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Marshall Poe
Welcome to the New Books Network.
Podcast Host
Welcome to the podcast. Our guest today is Dr. Thomas Gidney, a postdoctoral researcher in international history and politics at the Geneva Graduate Institute. We'll be talking about his book today, An International Anomaly Colonial Accession to the League of Nations, published by Cambridge University Press in 2025. So Thomas, I thought we would start by asking you about the genesis of the book. You're tackling some very big themes about sovereignty and colonialism, but through a somewhat unusual lens of membership at the League of Nations. And I'd love to ask you how this angle sparked in your mind.
Dr. Thomas Gidney
Well, first of all, thank you for having me on the podcast today. I'm very excited to talk about the new book. The genesis for this project came for me a few years ago when I was on a university exchange at Jawaharal Nehru University in Delhi, and I was desperately looking for a sort of topic for a PhD and I came across India's very anomalous membership of the League of Nations whilst it was still a British colony. And I thought this is strange because it undermines a lot of what we expect from international organizations and their membership. For example, today at the United nations we see this very clear link between the sovereignty of member states and their membership. And it's a big, a big, big question for some sort of states in waiting. Obviously, like Palestine has come up a lot in the last few years as a potential member state. Currently it has observer status, but there's a very clear link. It's almost like a sort of stamp of recognition, international recognition that many liberation movements have sought over the decades, especially in the 1960s. But the question is, why did this happen in the period of the League of Nations? Does this idea that colonies being member states of an international organization undermine this link between sovereignty and membership? And I thought it was worth investigating and also opening up to other case studies too.
Podcast Host
Great, thank you. So, speaking of case studies, there are three primary cases which are quite different from each other and yet you put them into a coherent framework in this book. The cases being India, Ireland and Egypt. So could you tell us a bit about what historical questions you had in mind when you chose these three cases to discuss together?
Dr. Thomas Gidney
There are a few reasons why the book focuses on these three cases. The first is that the membership of colonies at the League of Nations was a purely British imperial phenomenon. No other empire included their colonies. And I think we'll get to that a bit later. Now, these are three examples of different colonies. In fact, Egypt wasn't technically a colony, but for de facto essentially was a colony. But there were also other British colonies such as the British Dominions. This means internally self governing, often white settler dominated colonies. So Canada, South Africa, New Zealand and Australia also became member states. There's a little more literature on them and I have used them to some extent, but I haven't really focused so much on their membership of the League of Nations for the reason that a there's already pre existing Literature. And B, they were sort of the states that. That in this system of including colonies, these were the states that were sort of destined to become member states of the League. This wasn't necessarily the case for India, which I've included as really the first case study, because it is a state that joins alongside the dominions as a founding member state of the League of Nations when it is there at the Paris Peace conference after the First World War in 1919. And essentially it joins alongside all these dominions that have a much higher constitutional status in the British Empire. The second case is Ireland, which joins in 1923. Now, this is interesting because it has a different position in the history of the British Empire, but also a different history and the position of the League. It doesn't join as a founding member, but it joins and has to go through the regular admissions process that the League of Nations sets. But it's also at a different point in the British Empire where it's struggling to deal with anti colonial nationalist movements, struggling to kind of keep its occupation within its colonies under control. And finally, Egypt is a much, much later case. In fact, it's the last member state to join the League of Nations, really at the League's decline in the late 30s, 1937. So it's at a time when most states have kind of realized that the League of Nations is a relatively impotent tool. And it's at obviously a very different stage of the British Empire where it's starting to face the rise of fascism in Italy, in Germany, and having to sort of pivot towards these new threats. So these are the three cases. But I also. The reason why these three cases came naturally to me was when I was looking at the League of Nations archives, I found a wonderful pamphlet written in 1920 by activists of these three countries that had gotten together to essentially petition the League to complain against British imperial rule in their colonies. And I really tried to find who these people were and see if how they all got in the same room together to sign this letter. And I struggled to find it. But it was fascinating to see a level of cooperation between these different movements too.
Podcast Host
Well, okay, great. That's a great start. And I guess one of the surprises I had in reading the book was in where you began. So I thought we would begin with discussions of Indian membership around the Paris Peace Conference. But actually in the book you take us a little further back in the history of international organizations and you also take us to a different part of the British Empire, to discussions of imperial federation in relation to South Africa. And I was wondering why you think this background that's specific to the evolution of the British Empire is so important to understanding these discussions around colonial membership after the First World War.
