusivity part... if you promote this diverse country value systems, it may attract. And it did attract because it offered a pathway for a multicultural society to coexist.”
  (Paul, 48:35)
• On Institutional Reform: “If you’re not on the table, instead of determining the menu, you will be on the menu. A very apt thought.”
  (Paul quoting former Canadian PM, 29:00)
• On Intellectual Freedom and Engagement:
  “If India has to become a global power, a closed state with no intellectual activity possible, no criticism possible ... will not happen. We become a Myanmar, a big Myanmar by the way. And that is unfortunate.”
  (Paul, 59:20)

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Important Segments and Timestamps

• Introduction & Motivation for the Book: [03:06–07:23]
• India’s Missed ‘Pivotal Moments’ (UN, NPT): [08:20–16:17]
• Institutional Rigidity & India’s Adaptive Strategies: [19:38–30:48]
• Challenges Inside India’s Foreign Policy Elites: [33:37–44:50]
• Domestic Rhetoric vs. International Reality: [44:50–53:35]
• Need for Openness & Global Engagement: [58:44–62:11]
• Closure & Author’s Hopes: [63:08–63:45]

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Conclusion

The episode provides a sweeping, critically engaged examination of why India's quest for major power status remains unfinished despite material gains and increased global presence. The heart of the challenge lies in institutional rigidity, missed historical pivots, a growing disjunction between domestic rhetoric and international strategy, and a need for intellectual openness and reform. Professor Paul’s nuanced critique—grounded in international relations theory and historical evidence—urges India’s policymakers and society to think bigger, act more inclusively, and embrace open engagement as the path forward in the complex landscape of 21st-century world politics.

Transcript

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[Professor T.V. Paul]

Welcome to the New Books Network

[Dr. Sashi Kumar Sundaram]

welcome to New Books Network. I'm your host, Dr. Sashi Kumar Sundaram. Sashi for short Senior Lecturer in Foreign Policy and security at City St George's University of London. We are we are Here with Professor T.V. paul Professor Paul is distinguished James McGill professor at the Department of Political Science, McGill University in Montreal, Canada. He is the founding Director of Global Research Network on Peaceful Change. He was the President of the International Studies association in 2016 and he's a recipient of a number of awards, honors and fellowships. He's also published a number of path making theoretical and empirical works in international relations on international security, world order, politics of nuclear weapons, non proliferation peace, and peaceful change. He's a prolific author. He has published 24 books, about 90 articles and research works. Today we are here to talk about Professor Paul's recent book the Unfinished India's Search for Major Power Status from Nehru to Modi, published by Oxford University Press and Westland Books in India in 2024. The topic of India's quest for major power status is extremely relevant in today's age of geopolitics, geoeconomics and the return of great power competition. So welcome to the discussion, Professor Paul, and congratulations on the book.

[Professor T.V. Paul]

Thank you Sashi for inviting me to your very interesting podcast.

[Dr. Sashi Kumar Sundaram]

Thank you. I must say your book is incredibly clear and readable. You weave rich theoretical and empirical evidence with clarity. I would like to begin this podcast with a simple question. What inspired you to write this book?

[Professor T.V. Paul]

So over the past 2025 years there has been a lot of interest on India, especially India as a rising power. But when I looked at the most of those works had no theoretical or conceptual basis to their arguments based on India's material growth or soft power or political trajectory. So I wanted to use some of these skills. I have tools I have in international relations, especially the literature on status and status acquisition, status accommodation, status anxiety, humiliation, et cetera as big topics in our field. And I did an edited collection, co edited collection with some other colleagues for Status in World Politics with Cambridge University Press, which actually received considerable attention among mostly among scholars and many younger people are now working on related themes. So I thought I would apply my theoretical insights into India. But like you said, I wanted to write this for the general audience too, informed audience, because they are the ones who really think India either has arrived or is arriving or may never arrive. Especially in the diaspora you have a lot of people with opinions on India's rice. And so this prompted me to look at a wide net. I go back to the historical net, starting with Nehru and even before that, where this aspiration has always been there, if not a great power, a leading power, and many of India's behavioral traits, starting with the non alignment desire for strategic autonomy, looking at the Bantu process, later on Indira Gandhi's nuclear testing war and then of course with Pakistan, then of course BJP's arrival with more pronounced determination to achieve major power status. And then of course the end of the Cold War and the series of things happened with the nuclear accommodation with the united statesman Singh and etc. And then of course BJP once again pushing this agenda of Hindutva and connecting it to that as the benchmark for India's rise. Of course a lot of things they have done over the years. So all this led me to think that this subject of status India status achievement deserves a lot more attention. And many of the conflicts India have had over the years, in particular with China, particular with Pakistan and most importantly with the United States had some major reason, status reason behind them and that is not understood properly among both policymakers and scholars. So my effort is to force people to think a little bit harder. Why are we in conflict with China? Why we were supposed to be Hindi, Chini bhai bhai. What went wrong? Is it purely territory? No, there's a lot lot to do with the positional role in the international and regional orders. So there's a lot in the book had to condense it and tighten it, cut out some of the archaic theoretical literature. So hopefully people will be provoked to do more work and to encourage policymakers to think think about these things before they make pronouncements. So that's where it is.

