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- [00:01]
A
Welcome to the People Power Politics Podcast, brought to you by cedar, the center for Elections, Democracy, Accountability and Representation at the University of Birmingham. Hi everyone and thanks for joining us on another episode of the People Power Politics Podcast. My name is Timitayo Odeyemi, Research Fellow in Democratic Resilience at cedar and I'm your host today. I'm delighted to welcome to the podcast Dr. Adeyui Akianla, Associate professor of Politics on International Relations at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa, and co editor of a major book titled African Union and Agenda 2063 the past, present and Future, published by the University of Johannesburg Press. Today we'll be using the African Union's 20th anniversary in Agenda 2063 as a gateway to reflect on Africa's political trajectory, the state of democracy, the balance between continental ambition and national realities, and Africa's voice in a sort of shifting global order. Welcome to the podcast, Dr. Adeye.
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B
Thank you so much, Dr. Adeyemi, for having me on the program and I look forward to deeper engagement with you even as the program unfolds.
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A
Right, let's begin with how you came to this project, this particular book on Africa and Agenda 2063. What drew you personally to want to reflect on the African Union at 20 and how did sort of symposium you had? How did it lead to this book coming about?
- [01:39]
B
I will start by giving a very short background about how the book came into being. Then I was the head of research and teaching at the Institute for Pan African Thought and Conversation at the University of Johannesburg and we just started a unit we call African Union Studies at the Institute. It's a special program where we intend to begin to study the working modalities of the African Union and also begin to train future diplomats and workers that will assume positions not just in the African Union in wex and also in many of the foreign policy foreign affairs departments in AU Embassy, just to increase the capacity of the African Union to deliver on their promise of attaining the Africa we want. So at that point in time, the year also coincided with their 28th commemoration of the establishment of the African Union. So we just felt, okay, it's better also to start looking at the performances of the African Union for the past 20 years. So we conveyed a symposium where we had a partner Trust Africa from West Africa. And we put together about 168 people here in Pretoria to engage for three days looking at not just criticizing the African Union, but somehow also critiquing where possible, and also to be able to celebrate some of the moderate achievements that the African Union has managed to record over the past 20 years. But because the Agenda 2063 at that time was about nine years plus, we also felt it was also important to touch base on Agenda 20 since it has become the continental blueprint for good governance, development, peace and security, or generally prosperity on the continent. So we know that that's where the future lies. And it will be important to also, in a way, look at the performances of AU towards delivering on Agenda 2063. So the intention to write the book emerged during the meeting because of the quality of presentations, engagement, dialogues, and because of also the quality some of the people we invited to come, you know, and speak. So we just decided to commission a book and it was sponsored by UC1 in West Africa and they funded the book. So that was how we arrived at where we are.
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A
Thank you very much. So, drawing on the insights and all the arguments that you have put together in the book, now if you were to summarize where the African Union stands today, politically and institutionally, what kind of story would you tell? Is this a moment of confidence or.
- [04:28]
B
Just sort of crossroads? I think it's a missed feeling. And I'm not just speaking about my opinion, I'm speaking about my reflection because of also my engagement with the African Union and also because of the perspectives, or let me say, research based perspective of some of the authors. If you run through the book, I think it's a mystery and some of them are so pessimistic about the performance of the African Union, but some are also relative, relatively optimistic. And for some people it's as if maybe the African Union do not even assist in the first place. But if you look at it holistically, my arguments are founded on two very strong solid foundation. One is that the African Union is not a supranational organization. So one will be naive to compare it with the European Union, for instance, which is supranational with Biden authorities guidelines on member states, because the member states agreed to surrender part of their sovereignty to the center. But in the case of African elites, and they are so afraid to yield some of their sovereignty to the African Union. So African Unity operates as an international organization. So there is a limitation to what they can actually achieve. That's, you know, on the one side then secondly, the African Union will be as strong as the strength of his member state. I think we also have to be cognizant of that. The African Union relatively performed a little bit better. Better when we had strong character as leaders of some of the major powers in Africa. So collectively they could drive the agenda of the African Union. And they support the African Union in terms of finances, in terms of willpower. So that's one way to look at the African Union. But if you also look at the leadership of the African Union itself, their mindset, their approach to continental issues, then you are seeing some reluctance, some relatively lack of political will, not just institutional capacity. Sometimes they are too slow to react to many issues. And maybe that's also about the configuration of the working modality of the African Union itself. So if you look at it generally, my last statement is just about Africa is still better with the African Union around. It could have been worse without the African Union.