Dr. Thomas Gidney
So at the very beginning I said this was a purely British phenomenon. Only British colonies join the League of Nations. And so it's important to look at British imperial politics to understand why only Britain included its colonies and not France or Portugal or the Netherlands. And so for me, I think the main argument I have is that before the First World War, but really accelerating during the First World War, there's a growing tension between what I call the imperial Federalists, which are well known as the Imperial Federalists, but what I also call the Imperial Confederalists, those that have a more autonomous version of empire and want dominions to have or autonomy for themselves. And the book really starts around the formation of the Union of South Africa. And this is important because these two groups are embodied in a struggle here. So after the second Boer War, Alfred Milner is sent to be the sort of green governor of South Africa. And he has a group of young scholars from Oxford called the kindergarten. And these kindergarten are very keen to turn to sort of bring together the disparate colonies, both Afrikaner and English, in South Africa, whilst other leaders, especially the Africana ones. And we see this in the figure of Jan Smarts being the sort of more predominant figure and a very, very important figure throughout the book as also accepting South Africa's part within the British Empire because essentially the Dutch farmers, the Dutch speaking farmers, had fought against integration into the British Empire, but doing so as a highly autonomous entity. And this is important because the creation of the Union of South Africa is a sort of brings together these two tensions, but it also brings together a third tension, which is the rise of Indian nationalism. And as we know, as many Indians are very familiar with in the story of Gandhi, Gandhi really begins his, I suppose, radical radicalization, as the British might call it, against British imperial rule from the mistreatment of Indians and the discrimination against Indians. And part of this is actually pushed by Africana politics that is against the massive importation of essentially Indian and Chinese labor into South Africa, which they see as a sort of racial threat against white rule in South Africa. And so the British are sort of okay initially, they bring them in because they see it's cheap labor to exploit the mines in South Africa, but then realize that it causes a lot of tension with Africana politics and start to bring in more restrictive immigration. And this undermines a lot of the idea of imperial unity for many Indians. India itself has a burgeoning nationalist movement, especially in Bengal, that then expands more throughout India at this period and only becomes more inflamed during sort of the run up to the First World War. There's some very famous cases, the Komagata Maru cases Japanese steamer which is held in the port of Vancouver with many Sikhs on board that are not allowed to enter Canada. And then we see other things like the whites Australia policy. And essentially this idea that Indians are not sort of already second class citizens within the Empire becomes more more clear among many Indian nationalist organizations. All of these tensions accelerate during the First World War. Indian there's a famous mutiny which is quashed in Singapore by Indian troops. There's a revolutionary Punjabi movement, the Gaddas. And Indian politicians themselves have higher expectations that Britain will give more constitutional rights to India once the war is finished. Obviously millions of Indians contribute to the war effort too. So there's this sense that, you know, that they're owed constitutional development after the war. But the same feeling also runs parallel in the Dominions too, or the proto dominions at this point. So Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, they all send compared to the number of people, which is quite small at this point, a lot of troops obviously, famously for Gallipoli which has many Australians, or Vimy Ridge on the Western Front which has many Canadians. So sorry if I'm talking a bit too long. But there's also another important aspect which is the collapse of the Asquith government during the First World War and the replacement with Lloyd George who creates a coalition government. And a lot of this push towards colonial inclusion comes from Lloyd George. He brings together something called the Imperial War Conference and it is based on the Imperial Federalist Conferences that existed before the war, which was essentially an imperial federalist idea to give the Dominions a greater voice within the running of the Empire. Now the Imperial federalists hoped to create an imperial Parliament in which the Dominions would be represented at Westminster as if they were almost like constituencies within the United Kingdom. But the Dominions themselves don't want this level of integration, but they do want a voice within the running of the Empire. The question is whether India should also be included among these dominions. And so India actually does become a member of the Imperial War Conference, although its delegation is selected by the Government of India and the Secretary of State for India who is a British minister. So it's not a free. And I think this sets the scene for what's about to happen with the League of nations later on.
Podcast Host
One of the interesting analytical interventions you make in tracing these tensions through the First World War is the need to separate constitutional forms and their evolution from actual and substantial steps towards decolonization. That we need to kind of think about these apart if we're trying to understand what's really happening. So for example, these questions of membership in an international organization don't necessarily correspond directly to shifts in governance within India. I just want to ask why is this analytical separation so important in understanding what was at stake in the significance of colonial membership in the case of India specifically?
Dr. Thomas Gidney
So as I was sort of setting the scene, India joins the Imperial War Conference as a member with no control really of its delegation. It has appointees essentially by the British government. And it's the same thing that happens at the League of Nations. We know that it's not a free delegation. When the Paris Peace Conference finally comes, the Indian National Congress attempts to send its own delegation. So what the British are doing is they're creating a sense of constitutional development, a sort of promise that India is on the path towards nationhood. But they're doing it whilst essentially vacating it of any real power or meaning. These are purely symbolic gestures. And I think that this is a very important point of what the some's gone as the 1920s and it became more popularized again in the 90s, again is something called the third British Empire. It's a shift within the British imperial structure which acknowledges the different nationalities within the Empire. We realize it's not everyone's British, but tries to keep under everyone under this umbrella of the British Empire. And I think that this is what Indian membership is an attempt at doing. It's saying we realize that India has its own aspects as distinct from Britain, but in reality and is on a very slow path towards dominion status alongside Canada, alongside South Africa. But you know, at the same time we don't feel comfortable with, you know, Indians actually having a say in the running of their own country. There are elements of this that famously those who follow in history know of the Montague Chelmsford reforms in 1919. So it's some small constitutional reforms that create a upper and lower house. Though again, the electorate is very restricted to land owning or very rich land owning Indians. So again, these are four. These are forms of devolution which are largely symbolic, which essentially are trying to meet the growing demands for autonomy, but not really loosening the reins of power that Britain holds in India.
Podcast Host
Thanks. That brings up one of the very powerful threads of analysis throughout the book, which is fictitious Sovereignty as it is practiced in different parts of the British Empire. And I guess I wonder how you would assess the agency of Indians within this context. You point to a number of individuals who represented India in different kinds of ways. So someone like Srinivasa Sastri, who was a representative both at the Imperial War Conference and at the League of Nations. Do you see a kind of more or less continuity in the ways in which these Indians were able to speak and act? Or were there some specific constraints or possibilities in a new international organization like the League of Nations?