[Dr. Sashi Kumar Sundaram]

That is very interesting because on quite a wide range and a long arc of understanding India's quest for great power status in 2003 you wrote an important book with Baldev Rajnair on India and the world order Searching for major power Status with Cambridge University Press. Today we have this book on India's quest for major power status. Why do you believe India's journey towards major power status remains an unfinished quest? And this question might be interesting for readers as well as audience because there's a long arc starting from Nehru or even earlier towards Modi and BJP today that there is this quest for international status as you elaborated before. But you also remind readers that this is this remains an unfinished quest for a very long time. And why do you believe that?

[Professor T.V. Paul]

So I think that is the crux of your question is very apt. The first book we mentioned many of the things I discuss but we didn't have the theoretical tool of status literature. I used a little bit. We used a little bit in the initial chapters. But that book also actually received very well at that time. It was after the nuclear test and all that. So this is my own effort as Professor Nayel has passed away and using the theoretical tools. And what I notice is that India has made considerable progress. But the roadblocks are so massive that it may take several decades for India to achieve the wherewithal or the markers required for status. But even then it's not guaranteed because the great power system, that's the peer group has to accept you. And that accommodation is very tough for a newcomer. Newcomers are often looked at us poaching into the established powers club and it's a club good. They don't want newcomer. It's like golf clubs or you know, this particular white men's Club, you know, vice men's clubs are closed for newcomers. So this is because it, it influences upon the established power's dominant status. And nobody wants to give up easily their acquired status. So status is often viewed as a zero sum property. A game where the newcomer either has to win a war and in the post war settlement get its status accepted. It needs many attributes. Hard power, soft power, diplomatic skill. Diplomatic power is actually part of soft power. But it is very important to have the capacity to negotiate its way through at pivotal points. So two simple two critical points, critical junctures we call them, have occurred when India missed the boat. That's 1945 in San Francisco when the UN system was set up with the General assembly general membership. Every state has got representation and the Security Council with the permanent five plus ten other elected members there. India's name was recommended by a couple of countries, but the British opposed it and did not include recommended to be a member of the Security Council. As a result, it was excluded when its 2.5 million Indian soldiers fought war along with the allied powers. The largest contingent from any country of the colonial part. And the British simply argued India is not independent yet, it should not be there. But at the same time China was included, although they had many similarities for economic, political, not political, developmental state. And India contributed more to that war because China had to fight the Japanese within China. But the point is it was complete neglect. So you missed the boat. Now the problem is the world order is set at points when new war started and war ended. And the creators are the winners. The losers are no longer not in membership like Japan and Germany. Another pivotal point when India missed that institutional membership was the creation of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. The treaty, as you know, has two classes of states, Nuclear weapon states and nuclear non nuclear weapons states. Nuclear weapon states are those who tested before 1967, January 1, and India did not test before that. The China is in it. India is not. Anyone who has not tested will be treated as non nuclear state. India objected massively that the strongest opponent very difficult for India. And that's for status reasons. India did not want to be consigned to a non great power status forever. And even Shastri, very Gandhian man, you know, more revelations that he might have even would have sanctioned a nuclear test if not for opposition. His own sometimes a little bit of Gandhian morals. But Baba and Satna and all were in favor of a nuclear bomb. They could have tested. But it would have been a very difficult response from the great power Club. Would have been very Harsh. And India was dependent on them for basic aid, foreign aid, food aid, et cetera. So the timing was not in India's favor. Then it tested in 1974. Indira Gandhi, you may recall, first Pokhran test and Indira they tested. But nothing happened after that. As far as we know. There was no weapon development, no strategic thinking how to use this as a deterrent weapon. So you now almost like what Iran is doing. It's a mistake to be a fence sitter. Which means if you are a fence sitter, you will be tempted to be pushed. And that's what happened to India. For 30 years India was under sanctions, economic sanctions. Scientists could not, you know, so called ISRO and all in fear they cannot even, could not even visit the United States. We were massively deprived of American technology. And the general political relationship also went down partly because of this nuclear relationship. And so 1998, Clint Batch pie tested for two years. Of course there were sanctions, but then they lifted. And then also coincided with the end of the Cold War. And then they're thinking about on the part of the Clinton administration in particular about this rising powers. And so India got some accommodation as a result. And then of course the arrival of George Bush Jr. And Condoleezza Rice all thought India has to be recognized. The only way to do that is to get rid of this nuclear apartheid. As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said once to me personally actually there was a nice quote I got in the book, I have it in an interview. So that apartheid ended and that was a struggle for India. Now that part is partially accomplished. It's still not in many clubs within it, but at least it's treated as a separate case. So then of course the all the growth in technology and economic growth, consistent growth. A lot of predictions that India along with China and other rising powers will be, will be very much in condense in a position to determine the future international order and that it ought to be treated. But within India, of course the domestic politics now has taken up this subject with both Modi's party and Congress party. They have two different visions of how to achieve it. But both are actually seeking a larger role in the international arena. They are sometimes reluctant to call great power because that term is a little bit European archaic. But the idea is to say leading power, important part. Yeah.

