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- [00:01]
A
Welcome to the new books network. Hello and welcome back to the podcast of the second Cold War Observatory. I'm Jessica DeCarlo and I'm joined by my co host, Seth Schindler. Hey, Seth, how are you doing?
- [00:21]
B
Yeah, I'm all right, Jess, how are you?
- [00:24]
A
I'm doing well. We are in February of the semester and it is flying by. I am back from research leave, so it's been a hectic spring.
- [00:33]
B
Tell us a little bit more about your research leave. Did you travel anywhere, do anything fun?
- [00:37]
A
Yeah, the re the research leave itself. I did a bit of travel domestically, but actually at the very beginning of January this year, I was in Beijing for some forums at Peking University and meetings around the city. And as always, I love being back in China. I feel like I always learn so much about what's happening there, how China. China's thinking about the US Actually, as I was going to give a presentation about China, the environment, et cetera. It was the morning that Trump announced leaving all the UN and environment councils. So it was, I felt, to be a somewhat tense conversation, but also unsurprising that every single day Trump is making a new announcement that we can't believe.
- [01:17]
B
It was a busy January for people interested in geopolitics, to put it mildly.
- [01:23]
A
Right. I mean, Greenland, Venezuela, it's been a lot to keep up with. I think as we're thinking about this podcast, there are so many more people we want to bring on to help us understand all of this.
- [01:34]
B
Right? Yeah. I mean, we could do entire episodes on so many of those issues. Multilateralism, Venezuela. But Greenland really is the one that we're going to focus on most today. Right. And I just have so many questions. When everything started, I realized that I knew very little about the history of US Involvement in Greenland and the region. But, you know, it seems like for the time being, the military option is off the table, although the US Is apparently still committed to getting Greenland, whatever that really means. So if I look at recent media coverage, this is still an ongoing issue. Just a few days ago, Financial Times reported Greenland ice melt, open sea routes for critical minerals. Then two days later, China wants to create a polar Silk Road through the Arctic. Finally, a day after that, Mette Frederiksen, the Prime Minister of Denmark, announced that Europe needs an emergency mindset to survive, presumably because of its erstwhile ally, the United States. And so, yeah, I guess all of this told me that I really need to get caught up to speed on this issue.
- [02:40]
A
I couldn't agree with you more. And it's not just Greenland, it's the entire Arctic. Trying to understand it as a region, the countries involved, but. But not just the countries. There's so much happening in a trans border way that I think is really important to look at, from, you know, melting ice and climate impacts to indigenous peoples. I think there is a lot that we both knew we needed to learn and we're really fortunate that a book came out to help us do that. So today we're going to be talking about the fight for the future of the Arctic. It's by Mia Bennett and Klaus Dodds. And this book, Seth, I think, is if you know nothing about the Arctic and want to try and get a sweeping history and understand present politics, this is the one book you have to read.
- [03:23]
B
I would agree with that.
- [03:24]
C
Yeah.
- [03:25]
A
So we are very fortunate today to have Professor Mia Bennett on the podcast. She is an associate professor of geography at the University of Washington and has been focused on the Arctic for over the past decade.
- [03:37]
B
Mia, thank you very much for joining us.
- [03:39]
C
Thanks for having me, Seth and Jess, it's a real pleasure to be here.
- [03:42]
B
We have so many questions for you. We really love your recent book, but of course, where else could we start than Greenland? Most listeners will know that the US Made a big power play, basically threatened to invade and then walk that back. But the US Under Trump wants Greenland, whatever that really means. Does this have to do with defense? Is it because that the United States is afraid of perhaps Russia or China coming over the Arctic? Is it because of resources in Greenland? Is it just some idea that Trump has? Perhaps it's a combination or none of the above. How do you understand this recent development in Greenland?