Dr. Thomas Gidney
There were many constraints. I think that the people like Shastri are very interesting. Vinit Thakur has written a book on a biography of Shastri because they make up this interesting group which are sort of Indian liberal moderates, moderates of the British term because they would have called Gandhi and Nehru the extremists at this time. Essentially people seeking for virtually full independence. The moderates are often underlooked because they don't really feature well in Indian national historiography as they're sort of seen as collaborators. But at the same time, they're people that are seeking sort of a dominion status or more autonomy for India, but within the British Empire. And many of them are representative of the old Congress before it really starts to change in 1919, 1920, as Gandhi becomes more influential, I think there are people that are seeking equality for Indians within the British Empire. So people like Shaspri were very keen to use the League as a tool to push for true equality for Indians within the Empire. But on the other hand, many of these other dominions were pushing back and using the League again to essentially say, look, they had no business having to accept Indian migration. And the issue here was, as the British didn't really want to air their dirty laundry in public, the whole structure became very, very complicated and became something known as interstate, this idea. And in the book, I compare it a bit like to the Holy Trinity, because it's this idea that you have these three different entities, but they're actually the same thing at the same time. The Holy Ghost, God and Jesus. But. And it's the same sort of idea that Canada, Australia, Britain, New Zealand, India and South Africa are all separate, but they're also part of the same entity as well. It becomes a real, really, really confusing for many international jurists at this time. So the idea that one part of the Empire can criticize another part of the Empire internationally becomes really confusing and very embarrassing. And India becomes this sort of saw within the British Empire because it has so Many issues, especially with other Dominion members, especially Australia and South Africa, but they don't want them to wear these grievances internationally. So they tend to do it in House at the Imperial Conferences. But it means that many Indian delegates, even if they do are seeking equality, are essentially gagged and not allowed to raise these issues in Geneva.
Podcast Host
I wonder how we might use this question of India's membership not only to look at tensions between the parts of the British Empire, but another thread that you also pick up on is different kinds of Indian nationalists. As you say, did different kinds of Indian nationalists disagree only on the steps towards greater autonomy, or did they also disagree over the. The form of sovereignty itself that was enshrined in the League? And is there a way to use this specific question of membership to look at broader debates around sovereignty as they are evolving in the Indian context?
Dr. Thomas Gidney
Yes, we see this change in the Indian National Congress after the First World War, and essentially the old hands, the old Congress who seek a more sort of constitutional evolution, are pushed aside. And these tend to be the people that end up going to the League as delegates. They're people with a lot of experience within the Indian government, government of India, but essentially they're quite loyal to the idea of the British Empire, whilst Gandhi transforms the party and essentially uses more direct methods, not violent, but hartals in Hindi, you know, sort of strikes, protests, you know, essentially defying British rule to get there. And you can see a different, different position in the League as well. I think Nehru at one point calls the League of Nations a band of robbers and sets up the League Against Imperialism in, I think it's 1927 in Brussels and has a big role there which is directly aimed against the League of Nations. So for the Indian National Congress, it's clear that the League is a farce and that they don't really have anything to do with it. Which is very interesting because obviously, remember that Nehru becomes a very influential figure later in the United Nations. So it's not an intrinsic hatred of international organizations, it's just a clear understanding that without free delegation, that it's essentially a farcical position for India to have a membership there. On the other hand, other. In one of the earliest books on India's membership of the League of Nations, Pharaoh Setna is a member of the Indian Legislative Assembly. So this sort of weak early parliamentary Parliament set up after 1919, and he's someone that uses his position to essentially say that the Legislative assembly should have a greater role in selecting delegates, not the government of India or the British government. So there are those that are seeking internal change and those that are reigning against India's membership from the outside, saying that it's all a fuss.
Podcast Host
I wonder if we might also zoom out a little bit back into the comparative frame of your book. And I'm thinking about this document that you found in the League of Nations archives of the 1920s about kind of possible cooperation across nationalists in the three cases that you look at, because what. What seems like a powerful narrative thread throughout the book is the shifting imperial policy of the third British Empire. What might be a bit more difficult to trace is whether there is also some kind of coherent transnational, either solidarity or at least Connecticut debates around what it would mean for nationalists to seek recognition through the League of Nations. And I wonder whether these debates that you see among Indian nationalists you see also in the other two cases that you analyze in terms of, for example, pro treaty and anti treaty nationalists in Ireland, or whether you think we need to deal with nationalist debates in these two cases more separately than that.
Dr. Thomas Gidney
There are important linkages and separations, but it's clear. So Eris Manila has his famous book, the Wilsonian Moment, which captures the massive enthusiasm within the colonized world when there's a belief that Woodrow Wilson, this great idealist American president, is going to support national self determination of them against within the British and French empires, which obviously doesn't end up happening because they're American allies. And Woodrow Wilson is not as big as an idealist as we know today. And so a lot of Irish nationalists in particular are very influential in American politics. And they go from loving the League of Nations and its ideas to absolutely detesting it and opposing America's entry into it because they see it a, as a, a sort of a fake project by the president who's betrayed them. But also they realize that Britain is going to have a dominant position in the League of Nations with all its dominions and India at its formation. Britain has six votes at the League assembly and there's a lot of resistance for the Irish to join the organization. The Egyptians too, probably not quite as jaded with the League as the Irish were. But there was definitely a sense of disappointment and wariness of an organization that Britain was so powerful in. So there's a level of enthusiasm that's seen in all three. You do find some pamphlets and letters written together by different nationalist groups, but it's not clear. There was a very concerted effort, the three of them working together. But also maybe there are some documents I didn't find, but I hadn't seen a lot of it. I've seen some evidence of some essentially some activistic behavior together, but never a very, very, very strong push by all three. However, you know, maybe there are some things just that we found in this, in this realm. Yeah, sorry. Let me collect my thoughts a second.