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[Professor T.V. Paul]

no.

[Dr. Sashi Kumar Sundaram]

It is brilliant because you give a very long arc of this long unfinished quest, if you like, on India's quest for major power status. But when I read the book the Case of India allows us to open up far more interesting theoretical ideas on questions relating to nuclear weapons, nuclear non use fence sitters as you call them, and the disadvantages of being in the fence sitting mode, and the problems of missed opportunities for many states in the existing institutional arena. One important theoretical intervention that you make in the book, particularly on questions relating to status and status inconsistency, is the point on the institutionalized status that can serve as a source of power and influence in international politics. And I found this point very important because membership in higher status group offers a form of associational power as you call them. And India's quest for long term status might be hubristic in recent years, but over a long period of time it was also this quest for associational power within an institutional environment. So one related question I had is within the general understanding of greater international institutional rigidity to either enter or get recognized by other peer groups, as you say for status, there is a recognition among multiple scholars that the international institutions are extremely rigid. So how do countries for example like India or any other sort of global south country use or engage against this institutional rigidity? In your book you talk about asymmetric strategies, particularly hybrid warfare rhetoric, non military expansion, as a way to sort of break open these institutional rigidities as you call are these the options right now for countries like India given that the institutional rigidity is getting more intense with the arrival of Trump and the return of great power politics and the return of geoeconomics in an age of so called de globalization. How do countries like India face this institutional rigidity and what are the options available for them?

[Professor T.V. Paul]