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A
Okay, that's interesting to note. Just taking it off from the point you make about the role of the elite and all of that. The EU was meant to be a union of the peoples, to quote that, not only of government. Two decades after you think the AU has brought African citizens any closer to continental politics? Or has it just remained an elite, primarily an elite project, to put it.
- [07:21]
B
That way, I'm sure the leadership of the AU will be sincere. They will also agree that it has been elitist. It's been driven by political elite political leaders, presidents, ministers of African state. Unlike what we have in a functional, maybe continental organization where you have the bureaucrats coming stronger into this space, you have the civil society actors representing the citizens becoming more active. But within the African Union that we have not really seen an integration of the citizen with the activities of the African Union. Many Africans don't even know there's an organization called African Union. For some of them, you ask them, where is the African Union located? They won't even know. I teach politics and even something. The philosophical foundation of the African Union called Pan Africanism is something that has been eroded. Many postgraduate students are not even conversant with the idea any longer. And if you look at it, of course the African Union tried to respond to this by trying to strengthen the ecosoc, which also governor civil society at all, representing the people directly and integrate them with the workings of the African Union. And antique ECOSOC have also been trying one of the agencies of the African Union try to integrate the people with, you know, the activities of the African Union. And I also know that they've tried also to somehow integrate the youth relatively by, you know, putting, establishing some position they call maybe the African Youth Union youth ambassadors. And they make it regional, where they bring youths from the six regions and they try to galvanize the youth in their region and Integrate them with the working modality of the African Union. But if you look at it particularly at the decision level, making, you know, that is very elitist, is driven by the decisions of the General Assembly. The General assembly is composed of presidents. So the voice of somebody like me would not matter to the African Union. So it's not, not people centered at all.
- [09:33]
A
So that that could then link to the idea of democratic norms and realities more broadly on the continent and how this would then link to the sort of ways that people are flowing with. Whatever it is that the African Union, even in its elitist form, as you put it, or whatever it is that it is putting out now, the African Charter on democracy, elections and governance. I mean, that should perhaps be one of the continent's most ambitious frameworks, to put it that way. Yet we have seen coups, military coups, the latest being in Madagascar, protest some sort of shrinking civic spaces here and there. What does this tension between democratic aspiration and political reality tell us about where democracy stands in Africa today?
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B
Well, I want to assume the democracy we are talking about is representative liberal democracy. And over the years there was a time military regime was so popular in Africa, particularly across West African countries. But in the last 25 years, it looked as if that maybe because of the ways of democracy, the Washington Consensus, the conditionality clause of the Bretton Wood Institution to advance loan, and maybe some manipulative strategy one way or the other, it look as if Africa as a continent began to accept liberal democracy as the most effective political political system that can guarantee inclusive development, stability and peace. So most African countries actually accepted liberal democracy and they began to vote for their leaders. But if you notice by 2020, 2021, that wasn't smudged with declining democratic performance. But that was when the reality hit Africa, when many countries in Africa began to come under undemocratic government. Military coup in about nine countries now, I think the African Union sits at top about six. What is six, nine countries under military regime. I know Mali since August 2020, Chad since April 2021. Guinean is about, I think September 2021. Sudan October 2021 and Burkina Faso, January 2022. Niji July 2023. We had it in Gabon two years ago, August 2023. Now in Madagascar. And if you have an organization that tend to establish with the mandates to promote democracy, and we have democratic reversals as we have it currently, then you know that democracy and democracy has performed poorly in Africa. More so because the AU also has been naive in also trying to react to military coup. Without actually putting a check on the excesses of the political elite that turn the dividends of democracy to punishments of democracy. So well that that's the way to put it. It doesn't matter the protocol. Of course there are many protocols on non constitutional government. But you also know that many African presidents have manipulated the constitution to stay in power. They have designed many strategies, manipulative indeed to stay in power forever. Paul Biya is still there in Cameroon. Since I've grown up, I've also always known Paul Bia to be the president of Ghana. He doesn't even live in Africa. And there are other comrades within the circle of the African Union that have been engaging in what we call democratic autocracy in Africa. So one wouldn't be surprised to also witness these waves or what they call epidemics of military coup or democratic reversals in Africa. Democracy has not delivered in Africa.
- [13:37]
A
Perhaps on a more positive note, some would argue that these setbacks that you have highlighted, the AU has been very crucial in preserving a minimum commitment to say, elections to rights and peace. I know you've produced other works that have looked at all this aspect of regional integration and some of the roles that the AU plays also. Others on the other hand, see its influence as quite limited. Even despite all the contributions, to put it that way. How effective has the AU actually been in defending democratic norms and institutions across its member states? Just building on what you have just narrated.