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Podcast Host
So if we stick with the comparative frame, but move back to the imperial policymakers, I wondered if I could ask you about a term that you bring up towards the end of the discussion about India, which is a process of dominionization, which if I understand correctly, describes a form of colonial state building that that is integral to this third British Empire that decentralizes but also tries to encourage ties across the British Empire. So it's not at all the kind of decolonial pattern, but one of maintaining the empire. And I wonder to what extent did British imperial policymakers learn as they go about this process of diminution in terms of the three case studies in this book in chronological order. And then to what extent does this process can we see it continuing through the 1930s?
Dr. Thomas Gidney
So Dominion status is a constantly evolving status. This is what's interesting. So initially it is just these sort of white settler economies that have greater internal self governance. But on the eve of the First World War, they don't really have independent foreign policies. They don't really have their own bureaucratic departments to manage diplomatic affairs. So they're very beholden to going to the British Foreign Office. So when they finally get membership of the League of Nations, it's actually a very big symbolic jump for them. And this is where things start to differ between India and the dominions. The 1920s sees a very rapid development of these state owned foreign policies, especially for Canada and South Africa. That are the states that want to assert their autonomy from Britain the most. New Zealand and Australia are a little less keen to do so. But essentially these different dominions use the precedents built off each other. So if one state managed to get one kind of greater example of external representation, the others would all seek that same level just as a sort of form of constitutional development. And so by the early 1920s, membership of the League of Nations is synonymous with dominion status. At this point it becomes part of dominion status. And so any colony that is anticipating to become a dominion can also anticipate to become a member of the League of Nations. It becomes even stranger obviously with the case of India because it's, you know, already a member. But for Ireland it's, it's an interesting part of the debates between Sinn Fein or Sinn Fein's representatives who come to London. Obviously we know later that Sinn Fein would split in two over these, over the treaty that is signed between, you know, the future Irish Free State and the British government to essentially ends, end the war. But Ireland becomes a very interesting example because the Free State, even though the Republicans who refused to sign the treaty and refused to sign up to the oath of allegiance, so essentially Irish politicians had to swear an oath of allegiance to the monarchy but were allowed in exchange this sort of quite autonomous Irish state. They attacked the, the attack the Irish Free State for being a sort of puppet in a stooge of the British government. But many Irish Free State politicians who had previously been in the IRA and the SIN fame before were not necessarily, you know, keen in saying the oaths of allegiance and actually were very keen to use the League of Nations as a form of asserting Irish statehood and Irish sovereignty. So one of the key elements is that when just before Ireland joins the League of Nations, there's a sort of propaganda battle between the pro treaty and the anti treaty treaty Acts because the pro treatyites want to make the case that the Irish Free State is the official Irish state. But the anti treaty actually realize the danger of membership of the Free State for them because they realize that it's going to get international recognition and it's going to delegitimize their own movement for an Irish republican. And so there is a propaganda battle here in Geneva to say to essentially try and convince the League who is the correct form of Irish state. Is it the underground government of Eamon de Velarra that is refusing to accept the Irish Anglo Irish treaty or.
Podcast Host
Is.
Dr. Thomas Gidney
It Arthur Griffiths and Michael Collins's sort of British Dominion state? Furthermore, once the Irish actually joined the League of Nations, and what is interesting here is that it joins not as a founding member. So one of the interesting points to note is why does India join the League of Nations? Because if a part of the uk, if Scotland tried to join the United nations today, it wouldn't be able to join. It would not meet the prerequisites to join. India does so because a loophole is drafted at the Paris Peace Conference that allows any signatory of the Treaty of Versailles or any of the other peace treaties to automatically join the League, irregardless of its status. Nonetheless, Article 1 of the League of Nations allows any self governing state, dominion or colony to become a member state of the League of Nations. Now India wasn't self governing, but through this loophole it was able to join. The question is, could Ireland join as as a dominion? And that suddenly caused some questions in Geneva. But at the end of the day the League of Nations said that the Irish Free State was sufficiently self governing, even if it was dominion and part of the British Empire to become a member state of the League.
Podcast Host
Great. Thanks, Thomas. So now moving on to this third case study of Egypt. What's striking is the similar timeframe of independence, or at least nominal independence between Egypt and Ireland, but very different timings of accession to the League of Nations. I was wondering how you approached this puzzle and what kinds of questions around sovereignty this lag brought up for your historical account.
