Neighbours before strangers | Alain de Botton, Seyla Benhabib and Tommy Curry

Summary

---

Podcast Summary: Philosophy For Our Times – "Neighbours Before Strangers"

Guests: Alain de Botton, Seyla Benhabib, Tommy Curry
Host: Alex O’Connor
Date: March 10, 2026

---

Overview

This episode brings together three prominent thinkers—Alain de Botton, Seyla Benhabib, and Tommy Curry—for a searching, often contentious debate on the ethical and political question: Should we value our neighbors more than we value strangers? The discussion interrogates the foundations and shortcomings of moral universalism, considers the historical and lived realities of group preference, and explores whether the rejection or reformulation of universal moral ideals might explain the rise of modern populism and nationalism.

---

Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. The Meaning and Origins of Moral Universalism (04:04–12:38)

Alain de Botton (04:04):

• Traces moral universalism back to Christianity, particularly Jesus’ teachings to expand love and respect to all, even “the leper.”
• Frames universalism as a deliberate provocation—a bold ideal, not easily or always achieved in practice:

  "We have to have time for ideals... To call it overreach is slightly to demean it." (05:28)

• Argues questions about whether we can prefer some people over others (i.e., partiality) are somewhat moot—since we do and always will. The challenge is to prefer in better, less arbitrary ways (philosophical schools, ideas, etc., rather than national, ethnic, or arbitrary boundaries).
• Example: Discusses the film Force Majeure as a meditation on unforgivable acts of preference—even towards oneself.

Seyla Benhabib (08:01):

• Declares herself “the house Kantian.” Contends the important question is not whether morality is universal, but whether it ought to be.

  "The premise that all human beings are of equal worth and dignity...remains with us, and I believe that this is what universalism in morality means in the first place." (08:21)

• Accepts that universalism is historically difficult—sometimes hypocritical—but contends principles are “regulative ideas” meant to guide, not dictate action.

  "If you believe in a principle, a principle is a regulative idea. It guides you. It doesn't tell you exactly what to do." (11:45)

Tommy Curry (12:43):

• Expresses strong skepticism, outright rejecting moral universalism as naive and ill-fitted to a world shaped by exclusion and power.

  "Universalism doesn't fail simply because one agrees or disagrees with the good or the bad...The very essence of what fits into the category of being a human being has always been contested among European philosophers." (13:09)

• Points to Kant and the Enlightenment’s histories of racial/anthropological exclusion, drawing a line from abstract ideals to practical forms of exclusion and violence.

---

2. Universal Ideals vs. Practical Realities & Exclusion (16:40–29:24)

• Host (Alex O’Connor) asks whether universalist ideals often mask exclusions under the guise of equality.
• de Botton (16:52–18:52): Notes the modern Nation State prescribes equal dignity for all but not “affective” ties (mutual affection or love). Acknowledges the tension between egalitarian frameworks and real attachments/loyalties.
• Benhabib (19:30–21:47): Engages Curry, agreeing that Kant’s rationalism excluded many, especially women and people of color, because the “essence of humanity” was defined as the rational male’s trait; wonders if we must reconstruct rather than abandon the tradition.
• Curry (21:49–26:01): Rejects reconstruction as insufficient, arguing the very starting point of universalism excluded Blackness and other “non-beings.” Suggests many philosophers saw non-Europeans as destined to “die out” in the progress toward ‘civilization.’

  "Our societies are falling precisely because universalism can't control behavior. It doesn't change the way that people are structured to perceive people that are outside of their kin group." (25:35)

• Benhabib (26:07–28:15): Pushes Curry to clarify—does he claim philosophy cannot conceptualize Black humanity, or only that it often hasn’t historically?
• Curry clarifies: History shows that even ‘inclusion’ (by Black thinkers) did not translate into social reality; “conversations and dialogue do not change the contours of history and knowledge.” (34:58)

---

3. The Role of Preference, National Identity, and Populism (29:24–48:57)

• Host asks de Botton if “bad” reasons to prefer (e.g. national borders) ultimately erode the very idea of nationhood, possibly explaining rising nationalism.

Alain de Botton (29:24–32:18):

• Tells a story involving a taxi driver who affirms Kantian ideals but admits to everyday group preferences (“the neighbors, their cooking smells very different…”).

  "In that ride... there was an articulation of a lot of these themes: a layer of lip service paid to...universalism and an embarrassed but nevertheless defiant critique. I do have preferences." (30:12)

• Suggests the “frontline” on these issues is lived experience, not abstract theory.

Curry’s perspective (33:17–35:00):

• Argues lived biases are not simply “failings of rationality” but reflect socially constructed aspirations—sometimes for exclusion and domination.
• The political success of leaders like Trump testifies to the depth and effectiveness of these in-group preferences, weaponized through power.

Curry’s critique of moral universalism (35:00–37:00):

• Cites history—enslavement, colonization, mass violence—arguing moral universalism is more rhetoric than reality:

  "Moral universalism does nothing for us but play into our effectivity about rhetorical tropes that make us feel like we're good human beings." (36:30)

de Botton’s and Benhabib’s Rejoinders (37:00–42:34):

• de Botton: Argues for retaining the “ideal” even if we always fall short (“Christian eyes of love”).
• Curry: Pushes back—the cost of such ideals, when they exclude, can be permanent (genocide, erasure).
• Benhabib: The concept of the ideal itself can and does expand with history and encounter. Emphasizes practical, material causes for crises of migration (wars, climate, economy); not simply failures of moral idealism.

---

4. Can National Identity Exist Without Preference? (42:34–49:48)

Host reframes:
Does universal equal treatment of all people undercut national identity, fueling a backlash of populism and nationalism?

Curry (43:27–46:32):

• Sees in-group preference as anthropologically inevitable across cultures. Social systems are always structured to designate insiders and outsiders.
• Moral universalism, by itself, is powerless against new forms of exclusion and violence; societies will reassert “threat” narratives to justify preference and even brutality.

Benhabib (46:47–48:57):

• Accepts that preference for in-groups (family, kin, professional group, etc.) is anthropological, but sees modern identity—and national identity—in particular as “fractured, complicated, interactive.”

  "[N]ational cultures are always interactive cultures...I don't see fortresses as being necessary to the cultivation of national consciousness." (47:54)

de Botton (49:07):

• Responds to Curry’s pessimism: Yes, in-group preference is perennial, but history offers darker and less dark manifestations. The realistic task is to “get it from the tyrannical to the bearable. That would be success enough.” (49:46)

---

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Tommy Curry: “Universalism doesn’t fail simply because one agrees or disagrees with the good or the bad...the essence of what fits into the category of being a human being has always been contested among European philosophers.” (13:09)
• Seyla Benhabib: “If you believe in a principle, a principle is a regulative idea. It guides you. It doesn’t tell you exactly what to do.” (11:45)
• Alain de Botton: “We have to have time for ideals…because to call it overreach is slightly to demean it.” (05:28)
• Curry: “You don't make the same mistake for thousands of years and then say, oops, my bad in the 21st century on a panel. That's not what's happened.” (35:22)
• Benhabib: “I don't see fortresses as being necessary to...the cultivation of national consciousness.” (47:54)
• de Botton: “We want to try and get it from the tyrannical to the bearable. That would be success enough.” (49:46)

---

Important Timestamps

• 04:04 Alain de Botton: On the Christian origins and necessity of moral universalism as an (imperfect) ideal.
• 08:01 Seyla Benhabib: The Kantian position – universal human worth as a regulative idea.
• 12:43 Tommy Curry: Rejection of moral universalism based on its history of exclusion.
• 16:52–18:52 de Botton and O’Connor: National identity, statehood, and the absence of affective ties.
• 19:30–21:47 Benhabib & Curry: The limits of rationalism and humanity’s definitions.
• 21:49–26:01 Curry: The impossibility of reconstructing traditions fundamentally based on exclusion.
• 29:24–32:18 de Botton: Taxi driver parable; everyday experience of group preference.
• 33:17–35:00 Curry: Biases as socially constructed, not just individual failings.
• 35:00–37:00 Curry: The failure of universalism to prevent historic atrocities.
• 42:34–48:57 Roundtable: The relation between universalism, nationalism, and the construction of in-groups.

---

Tone & Style

• Intellectually rigorous, sometimes fiery.
• Curry is forceful and uncompromising, often pessimistic.
• Benhabib is nuanced, committed to the utility and evolution of principles, open about tradition’s limits.
• de Botton is pragmatic, focused on ideals as aspiration and the messiness of human practice, and seeks bridges.
• Polite, but persistent disagreement and deep engagement throughout.

---

Conclusion

The debate ends without consensus but provides a vivid illumination of the enduring tension:

• Are universalist ideals of equality meaningful when exclusion and partiality are persistent, perhaps natural, features of social life?
• Is the task to reconstruct and expand ideals, or to reject the very frameworks built on centuries of exclusion?
• Can nations thrive without some form of “preference,” and if so, how?

Listeners come away challenged to reflect not only on the philosophical heritage of the West but on the current crises of identity and belonging that animate political life today.

---

Transcript

[A]

As a small business owner, sometimes it feels like no matter how much planning you do, there's always surprises, like an urgent, expensive repair. But here's a surprise you will like with Progressive. Small business owners save 13% on their commercial auto insurance when they pay in full. So enjoy a surprise for once. Get a quote in as little as 8 [e-mail] progressive casualty insurance company and affiliates. Discounts not available in all states or situations.

[B]

How can we reconstruct these philosophies and expand and enrich our notion of humanity rather than doing away with the premise of humanity altogether?

[C]

I disagree with that strongly.

[B]

Okay, all right.

[C]

I like you, but I disagree. Moral universalism does nothing for us but play into our effectivity about rhetorical tropes that make us feel like we're good human beings.

[D]

Hello and welcome to Philosophy for Our Times, bringing you the world's leading thinkers on today's biggest ideas. My name is Daniel.

[E]

And I'm Zeb. Today's episode is Neighbors Before Strangers, a debate covering the big questions in populism and equality. It really dives into whether it's moral to show preference for those we have more in common with over those who are in some way different, a conversation which has become all the more important since this debate was held back at our how the Leit Gets in festival in early 2025. This panel features three incredible speakers. Alain de Botton, the founder of the School of Life, Sayla Ben Habib, one of the most influential political philosophers of her generation, and Tommy Curry, the personal chair of Africana Philosophy and Black Male Studies at the University of Edinburgh.

[D]

The talk is Hosted by Alex O', Connor, YouTuber and host of the Within Reason podcast. So without any further ado, we'll hand over to Alex. Thank you. Good afternoon, everyone. With so much recent focus on populism and its focus on immigration and nationalism, an ethical question has been thrust to the forefront of our politics. Should we value our neighbors more than we value strangers? This topic reflects the universalist morality of the main moral Western frameworks. But critics have argued that moral universalism of this kind generates a cause for favoring strangers over the interests of those who are closer to to us, and that this is profoundly mistaken. Chinese Confucianism, for example, thinks that the family is more important than strangers. Recent studies have also shown us that people in practice do favor those who are closer to us. And moreover, many think many people think that it's morally right to do so. So should we abandon this moral universalism, see it as an Overreach of enlightenment values that fly in the face of, of our behavior and what is beneficial for society. Might the excesses of moral universalism have contributed to the rise of populism? Or is moral universalism essential to the value of the west, the value system of the west, and abandoned at great peril to ourselves and the world? Joining me today to discuss these questions are Alanda Baton, the best selling philosopher and founder of the School of Life, Shayla Benhabib, one of the most influential political philosophers of her generation and author of at the Margins of the Modern State, and Tommy Curry, the personal chair of Africana Philosophy and Black Male Studies at the University of Edinburgh. So please help me in welcoming our panel. So our first theme is on this question of moral universalism. Is morality universal? Alain

[F]

by the way, I think it's really good that we are having confusion here. It's a sign of something we're recognizing something really good that we can't quite agree. So sometimes these panels or debates have an idea that we're going to reach one truth and then it's good that we're in a bit of a mess here. It's a complicated issue. I read this issue, I mean, so it really. Moral universalism for me begins with Christianity and with this very bold claim that you see in the mouth of Jesus that the leper is worth as much of your love and respect and honor as, you know, the well being, the well person that we must broaden a revolt against this an ancient Roman clan based view of who is in and who is out. It's like every human is a child of God, et cetera, et cetera. Is that overreach in that? Well, yes, of course there is, of course there is a kind of, that's a deliberate provocation, it's meant to have overreach. I mean, it's not an accident because what it is, is an ideal. It's an ideal of behavior. And I think we have to have time for ideals, you know, because we're to call it overreach is slightly to demean it. It is, you know, what you would be doing if you were fully a child of God in the Christian point of view. Is anyone fully a child of God? Not quite yet. We're all approaching that. And that's okay. That's okay. So having ideals is okay because that also presumes an acceptance of something more real. I read in this question, really the question can we prefer certain people? Can we have preferences among people? And I think that in different points, in different moments we can get very hung up on this question, as though to have preference is a sinful thing. Do you remember this film by a Norwegian film director called Fosse Majeure? It's a film about a family that takes a skiing holiday. And there's an avalanche in the middle of the skiing holiday. And in the midst of this avalanche, one of the characters, the father, puts himself ahead of his family very briefly, but puts himself. And from then on his whole life unravels. His wife can no longer look at him in the same way. He has shown a preference for people, in this case himself, which is deemed unforgivable. It's a very fascinating film, that point of view. Now, we're still circling this idea, can we prefer other people? And I think the answer is not can we prefer because we will prefer, but what is the best way to prefer? On what basis do we prefer? And I think that that's the area that we need to look at. The worst kind of preference is based on some very arbitrary things, like the person prefers somebody within these land borders. That's a very clumsy way of preferring a human being. Philosophy, of course, has always dealt with preferential groups, as has politics. You know, we prefer those who support a Kantian position. We prefer those who are adherents of Wittgenstein, et cetera. We are existentialists, it's assumed you can prefer positions that's a lot more interesting than preferring people from certain nations or certain ages or certain creeds. So there are better ways of preferring people, but can we prefer. Absolutely. So we need to make our way towards more interesting, more nuanced ways of preferring. I'm going to stop it there. Sure.

[D]

Dr. Benaby, we'll go to you next. What do you think about this universalist conception of morality?

[B]

Well, for the sake of the discussion, I will play the role of the house Kantian here. I'll begin by saying that the question is not so much, is morality universal? I think the question that's being asked is an odd question. Ought morality be universal? Now, I'm going to defend the proposition that premise that all human beings are of equal worth and dignity may in part be indebted to the Christian tradition. But it's certainly an experience of modernity and the modern age, and it remains with us, and I believe that this is what universalism in morality means in the first place. The commitment to equal value and dignity of the human being, which is also incorporated in the various agreements and institutions of the post World War II period. Now, saying this leads of course to the question human beings have lived by other systems of the good and the just. Throughout history there have been systems that are more embedded in an ethics of virtue oriented towards the family, or an ethics oriented towards religion, theology, cosmology. But I think once the experiences of modernity have yielded this understanding of moral universalism that there are really no good reasons to justify to another human being the recognition of their worth and dignity. It's very hard to, if I may use a controversial word, to regress behind that. There is a distinction that's made in both Anglo American and German philosophies that's between morality and ethical life. Ethical life refers to aspects of communities, affiliations, chosen or not, in which we are embedded. Collegiality may require something different from us than what respecting human rights requires. Being a member of a family may require something different from us than, let's say, what an institutional ethic requires. I very much learned, despite the fact that I'm a Kantian, from Bernard Williams. When Bernard Williams says that sometimes in morality the trouble is that you can have on sought too many. And so I think in that sentence we have to try to reconcile these preferences, which I also believe are significant with our universalist commitments. I don't see an opposition there. I think it's always a matter of being able to mediate properly. Now, anticipating maybe something that my colleague may say, and this is my last point, universalist morality is justifiably accused of hypocrisy. I say justifiably because it is very difficult to be able to exercise it. It's very difficult to live our institutional and political life in such a way that we recognize equal worth and dignity of human beings. And it's very hard sometimes not to have to make any. Any distinctions. But nonetheless, if you believe in a principle, a principle is a regulative idea. It guides you. It doesn't tell you exactly what to do. When we come back in the second round, maybe I'll also express my criticism of Kantianism. I began by saying I'm going to play the house Kantian, but I do have my criticism of it, so maybe I'll just stop there for a time. Yeah, go ahead.

[D]

And Dr. Curry, what do you make of what you've heard so far on this concept of moral universalism?

[C]

Yes, I feel like I'm going to sound like a broken record to some. I do not believe in moral universalism. I think the question of morality, understood primarily as a designation of goods or bads, what is good and what is evil and how we should assign value to those and whether or not those things can be willed for people, not only in our time, but across the board. Assuming if we're talking about Kantianism, I think it fails. And what I would like to suggest is that it fails because philosophy in a certain sense is not fit for purpose. The philosophical disagreements about both what is good and bad can go on forever. But for me, I. I think the question of universalism provokes us to ask a different set of questions. Universalism doesn't fail simply because one agrees or disagrees with the good or the bad. I think moral universalism fails because the very essence of what fits into the category of being a human being has always been contested among European philosophers. And from the time period of modernity, we can talk about Kant as developing a system or a categorical imperative by which we can evaluate certain goods and evils across time. But we often do not talk about who Kant thought was exempt from that. There were certain groups of people that Kant simply did not believe belonged in the same moral community as other groups of people. That's not a failure of reason or misapplication of the universal. It is a fundamental construction of the characteristics by which some people are thought to be human beings and some people are thought to be sub human and not human at all. What we often do in this debate with philosophy is we assume that having a rational discussion about what we should endorse as individuals, as our beliefs would lead us to believe who should be included in that discussion of individuals, somehow changes social structures, or more importantly, the people that we believe should exist within in certain societies. And I think that there's a lot at risk now with this pretense of moral universalism, because as we see with the right and with other authoritarian and ethno nationalist forces, morality can be played with, it can be manipulated. Power allows you to construct the universal for those people that you think belong in your group, your sect, or your society. And when we do that, when we see the malleability of the alleged universal and it's used to murder certain groups of people, and to say that their murder in fact makes the world better and more moral because they were evil, we see that certain groups of people don't fit. Not because we disagree, but because we've decided to create a world, a nation, a country in their absence. