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Utku Balaban, "Industrial Islamism: How Authoritarian Movements Mobilize Workers" (U California Press, 2025)
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Welcome to the New Books Network.
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Welcome to New Books in Islamic Studies.
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I'm Jacqueline Michael, one of your Channel
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hosts, and joining me to discuss his new book, Industrial How Authoritarian Movements mobilize workers, is Dr. Utgu Balaban.
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Balaban is an associate professor of sociology at Xavier University and the author of
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two books, A Conveyor Belt, A Flush and Social Inclusion Practices in Turkey. Industrial Islamism recently received the best new
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book in the category of International Political
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Economy from the International Studies Association.
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There are two main questions that are at the heart of industrial Islamism.
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First, what explains the rise of religious populism in contemporary Turkish politics and society? And second, how does industrialization help to explain change and continuity in social and religious life in Muslim majority countries? In Industrial Islamism, Utko Balaban examines Turkey's rapid post Cold War industrialization and argues that the answers to these questions lie in a class analysis centered on the relationships between employers and employees situated within larger contexts of globalization and historical Islamization. Political and religious transformations occurring in the 1980s and 1990s are not the result of a cultural backlash to or rejection of Westernization or some nostalgia for an idealistic past. Rather, Balaban argues that they are related to the rise of a socioeconomic political class he calls the faux bourgeoisie that strategically employ Islamic populism as a method for protecting their interests against other primary class actors. These changes are internal to the mechanics and logics of capitalism, as shifts in the traditional relations of production produced new alliances and networks based on small scale capital accumulation. Balaban's Turkish case study can be applied to other Muslim majority countries in which small scale industrialists similarly dealt with economic anxiety and aspirations through recourse to popular Islamist rhetoric not as a specific moral strategy but as a political one.
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And in our wide ranging conversation we
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talk about the origins of industrial Islamism,
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some of the main findings and theoretical applications to Marxist theory, and also to
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Islamic studies as a field in general. Here coming up is my conversation with Utko Balaban on his new book, Industrial How Authoritarian Movements Mobilize Workers. Enjoy.
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Welcome to the New Books in Islamic studies podcast, Dr. Balaban. I'm really excited to talk about your new book Industrial Islamism and we have a tradition here on the podcast where our first question to our authors is for you to tell us a little bit more about the origins of the book and your research in this area.
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Thank you very much Agdon for this opportunity. So actually this project originated from, I say, quite an inductive background or empirical, if you will, my previous research projects, either as a research Assistant or an independent young east researcher in 2001, in 2002, 2007, 2008 and between 2012 and 2015 and others less visible research projects repeatedly illustrated the significance of the role played by this non monopoly entrepreneurs in manufacturing industries in Turkish politics. For instance in 2001, the research project I conducted or just assisted, you know, is a research about the trade relations between Eastern European countries, including Russia and Ukraine and Romania and Turkey after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And you know, they say the, the Turkish, you know like you know, merchants or you know, like people showed me that, you know, like many for instance, you know, this Eastern European and Central European women came to Turkey, you know, as merchants but then ended up, you know, in certain type of romantic and sometimes you know, sex rage related Yani connection. That was the topic of the research project which had nothing to do with Islamism or I don't know, Islam monopoly entrepreneurs. But there I just saw that in like most of the people, male figures who just for instance interacted with this Russian, Ukrainian and again Eastern European women. Basically Justin came from a particularly on the profile, many of them very business people, just basically just gaining their revenue from this new global economy of the 1990s. Again 2002 there was the economic crisis. We just went out to just talk to the people who were affected by this massive financial crisis in 2002. And then again we saw again those folks in neighborhoods. So in other words, you only see. I mean gradually I just became more and more convinced that this is someone like Shook studied the relationship between especially industrial workers or workers in manufacturing industries and their employers. In order to understand, let's say the current state of politics in Turkey. And especially in part in 2008, I conducted participant observation in multiple small factories or sweatshops in garment industry. And probably this was the first one in the literature on Turkey, you know, I mean I don't think you know anyone asking. I had already worked in the satisfactories as a worker like I did and, and the goal was not to study the Islamist movement but during, you know, like the part of the one year long, you know, part of the ulceration. I saw how significant the relationship between my coworkers and their employers or the local success of the Islamist movement, in other words, the local bond between my co workers and their employers, you know, like seemed so indestructible or unbreakable. And I just realized that this was the core of the success of the Islamist movement. Later in 2011 and between 2012 and 2015 I conducted a four year long field work in industrializing cities of the country. And there I thought just made my other observations about this connection. So in other words, I slowly but rather unintentionally, you know, gathered all this research material and formulated, you know, formulated several arguments about the conditions of rise of Islamism in Turkey, even though that was not my original necessity point, you know, in any of the research projects. And then I just didn't realize that, you know, like I had to write, you know, like I'm presenting like my research output to answer this question. There were some gaps which I filled while I was working on the books, such as I conduct the content analysis of the Sunni orders, Sunni religious orders of Tarakaz. And I just had to just come up with a broad analysis of country cases. I had to just come up with the theoretical framework. After I just filled in those gaps, I just convinced myself that I had sufficient material to present to, to scholars and to its potential audience.
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Thank you for that introduction. And you teased a couple of things that I really hope that we'll get to in the rest of our conversation, your fieldwork in the area. And also I wanted to mention that kind of as we get started, I really, really appreciated how clearly written the book was. It was very clearly laid out. The structure of the book makes sense and it's, it's a really rich book for some of the reasons that you just mentioned. You're doing a little bit of ethnography, you're doing some quantitative analysis, qualitative analysis. You have a model in the second or the first chapter that I also want to ask you about, but especially the introduction of the book. You were very clear about your arguments. This is the first argument I'm making, this is the second, and this is the third argument I'm making. So just as a reader, I really appreciated how clearly written the book is and that definitely makes it more accessible.
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Thank you very much. Thank you very much. You made my day.