Dr. Thomas Gidney
It's one of the puzzling questions because initially when I came to this topic I thought that the. So because all three of these case studies had very active national independence movements, I thought that giving League membership was an easy way to sort of placate these nationalist movements. But it's strange that Egypt, which was had one of the most successful movements, essentially the Egyptian Revolution of 1919, which really rattled the British administration to its core, was one of the last states to, or the last state to join the League of Nations. So for me it was a bit of an interesting case to sort of delve into. There is not much written about Egypt's membership of the League as well, mostly because it is the last member state to do so. So Egypt, just to get the technicalities out the way, wasn't technically a British colony, but was an Ottoman one, but under essentially British occupation since the 1880s. And when the First World War broke out, obviously the Ottoman Empire declared war on Britain and France and so Britain seized Egypt for itself. As a British protectorate. And there was a lot of hope among Egyptians that it would gain independence after the war, which the British were not keen on doing at all. But because of the Egyptian revolution, they were really forced to look at what status they could give to Egypt. Again, not to placate Egyptians, even though they didn't really want to lose control in Egypt, mostly because of control of Suez, but also it's not really mentioned very much control of the Nile as well. This is an angle that's often forgotten about Egypt, too, is that the Nile led deep into Britain's empire in Africa. So this was an extremely important part of the empire. For these two reasons, ultimately, Britain decides to unilaterally declare Egypt to being independent. And what I mean by unilateral is this, unlike in Ireland, where there's a negotiation between my Michael Collins and parts of Sinn Fein, there are negotiations with the predominant Egyptian nationalist party, which is called the waft, the Delegation party, because they sent a delegation to the. Or attempted to send a delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, which was actually arrested and deported to Malta. But these negotiations didn't really lead anywhere. And there was one main sticking point, which becomes a sort of recurring theme throughout the chapter on Egypt, which is control of Sudan. And Egyptian nationalists claimed that Sudan was part of Egypt because Egypt, in the 19th century, under Muhammad Ali, had conquered Sudan, and he had then been reconquered following the famous revolution by the Mahdi, who kicks the Egyptians out, had been recaptured by the British and ruled as a condominium. So the British and Egyptians held joint rule of Sudan, and the British were not keen on seeing Sudan go to an independent Egypt, and they were scared that they would lose control of Sudan. So ultimately, no deal was struck with the wafts, but the British decided to declare Egypt to be independent on their own terms. This meant that, again, this is a very recurring theme. It's a symbolic form of independence stripped of any real practical meaning, because Britain held something called the reservations, which was large control over Egypt's army, its communications and its foreign policy. And Britain maintained an occupying force within Egypt. But it did mean that Egypt was allowed to operate a government, a parliament, an upper house, also had a monarchy too, which would have some say within the domestic administration of the country. So this independence, this unilateral declaration, happens within weeks of Ireland also becoming a free state, except in the case of Ireland, the next year it would become a League member, and for Egypt, it wouldn't happen for another 15 years. So what goes wrong? And essentially what goes wrong Is that the, and this is an interesting part of what League membership can mean is that though the League allowing nationalist movements this kind of, you know, dangling in front of them, this sort of bauble of saying, oh, you can join the League of Nations is quite attractive. The League of Nations is not a completely impotent tool for a independent state. The British are scared that if Egypt does join the League of Nations and hasn't settled the question over Sudan, that they'll be able to use the League as a place to essentially condemn Britain and maybe bring a case to the International Court of Justice against Britain over who actually owns the Sudan. And the British, even though they have quite a dominant part the League, they think this could be a mess. They don't want to get embroiled in this kind of conversation where they could be dragged in front of the International Court of Justice. And they just think the whole thing could be an embarrassment and a potential threat to their rule in Sudan. So Britain says we are going to control these elements of your foreign policy until you have struck a deal with us. And then we'll relinquish these parts of these reservations and return to you your ability to have a foreign voice. And this goes on for a long time. And there are some very heated moments essentially as Britain starts a process of de Egyptianization in Sudan. The local Governor General is the least dak is assassinated by Egyptian nationalists on the streets of Cairo and the British launch full scale retribution. Essentially the demand large amounts of payment for the death of the and the death of the Governor General and essentially reoccupy large parts of Egypt. And the Egyptian waft makes an appeal to Geneva for protection, but it falls on deaf ears. Essentially what happens is this very, very long period and we're not going to go in detail into it because it can get very, very repetitive of Egyptian governments rising and falling, negotiating with the British, coming very, very close on several occasions, but then always getting stuck on the position of Sudan. This did you want to raise it? I feel like I'm talking to a long time. So eventually this deadlock breaks in 1935 and in 1935 it's a sort of external pressure that breaks the deadlock in Egyptian and British negotiations, which is Italy's invasion of Abyssinia or as we know, Ethiopia. This is a really big deal for both Britain and Egypt because Egypt is neighboring Ethiopia. But the Italians themselves are selling themselves as this up and coming power. They occupy Libya at this point. They have a very large Mediterranean navy and there is a lot of attraction among imperial imperialists in Italy to reconquer Egypt as part of this sort of new Roman Empire. Mussolini is planning to bring back the mare nostrum of the, you know, essentially Italian control of the Mediterranean. And Egypt is a key part of this. And what makes things more threatening for British rule in Egypt is that there's a very large number of Italian expatriates, or immigrants, as you want to call them, living particularly in Alexandria. They are very well organized, they are well funded. And many of them, especially the newer migrants, are strong fascist sympathizers. They themselves also impact Egyptian politics. The WAFT is starting to lose its monopoly on Egyptian politics because people are starting to see it as relatively impotent. They haven't achieved essentially the end of the reservations. They haven't achieved league membership. They haven't achieved full independence. And other more, one could say ultra nationalist or sort of fascistic groups start to arise at the Young Egypt Party, also known as the Green Shirts, because they have a paramilitary wing. Anytime there's a sort of color and shirts as the second World, you can often tell it's a sort of quasi fascist organization. So the WAFT itself is actually threatened by the rise of fascist politics because they're losing their monopoly in power. Also, the Italians are becoming quite threatening because Egypt doesn't want to become another Libya or another Ethiopia, Especially as the war crimes start to mount in Abyssinia. I mean, the Italians are famous for massacring the inhabitants of Addis Ababa. They bomb and gas hospitals, essentially. This even though the Egyptians are quite keen to sometimes negotiate with Italians as leverage against the British, they do not want to see Egypt become a war zone. And as the Egyptian army at this point is by because of British politics, is a minor defense force, they realize that if Italy wants to invade, they would be reliant on the British. So there's a pressure on both Britain and Egypt to come to the table. And in the winter of 1935, a lot of the Egyptian political groups also come together to essentially negotiate. Well put pressure on the British. There are large student riots, but also there's pressure to actually finally get a deal. And so the British compromise on Sudan. They allow Egyptians to recolonize Sudan and have essentially the condominium agreement is sort of re revitalized. And there were other essentially plans to allow to minimize the British occupation within Cairo and essentially center it around Suez, which is really Britain's main interest. And this comes to a head with the Anglo Egyptian treaty of 1936, which opens the gates for Egypt to join the League of Nations. So again instead of Britain. So Britain, which has held off on Egyptian membership for 15 years, finally gives the green light and, and supports Egypt's accession to the League of Nations. As I mentioned before, Egypt is the last member state to join the League of Nations. And this is an interesting point because at this point everyone has lost faith in the League's ability to essentially manage conflict. At this point the Egyptians can't really expect the League to be a shield against an Italian invasion. However, for them it is a status symbol and this is why it's so important. The Egyptian Nationalist Party such the waft, used this as a great kind of coming of age of the Egyptian state to parade their delegation in front of the other countries, the other member states and state that Egypt has reached a point in which it is ready in its self governance to sit among the family of nations. And this is exactly what the British had sort of intended colonial membership to be. And so it's interesting that even at this point an anti colonial nationalist organization still wants to join an international organization which has been written off by most of the world as relatively impotent.