- [04:23]
C
Yeah, great question, of course. What other topic could we begin a discussion today about Arctic geopolitics except Greenland? I think you mentioned a lot of relevant issues that have motivated the Trump administration to really fixate on Greenland. Among those are defense, critical minerals. We also just have simple desire for territory and expanding US Territory. I think on the one hand, a lot of these impulses are not necessarily new. So even though I think there's a lot of controversy, or there is inarguably a lot of controversy over what Trump is saying, there are historical precedents for American interests in acquiring northern territories on all sides of the lower 48, let's say. So on the one hand, in 1867, the US purchased Alaska from what was then the Russian empire. And around that time, there were even then kind of some voices on the sidelines saying, well, the US should also look to acquire Greenland and Iceland that obviously didn't come to pass. But throughout the 20th century, there were periods where the US saw Greenland as crucial to its defense. And that, of course, came to a head during Second World War when, after the Nazis took Denmark and Denmark could no longer effectively defend its then colony, Greenland, Denmark and the US Effectively signed an agreement that allowed the US to establish military bases. So those bases were constructed. The US still operates Pitufik space base in the north of Greenland and Greenland and that base are integral to the US Defending not only itself, but also North America and contributing to NATO defense as well. When Trump describes Russian and Chinese warships floating around Greenland, I do think that is a massive exaggeration, if not a falsehood in some ways. Certainly there are likely Russian submarines operating in the North Atlantic, as they have done since the Cold War. But as I once read in the. As I read recently in the Financial Times, Trump asks. He points out a lot of issues in the world that he doesn't always have the right answer. So he's pointing out the issues of Russia and China in the Arctic. But I would say these two countries, militaries and coast guards, are cooperating more in the Bering Strait rather than around Greenland. So when Trump is kind of concerned about acquiring, or I would say strengthening American defense in the Arctic, I think it's not really Greenland where attention should be placed, but perhaps, perhaps more so in the Bering Strait. So I think ultimately, when we think about, okay, so why then is Trump going after Greenland? I think a lot of it has to do with what Klaus Dodds, my co author, calls ego politics. Trump's always been a Wheeler, you know, a dealer and a property dealer. We should say. He's always been someone interested in, yeah, larger than life deals. And if he could become a historic president able to expand American territory for the first time in decades, I think he would like that to be a part of his legacy, even if it means potentially destroying NATO.
- [07:34]
B
It's a great answer. So it seems like in some ways it comes down to Trump himself. I don't usually believe in this kind of great men make history narrative. Right. But it does seem that in this day and age, it's hard to escape that conclusion at times. You mentioned the Bering Strait, and I want to pull out a quote from your book, page 190, where you talk about how the world is changing and we're kind of. It's kind of back to the future where we're kind of like going back to the Cold War, but it's playing out in very different ways. You say that as the region builds up after the Cold War shatters, Arctic competition risks heating up in locations where geography produces regular encounters between Russia and its NATO neighbors. So we've heard a lot about Greenland lately. You just mentioned the Bering Strait. Can you just give us a kind of general synopsis of, of the state of play, the geopolitics? Where are the potential flashpoints? What are the encounters and what are the tensions? Is it over resources, Military bases? All of the above for those of us unfamiliar with the region?
- [08:38]
C
Yeah, great question. So the Bering Strait is this passage separating Russia and the United States. It basically goes between Alaska and Chukotka, so Kamchatka, So basically the easternmost parts of Russia, which at certain points are only, I think we have the Diomede Islands. Russia and the US each have one of them, and so they're separated by, I think, just four odd miles or so. So the two superpowers come very close together. There are not a vast amount of resources there. The Bering Strait is generally understood as an international passage. So Russian ships are going through there, U.S. fishing vessels, countries have this freedom of passage. What we are seeing, though, is because as we kind of gesture towards geography is producing these encounters as Russia and then China, which is not terribly far from the Bering Strait, start to kind of come closer together, not only in terms of economic cooperation, but also military cooperation. For the past several summers, we've seen them carry out, let's say, military exercises and training. So these training and freedom of navigation operations are all above board. I would say they're carried out in accordance with the United Nations Convention on Law of Sea. They're carried out in international waters. And one could draw an equivalent between what the US does in the South China Sea and what Russia and China are doing in the Bering Strait, not too far from the Aleutian Islands. So you have this passage, and then at the southern end of the passage, you have a very long strand of islands that are almost all falling within US territory. So there's definitely a lot of fishing, but not really other resources. And as I mentioned, you know, maybe controlling the passage, I think, is not really something that any of these countries are really fixated on. I think it's more kind of a place where it's potentially becoming a flashpoint simply by virtue of increased encounters between adversaries which, if anything, were to go wrong, let's say, I don't know, you had a plane intercept another or things like that, then it could quickly spiral. So I think that's where the kind of risk is coming from at the moment.
- [10:55]
B
But are those the main flashpoints for you where something could happen? Bearing Strait Svalbard comes up, of course, all sorts of different. It's a much more expensive geography than I knew about before. Where are the main flashpoints where you would expect something potentially to happen between great powers?