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Okay, that's great. So you were just talking, as you mentioned, the origins of the project of the role of the workers and the role of political populist Islam in turkey in the 1990s and 2000s. Now I want to turn to ask you a little bit more about some of the main arguments that you're making in the book. What do you argue explains this Islamist transformation that's happening in Turkey in. Sorry, that's actually probably the 1980s and 1990s. Your argument in a sense is that Islamization follows industrialization. So could you explain that to our listeners. And then also could you explain how you define the term Islamist or Islamization?
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So first of all, I mean, this is the very, very first chapter of this book. This is about the very first chapter of this book. Because I just when I started to work on this project, as I said, this was a missing gap. I just had observations about Turkey, difficulty on, let's say parts of Turkey, but in particular about Istanbul, the biggest city of the country. And arguably, if you still count you like Turkey as a European country, also the biggest city in Europe. But at the end of the day, this is kind of an issue pertinent to social sciences. I mean, so you just don't come up with ethnographic material. You just make good observation of bad observations. I don't know. But then let's say you just use that material for different purposes. Then I mean, basically the reader can simply see this just a mere case study and then basically interpret your observations as a case of information that is just relevant to again the Turkish case or three, some of simple. So that just seemed bothered me very much because I just had this feeling that what I saw in Turkey and say could not be that unique. So like anything else, this social scientist, of course, we look for some patterns and they say, where do we have these patterns? Do we have those patterns based on this? This is the first, let's say, intervention or an argument of the book was pretty simple. The more industrialized a Muslim majority country becomes, the more visible the Islamization of politics in one single, let's say, phrase. I can summarize the bottom line of the first chapter of the book. And what do I mean by Islamization of politics? I do not mean by Islamicization of politics necessarily the degree of the success of the dominant Islamist movement, you know, in that country. For instance, you know, they say Islamist can like take Egypt as an example. So Egypt is one of the oldest, you know, this isms movements as I understand it, in the Muslim majority world. And. But they never came to power. I mean, this is kind of one of the very interesting observations. I think, you know, this. Anyone who studies Islamism should just should answer or address or just, you know, deal with. And there's a gap. I believe in the literature people simply just mention that and just, you know, go on to whatever they want to say. But then, you know, they say we also see this clear indication that the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has had made a massive impact on how the ruling elite, you know, let's say, govern the population. And at the End of the day, for instance, Mr. Sadat adopted a much less secular or secular perspective when he tries to just run the country as a dictator, something like that. So then this means that the musician is about the growing significance of the religious motives importance. Regardless of who does that. It can be done by the Islamist movement if they just succeed in coming to power. It can be done by its main opponent which has the power in reaction to what ISM's movement does. So that will be my answer to your question. What we should understand by ismization of politics. And when you just kind of broaden the scope of this definition, if you just go slightly beyond the scorecard of the individual, then you're like, you start to see patterns. And the pattern is to me pretty always the more directly a nation state, a country just got engaged with the industrial commodity, global industrial commodity chains, the more likely an Islamist movement, especially a non jihadist. This is a movement to come to power or at least you know, to make a good strong claim for power. And for instance like countries which just have not been that much integrated to this young global commodity chains, the pattern is that you don't find strong Islamist moments actually you don't see convincing sign of strong Islamization process. Islamization process as I defined it, like increasing visibility of the religious motives. While if a country just engages like Nicols common chains, then Islamic Muslims have a bigger space to operate. What other we only say. I'm all observations we only say or conclusions. Doesn't does data. Let us make number one. Jihadist movements for instance are a real succession in the Muslim majority country. The biggest majority of the countries are characterized by relatively peaceful Islamist movements. This is a completely on this and this complete opposite to how the Islamist movements are portrayed or depicted in public. So when we just talk or think about Ismus, all of a sudden we start thinking about, I don't know, Al Qaeda and this and that, this Taliban, yes, they do exist, but they do not characterize like basically especially in art, since the end of the Cold war. One last point also the timing matters. Well, until the collapse of the Soviet Union basically. I mean we just didn't used to hear a lot about Islam's movements. I mean, for instance, you know, like many Arab countries were characterized by the basic Arab nationalism which had, you know, sort of left leaning, a left leaning tendency to some degree. They called themselves Arab socialists, etc. Etc. Which I believe they were not by the way. But it's not like there was this undertone where when you go to the galaxies this Oil, you know, let's say countries, so to speak. You know, I mean, yes, you know, there are dynasties and there are dynasties and they use your religion as a significant, you know, they say instrument to legitimize their power, but they cannot be, you know, like described as Islam's movements. It's a completely different thing. So in other words, you only say, I mean, the way I see it, you know, like many things that changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And along with this collapse, basically the organized labor all around the world basically lost some of its power. And we see the simultaneity, chronological simultaneity, between the rise of Islamization of politics in many cases with the growth of power of the individual Islamist movements and the decline of the collective power of the working class. So go figure. I come up with a narrative that just makes sense of this or the second option is that you don't want to touch that and you tell us a story about, I don't know, like 30th century long, there's a history of the Islamic civilization, et cetera, et cetera. I don't think this is like the second option. The way I see it is not good social science.
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Could you say a little bit more about how your thesis of change and domination and the role of religion and politics and that in Turkey at this time, how is that different from how others have tried to explain similar phenomenon, for example, the longevity of the AKP party in politics? And what I'm getting at is, if I'm reading this correctly, a lot of scholarship will look at what's happening and say, well, this is a, it's a rejection of Westernization or it's more cultural. There's cultural reasons for what's going on. But as I see it, your thesis is saying that that's not helpful, that's not helpful for understanding the structural transformations that are happening in Turkey. And then also could you tell us more about this class of small scale manufacturers that are at the heart of the book called the Faux Blood?