Podcast Host
Yeah, I really want to follow up on that because as you say, membership in 1937 was unlikely. Well, given what we now know to yield material changes of a significant scale. But there's nonetheless this what I find somewhat surprising observation. You make that in the case of Egypt, but across the three cases that a good number of anti colonial nationalists find a lot of significance in League membership. And I was wondering how you might compare them to reflect on under what conditions League membership held the most significance for nationalists who we might not obviously expect to deem membership to be of significance.
Dr. Thomas Gidney
On three case studies. It was ironically the most skeptical of the three case studies, which is Ireland, which clearly gains the most from its membership. In their case, even though there's this anger at Wilson's organization being dominated by Britain and not allowing colonies to join, the Irish really use the, or attempt to use the League as a stepping stone as much as they potentially can. And Ireland drifts away from the British empire throughout the 1930s. And even politicians such as Eamon de Valera, who was very critical of the League, critical of the Free State, essentially becomes the president of the League council in the 1930s and a very active member of the League of Nations. So I think in Ireland's case you can definitely see the League becoming an important badge of Ireland's growing statehood and clearly a path towards Irish independence. In that regard, I think India is completely the Opposite. On the other hand, Indians themselves might make a few small headways in changing the delegation because essentially in the first few years, the delegation was always headed by a white or European colonial officer. By the 1930s, the delegations were generally headed by Indians. But again, they were selected loyalists by the Government of India and the Secretary of State for India. So they were, I think, from the Indian nationalist perspective, the Indian membership of the League was always a farce. And in the case of Egypt, they didn't really have enough time to enjoy their membership before the League came crashing down during the Second World War. And the League didn't protect Egypt against Britain either, because Britain essentially reoccupied Egypt when the war broke out and arrested the King for being too pro fascist during the Second World War. So it was essentially largely symbolic for the Egyptians with very, very few practical benefits.
Podcast Host
Well, at the end of the book, you take the story through the Second World War and beyond and you write about the way in which the third British Empire couldn't really survive beyond the Second World War for a number of reasons. And I wonder what this vantage point of Second World War, what does it reveal about the specific conditions of the interwar period that allowed this third British Empire to evolve and to survive?
Dr. Thomas Gidney
I mean, the third British Empire was really created on the idea that the common, essentially even racial, it's sort of racial European, but also like Anglo Saxon cultural ties would mean that places like Australia, New Zealand, Canada, not speaking about the Quebecois, obviously, who were not British and English settlers in South Africa would essentially always have a connection to their homeland. And so the idea of the third British Empire was that these common ties would mean that the British government could allow a level of autonomy for these places because they would always be loyal. And then it's an expansion of that because there's an idea when the Afrikaners join in South Africa that, and, you know, Jan Smuts comes onto the scene that, you know, you can have a different culture, yes, they're still white, but they're not British. And they did fight a war against Britain. But that the common ties of Empire which allow different national communities to exist under a greater sort of superstructure, could continue. And this is, this is the experiment to a more limited extent in India and other places, this idea that common ties in British governance could essentially keep the British Empire together. It's actually one of the reasons why Egypt did not become a dominion and they chose full independence because they believed that Egypt's governing structure was very different from India's and had, was essentially didn't have the same sort of British institutions. This doesn't really work for many reasons because yes, it's true that there's a level of loyalty from the more Anglo Saxon states and Australia and New Zealand still stay very close to Britain after the Second World War. But the moment that other nationalist groups can essentially gain power, they essentially try and diverge from Britain's foreign policy very, very quickly. And you see this in Ireland in the 1930s. Ireland doesn't join the Second World War. I think famously Eamon de Valera sends a condolence note to Germany when Hitler commits suicide. Then India, which gains independence in 1947, actually does join the United nations as a founding member. And this is interesting because the same loophole that was used at the Paris peace Conference in 1919 is reused again at San Francisco Conference in 1945, which allows any participant at the conference to automatically join regardless of their status. And so the Philippines, so an American colony and India gain membership at the United Nations. What's very different is that the following year in 1946, India is still a colony, but Nehru and the Indian National Congress are allowed to form a provisional government. And at this and at the first General assembly of the United nations in 1946, the Indian National Congress can send their own delegation and everything changes. The new delegation, which is led by Nehru's sister Vijay Alakshmi Pandit, pursue an aggressive policy against South Africa because essentially this South Africa had actually been India's main opponent in the interwar period. Now they're not restrained by Britain anymore, the gag has been removed and they launch an attack against South Africa for this sort of proto apartheid because the full policy of apartheid will arrive in 1948. But there's already a lot of anti Asian policies that have been brought in South Africa. And this is very embarrassing because India starts to side with other states like the USSR against Britain. And Britain has to support South Africa to maintain this imperial unity, to retain interstate. And so this all becomes crashing down in the first General assembly when India, which is still a British colony in 1946, takes a completely different line to what Britain has told it to do by 1947. I mean, India is still technically a dominion when it becomes independent. But at this point dominion status has again changed. Dominion status is now pretty much effectively independent in 1947, once India gets there. And so and Ireland. So Ireland and India are really changing what it means to be a dominion from essentially part of the British Empire to almost a de facto independent state. And at this point intese the Structures of the British Empire. The third British Empire can't really survive anymore.
Podcast Host
I want to now pick up on another comparative dimension in the book, which is not just about different parts of the British Empire, but also the British Empire among other empires. And why there is this peculiarly British story of colonial membership. Something you've mentioned a few times already, is this kind of construction of racial and cultural order within the third British Empire that allows for this. That allows for colonial membership. And I wonder if that is put in comparative perspective, what is it that is so specifically British about this construction of race and culture that other European empires don't follow?
Dr. Thomas Gidney
What's important to know is that other states were paying attention when Britain did this. France in particular, which is the other major imperial power at the League of Nations, looks at this and they say, okay, you know, Britain's going to get extra votes here. They were not particularly happy of Britain having a predominant position, but I think that France in 1919 wasn't actually a very strong believer in the League of Nations. Initially, they didn't think it was going to be a particularly powerful organization. And the French start to feel sidelined when they're. When there's questions such as the resurrection of Germany, should Germany join the international community again? And there, when Britain is pushing this, I think the French start to see themselves as outnumbered. So the French look at their own colonies and they compare their colonies to the British ones and they say, you know. And there's a debate I found in the Paris archives, which I think is. Was really fascinating between these different colonial governors as to whether France should follow suit and allow its colonies and mostly its protectorates. So here we're talking about Tunisia, Morocco and Southeast Asia. So I think at this point, I don't know if, Andrew, it would have been Android or whether they would have split it between Cambodia and Vietnam and Laos should have become independent members of the League of Nations, even though they would have been under French control. And there was a. The conversation certainly did veer towards allowing them to join at one point, but there was this belief that at the same time, these were not really places where they racial or cultural connection to France in the same way that Canada or Australia or New Zealand had. They didn't really broach the topic too much of India, but they noted that the. Obviously the Indian delegation required a lot of supervision. And the French didn't like the idea of all of their colonial delegations having to be essentially supervised. So I think that they struggled to find a large enough white settler community outside of France to really turn into like a model member state. Algeria would have been a potential example because in many ways it resembled a lot of a bit like South Africa with a sort of large white settler community and a larger local community, Arab community, rather than African. But Algeria had obviously become part of France at this point, so that wasn't really an option. So I think there is this belief that in Britain, these racial, cultural, British links would mean that these colonies would never really abandon Britain. That there was a sense of there was a trust and loyalty in them. And where there wasn't a trust and loyalty, such as in India, that essentially the sort of supervising power could. The supervising delegate, member could essentially lead the other delegates to do what they wanted versus in France, where they just couldn't really find a good example. So they bowed out of doing this, even though they did consider doing it in the case of the United States before they had officially decided not to sign the Versailles Treaty, which meant that they didn't join the League of Nations. Essentially a lot of detractors of the League of Nations and the treaty did use Britain's predominant position and said things along the point line of, oh, should the United States start to include its different states as member states as well? But ultimately the United States didn't join. But the United States would probably have been the country that would have pushed back on Britain's multiple membership the most if it had joined.
Podcast Host
Thanks, Thomas. And I guess now trying to relate this history from the first half of the 20th century about colonial membership in the League to decolonization in the second half of the century. Are there ways in which this history can explain some of the differences in which European Empire is decolonized in the latter half of the century? I'm thinking about not only Britain and France, but also Dutch Empire, Portuguese Empire. Does the peculiarly British story here echo through this kind of important process that begins after the Second World War?