Yeah, so you raised some very fundamental questions, both practical and conceptual at work levels. First of all, institutions are needed to get legitimacy to your power status or your status without institutions recognizing you as the unique Power of caliber, different caliber. It's a hierarchical order we are talking about where others recognize peer group in particular and second bragging act is recognized. This state has many attributes of great power status. It should be treated as one. Now that institutional recognition, as I said, does not happen frequently, mostly after post war settlements or a major crisis or institutions completely fail. And then the newcomers try to create their own institutions. So what you notice is that newcomers are trying to create their own institutions. You have the brics, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, cooperation. Then you have the G20, which was actually considered as an alternative to UN Security Council expansion, including India and other pivotal states in it. And so I think many in India and elsewhere thought these institutional innovations can compensate for the rigidity of the UN system or the inability of the UN system to reform and adapt, bring in new members. Now with the Trump's arrival, he has decided that these institutions are constrained on America's superior power status, hegemonic power status. US is paying them to allow these other powers to have a free ride or to achieve their goals at US's expense. From a narrow point of view, he has a point. But from a global order, global peaceful change and all perspective, what is doing is harming India, not just India, in fact all other countries and the economic tariff system, the weaponized interdependence. India now, as you know, has been much more damaging for India and Brazil and South Africa and all these other states that rely excessively on trade with mostly with United States and of course now with China. So the weaponized interdependence is they thought that they have some level of capacity to influence American policy because interdependent states, the costs and benefits are shared among these states and that one cannot unilaterally alter it, alter the cost or the benefits. And that's what Mr. Trump has really challenged that idea and imposing these sanctions, these tariffs unilaterally. Of course they haven't been successful and failed in many ways, but it gave the impression that these second ranking states would not have the capacity to fight back. Now India has innovated by going to European Union, creating free trade agreements with New Zealand and Australia or potentially Canada. But even that is not going to compensate for these trade difficulties. Mr. Trump is a neo imperialist, which means he thinks that the United States has an extraordinary advantage with its dollar power, which is the currency of choice for everybody, not choice. This is actually you don't have much of a choice other than dollar at this point and then use that and that the US is Somewhat isolated according to the MAGA people or make America great again people which by the way is a status project too. Another topic that many people haven't understood. What do they want? They want to keep their dominant status internally and externally. Internally the so called white Anglo Saxon minority. Externally, America is the lead power for as long as they can. And so he is the emperor who is making that possible in his perspective. So countries like India, although he initially showed some interest, he looked upon us from a little bit of racism too. This is a problem in the western crass racism in terms of only if you are in my group, I'll allow you to become something. But sometimes countries have the capacity to push back. Look at China, he tried to play the same game and China has certain monopoly capacity which is the rare earths. Now India has none of that. This is the problem. India has capacity. So if you talk about choke points, whatever Iran is successful so far to prevent big massive escalation. Is that choke point. Now that's a very daring strategy of course, but it is an asymmetric strategy. India has Malacca Strait and there's no war with China or with anybody. So you can't put a navy there and destroy your coal, your other assets. So you need some assets that others really need from you. We thought we had the population, the demographic advantage. You need the Indian labor worker, especially the tech worker. But that now with AI's introduction may reduce considerably that need. And Trump himself took away the H1 visa option substantially. So what would have been India's advantage? That India as a market, no one can avoid it and that market opportunity or market possibility has not come to fruition. Yes, it's a big market, but it is still 3 or 4% of world trade. And so these investors who come and put money into Indian equities, they rapidly withdraw it whenever they see some blood somewhere. They go away from India and put it into dollar and other assets. That's what's happening. And so this run on Indian rupee right now is just showing the weakness of India in many ways. So the depth of India's development, India's economic activities are reasonably good. But it is not enough to say you can withstand these challenges like other great powers can. A great power can inflict cause pain on others without receiving equivalent pain. Okay. Of course, unless it's in a great power war, which is not talking about war situation. So India has a lot of trouble with that. But it has assets. So it's still a potential power. Its growth rate is reasonably good and people are Projecting it will be, it was supposed to be number four economy nominal terms and now the rupee decline. That means it is now 6th largest economy. Britain went back to their position. It's a very tricky game if you go by the dollar nominal terms. So where is India heading? Of course you have questions on that, but that depends on a lot to do with international circumstances, the systemic conditions as we call because a rising power needs a favorable systemic condition acceptance if you want peaceful accommodation, acceptance by the dominant powers of the day or in opposition to them, you fight the war and win the war as Japan and Germany try to do. Or you have some advantage that others really need you balance of power advantage in particular. So I think the Trump administration has done enormous harm in many of those areas in particular now with Pakistan as the interlocutor for the crisis in Iran. And we can talk about that. And in my book I have a whole chapter on the India Pakistan conflict. I call it a status conflict too. As the Hindu Muslim rivalry evolved into who is important, whether they are co equals. So there are quotes after quotes from Muhammad Ali, Jinnah and all, you know, saying we are not inferior to India, we are co equals. And some Muslim leaders thought they're superior because they were the rulers of India, you know, the Mughals rulers, and they did not want a moth eaten Pakistan, they got a moth eaten Pakistan which is smaller in size. They wanted all of Punjab, all of Bengal to have an equal status even though undivided India only had 40% of the population Muslim. So it's a very complex psychological, socio, psychological phenomenon with enormous implications. You asked the question, let me talk about the power. You need this recognition partly for psychological reasons. People want to be respected. Recognition is one of human needs. Now you can say some may not seek as intensely as others, but if you think you have the attributes or future attributes and you are not getting there, then it can become a big conflict. Reason for conflict. But most importantly, what do you need? Status. Many people say it's all rhetoric or it's not very important to be recognized. That's not true. When decisions are made, if you're not on the table, they determine your future. You don't determine your future. Look at the way colonial power is determined. Or in the past, the P5 determined many crisis situations. So there is this reasonable quote by Prime Minister Carney of Canada. If you're not on the table, instead of determining the menu, you will be on the menu. A very apt thought. So that's what your decision making your agency will be higher if you have a role, but you need a capacity to strategize, to have ideas how to use your status. And on that subject, India is lacking right now, unfortunately. We can go into that in many ways.

[Dr. Sashi Kumar Sundaram]

It is a good understanding of the tensions in some ways for rising powers that they have to look at the opportunities because the existing institutional structure is extremely rigid. So they have to formulate opportunities to revamp or revise or create new institutions in order to manage their status or engage in international politics according to their own terms. However, as your book rightly says, India has lost its grip to engage in this sort of institutional power politics, if you like. This connects to some of your previous works on the nature of using institutions for power political purposes as well. And instead, India has moved outside the realm of formulating collective actions through institutions, creating more partnerships with other countries to formulate a new order. India has moved into particular rhetorical strategies, looking at it as a civilizational power with a particular understanding of India's Hindu moral beliefs and how India's Prime Minister is the Vishwa guru for the world and so on. This shows that if global disorder was an opportunity for states, some states had made use of these opportunities for renegotiating their roles. But other states which could have potentially used these opportunities have lost their tracks. And reading your book, I suppose India is one of those states which is quite clearly missed some of the most fundamental tenets of understanding its role in the institutionalized world order. Not seeing an opportunity to play an important role in resolving the crises or peaceful negotiations or diplomatic negotiations between United States and Iran, for example, which Pakistan has taken over, as you pointed out, or to find other ways of mobilizing the global south states towards a particular collectivist project for fighting back together against the neo imperialist domination of the United States, India has not quite clearly done those strategies. What in your view is actually the reason why India's power elites, if you like, or India's bureaucratic as well as policymaking elites have quite not clearly grasped the understandings of pursuing a long term strategy that is about institutionally revamping and allowing India to play an important role in world politics rather than play short term games that involves sort of mobilizing particular religious minority views about what is the right way to conduct politics within the domestic setting.