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Yeah, thank you, Jacqueline. So your question, thank you very much again for the moderation because I don't think I was supposed to talk about the other three arguments of the book, but I just again got kind of lost between the first one. So about the relationship between say modernity and Islam. So this is just ripple, goes back to my second main argument. The second main argument I make in this book, basically I just ask a simple question. I mean, now I'm specifically talking about the Turkish case. Turkish is the Messian let's say have been around since the. I mean like as a. As a political. Since 1970s. But they had to wait, let's say to just, you know, become a major political power. Well, until the mid-1990s. We are talking about, you know, like practically for all practical purposes we are talking about one generation. So if you only say, I mean Zimzo get anything to do with. Because they like to do get of course bestial values or I don't know, modernity, et cetera, et cetera. But not in the way let's say it's described in the literature. If is just truly, let's say a reaction to let's say the modernist values encapsulated within this capital solution of production course. I mean I would expect the zemist to become much more powerful say in the 1970s, if not in the 1980s, if not the 1990s. The civility had been, I mean kind of just quite smooth, you know, like for the Zimmies, you know, they say bid for power. None of this happened. Quite the contrary. So then you're like what you know, like did you know, like people truly just wait for. Let's say this is a question like I should ask. And I don't think they say generally speaking just have any kind of issue with the modernist values because those modernist values actually created the setting for their success in the first place. And once again listed the industrialization is the key we say factor. Let me make this argument. It's not just globalization as such, it's about the exploitation of labor. I mean, is there some walking. So that's why like this particular let's say connection between let's say Islamism and modernity. Right. I think you understand, deflects our attention from where we are really supposed to look at. And you also ask about this concept for bourgeoisie. So again this about my second argument. The Turkish Islamist came to and stay in power I argue because of the support of the owners of the small and medium sized manufactured and enterprises. And I call this owners the four bourgeois. They are not monocol captains, they are employers, they are entrepreneurs. But at the end of the day they just serve a critical function within global commodity chains. And unless we just look into this kind of a connection, I mean the whole debate about Islamism should be chained, should be, I mean will be almost imprisoned between this, you only say, I believe non historical perspective about relationship between Islamism and modernity. And a third argument, if I may continue is about the relationship between the isms and the working class and I think this also has some relevance to our question about how the modernity isms relationship is generally perceived or studied in literature. The underlying or implicit message I say almost unexception in all of the studies it look into this practical coordination between modernity and Islamism I believe assumes and the implicit assumption is that Islamists and the working class basically are in good terms the Islamists in a sense in one way or another represents only the working class. And the argument also goes that this representation may not be taking place in the space of economy, in space of resources, etc. But it takes place in the spiritual real, if you will, or metaphysical reality, like people try to make sense of things, et cetera. Religion may provide some answers, especially for the questions that are related to this uniting of modernity, if you will. No, that's not what I saw in the field throughout almost 20 years. I argue that the core motive in this relationship between the exempts and the working class is domination. They basically dominate the local urban space, both economically and socially and together of course culturally. And so then you understand a bond is established, but this bond is not established in a way that zims truly represents the interest of the working class, either spiritual or economic doesn't matter. But usually this bond to further put pressure on the working class in order for the effective operation of the global commodity chains. And the final argument which I think again related to your question in a sense so about let's say where this non monopoly entrepreneurs stand in the world or the fog. I also tried to present a broader theoretical framework about the notion of middle class and define these entrepreneurs even though they are entrepreneurs, even though they employ young workers within the. Within this analysis category of the. What I call circulation classes, not the bourgeoisie or the capitalist class, not the proletariat or the working class, but the third category. So then you. This. This exactly why we just have this debate, Jacqueline. So for instance, I just distinguish between this entrepreneurs, the vaux bourgeoisie, non monopoly entrepreneurs and the pete bourgeoisie and the Ross, please take no offense, but I'm talking about the likes of us, you know, like scholars and then I don't bureaucrats, et cetera, et cetera. So the way they define you like modernity would be of course fundamentally different from the way the faubourge was would define the modernity. I mean the typical petty bourgeois, again black scholars, bureaucrats, professionals, et cetera, et cetera will define the modernity as opposed to this a factor because the notion of modernity opens up space for this particular social Class, the prote bourgeoisie. It is in our interest like to in a sense to just associate the notion of modernity with something positive. But for bourgeoisie doesn't have this conceptual baggage. They are beneficiaries of the modernity. All right, but at the end of the day, the way they connect to the modernity just takes place through this most visible its engagement with the late stage monopole capitalism. So that's why they have space to be critical of modernity, if you will. Then all of these connections are just mislocated in such a way that one particularly say part of the narrative of the four bourgeois, not just in Turkey, but in the rest of the world that appears as anti intellectualism to us. In other words, to the pretty bourgeois scholarly. All right, is actually a debt party reference is actually only a minor component in the meta narrative of the Faubourg. And you know, we say the metanarrative of the main ally of the Faubourg in a specific country context, which happens to be in this case of course is something like in Turkey. So in universe I make four arguments. The more industrialized a Muslim majority country becomes, the more visible visualization of politics. Number one, number two, Turkish systems came to power thanks to the forbidden regime. Number three, the core motive in the relationship between workers and the small, not small, but you know, like non monopoly entrepreneurs and their employees, again is domination. And number four, we are not talking about just, we are not just talking about, you know, Islamism, Islamization. We are kind of talking about something much, much, much bigger. We are talking about actually again the late stage. You're in the same molecule capitalism, which again requires some sort of, you know, let's say further intervention in terms of how it theorizes. And I was threatened with that in the book.
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You have a model of Islamization that is presented in the first chapter of the book. I believe that goes into some of what you were just talking about. And in that discussion you're talking about what factors predict the extent of these processes of Islamization. And you include aspects like the strength of organized labor, the volume of capital investment and the availability of hydrocarbon resources. And could you say a little bit more about how that model explains the hegemony of a party like the AKP in Turkey? And could you also say a little bit more about how that model helped to understand other Middle Eastern and Gulf states, other Islamic movements in those states? I think you compare it to post revolutionary Iran and then also Egypt, which you talked about at the beginning of our conversation.
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Yeah, so yeah, As I said, this is what I did in the first chapter. Now first let me complain a little bit Jackie, if you allow me. So I mean when I started to read the literature on the Islamist movements and what I would later call is the musician politics, I mean I became incredibly difficult to find any kind of, you know, let's say, I mean a good number of meaningful, you know, let's say studies. They just kind of talk about the kind of connections you have been talking about here. So for instance, I mean there are, I mean the left leaning Scados for instance, you know, have been for a very long time talking about let's say the strong socialist movement in Iran before the Zen revolution. But I mean the way they just present you like the whole story looks like that. And to me, because I mean, I mean they just presented not as a realization of what was already there but against the most likely they say scenario in Iran in the words, you know, like the mentality is that, you know, this is the, the socialists, you like had to make a revolution in Iran but then something weird happened magical about either the IEP loss the Shah. Just very contextual, not contextual they say very ephemeral factors and that is them scale to power. This is not theory, this is basically an extended version almost like conspiracy theory. I mean I think they got to do better than that. And then in the book, that chapter just really was kind of challenging to me because of this again absence of a holistic perspective of Islamist movements in the Muslim majority world. I realized actually basically did not have a good general global framework about this. The factors of the factor they just made and could make and Islamist movement, let's say is successful. And this actually refers to a broader issue. I mean when it comes to say the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe, all of us are the historians and other social scientists next to take in Europe as one single unit and then tell us they say about those factors regarding labor and capital and colonization and whatnot. We immediately are presented a good picture, unifying picture about what happened. I mean the narrative could be correct or incorrect, I don't know. But you know, but when it comes to the Muslim majority world, all of a sudden we just find ourselves in this particular CK studies. They do not, you know, even claim to just make any kind of beyond, I mean argument about the Hogsu picture. So now this is the complaint, the part where I complain. Now let me just speak about what I found out. I just did a pretty simple thing. Of course after all this attempts, you know, this with Other indicators. This is where I mean if you just go and you talk to a mainstream economist and that person probably will talk about three main year, let's say factors of production, capital, labor and basically land rent or rent in general. So I just, you know, told myself what would happen if I simply applied or used on this related unlicie values or that characterized these three variables to all of the Muslim majority countries around the world and see if I could find any kind of let's say correlation if you will, between the way the Islamization of politics and the extent to which the Islamization of politics took place. What kind of actors basically just champion decentralization of politics and what kind of popular regimes we would end up with. And the first step of this analysis was basically simple to look at the size, relative size of the industrial workforce. How many workers work in different types of industries in your country. And generally does this have any kind of connection to again is the institutional politics. And I was like pleasantly and greatly surprised by what I found. Basically the bigger the relative size of the industrial workforce relative to the total of course basically the, the more visible is the position of politics. And the way I just operationalize that notion is the position of politics was about using one part of the let's say database called varieties of democracy database. And there, you know, let's say basically country experts basically give scores three different countries to their own to the country which they are expert of about different variables. And two variables were particularly important. One of them was about measuring the relative strength of the service moments. And the other one was basically the relative strength of the government and that uses the zinc motors. What I did was basically to just take both indicators and use them together in one single this unified indicator. But then after I was done with the this analysis of the about relative size of the industrial approach, I just asked myself in the following question, what if I use the data about the other two factors of production, namely capital and you know, this is land event. Then I used those few indicators and came up with it. It just gave us a different kind of typology. For instance, you know, let's say if your country has a good, you know, let's say chunk of, you know, like oil. But if you, your country does not have a good industrial basis and does not receive capital, this is where you would likely see the rise of jihadist moments. Why? Because I mean there is just an, an undeniable source of wealth. But that wealth is not basically surrounded by a particular arrangement between the ruling class, if you will, local Ruling class, if you will and you know, the working population. So that's why that source is susceptible to immediate, strong and fast necessary political action by any kind of movement which just seizes the opportunity. So that's why it's more, you know, let's say likely for energy high risk movement to be successful in that kind of a context. But what if for instance, you know, let's say you had all of this, you know, like factors quite visible in your economy. In other words, you have big unlocking oil resource say or natural gas. You just have a relatively big unlike industrial workforce and you just receive capital. This is your dynastic regimes in the Muslim majority world because they control everything. And then you know, let's say, I mean no Islamist movement, you know, I can't challenge that. Turkey and many countries like Turkey, which in total accounts for roughly 2/3 of the Muslim population in the world, are characterized by a relatively big industrial workforce which most emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Let nothing like that which receives unless a capital investment for both domestic and you know, like foreign sources. I do not make the distinction because I don't think that distinction is relevant. But no significant hydrocarbon sources in this country cluster. You tend to see the rise of quite successful ISMS movements which do not try to counter power by using violence primarily, but by gaining the legitimacy of the population was the working class. So then you have this nice matrix in which you only say what kind of. You only say factors of production are associated with what kind of political regimes and how much of Islamization you tend to see in the party country. I'd say around 75% of the country around the world just fits this model to a good extent. On the top of that I also argue that the countries that do not fit, I think this model also has an explanation for that too. And here is the bottom line. This is the perspective, the global perspective. I just, I'm. This is going to be a bold claim, but until someone just comes up with a better framework, I think this is what we have right now. So that's why I don't think, you know, like anyone, you know, they say everyone like should just first attack, you know, they say on this particular mod identify these problems before they continue to speak about orbs individual unless a counterpiece, as though they are separate, unless a unit of analysis.
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Now I'd like to talk a little bit more about the particular case study of Turkey and I would like for you to share a little bit more about the historical context of the changes that you're explaining in the book. Your narrative begins in the 1950s and the 1960s, when leaders like Nedgvettin Orbakan start working towards coalition building with small manufacturers instead of with larger industrialists. And Erbakan would become the primary face of this larger movement. He was a prime minister for just a year, I believe, in 1996. And Erdogan also was a part of this group of people, I think was maybe a student or an ally of Orbakan. You can explain that in a second, but could you share with us more the historical kind of contours that are important for understanding the changes that you're talking about in Turkey?