- [11:16]
C
Right. So we have this chapter on flashpoints, and it was funny when we wrote the first draft, we had four, which were Svalbard, as you mentioned, the Bering Strait, the central Arctic Ocean, which is quickly opening up as sea ice recedes. And then we had the expanded Russia NATO borderlands. And we would really point at that one in particular because Sweden and Finland joined NATO largely in response to Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. So you have this extended border, which means NATO has an extended northern flank, to use the Cold War terminology, facing Russia. So those were our first four original flashpoints. But then soon after we had submitted that first draft, Trump is inaugurated for the second time, and then he already starts kind of saber rattling at Greenland. So Klaus and I thought, okay, we need to add Greenland as a fifth flashpoint. And I think we're both kind of relieved we did. Not for the sake of Greenland, but just for the sake of the book having a slightly longer shelf life.
- [12:14]
A
So I'd love to ask a question on China, because it's not an Arctic country.
- [12:18]
B
Right.
- [12:18]
A
You talk so much about these. These countries that are part of the Arctic territorially, but China's playing an increased role in the region, specifically through the Polar Silk Road that you discussed. But it seems that Russia also plays a role in facilitating China's kind of access or role in the region. So could you tell us kind of what's happening with China at the moment and how you see that relationship evolving with Russia?
- [12:42]
C
I think so. Russia and China often describe as kind of having a strategic alliance. They're not necessarily countries that share the same values ultimately, or the same political systems even. I mean, there are similarities in terms of them both being quite autocratic. But ultimately, I think each country sees that it can gain a lot from working more and more with the other. So we could say over the past 10, 20 years, Russia has increasingly pivoted towards the east under Putin, both in an effort to find new markets for Russian oil and gas, liquefied natural gas in particular, and also to find new suppliers of infrastructure for Russia for its oil and gas industry, and to find new sources of investment. So this pivot to the east, I Think initially was perhaps done to both capitalize on China becoming a growing economic power and global investor, global commodity purchaser. But also the fact that Russia was trying to weaken, wean itself off of being too dependent on the west, especially on Europe. Now I think that pivot towards the east has become all the more existential for Russia, given the effects of sanctions, first following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, and then the full scale invasion in 2022. For China, I think China sees working with Russia as beneficial as well. When China first started talking about its Belt and road initiative in 2013 or so, over time, that multi trillion dollar plan for global infrastructure development and investment came to include what China calls the Polar Silk Road. And that is a little bit of a kind of fluid concept, but I think running through it, or running through all definitions of it would be what Russia calls the Northern Sea route. So the shipping route hugging the north coast of Russia that connects markets in Asia with markets in Europe and along the way links up with natural gas, oil terminals and mineral minerals coming out of the Russian Arctic. So there's a lot of potential in theory for Chinese container shipping over to Europe taking 30% less time than normal, and for Russia in turn to send resources from the north over to China. So I think these two countries are figuring out how to work together. Together they don't always see eye to eye on things. But I think lastly, as China has become a little bit more cordoned off from investing in other parts of the Arctic, at least until, you know, honestly the past couple of months when we start to see more of a rapprochement between China, Canada and Europe. China saw Russia as offering maybe the sole real inroad into Arctic investment in recent years, things like that.
- [15:33]
A
Thanks for that. Yeah, so there's a lot there about logistics, trade. Something that came up in the book for me too was the research stations that China maintains, Korea and Japan are also on there. I believe you also mentioned this trilateral high level dialogue on the Arctic between those three countries. And I'm curious if you could share a bit more about how these East Asian countries are engaging in research or other activities.
- [15:59]
C
Yeah, so I had studied this topic quite closely for my master's. About that was in 2012, 2013. And I think one motivation for that research topic at the time was the fact that these three Asian countries, as you mentioned, alongside India and Singapore, were working quite hard to become observers in the Arctic Council, which is the leading intergovernmental organization governing the Arctic at a regional scale. So I Think all of these East Asian countries at the time, both were kind of developing their interests in polar science, both in the Arctic and Antarctica, interests in climate research, interests in kind of the potential for using Arctic shipping lanes as they were becoming more open due to climate change. So I think there were a lot of shared kind of commonalities, access to resources and fishing grounds also for China, Japan, Korea, all major fishing nations. So there were some shared commonalities. I mean, China, Japan, Korea also have some differences in how they participate in Arctic development and governance. So for instance, Korea's been quite an interesting actor to watch in the Arctic because it has, I would say, really strived to work with indigenous peoples. There's been a lot of partnership under the Arctic Council with the Aleut people in Alaska and with Korea. There's also been various kinds of outreach events that Korea puts on and will bring students from different parts of the world, including indigenous students, to come to Korea to learn about how the country is kind of trying to, let's say, expand its Arctic activities. Japan is a little bit more hamstrung in that regard because of its own, let's say, fractured relationship with indigenous Ainu people. But Japan has a much longer history of participating in polar science at both ends of the earth and has icebreakers as well and kind of has worked for a long time in the Russian Arctic as well, especially during right after the Cold War. And then China, for the reasons we were just discussing, they're kind of a big player that can't be too ignored. But I think sometimes is somewhat absent from what I've heard from certain lower level Arctic Council governance type meetings. I think China often prefers to work in different venues while still trying to to maintain a presence in all of these forum that fora that have arisen.
- [18:27]
A
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- [18:29]
D
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- [18:41]
C
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- [18:42]
D
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- [18:57]
B
Mio One of the topics underlying the narrative of the book is that the Arctic itself is changing in the sense of it speaks to this notion of polycrisis perhaps where you have multiple things happening. On the one hand, there's environmental change that's happening all over the world as a result of climate change of course and other things as well. And then there's geopolitical rivalry and these two crises collide and they do so in the Arctic. The book's title is Unfrozen. This suggests that the environmental change is foregrounded. Can you tell us a little bit about first of all, the environmental change? I think probably some people assume that they know about it. I mean, ice is receding and so on and so forth. But you go into great detail in the book. But then how does that environmental change relate to geopolitical rivalry?
- [19:54]
C
Right, yeah, I think there's a lot to unpack. So I mean, of course, as we all realize, the Arctic is changing and it's changing faster than it has in human history. So we have the acceleration of warming in the Arctic, the acceleration of all sorts of phenomena. Sea ice retreat, as you mentioned. So one statistic we highlight in the book is the fact that sea ice is now a quarter of its previous volume, which is just an incredible loss of a whole landscape as, as Dirk Knotts, a professor, describes it as. So what this means is that Arctic sea ice has basically diminished in extent in half and then it's also thinned by half. So all of that leaves it at just a quarter of that previous volume. And that has knock on effects for everyone from let's say Greenlandic fishermen who now they basically can just go out on the ice and dig a little hole or drill a little hole to go ice fishing. But before they would have had to almost carve a little staircase five feet tall into the ice. So we just see this huge loss. It's a lot more of a precarious, a lot more precarious sea ice, which makes transportation more risky. It makes it harder for animals to hunt like polar bears and seals or to give birth. So we have all of these really worrying effects. And then further to kind of this loss of sea ice, once you have what was formally highly reflective, white sea ice just turn into blue open ocean. It becomes much more of a kind of heat sink. So that's why the Arctic is warming so much faster than the rest of the world, because you just have this drastic change in albedo or reflectivity. And in comparison, if you were to cut down a tree in the Amazon, then you go from green to brown, so the change in reflectivity is not nearly as drastic. So you don't get this acceleration or what's called the Arctic amplification effect. So all of that leaves us with a region where you have the loss of sea ice on land. You also have melting Permafrost, which is really kind of the loss of typically permanently frozen soil, basically becoming swampy. And that really puts into jeopardy the foundations of infrastructure that was built all across the region, much of it in the 20th century, for instance, in the former Soviet Union. So you have risks to urbanization, industrialization, that in turn creates new ecological risks if pipelines are suddenly going to burst, since they're not sitting on frozen ground anymore. Other phenomena we highlight growing risks of wildfires, which in turn then have human implications. So in 2024, the whole city of Yellowknife in Canada's Northwest Territories had to be evacuated because of the kind of looming wildfire on the city's outskirts. So, yes, we see a region that is very much defrosting in worrying ways. And that introduces, on the one hand, maybe in the 1990s and 2000s, opportunities for countries to realize there is an environmental crisis that is regional scale and to try to work together to mitigate it, or at least come up with adaptation measures. Now, at a point where international cooperation is, let's say, less, less robust, and we have countries more interested in perhaps national security alongside energy security, becoming self sufficient in resources, countries are now starting to see opportunities in a melting Arctic where you have some resources that are indeed easier to access, shipping lanes that are opening up. So we see a kind of changing stage, if you will, for geopolitical competition as a result of this changing physical environment.
- [23:47]
A
So I think the whole book really shows that the fate of the Arctic is not settled. And you write that the twin forces of ecological and geopolitical volatility could drive rising temperatures and great power ambitions to consume the Arctic. But this does not have to be the way the story ends. You then go on to say that in parts of the Arctic, the region's fate could be increasingly determined by indigenous peoples who have been demanding recognition of their lands, rights and resources. I wonder if you could tell us a bit about some of those struggles. What you're seeing, points of hope or agency? You have a lot of history on this and then a lot written on the present moment as well.
- [24:26]
C
Katya. I've never had anyone read the quotes from the book, so it's funny, I've actually like opened the book once. I don't want to look at what I wrote because I'm. Oh my God, they're so good. Thanks. And so I think what we try to do in the book is really kind of chart the course of this almost 60 year push for autonomy, recognition, self determination from indigenous peoples across the Arctic. So, as you mentioned, we kind of situate the contemporary fight for recognition in these longer struggles that have been going on in places like Alaska, northern Canada, in Scandinavia, in Sapmi, the Sami homelands, in Greenland, of course, and in Russia. All of these struggles are constrained in different ways and also different opportunities based on the kind of states, national states, let's say, in which they're unfolding. But I think what's been really exciting to see at the same time as how indigenous peoples have really organized politically above and beyond national borders, because their populations often span these national sovereign territories. Right. So I think what we look to, what we maybe anticipate in the future, is continued organizing that both transcends borders. But in some cases, for instance, in the case of Greenland, Greenland might be a country where, or a place where indigenous people actually are advocating for territorial sovereignty that does somewhat neatly fit into the current Westphalian state based order. I would say then you have the kind of opposite extreme where in Russia, because Putin has really just in many ways persecuted indigenous peoples, you have then exiled indigenous peoples from Russia who are organizing kind of outside of their traditional homelands. So I think all of this is to say that the geography of Arctic indigenous peoples and how they organize doesn't follow any one neat pattern. But I think it does follow this continued, really empowered trajectory towards not really shying down in the face of pressure, whether it's by their own states or by another state, in the case of, let's say, Greenland vis a vis Trump now. Right. So I think it's just really impressive to see how they have managed to maintain their victory so far. I realize, and I think we note this in the book, that there are certain risks at the moment, given that countries such as, let's say the Nordic countries, feel that they need to kind of batten down the hatches and ensure national security. And in turn, that could jeopardize the rights that indigenous peoples have won to consultation or land if more and more issues are becoming, let's say, classified. But I think we see indigenous peoples who are able to now organize politically, they're able to fight cases in court, they're able to ally with indigenous peoples beyond the Arctic and other partners. So I think we see a lot of resourcefulness, and I hope that that will continue even in the face of a very fractious global environment. And if anything, I think indigenous peoples in the Arctic are kind of the last remaining torchbearers of this idea of circumpolarity and a kind of more holistic,
- [27:42]
B
unified region that's such a nice answer. And I guess it's a nice theme to start to wrap up on. The idea of this region is for many people it's very abstract. We read this book with our second Cold War Observatory reading group and many people lacked a kind of concrete, well, a mental map of the Arctic. And you do address that in the book. You have a chapter on the region itself. Where is the Arctic? We would love to hear a little bit more about your personal experience. How did you become interested in the Arctic?
- [28:16]
C
Yeah, where is the Arctic? I think Klaus had this sentence where he says it becomes a little bit of a parlor game. So, you know people, you could have endless debates on where it is. And that depends not only on your own position on where you're from, but also maybe on your discipline, if you're an academic. So a political scientist, human geographer might describe the Arctic as, yeah, all of the countries with territory north of the Arctic Circle. But perhaps a climate scientist would define the Arctic based on this kind of squiggly line around the north, above which the temperature in July does not rise above 10 degrees centigrade. And if you use that definition, then the Arctic is shrinking, I think more or less every year. And then if you use this kind of more, I would say, kind of human geographic definition, it could actually be expanding if we now include countries such as Korea or even parts of China in this so called global Arctic. So I don't think it's a closed case. I think what I would stress is that the idea of the Arctic has changed throughout history. It's always tended to be a kind of northern place generally characterized by snow and ice. And that, I think distinction has in turn invited a lot of romance ideas of the sublime. Of course, it's attracted everyone from explorers to colonizers to fortune seekers over the centuries. But I think it is kind of hard to escape the notion that even for the people who've called the Arctic millennia for tens of thousands of years, they moved into the north from more southern latitudes. Why did they do that? I mean, there could have been, I would say, some, maybe sensible reasons in terms of following animal migrations or at times, ecology and climate were more hospitable centuries ago. But also, I think there's just certain allure that the region has. And I think once you've been there, it does keep calling you back. And certainly it's called me back over the years. So I suppose to speak a little bit to how I became interested in the Arctic, wherever we might pin it On a map, part of my dad's side of the family has Swedish speaking Finnish heritage. Um, and when I was a teenager, I kind of just got this fanciful notion that I would start teaching myself Swedish. So I did that and then I went to Sweden to study Swedish. And that led the following summer to an internship at the US embassy in Oslo, Norway in 2008. And I was a bit disappointed because I wanted to go to Sweden. Norway was, you know, that would, that would fit the bill still, and I could still kind of practice my language skills. And coincidentally, I started to learn a lot more about the Arctic through that internship. So I happened to help organize a visit by the United States Geological Survey to announce their circumarctic oil and gas appraisal at a big conference. And also that summer. And so in 2008, climate change, oil and gas, commodity cycles, all of this was really coming together to produce this vision even then of a region that was highly dynamic and becoming unlocked. And my 20 year old self just wanted to, to learn more about it and kind of combine my, let's say, more cultural interests in Scandinavian Arctic with my academic interests in political science and political geography. So I kind of did that in university and continue to do that to this day, I guess. So, yeah, it always keeps bringing me back. And yeah, I hope that everyone has a chance to kind of visit or at least learn a bit more about this really magical and fascinating region.
- [31:58]
A
Yeah, it's been so fun to learn about the Arctic through your passion and I could feel that come through in the book, I guess. One closing question I want to ask about the book itself. How did you and Klaus come to deciding to write this book? Deciding to write it the way you did. What were the motivations behind it?
- [32:15]
C
Yeah, so all credit is to Klaus here. He signed the initial contract for the book. I'm not entirely sure in what year, but it would have been, let's say sometime in 2022, perhaps with Yale University Press, on account of the success of his previous work, his previous book, I should say, Border Wars. So then Klaus was, I think, approached to write this book on the Arctic, signed the contract, but then was promoted to Dean at Royal Holloway and I suppose no longer had the capacity to write and a whole monograph, let's say. So Klaus and I have known each other for a decade by that point, and we'd collaborated on special issues and conference sessions and whatnot. So he very generously asked me as a earlier career scholar, to see if I'd be interested in co authoring And I was really thrilled by the opportunity. Cause I'd always had kind of dreams of writing a book. But my own PhD dissertation was article based. So where was I going to start from scratch? I wasn't sure. But here came an opportunity in my lap that I couldn't ignore. And an opportunity as well to work with someone who I really admire and who I could learn so much from, both intellectually and in terms of the kind of method to the madness of book writing. So class had already come up with a table of contents with about seven chapters. So we decided each of us would start half of those chapters and then send back Word word files to one another and just kind of iterate from there. We did end up adding a couple more chapters and in the end we decided I would be first author. So I kind of tried to stitch them together and go through with a lot of the editing more stylistically, let's say Klaus had a lot of this really great attention to the bigger picture of geopolitics. Would structure a lot of chapters and then I could go in and add in my, let's say more field based observations from my fieldwork and travels in the region. So I think together we learned a lot from one another and hopefully it was a. Hopefully Claas would say the same. It was quite, I think, complementary, very easy process. Overall, I would say I think we work well together and I really enjoyed the process and I'm forever indebted to Klaas for the opportunity.
- [34:25]
B
That definitely comes through in the book that you clearly work well together. I mean, it's written in a single voice and yet covers such breadth that I mean, would be difficult for one person, I think, to write this. I also have one closing question, if that's all right. And I would just like to ask you going forward. So returning to geopolitics, we started with that, then we talked a bit about environment, new actors like China, South Korea, indigenous politics in the region. And if we can return to geopolitics and just tell us what on earth is going to happen. So everything from Greenland to the other politics of this region. And if I may, I mean, reading this, it struck me that Russia is much more of a central protagonist in the Arctic than it is elsewhere. So the way that Jess and I and other colleagues in the Observatory have, have framed the contemporary geopolitics is that the US China rivalry really structures that. Right. That's kind of the base of it. And yet that doesn't mean that they're the primary protagonists in every region. It's just that that is the contest that is playing out all over the world, from whether that's, you know, outer space to lithium in Latin America or rare earth minerals and in copper in Zambia or Congo. And yet you have a lot of other regional powers. Right. That in all of those geographies, shape geopolitics. And in this region seems like the Arctic, it's really Russia. And not only does it shape the geopolitics, it's the primary protagonist. And I was, I found it really interesting, the chapter that you kind of COVID just the extent of Russia's history, the settlement, the technology, the built environment that Russia, the expertise that it's accumulated over the years. And so with that being said, what on earth is going to happen in the future in this region?
- [36:14]
C
Oh, my gosh. The one question to close on. Keep the question.
- [36:20]
A
Yeah.
- [36:22]
C
As an academic like the two of you, I think I really fear making predictions. Right. We're all about kind of critical analysis of the past and maybe of the present, if at best, but looking to the future, I mean, yeah, I don't think I would promise to divine any tea leaves for the region. I think the only thing I can really conclusively say is that change is completely unpredictable. I mean, and I said this the other day to an audience I was speaking to, is that if you were to ask folks in the 1980s at the lower, maybe, let's say, 1970s, at the height of kind of US Soviet enmity, that one day these two countries and others in the north would sit together with indigenous peoples around a table in, I don't know, Greenland or Sweden and be discussing Arctic climate change, I mean, that would have been completely unfathomable. So I think that actually idea that we could go from such adversary relations to quite cozy, almost circumpolar ties does give me a little bit of hope that what we're seeing now is not going to be forever. There will hopefully come a time, and it could be a time driven by greater indigenous leadership, by an independent Greenland working more with Canada working more than Nordic countries. It's really unclear, but where we see a kind of renewed sense of Arctic cooperation. I don't think it will map on very neatly, necessarily, to what we just lost over the past 30 years, or what we lost that had been built over the past 30 years, I should say. And I think it will take generations to reach a point where you do have some semblance of region wide cooperation. And I say that because I think first the trust or the mistrust that has now been sown by Russia among the other Arctic states is going to be generational, I think, even if Putin, if and when he is out of power. I think folks have realized that for the foreseeable future, Russia does not really want to become a liberal democracy. And I think that was the illusion that many, at least the Nordic countries, maybe even in the US believed that Russia would eventually want to model itself and become like one of us. Now it's clear that no matter who is in charge in Russia, that's probably not going to happen. So we have that loss of trust, which has of course been compounded in very unforeseen ways by the US and not only its dealings with Greenland and NATO, but the fact that the US is wholesale rejecting a lot of kind of liberal values, rejecting science, climate change, work on climate change, things like that. So all of that is to say that I think we're entering a period where Arctic cooperation will persist in slightly less conventional and smaller scaled ways. So maybe the rise of what's called minilateralism, where you have small groups of like minded countries forming small task forces or coalitions on maybe more technical issues, whether it's fisheries, indigenous peoples, well being, things like that. But I don't foresee in the near future kind of region wide agreements on things. But hopefully that inability to come together as a circumpolar community will not last forever.
- [39:36]
A
Thanks so much, Mia for this. I think the idea of, you know, rebuilding and having that be smaller scale offers some hope to me. I love ending on notes of hope, so I appreciate.
- [39:48]
C
Right. Yeah. It's hard to find these days, but
- [39:50]
B
it is, it's insurance supply.
- [39:52]
A
It really is between. Well, there's a lot of mistrust that's brewing around the world. So we will see where the next chapters of this book take us. But again, this book is the fight for the future of the Arctic. Our whole group. Agreed. If you don't know a lot about the Arctic, this is a really, really great place to start.
- [40:12]
B
This is the one book. Indeed. Just read this one book. Yeah.
- [40:16]
A
Thank you so much for talking with us about this, Mia.
- [40:19]
C
Thanks Jess. Thanks Seth. So good to see you both and hope to meet in person sometime soon. Appreciate the opportunity.
- [40:25]
B
Thank you. Bye. Bye.
- [40:26]
C
Thank you. Bye. Sa.