- [14:18]
B
That's the point I'm making. There's just little the African Union could do. Protocols are meant to be enforced, but if there is no enforcer, then that means what we have is an system close to state of nature. Of course they have some instruments where they tend to be able to diplomatically influence countries to respond to ad hire with their protocols or their norms and principles. And they have instituted, you know, institutes, institutions like maybe panel of the Wise, you know, dispatching emissaries to countries, you know, maybe after breakdown of order. So remember where I started from that the African is still better off with the African Union. The African Union do not plan co, they don't overthrow government. But ordinarily the expectation is that they respond to such breaches of their norms. But they also rely on member state, the commitment of member state, the commitments of Rex, the regional economy commissions in those regions. Because somehow they tend to wait for them to act, then they support them so that we don't have conflicts of interest in terms of responding to some of these absolutes overthrow of constitutionalism in those days. But one will also be naive not to also mention some of the direct contributions, particularly in terms of strengthening free and fair democracy in member states. We have the AU observer team electoral nations going to countries not even during election as many people would think. They usually dispatch their team to countries even before election to understand the nuances. So that it's just like an early warning system so that they can vote, they can diplomatically engage with countries. So they have done that. And even I think it was 2023 that their APRM also tried to launch their report on non constitutional governments in Africa. And they have been negotiating with state. But what people will talk about is the statistic on the table where we have about nine countries that look seem to be under a civilian democratic administration, but are now under military regimes. In the case of Madagascar in October, the AU was very to react with strong words to condemn the coup. But what would the AU do? Sanctions don't bite the elite any longer. If you impose sanctions on maybe Burkina Faso, how are the military governments affected by such sanctions? So they know it doesn't work any longer. And if you also threaten them more then they threaten to leave the international organization just as those three countries left left Ecowas. So despite the fact that one we want to look at the AU to to to combat military kubots the intervention is actually limited. And because also the democracy in Disa Health for instance became unpopular in the last four years. So when you see some kinds of legitimacy with military regimes, then it is disheartening. And that's where the African Union should work. Work more by sensitizing the people on the ground to also expose them to the advantages or benefits of liberal democracy.
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A
So I would take that up and then ask about leadership reform because most of the points that you have raised now would then speak to idea of the sort of leadership that individual member states have been able to institute or put in place, as it were. Your book specifically includes chapters on leadership and institutional reform. From your perspective, why has leadership renewal been such a challenge for African governance? Or what kinds of reforms could make the AU for instance become more responsive to citizens?
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B
Well, the fact is just that until AU becomes a supranational organization, it will remain a barking dog that cannot because you need to have some form of coercion. Not just in terms of deploying troops, peacekeeping or removing president from office, but there should be some hold. And if you look across Africa, how many leaders will Africa look up to in this kinds of space? I know in the yesterday we had strong president like Nelson Mandela that can appeal to the Sensitivity of Africans beyond its national borders. We have president like Obasanjo in Nigeria, which is relatively well respected beyond the borders of Nigeria and influential within the African Union. We have Abdullah Wade of Senegal, we have the president of Algeria. We still have Gaddafi sometimes that stated, when those leaders, we had the Becky of South Africa, when those leaders pull their strength together, then we see the African Union moving in a certain direction. So we don't have such leaders any longer. I don't think we have any continental leader in Africa. But in terms of the African Union itself, maybe it has to also start even with their recruitment policy in the attempts to find a way for exclusivity. What we have also seen is that some people have been tactically knocked out from even vying for the position of the auc, the African Union chairperson, for instance, because it's being rotated. There are some considerations, but for me, I don't think where people come from should be one of the considerations should be purely on competencies. If you are competent and two people are competent in the same region, then one can be the the chair of the AU for four or five years and the other one can step in. But when you zone candidates, there's the limitation you have placed on recruiting the best. Then you have to look at the recruiting modalities of the African Union. Not just at the top. Even, even. Even the worker is still zoned. Sometimes it has to go to the west, it has to go to North Africa. Even for you to get a job at some of their agencies, it has to be determined by nationalities question. So that is really sad. And if you come to the members, we know, you know that votes don't count in many African countries. Some countries don't even attempt to count the votes. You have vote snatching, you have rigging, you have malpractices. And it's a system. How can you have a credible leader? Even how people vying for positions in some African countries like Nigeria, it's also something to retain when they are talking about maybe 20 million naira to take the form. Where will a normal man on the streets, you know, a civil servant, for instance, or a poor teacher like I am to be able to say, let me contest for presidency. So there are many things to think about. And the space itself, apart from the question of the electoral space being saturated or commercialized or monetized, you also have to think of the violence, you know, that lives side by side with electioneering in Africa. So so many credible Africans stay away from active politics and the leaders we have Nowadays we don't even know if they are ruling Europe or ruling Africa because many of them respond more to international climates than even continental issues. So there are all kinds of problem, yes, leadership both at member states and also at the level of the African Union. But my sense is I'm beginning to see some vigor in the recent leadership of the African Union that came to, you know, that came on board just few months ago. Maybe one could just give them some time. It looks as if things may change within the African Union. But fingers crossed anyway. Maybe if you talk particularly of the African Union review. You know, they initiated a review system years ago under the leadership of Paul Kagame, you know, of Rwanda. And it came up with many recommendations, particularly African solution to African problem in terms of Africans finance in African Union. But it's just there on papers. African Union is dependent on foreign donors for, for its day to day activities. So most of the recommendations of the, of the review panels are still hanging. So it's still the same African Union that we knew.