- [37:16]
A
The last impression I would like to give to the audience of this interview, or just a conversation, is that I offer a mechanistic model. All right, this is not my invitation. All these points I made on this day a couple of months ago were all about filling in a huge gap. You know, I think about, you know, they say, or in the literature, autism moments. We need a global perspective, a framework, you know, let's say basic, false, probable, they say, arguments, etc, measurable, so on and so forth. But I mean, of course, your country, the country context doesn't matter. I mean, there are so many contingencies. I mean, Egypt, you know, like, quickly had, you know, like a similar kind of movement, like the Turkish one, much more successful. I mean, that's what I mean. If you like certain things, your life had gone in a different direction. This, I mean, that's all obvious to me in the Turkish context. Basically, we just, you know, need to read a talk about those contingencies. And, you know, all this, in some cases, quite personal, they say. I mean, developments and incidents, et cetera, in this regard. While I was working on this book, I realized how significant this figure was. Nijmetin, Arbaka, I mean, I'm not sure, like, very close. You're like this moment. But, you know, let me tell you, I mean, his zeal actually impressed me when I just learned more about him. And the question I ask in the book, okay, this is kind of nothing clear or, I mean, not. Not an analytical or empirical question, but, you know, kind of personal question was Nejmet. And Abakan was a mechanical engineer, and he was also an Islamist. All right, but the thing is that the surprising, I think, observation I made was that at the time when he just was involved in a Sundi sect religious order, I mean, Islam was not pretty clearly defined. I mean, there were some sort of versions of it, you know, in the late 19th century, in the 20th century, etc. So measurement in Arabica actually I would argue played a foundational role in how what we understand by Islamism in today's Turkey. And one of his big list of goals was, you know, to industrialize the country. He went journalist to invest Germany for his academic studies as a mechanical engineer came back. So I mean, which one was really more important embassy with Islamist mujahideen or who just basically used the industrialization for the sake of the success of this new movement? Or was he primarily a mechanical engineer who wanted to enter industrialize his country? And ism was the way to go, you know, to realize, you know, to achieve on that particular object. And he tried everything. Basically he wanted to be a part of the political establishment. By the way, I mean, I think maybe a minor observation in the book, but I should underline this. I don't think the secularist establishment, the so called secularist establishment did not have major problems with Islamists at that moment. I mean in the 1960s, for instance, 1970s, for instance. I think this is a misrepresentation of what was happening in those two decades. He was invited to very important meetings and committees after the coup in 1960 conducted by Done by this very secularist generals. Not even generals, they were this lower ranking officials and they just did not have any kind of, let's say problems with working with Arba Khan for instance. But then after all of the, he just failed every single time in different types of projects. For instance, he initiated a small engine factory in the country. Say, you know, like let's suppose that that part of the investment had been successful. Then Islam's movement probably would have taken a different path. But he failed. And then he tried to create a space in the main conservative party. Again failed. He just tried to expand his influence among the business owners. He got small business owners mostly. He succeeded but ultimately failed to just represent them like say in their own business associations. Only after all of these paths were closed, he just directly got involved in party politics. And Ergon type. Erdogan had nothing to do with any of this. He is a career politician. Erbakan greened up in new movement. Erdogan was only just rank and FL pile member initially in this moment, but he just transformed it in such a way that ultimately Arbakhan basically lost power even within his own movement. This is a sad story actually.
- [42:18]
C
Could you tell us a little bit more about the role of the religious orders in this history of shifting alliances in the introduction perhaps, or maybe the first chapter? I think it's in the introduction you talk a little bit more about attending a ritual and there was a bit of a sermon and you're there with a friend and then there's a collection plate that goes around and then you notice that some of the people in the front of the room are giving larger bills, more significant amounts of money. And then when it comes to the area that you're in with some fellow workers, there's less money that's given. And then some people were asked to leave before the zikr ceremony started. So could you share a little bit more about that anecdote and explain a little bit more about the role of religious leadership in the story that you're presenting in the book?
- [43:09]
A
I think that was either in chapter three or four. I can't remember from top of my head, but yeah. So this, I mean, let me underline this aesthetic is clear. This book is not a study of the exam movement in Turkey. I'm let my underline this as thickly as possible. This was not my intention. Again, as I said at the beginning of this conversation and to be honest with you, the reason why, like, you know, it's nothing like the center and it's the theme of this book is that I don't think we can understand the Islamization of politics in Turkey by studying the Islamist main Islamist movement in Turkey. I mean they have to separate the street. We have of course, course have to study Islamist movement. But that aesthetic is specifically focused on the Islamist movement and its allies, so to speak, such as, you know, like this Hind 6 I mean, does that, you know, help us to understand, you know, like why Islamization of politics that happened in Turkey? But I mean I was there, I mean I just lived in that neighborhood, et cetera. So this is a four year actually, as you probably notice, this was my own natural habitat in a sense. I grew up in like, you know, at least in second half of my childhood dream is in that region of the city. And I just established some connections of course and you know, I just found myself in this really interesting place. I'm not going to disclose, you know, like where it was etc, because I mean, I don't know, there are of course ethical issues, but what I saw was, you know, let's say and gave me pretty clear, you know, like see note. So in this like streaming orders, there's a hierarchy and there's a class hierarchy and that class hierarchy will be invisible again to most of the outside observers who just see the quote unquote, the Muslims as one big King on the Sikh community. So the class of persons. And also it's kind of difficult to catch those class differences because I mean people really look alike. You know, even the local elite, the Fogo US League doesn't look that much different than elected workers. But there, I mean it was pretty clear. I mean they said the rich ones, richer ones, local elite, the same guided, you know, we say financial ceremony. The ceremony was, you know, disorganized in such a way that you know, these people were able to see who just made a big contribution and small contribution. There was some degree of frustration, especially among some of the attendees, work, work, working class attendees about this part of the practice. And then you know, this, they were needed by the, this working class attendees were sort of needed, not like by the particular sect or for the ceremonial, ceremonial purposes. We just want to have a big crowd, of course. But they were given a very clear signal that, you know, they said they were not really very welcome, you know, like to the actual sale, I mean during the ceremic practice. And one again, just an argument. I make the observation, not an argument, but observation I made was that very, a very, very small percentage of my co workers in the sweatshops and factories were followers of this style test. They were listening to their messages. They just knew more this about their stance on cultural issues, day life practices, etc. Etc. But you know, my observation is not, I think counterintuitive. Just think about this. When you work over 12, 13 hours a day and you just cannot make ends meet and you are exhausted all the time, how could you find time? You understand energy. Like you join those activities, you're going to have some resources which local businessmen and business people or the local elite on your head. That seems like that was the bottom line of the observation. I hope I did not. I hope I answered your question.
- [47:11]
C
Sure, yeah. And I just wanted to point out that you did interviews with national and local religious leaders, folks from the Naqshbandi in the Salafi community. And you write that leadership within these orders denigrated the labor of workers and assigned a higher social spiritual status to the full bourgeoisie. Could you say a little bit more about that?
- [47:32]
A
Absolutely. Thank you so much. But just on minor connection, I did not conduct interviews. This is a content analysis. So two research assistants of mine and me, we just basically watch a good number of, you know, let's say videos, YouTube videos. It just gave in the search expert, the full sermons of the speakers on the representatives of these ranges. And let me try to justify why we Just I chose this method instead of conducting interviews. If you are interested in this, I mean this is this videos or the content is designed to communicate to their own audience. All right. I conducted hundreds of interviews. You know Mr. Foley's book. Yeah. Hundred feet interviews between 2011, 12 and 15, et cetera. So I believe in the virtue of in depth interview. But in this case I kind of felt like, you know this, the in depth interviews would not be the right method because then the person would be talking to me and he will know that, you know, I was there for research. You'll rightly guess that I was not an Islamist, et cetera, et cetera. But I think this kind of this, this, this YouTube output if you will just was much more say, say neutral in this, in this regard. You're making much more reflective of young list what kind of message they really want to deliver to their own audience anyways after this long period. I'm sorry for this. So let me come back to your question. I mean again what I saw was pretty surprising to me. First of all, I mean my starting argument was pretty clear. You know, let's say, I mean this, let's say religious orders directly or indirectly just you know, is a cooperate with the political Islamist movement, the party if you will, and then also sort of maybe cater for the interests of the former Jersey. But you know, they're just non monopoly entrepreneurs to some degree. But I wasn't sure about that. But down the line, let's say this, religious orders I predicted develop a narrative that just would appeal to the working class. Meaning that you would expect him to see a narrative which praises the working class virtues of hard work. I don't only say the hardships they endure, so on and so forth. Right. Because we just want to make it. You want to appeal to the working class because indirectly you need their support for the political movement is in this moment the third party. But first of all, let's see my research assistant, I, this probably the most important finding did not find much about working class, about labor, about work conditions, about I don't know, cost of living, you know, like things like that would matter, you know, like to your typical worker. And I knew that it just mattered to multiple worker because I work with them. Number two, whenever we found all the same tiny bits and pieces, fragments in one way when you refer to the working class, I mean almost most of these references were very, very negative. I mean basically the simplest formulation I came up with was as follows. I mean if you work basically you have less time, you like to worship. So work just comes up with what some common is called an opportunity cost, right. For your, you know, status in the hereafter, in the. In the whatever is going to happen, like after you die. So 10 I mean, and just this makes so much sense to me and retrospectively because in 2008 when I just worked with my co workers, I just got that a lot. I mean my co workers were being that happy. I mean, they were not followers of religious sex. But you know that the message given by the religious orders was that, you know, they were wasting. They literally, they were wasting their time. So. And this was weird. I mean it ended up there. Why would you make people feel uncomfortable with what they are doing? Especially if what they are doing is quite painful. Again, working for again 12 throating arsenal effector or switch up is not an easy job to do. So and then we also just found all this, you know, like references which vastly outnumbered the references to the workers and their living conditions, their race, et cetera, about the Faubourg. And the narrative was quite different. The narrative about this non voluple entrepreneurs was very positive because, you know, basically just gave them. Even Allah even gave them good luck or bad luck like this and that. So then this particular, this asymmetry gave me the impression that the religious six first of all, primary audience is not working class, but the full bourgeois is, number one. Number two, they do not really care that much about how the working class feels about their own. The content of their message. Number two, if they care, they believe, I suppose. I mean, they should be disciplined, you know, like with the help of this partner narrative. So we have a pretty. There's a grim picture, you know, like in terms of the way this relationship is structured between the relative orders, the Faubourg and the workers. And workers of course feel all this pressure.
- [53:09]
C
Could you say a little bit more about something you've mentioned? I think in. In almost every response that we've. That we've gotten to so far that, you know, you worked as a laborer in a garment sweatshop in a neighborhood in Istanbul in 2008 and you have ethnographic material that you draw on for primarily the book's fourth and fifth chapters. Could you tell us a little bit more about why you took that approach and how that helped you understand more of the various regimes of domination that you talk about in the book? I identified three main ones. Labor, the regime of labor, gays and hygiene.
- [53:55]
A
Jack, I'm going to ask you just like, I mean repeat the question. So like I do you ask me how these regimes of domination just bolster or support Islam's frontal like you know. Yeah, please. Yeah, sure.
- [54:10]
C
Yeah so first of all, could you tell us more about your experience working in the garment garment sweatshop and why you chose that particular approach to study this problem and then how you connect that to these various regimes of domination that we were just talking about. Does that make sense?
- [54:29]
A
Yeah, it does. I mean again, let me remind the listeners of this conversation of the very first point I made in this form. My intention, my long term, let's say scientific intention is not being to study the Islamist movement or even the Islamization of Poops. I mean I just want. If people just read this book I just want them to keep this in mind and I think there are bigger and more important topics in my opinion to study and so one of them is of course when they say how you just know commons people the conditions they experience. I mean actually this has a direct relationship to Islamism in Turkey of course. I mean many people in Turkey have been asking the same questions over and over again. The question you just asked, listen, for how many years have they been in power? How come I guess in a certain section of the book try to demonstrate that Turkish economy has been slowly just and going down. I called it, you know they say kind of administrative is amazing. It's supposed to be amazing but sustainable decline. Now in order for us to answer this question why is Denison monster was able to just establish this kind of a strong connection with a significant portion of the society and after I was convinced that we are talking about something related to the notion of domination. I mean clienteleism for instance or nothing only say something about the metaphysical, let's say, I mean perspectives of the people. And the first one clientism goes to what I call economic reductions and this, you know like emphasis on this moral or this not moral but religious universal connection you can boost community that calls to what I call cultural essentials. So I mean beyond this point so we say how can we truly understand the conditions under which again the oppressor accepts generally the conditions of oppression. And this goes back and we discussed it again in two bigger questions actually like the answers of which should just have some universal value. In other words, if we understand the conditions again under which period or the oppress exceeds the conditions of operation even though of course there are certain particularities like important to the local context and the part of the historical period we just can get draw certain lessons that can be applicable to other contexts as well. Historical and geography. And in that regard, during this down the line, I just slowly realized that, let's say BC3 relatively identifiable, when we say vectors, if you will, of combination. The first one is, as you said, what I just called the regime gaze regime. So this is kind of the easiest one to just observe because I mean, when you go to the working class neighborhood in Turkey where typically the Islamist movement is very present, strong, et cetera, et cetera, I mean just you see the eyes everywhere, like only this constant gaze on Swede, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. This doesn't pertain to of course, Islamist movement. You're like, specifically, you're like, there is this kind of an urban culture in the first place, which I again attribute to the power of the formal jersey to the local elite. The local elite basically uses the Islamist rhetoric to justify this kind of engaged religion. Of course I'm going to monitor how the women get dressed on the street because Islamic values teaches us to just protect the honor of the neighborhood. So this is the line, right? This not, I think, the reason, but it's very less a useful way to just kind of justify this part of your practice. The second one is, you know, basically what I just called you, like, you know, regime, labor regime. And here I don't think I just say, you know, like anything, let's say foundationally new because luckily we just had all this studies, you know, in different factors, settings, unfortunately, most of which again took place in western countries, Morocco, Atlantic countries. But it was again obvious that, let's say this, workers did not have time and energy to think about the factors behind their own suffering. They simply don't. I mean, this is one very simple point which many social scientists are thinking of as a timely myth. We primarily, because many social scientists do not understand what let's say amounts to the captains from this labor process and what kind of price your average worker pays for they just immediately dignize. I will say, and I'm going to make this argument the worker class and number three is just sort of much more about the anthropological perspective, the regime of hygiene, in a sense, you just have to sort of, let's say, come up with a certain type of set of practices and a narrative around those practices to just in a sense define the relationship of the body of your typical Muslim, so to speak, to the rest of the cosmos. So this is the realm in which not only those practices are invented and maintained, but also the individuals basically develop a certain form of self that just regulates you and the relationship between the rest of the rest of the local community first and the relationship of the community to the rest of the world. There you see the strongest, you know, they say, impact or influence of the Islamic repertory that's developed not only by the political party, but also by the civil disorders and also by these employers too, in terms of the conditions of politics and the mobilization of the working class.
- [60:52]
C
I think that the personal stories that you bring to the book and the experiences that you bring to the book really help enrich the discussion and the thesis. So thanks for sharing a little bit more about that. Can you say more about what your data relates or how it relates to Marxist theories of economics and labor and change? There's a you in the book, you talk about this debate within that body of scholarship about what defines the middle class. And so could you share a little bit more about how this idea of the faux bourgeoisie, how that relates to how people are using Marxist vocabulary and analytical concepts in their own work.
- [61:40]
A
We need the Marxist perspective, I mean, plain and simple, because other perspectives basically are the way I see it. Do not say more than what we already know and worse. You only see, I just got really bored when I read the literature, to be honest with you. So like, what is new? What is the goal of our resource? Is it good to just let us own things? Like, no, it's not supposed to be always about data, insights, let's say interview notes, like field notes, et cetera, et cetera. It's not just about the material, but how the material means refrains like the reality. We see how this reality social construct is, so to speak. And in this regard, the marks perspective if again improved in a certain way. If you overload in a certain way gives us, you know, like very, I think, important connections. I mean, I just discussed this very briefly in your book, but you know, I, I'm in the, in the final, this chapter, I briefly refer to China. I mean actually like this, this would be, I mean, I'd be fascinated if you're like, you know, at least some researchers, you know, like out there that read this book and then just, you know, hook you like some questions from this book. They're all research regime, but in other crime contexts, starting with China again. I mean, the rise of. You only said the transformation of Mao's ideology into this very crass form of nationalism, all right, in China is just your mind boggling. And you see the Chinese, the role of the Chinese formulas, you want to say, in the spark of the transformation, very vividly. So Islamism, nationalism, do they match? I Don't know but you know, I mean in terms, I mean they talk about different things, they prioritize, you know like different, you know they have different maybe versions of these three technologies of domination. Gays, hygiene and labor. But at the end of the day, you know like there is one common factor which is the rise of reformers in both countries. So this finding Marxist prospecting is actually a good one. You know this. That's when like see the. We haven't seen before. But on the top of that as you just pointed out, you know like the Marx perspective I can also has to just deal it work on its own organic challenges if you will. And I'm not critical of the Marxist because many of them just you know, try to do that down the line. As for few of us in particular, you know, I just, I, I believe everything boils down from one single question. What are the. What other social classes we have in doing campus model production in addition to the bourgeois and the proletariat? Marxists have been better of this problem since the time of Marxist Marx himself. But I don't think they just been able to give a good answer to this question. What our offer is pretty simple to understand. I just prioritize what the Marx for the circulation process, recognition in the capability for the commission. And there are three moments in circulation process and each one of these units, moments of metamorphosis open up a space for a non bourgeois and a non proletarian social class. And I would argue most of the politics we have seen at least, at least since the Great Depression of 1929 basically here being this game played by this social classes which are neither proletarian, normal bourgeois and I call that the circulation class. So that's why this narrative basically I think gives us a certain point to think about politics in a different fashion including what's going on in the United States for instance right now.