Dr. Thomas Gidney
I think that there's a very. John Darwin has a great sentence about how the UN becomes this arena through which new national identities can be paraded to the world stage. This doesn't happen at the League. And so there's a difference here because at the League, different African and Asian nationalist groups are skeptical of the League as a tool of British imperialism. This happens in the early days of the UN too. The UN does try to has many of the same failings of the League in its initial creation. But I think first of all, the United states and the USSR's membership of the UN makes it a very different organization. But the fact that India becomes independent and a very active member sets a new precedent for the un. And I think that African leaders, Asian leaders, can start to see the UN as more than just a sort of pawn of British imperial power, that it can be a relatively useful place to essentially assert one's sovereignty. And so by the 1960s, when African decolonization is in full swing, there aren't that many detractors within the African nationalist movements. I mean, honestly, like the many states join the United nations within days of independence. There's no push and fro like there was in the Irish nationalist movement, where the whether to join or not, it's seen as automatic and pretty much a badge of statehood from the get go. What is quite interesting though is that one of the in some ways colonial membership continued to exist through a new form in the un. I gave the example of India and the Philippines. But when the United States and Britain wanted USSR to come a member of the UN and they had to be convinced to do so, Stalin pushed back and wanted to include all of the internal Soviet republics of the USSR within the un. And there was a lot of pushback. Again, the US threatened to include all of its states at the UN if the USSR did this. And the compromise essentially was for allowing India and the Philippines, which would become independent in 1947, to gain membership of the UN. Two Soviet Socialist Republics, which were Ukraine and Belarus, would have to become founding UN member states. And so until 1991, Ukraine SSR and Belarus SSR were both parts of the USSR which had its own membership and UN member states. And it was very funny because the British hated this and they called them at the UN the two Stooges, because they always voted alongside Russia. They never really deviated from their position. And I thought it was a very interesting sort of way in which the Russians were the ultimate champions of this kind of colonial membership of the League of Nations, because they were the ones that carried it on until the 90s. But I think that even today there are some interesting examples we can look at. So I was contacted a couple of years ago by a professor in Iceland who was looking at the case of Greenland. And Greenland came up a lot in the news this year. Obviously, the US has been threatening to annex it, but Greenland itself has a very active independence movement. But within the Greenlandic independence movement there is some trepidation because through being part of Denmark, it has a lot of perks from being part of the European Union. So there was some debate as to whether Greenland could be a fully autonomous region within Denmark. With a separate seat at the United nations, separate from Denmark. So essentially pretty much fully independent, but symbolically still being connected to Denmark to have access to the European market and European Union still. And it is interesting to look at the precedents from the early UN in the League of Nations to state that this could potentially happen. So it's not even though this kind of colonial membership idea is now defunct. And I think today we really see this very clear line between sovereignty, state sovereignty and membership. And we see it as a sort of a stamp and an approval of having made it to statehood. And I think that if states like Kosovo or Palestine gain UN membership, it will be a very important part of their status. And both of these movements, both the Palestinian Authority and Kosovo, have actively been seeking membership of the un. It would be very strange to kind of go back to a place where we could allow regions within countries or essentially other parts of Puerto Rico, for.
Podcast Host
Example.
Dr. Thomas Gidney
Which is essentially a United States territory, to become member states of the un.
Podcast Host
Thanks a lot, Thomas. I mean, that's fascinating point in the contemporary world to end on. And I think. Yeah, it's been a pleasure learning about your book, and thanks a lot for being on the podcast.
Dr. Thomas Gidney
Thank you.
Podcast: New Books Network
Episode: Thomas Gidney, "An International Anomaly: Colonial Accession to the League of Nations" (Cambridge UP, 2024)
Date: December 18, 2025
Guest: Dr. Thomas Gidney
Host: New Books Podcast Host
This episode explores Dr. Thomas Gidney's new book An International Anomaly: Colonial Accession to the League of Nations. The conversation delves into the paradox of colonial or non-sovereign entities like India, Ireland, and Egypt obtaining membership in the League of Nations—a body conventionally reserved for sovereign states. Through these case studies, the episode dissects how the British Empire uniquely used international membership as both a tool of symbolic advancement and a mode of imperial control. The episode also compares the British approach to those of other contemporary empires and reflects on the legacies of these anomalies in modern international relations.
[02:30] - [03:57]
"Does this idea that colonies being member states of an international organization undermine this link between sovereignty and membership?" — Dr. Thomas Gidney [03:21]
[04:21] - [07:20]
[08:03] - [13:35]; [28:29] - [33:12]
[13:35] - [16:27]; [33:47] - [44:47]
"These are forms of devolution which are largely symbolic, which essentially are trying to meet the growing demands for autonomy, but not really loosening the reins of power." — Dr. Thomas Gidney [15:55]
[16:27] - [22:40]; [33:47] - [44:47]
"India becomes this sort of sore within the British Empire...many Indian delegates, even if they do are seeking equality, are essentially gagged and not allowed to raise these issues in Geneva." — Dr. Thomas Gidney [18:53]
[22:40] - [25:52]; [28:29] - [33:12]
[44:47] - [47:36]
[52:32] - [56:56]
"There was a trust and loyalty in them. And where there wasn't a trust and loyalty, such as in India...the supervising power could...lead the other delegates to do what they wanted." — Dr. Thomas Gidney [55:17]
[56:56] - [62:41]
On the paradox of colonial membership:
"It undermines a lot of what we expect from international organizations and their membership." — Dr. Thomas Gidney [02:49]
Comparing Ireland and India:
"The Irish really use the, or attempt to use the League as a stepping stone as much as they potentially can... India is completely the opposite." — Dr. Thomas Gidney [45:48]
On symbolic reforms:
"Constitutional development, a sort of promise that India is on the path towards nationhood... whilst essentially vacating it of any real power or meaning. These are purely symbolic gestures." — Dr. Thomas Gidney [14:50]
On the British colonial system compared to the French:
"There was this belief that in Britain, these racial, cultural, British links would mean that these colonies would never really abandon Britain." — Dr. Thomas Gidney [55:23]
On the anomaly of the League compared to the UN:
"At the League, different African and Asian nationalist groups are skeptical of the League as a tool of British imperialism... By the 1960s, when African decolonization is in full swing... it's seen as automatic and pretty much a badge of statehood from the get go." — Dr. Thomas Gidney [58:06]
The conversation is scholarly but accessible, balancing historical specificity with big-picture analysis. Dr. Gidney draws on detailed archival research, candidly discussing ambiguities and complexities while highlighting the paradoxes at the heart of the British international imperial project.
For listeners seeking a nuanced understanding of how international organizations intersected with colonial politics—and the enduring legacy of these dynamics on global governance—this episode is a rich resource.