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A
Let's shift a bit from, from the aspect of the elite to the other side of the aisle now, to put it that way. Looking at citizens specifically across the continent, we've seen remarkable citizen energy. From youth protests, digital activism to demands for social justice across many African countries. Some of them resulting in changes like you had in Kenya or leading to more authoritarian responses such we now have in Madagascar. How do you interpret this new wave of bottom up mobilization? To put it that way, does it represent sort of new form of democratic resilience in Africa?
- [24:08]
B
I think well, to respond directly we will say yes of course, you know, from Kenya to Senegal, you know, you can also talk of Madagascar recently. We can also link it to, to the SAS movement in Nigeria also at a point in time, not even to talk of the wind in North Africa, almost a dec. We are talking of the contemporary time. In the last two, three years we have seen some bottom up explosions and of course it is led by the youth. So we tend to argue that the youth are finding political expressions in activism. They are also participating in politics remotely if the space is not there for them to be actively engaged, for people to vote them to power, for them to stand for elections and for them to assume political leaders. But they are actually acting and putting pressure on the government to influence the government to change some of the policies. We saw it in Kenya during the tax reform and Madagascar, like I said, Nigeria. But one will also argue that of course it's led by the youth, but that's just the general Consensus in the society. It wasn't as if the thought of the youth is relatively that different from the thought of the older generations, but. But it was just the youth that could galvanize themselves, mobilize themselves, particularly with the advent of ict, you know, to be able to circulate, you know, coordinate without really speaking to one leader. Everybody disseminating information across their, you know, hand sell devices, using the mass media, Twitter, spaces, Facebook, you know, to mobilize. So it's actually a form of political resilience, as you have said it. For me, I think the future of democracy in Africa lies with the commitment of the youth to push for a change. We've not really seen them directly pushing for regime change, but we get to that point in time, you see them reacting to maybe one policy, maybe one policy they think is not in the favor of the society. But I think it may get to a time where the youth will mobilize directly for regime change. It might be bloody because remember, our leaders are brutal. They may respond forcefully, but I think the youth may get to that point where they wouldn't mind losing some life, shedding some blood for. For the entrument of democracy. Not just democracy as symbolic democracy, but effecting governance in Africa.
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A
Okay, still, young people, youth engagement. There have also been sort of empirical findings that have shown a direction that, that when it comes to democratic engagement, especially elections, which is very central to democracy, young people appear to be. Their turnout is far lower than people in the older generation. For instance, England speaks to what does the future of democracy? What will it look like if this trend were to continue? What do you think is responsible for this poor showing on the part of young people who sort of have the numerical advantage relative to other age groups across the continent?
- [27:24]
B
That's the point I was indirectly making. If you see the way they have responded to mass protests, the way they have responded to policy they considered antithetical to the interest of the society or even the youth interest. They have been able to mobilize thousands and millions of people on the street, but the question is just that they have displaced some political party when it comes to voting. Not that they are not interested in politics, but they have lost faith in elections. They know that the votes do not count some of the time or most of the time. And where do you see political parties not even presenting manifestos, but just. Just dancing on stages and that's dance. What. How would that attract the youth? And if you also look at it, maybe in Cameroon, for instance. Not just in Cameroon, in Uganda, where you see the old generation of people above 80 years still clinging to power. So the youth have lost faith in. And when you present to president, one is maybe, maybe 87, the other is 85. And you are asking the youth to come and vote. There's no choice between the two to them. And that's why I keep saying they find expressions in the act after elections. And the continent may still witness such trend in the next few years. But the youth will get to a point where they will take that transformation. For them to believe that we make a change through possible means, through peaceful means by voting during election, or also try to affect the policy or regime change after election, which might be violent. So the choice lies in their hand. And so that's some of the engagement we are beginning to have with the youth that they should participate more in politics. And we saw a little bit of that in South Africa, despite the fact that the percentage of the youth voting are decreasing. But we have also seen that some conventional political parties are losing powers in Africa. For instance, in South Africa, for the anc, very, very popular political party for them to fail to make up the government at the last election is really a signal that things are changing in Africa. In other African countries we saw the incubate losing powers. So yes, the youth are still displaying that apartheid against voting. But the choice is for them to actually see an opportun to get more involved and vote bad leadership. But their response was so people there's no credible contestants.
- [30:05]
A
So yeah, I mean you have published some works on FOCA and globalization and all of that and the impact on democracy in specific member states. So that takes me to the question of the place of Africa in the emerging global order. I mean Africa today operates in the different international environments. New power blocks China, Russia and the Gulf states all sort of competing for influence. How do these global alignments affect democratic trajectory in Africa? Can the AU, for instance, articulate an independent, democracy centered voice on the world stage? Perhaps one that is sort of influenced by African values in that sense?
- [30:47]
B
I think the African Union as a commission and also the member states when they come together and they speak as Africa is getting to a level where they actually being practical with what they call non alignment. I think in the yesterdays, of course Africa tend to hold on to non alignment. But we know that one way or the other it seems to be more sympathetic to the west or the romance more with the west. Despite the fact that China built their offices. And in the past few years we have seen realignment in the global space. We are seeing the African Union try to respond to any global power or medium power that synchronizes its own interest with the interest of Africa, the interest that the African Union is projecting. Remember, of course we talk about Africa as an homogeneous society, but you know, we have 54 countries all over also with different diplomatic interests, different core national interests of the country. Some of them align to Russia, for instance, through brics. Some may align maybe to the Arab world. We have many North African countries also membership of some organization in the Arab world outside Africa. Many align to Europe, to the West. So we have this, this multiplicity of alignment, you know, among the members and African Union, I think I, I'm seeing some sense and you can feel it, that they are now more open to receive any power that will advance the voice of Africa in the international space. And China has been one of those relative major powers that seem to be supporting Africa, particularly within the UN Security Council, for instance, where Africa, you know, has no seat. So that, that's. The AU is open to possibly relating, advancing, collaborating and working with any power. But they tend not to be aligned to any of the blocks, despite the fact that the blocks are becoming unclear now because of what many people also call global disorder. But be it as it may, I think they are becoming not independent, but they still depend on multiplicity of actors. Both from, from the west and even from the east speak to China, they speak to Turkey, they speak to the U.S. because I think COVID 19 also opened their eyes to the realities that Africa is still relegated to the background. When the global powers, particularly from the north, refused to give vaccines to Africa, I think maybe that also jolted them to begin to now search for partners across both.
- [33:42]
A
Maybe on a final note now if you were to define democratic resilience in the context of the Africa we want, what would it look like in practice, say by 2063? Now, which reform, or maybe a single reform, to just pick one gives you the most hope that the AU can, can reach that vision.
- [34:01]
B
Yeah, democratic resilience by 2023 to me means African states should have gotten to that level where they stand by free elections, rule of law, peaceful freedom, peaceful transitions of power, despite whatever internal challenges or external pressure. But for me, I think the most decisive reform, but I don't think I should call it reform. Support for democracy in Africa is this absolute resistance to unconstitutional changes of government in whatever form. I think because it's not just about military code, even unconstitutional terror elongation sitism, I think Africans should be able to decide who will rule them and hold the government accountable. And if you are able to remove unconstitutional changes of government military coup, including tenor elongation, democratic autocracy, I think Africa will fare better in terms of laying ownership to peace, security and also development. I hope we see be alive to see 2060.
- [35:15]
A
Well, on that very optimistic note, I want to thank you very much for joining us Dr. AD, and for sharing your reflections on the African Union's journey on Africa's evolving politics. Thank you so much. So we have come to the end of this episode of the podcast and I want to thank you also listeners for paying attention to this particular episode. I am Timi Tayo Odeyemi, Research Fellow in democratic resilience at Cedar and home host of this Hipu Power Politics podcast episode, and I've been speaking with Dr. Adiri Akianla, Associate professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Johannesburg in South Africa and co editor of the book African union and agendas 2063 the past, present and Future, published by University of Johannesburg Press in 2025. See you again in the next episode.
- [36:09]
B
Thank you. Thank you too.
- [36:12]
A
Thank you for listening to the People Power Politics Podcast brought to you by cedar, the center for Elections, Democracy, Accountability and Presentation at the University of Birmingham. To learn more about our center and the exciting work we do on these issues around the world, visit our website using the link in the pin. Podcast description.