- [65:35]
C
It would be so interesting to see more of the application of your findings and other contexts like you were just mentioning China, the United States, in India, where I do my work in India, I can speak more to that. You see the rise of this extremism and populist Hindu based politics and you see that intertwined with certain economic interests from different sectors. So I appreciate you saying that and hopefully those are takeaways for folks who are interested in this and will apply it to other contexts. As we start to wrap up. Could you say a little bit more and you've mentioned this already but how your research relates to Islamic studies as a field we are recording this for the Islamic Studies Channel. You've mentioned how some of your findings in the Turkish context apply to other Muslim majority countries like Iran and Indonesia. And you've also talked about how religious populism is the result of socioeconomic changes and not simply something that's related to simply the politics of culture and nostalgia. Those are two, I think, major findings. But could you say maybe more about either of those? Or is maybe something we haven't had a chance to talk about yet, something that folks working within Islamic studies, what are some takeaways for that particular community?
- [66:58]
A
I'm not an expert on Islam, so let's start with that. Not just that I don't think so few of these sociologists in particular, or social science in general, like, shouldn't be asking questions, you know, about metaphysics or theology. And these are different, I mean, forms of knowledge, if you. So there's that first of all. But we are or should be interested in the implications of the way Islam is framed by different interest groups, whether it be, you know, like social classes or regional groups or border like, you know, the ethnic. Different ethnic groups in this global hierarchy of race and ethnicity, et cetera, et cetera, or women, like heterosexual people. I mean, you name it, you know, and so this refers to a gap in the literature. Because, I mean, in the literature, basically, it's a very deep generalization. I'm aware of that. But you know, let's see. I mean, this is kind of just an undertone, you know, mis. I mean, what are the like, you know, social dynamics, who are the interest groups, etc. This is your book, all of them. So if you ask me about how if this book makes any kind of contribution to the study of Islam, it's not about Islam as such, but how it's like framed again by this, you know, interest groups. So because Islam, as I understand it, again, I don't want to say anything wrong or even offensive, but Islam has a good chunk of material about social justice, for instance. I mean, I mean, lots of you, they say, I mean the just nuisance we can draw from the practical era. It is a very strong, I think neoclass mentioned some folk of, let's say, resistance against the ruling class of that particular or maybe ruling status, not the class, but ruling status slope of the particular period. We don't have much of that in the contemporary listen narrative. But Islam, bide Islam strongly religious orders, et cetera, et cetera. So that's why you always say, I mean, there is something weird about this. And then people who study Islam. Basically I think we should be asking these questions like why is this patriarchy narrative is so, so powerful and about Muslim communities. I mean I'm going to take this question as something related to local communities, right? I'm not communities on the say composed of the entire population of your like in different nations states, et cetera. I mean the dominant interpretation as I understand it, you know, within this current content and predominantly liking a narrative of IH calls for what I call individual salvation. And this particular interpretation also defines the community according to a particular social formation that fulfills the individual's salvation. So the community exists not because for the sake of the salvation of the community but for the salvation of the individuals in that part of the community. This is an extremely, what I see is an extremely individualistic interpretation of the religion. Extremely individualistic and misinterpretation of the community according to the standards and rulings and rules etc of the religion itself. So accordingly, I mean there is a very strong connection in the way Islam is framed by the so called experts of this religion. As I understand it, Islam shouldn't have interspersed. Everyone should be able to read the whole scripture, make their own judgment, etc. So that is not the case obviously. And the way they define it definitely works very well, very well with the contemporary monopole capitalism period. And the second point about, about the potential contribution to the state of Islamic Muslim communities, I mean we gotta find a way to conduct this particular observation about the connection between Islamism and late stage advanced capitalism and the way this narrative emphasizes and defines the body, the human body. So there is this missing gap which I kind of discuss in this book. But there's a lot more to be about this. You know, the synthetic correlations, however difficult because we talk capitalism, something global, we talk about body, individual. So like very undisciplineal layers. But I think the more people study this pollution, I think the more we are going to know about what's really going on.
- [71:47]
C
That's great, that's really helpful for thinking about how scholars can take your ideas forward that you've given in the book. Last question for you. What are you working on next? What can you share with us that may be related to this project or other things that you have going on? But what can we expect from you in the future?
- [72:09]
A
Thanks Jah. So first of all there is an appendix in the book but that kind of at a very rudimentary level you understand sort of represents you on the location of the circulation classes including the faubourg USD in the Accumulation process right now I started that project in 2010. I mean, I, I couldn't live in the United States. I used to live in therapy. I used to teach at the university in Turkey. So to cut long story short, you know, this is the Islamist government basically started attack the crowds, be the scholars, you know, like sign the petition to protest that. Then again, to cut long story short, I had to leave the country. I had to come back, but I had to go to somewhere else and I ended up in that. Now when I was there, however, and like this question about in this alcoholic form of analytic from let's say expose or let's say presentation of the accumulation courses, that question has been bugging me for many years. I only put this tiny, this segment of that particular project in the book. And I will kind of contemplate thinking about that number and that I'm thinking about how to operationalize and understand for another. The second project I really want to work on is the connection between this, the rise of this. There are different words for concept for techno fascism or techno feudalism and Islamism. In this, this year's American Sociological Associations and the annual conference, I will present a paper about that. The title is Techno Feudalism and Isms. Because if I argue, if you use the framework I offer in this book, then say the likes of Mr. Elon Musk, the likes of Jeff B. Ben, I mean, the narrative that he'd been building up a striking astonishing parallels with the kind of narrative the Islamists in Turkey have developed over the behaviors. I mean, I know that I'm making almost, I think, this seemingly nonsensical argument here. How can we put this pre pillar like people together? But I think, you know, they say given that old groups represent two different circulation classes, it's kind of makes sense that we see those in like, you know, similarities or parallels.
- [74:42]
C
Great. So you're presenting at the ASA this year. Where is that happening?
- [74:46]
A
Yeah, in New York City.
- [74:47]
C
Okay. Okay, great, great. Well, Utku Balaban, thank you so much for this conversation about your book Industrial Islamism. We covered a lot of topics, the data, the models, the theory and some of the extensions of the work. So hopefully our listeners have a lot to use going forward in maybe their own work. Thank you so much though, for this book. And there'll be links in the show notes to the, to the publisher's website if people want to take a look at the book themselves. Thank you.
- [75:21]
A
Thank you, Jacqueline, for having.
- [75:23]
D
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