[Professor T.V. Paul]

So the civilizational religious dynamism that is reflected in the Hindutva movement is largely for domestic politics. Patience. It's a great. I talk about it. Status politics is a great electoral campaign slogan. You can influence a majority of a community saying you don't have the status in the world because of your religion or you are treated badly for thousand years of humiliation. Others came and conquered you, the Abrahamic religions, people of that faith, both Christians and Muslims before that. That it is time for us to reassert. The problem is, by the way, that is not just India alone, but there is a movement in Turkey, there is even Russia, you know, it's a movement to reassert one's law, status, quote unquote. Thinking that in the past we had it, now we don't have it. Therefore our civilization can rescue us. But the problem outside world. There are few takers other than diaspora who are also by the way, their psychology is amazing. Why the diaspora think India should be a great power. It's for our own satisfaction when we are treated badly in foreign countries. If only India were a great power. I will be treated differently. My passport will be much more valued. Okay, there are a lot of personal reasons, maybe those also have religious reasons. So I'm not blaming anybody, by the way. That's how it is. So this problem of activism as Nehru's period, you know, he's taking even before independence there was a conference in New Delhi, Afro Asian Conference in 1946. And that then led to the Montoon Conference, 1955. The resolutions after resolutions they made questioning the whole colonial order, questioning the nuclear order, questioning the racial order. That Bantung was a moment. And the great powers of the day, especially the United States tried to destroy the conference. They send agents and spies and impressing countries. But it went through. And then that had an impact on decolonization of Africa in particular. So that activism ended largely by 19 after, I would say by the Bangladesh wartime and Vietnam War ended. And then it. It was very difficult for India to use that strategy. Although like you say in your book, it's sort of rhetorical, rhetorically it was non aligned and it was tilted to the Russians for systemic reasons. The great power system was. Now there is a triangular system with China part of US alliance, Pakistan part of it. So these pressure points were so difficult for India. And then it withstood quite a bit, but a high cost for developmental reasons, economic reasons, et cetera. So today's world, well, everybody thought that we have these parallel institutions where you can get peaceful accommodation or a position in the global order discourse and negotiations through bargaining, institutional bargaining. And that has been going on reasonably well. And India has also formed this somewhat, I call soft balancing coalitions with the United States called quad. For instance, a quadrilateral arrangement with Australia, Japan, US and India which had some promises. But although the Americans wanted to make it, they could. NATO military alliance India is very reluctant to form a military alliance with anybody. It is still not non aligned. They call it multi alignment. It doesn't want to be very much want to be retaining. It wants to retain its strategic autonomy, which makes sense in many ways. But when you want to retain the strategic autonomy you also have to have a diplomatic finesse, a diplomatic capacity to engage in crisis times. What is missing in the Indian system today is you don't have a. Let me put. How do you put it. The kind of diplomats you had during the Nehruvian period or even Indira Gandhi's period. Your foreign, your external affairs ministry looks very weak. You have a pretty decent foreign external affairs minister with education and all that. But I don't think he alone can run this show or the. I believe much of it is run from the Prime Minister's office. The depth of Indian elite's understanding is rather limited and their toolbook responses to some situations also seems to be limited. I was at the United nations recently and I was talking to the Canadian ambassador there and he said, he asked me this question. Why are the Indian delegates so reticent here? They don't seem to be doing anything active or say even Singapore is, or Bahrain at that point, the UAE and all. And they are just not doing anything. I mean they are not coming up with anything as they used to. You know, they're very active in the UN system. I didn't have an answer. Maybe the recruitment patterns or they have to get approval from Delhi for anything. This is where India has to put that human resource and recruitment may be good for, you know, equitable distribution of the little jobs they have, few jobs they have. But you need people with opinions and ideas and capacity to express them at these forums. And you find the Indian elite used to be good as weakened over the years. And that's perhaps one problem with the current regime because they're semi authoritarian mode of thinking they are not able to. And this ideological thinking, they are not able to produce that. And the number of diplomats also very small. They apparently are smaller than Singapore's diplomatic core. How can a huge country run with a tiny group of foreign policy, foreign policy makers, all that. Then you have also a problem of continuous crisis with Pakistan now with Mr. Trump. Now Mr. Trump is by the way, everybody's crisis. So it's not only India's but India is in particular in a bad situation because India is friends with Israel. India obviously needs the Weapons, nobody can question that. But then it also needs the support of the Gulf countries for oil and other, you know, the migration of Indian population, et cetera. But here comes the problem that when there is a war you don't have much of an option. You're affected, but you don't want to hurt either party. And in this case the aggressor is very clearly your friend. Israel and the United States, there is no question about it. And that too on the basis of very poor misreading. Even though I said India doesn't have a diplomatic depth, I feel like the Americans are almost same situation right now. They got rid of all their old diplomats and you know, all kinds of psychophants are running the show right now. So this lack of strategic thinking, how to make use of an opportunity is very much there in many countries. But India in particular and this befriending Israel should have been okay to do it more subtly. Modi going to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and all the. The day before Netanyahu launched the war a day or two was a strategic error in the eyes of the world. You know, who, who are you trying to impress with that hug? And I think it was a big mistake. Whoever advised him to go at that point. Unless you really support the war on Iran, which again you need Iran too, so you need everybody. It was another lack of depth in the thinking. And then of course now you are a victim of this oil because you're so dependent on the transit through the Strait Hormuz and you don't have any plans. And then the United States, the Pakistani military by the way, very savvy people there, they have very good diplomats. Only problem is they do a lot of misreading of their capacities. They misperceive. I have another book called the Warrior State Pakistan and the Contemporary World where I look at this. Military people think like they're corporate group. They want to retain their higher status in the Pakistani society but they think that they are co equal to India or superior. They can play this game asymmetrically with India. So in 1971, before the war or 65 I have another book. They talk about these war decisions, symmetric conflicts and Pakistani generals thought they'll get the support of China USA. They start a war. That's what happened in 65. They got a little bit, but not enough. 71 same problem now China is much closer and the US Nixon and Kissinger. So they misread the amount of support they would receive as a result of they at that time opened up US to China by the way, they played the same game very efficiently. Kissinger of first visit was through Pakistan. So today the Pakistani General Munir and the Prime Minister are all working hard to think that they can play this game. My worry though is that if they think too think as they used to think, you may get more terrorist strike within India or some activity on the border. They hoping that these other powers will come to their rescue, especially the United States as happened last summer. So there can be in a bit of a bind on the Pakistan front. And then of course China where India has made some readjustments. So I think everybody is waiting for this three year period to go away. Somehow we will enter this paradise after he's gone. The question is will he go first of all. Secondly, what is successor would look like? The India needs to position itself to become more self reliant and look for different contingencies. There could be a contingency of a worst case scenario and that we have to think about how to cope with that and how to align.

[Dr. Sashi Kumar Sundaram]

Yeah, I found that discussion extremely fascinating. Given the understanding that India does have a huge sort of institutional power, material capabilities, as you've point out some hard power markers in terms of military and scientific technology, demographic advantage. India does have soft power advantage. Nevertheless, based on our discussion so far, it looks like India did miss the boat in using its strategic depth and using its sort of knowledge and knowledge networks with other diplomats within the institutions to exercise a particular role and play a vital role in world politics. I want to come back to this question on the puzzle of the status competition at the domestic level. On the one hand, we see most Indian political actors within the domestic establishment extremely vocal about India's civilizational glory, Hindu nationalism and so many other sort of rhetorical influences that are happening within the domestic setting. As you rightly say, this is not confined to India, including maga, Turkey and several other countries in the global south also have this engagement. Nevertheless, India's trajectory towards a particular form of Indonesianism has also affected its soft power skills and its soft power recognition in world politics. As much as there is a lot of criticism and a sort of disenchantment with Israel and its policies in the Middle East. There is also quite similar sort of eyebrow raising disenchantment with India, particularly in the trajectories of Hindu nationalism at the international level. But at the domestic level, Indian diplomats, Indian politicians are extremely vocal and also very articulative of what sort of India do they want and why do you see this tension? Why is that Indian domestic activism, rhetorically speaking, with a particular understanding of its politics does not translate at the international level. In the UN, for example, as you pointed out with your example and its implications of India's domestic Hindu nationalist projects on its soft power goals and its ability to negotiate with other great powers or also with its neighbors.

[Professor T.V. Paul]

So there's a distinction between internal dynamics and external behavior or external accomplishments as you want to call it. Actually the Indian elite uses kind of a real politic with often the civilizational idea is rhetoric. The challenge there is any ideology, any philosophy, if it is universal, it should have a room for others, your non members. Okay, so the moment you say you need to recognize me as a particular religion, religious, faith person and on my attributes and belief systems, but I'm not willing to recognize you, in other words, we are not talking about coexistence, although rhetorically we are. We have the Vasudeva Kudumba Marwan. So that means there are not takers because you cannot convert someone to Hindutva philosophy. You know, is it a communism had this philosophy, liberalism as an ideology, you can't become a member. It's very hard to become a member of this group. Same goes for Islamism too, by the way, or white nationalism Maga, you cannot become a member. I mean, yes, there are one or two Indians who have made some headway in the US but they are treated as, you know, just like during the British period we had some Indians working for the British Empire. You know, it is very difficult to enter clubs that are exclusive. So India's greatness, the civilizational greatness, is the inclusivity part of it, the one Nehru talks about or Amartya Sen talks about. You know, you read the Buddhist, all those ideas, some are very complex. So even in Hinduism there are great ideas for inclusion as much they can, barring the extreme caste ideology. But the point is, in actual reality, India was a pole of attraction for thousands, millions of people, you know, from time immemorial. So reading Nehru's discovery of India and it'll give you the idea that if you promote this diverse country value systems, it may attract. And it did attract because it offered a pathway for a multicultural society to coexist. And two, of course, economic growth wasn't the great model for a long time. But the point is inclusivity was in the constitution. You created a system that had possibilities for others to emulate and you had a leadership also in helping others coming up with solutions to their problems and global problems. So you played a role in global new economic order, new information order. The UN reforms or decolonization process, etc. And the transformation of the international system from a European led very power system to some level of agency to the second ranking states. So India did play a role, One cannot deny that. So today it has some institutional role and it did do a few things. G20, for instance, bringing Africa into the fold was a good move. But overall, what exactly is the achievement for? What's the consistency between the rhetoric and achievements? Partly because India wants to become a great power and it is trying to play the great power game. That means taking up the causes of all these global south countries beyond the point is not going to help because they are not very keen on great powers. He creates new great powers. He asked Nepal, even tiny Bhutan, even they may say. But who wants to create another power structure? Unless they are forced, unless they benefit also. So everybody wants their own autonomy and freedom, at least from the developing world. So you want to play both games, one with the great power club and the other with this developing countries. So there is considerable mismatch in that situation. The structural conditions have changed for India. So the ideology is good for one reason. It's good that electorally at least a single party can continue this power and probably will gain more seats as they go. But outwardly it may need recalibration and that's not enough to gain the support using their rhetorical power. It requires more concrete power. But I would argue that the material power itself is very skewed and developmental trajectory is one of the most unequal countries in the world among all the rising powers. So you have sub Saharan Africa within you, massive amount of population and the way the rural living standards. So you have very good highways and airports are all coming up. That happened in South Africa too, by the way, forgetting that under the apartheid regime they built some of the best highways in the world. So that's not enough. I'm not comparing. It's not the same. I have to be very kind to India. I'm actually a sympathizer of India being brown and brought up. It's not the kind of India many people think. But I do think that India deserve a place in the committee of nations. Many historical reasons why it was denied, but it needs to act with prudence. And it doesn't have to make people suffer, its own people for this goal of greater status. But it needs to improve its human development index. Without that, who will respect you if you have massive poverty in your midst, then we are asking others to recognize for other attributes that we may have that include Religion. And that religion unfortunately also has a hierarchical idea about caste born, you know, into a caste, impossible to change that. So all these modern liberals have trouble accepting the people who might accept are the Maga types. But they don't want India to be in or Indians to be in their world or I don't know which other civilizational state would accept India. Turkey? No. Hungary finished. Russia only for strategic reasons. You have a relationship. So Hinduism and Hindutva are all very unique to India. It's not clear. Even Nepal is not willing to consider India as their spiritual guru. So we need to, if I may so bluntly, just like we talk about Maga, the Hindutva people have to reform their idea of their religious concept of statecraft. Okay, they have insights from all these epics, but they have to reform this idea for 21st century. How do you play a global role? And that's where, you know, look at Vivekananda or Ramakrishna, all these people who did enormous, they recognize reform was needed for Indian religious ideas to become globally prominent. And they did achieve quite a bit, of course, with the limitations. And then they tied to that to independence movement and the Congress Party and all accepted the civilizational part with of course consequences with Pakistan and Islam. So I think a rethinking has to come to the intellectuals of the Hindutva that you have a role and a possibility to lead this country in the 21st century. So modernize your ideas. Don't say Manusmriti and Sanatana Dharma are all written there. We can't change any of that. They have changed. And if they can't change, there wouldn't have been a legislation on caste issues. So maybe some rewriting on what can do what we can do and include the global ideas of how others can be brought in, what kind of order we want to create. Without that, we just exist as a big chunk of humanity, one faith. And with a lot of problems. Yes, you play occasionally the elite games. That's not enough. You need to think much bigger. And it's funny how the Chinese, you know, despite all their problems, they have a lot of ideas in the not necessarily everything everybody wants to happen, but they are using the tributary model and ideas about how to attract other countries into their orbit. The whole trade link, the BRI Belt and Road initiative. And I was told that the Communist Party instills in every member from the local to the top. It's your responsibility to make China a great power or superpower. And that means you have to work, you have to deliver I don't think that has come to Indian ethos yet. So they may talk about the great power status rhetorically, but are they willing to work the village officer, the Panchayat officer, the district collector? If you are sitting on, I mean I have a discussion in my book. If you're sitting over the files of something that he can do within two seconds or two years, you are hurting India. You're not an agent of development. So it has to come to this fellow's mind, her head, that you will be helping India if you move that file in time and become an active agent of not just internal development, but as an active agent to acquire the global status that you deserve or your country deserve. That hasn't come because the political parties and the elite don't encourage them to think those lines. They are in their little world and money making world, you know.

[Dr. Sashi Kumar Sundaram]

So I agree. I think that and your book, you, you capture this tension in a very nice way, and I quote rhetoric as you say, on status among Indian elites. They aim to convince Indians that the world thinks highly of them. But they have made inadequate efforts to mobilize Indian society in a way that would actually heighten India's status abroad. This is in contrast to Chinese communist leadership which through propaganda often reminds the Chinese population of the need for higher status partially to rectify injustices for the hundred years of humiliation carried out by Western powers. And therein lies the contrast between the tensions on the Indian statecraft, if you like, and the Chinese statecraft. And of course we don't want to go down the route of Chinese style propaganda to keep the the entire population spellbound to one particular ideology. Nevertheless, when I read the book, I think the point that gets reinforced in this conversation as well on the notion that India needs to rethink its statecraft. It has to think big about particular understandings of power politics that is attuned to the times of our geopolitical world, particularly with the return of great power politics.

[Professor T.V. Paul]

I also want to bring another point which I forgot, which is India's engagement with the global academic world, scholarship on as well as journalism for that matter. India is very reluctant to engage scholars, especially critical scholars. You know, this OCI thing, they are blocking people who criticize even some minute way mentoring India. It's a big mistake. You need to convince these opinion makers of the world that India deserve a place and impress them because your soft power will not be known to others unless they write and engage you. When they write, they will be critical. Why do you have to be so thin skinned about Criticism. And so if India has to become a global power, a closed state with no intellectual activity possible, no criticism possible. And even today there's an article about the academic freedom of Indians themselves within India is completely marginalized. This is contrary to your goal. If your goal is recognition, acceptance by others, that other is who actually propagate the ideas. It's the journalists and of course social media people these days. But they will only accept, the world will only listen to authoritative writings and all that. And so why don't you engage them? Maybe there is a bit of insecurity, a fear that you may be losing in the debate. But look, Indians are very good at engagement. Adi Shantara, you know Vedanta, he spread it through traveling all over India, engaging the Buddhists and others and defeating them in debates. We know that, no? And why don't we debate the others? For that we need of course certain knowledge base and skill sets. But cutting off India, self defeating for a long time you cut off, nobody cares. We become a Myanmar, a big Myanmar by the way. And that is unfortunate. I may be harsh when I'm saying this because I want India to. Once again I want to say I want India to come up as an important global power. It will not happen if it's a purely bureaucratically or top leader going around and hugging people. But it will happen at the mass level, at the intellectual level, recognition of India's position. They have something called Raisina Dialogue in Delhi. You know, they only invite people who are very pro to India or who don't make a big splash in any ways. So they need to think about, I'm not dying to be invited. But the point is engage people who may differ with you but who have a good intention. They are differing because they would like India to succeed. And that include a large number of diaspora scholars who whatever reason, have the time and energy to read these things and their universities allow them to or think tanks allow them to do research and write. So engaging ideas is absolutely needed. And that's where the current leadership really have to rethink. You don't have to be so insecure. You have nothing to lose by face to face conversations with opinion makers of the world.

[Dr. Sashi Kumar Sundaram]

And this, this point is extremely important in the last sections of your book which, which also points out the importance of how India can become. Indian economy can become a central part of the trading and investor relations in the larger Indo Pacific region. Right. And I agree with you that it is important to be an open India, a country that is open to ideas, debates, and viewpoints and address its perennial sort of tensions both within India's domestic setting and in the international institutional environment to really rethink new ways of understanding India's statecraft. Unless we do that, we are in a long, unfinished quest for our status. So thank you Professor TV Paul, it was fantastic talking to you and I hope the book will be of great interest to both scholars and policymakers to read, rethink and engage with new ways of understanding India's engagement in world politics. Thank you very much.

[Professor T.V. Paul]

Yes, I appreciate your time and I also hope that people read the book without a prejudice or without a bias, like I am somehow biased against India. As an author, as a scholar, I have to be as honest as I can and as open minded as I can and that is what I'm trying to do. Hopefully there are ideas in it that others can pick it up. Thank you so much and best wishes to your own works. You also have a very interesting book called Rhetorical Powers you have recently published and I'm sure there are some connections there. And best wishes for all your efforts.

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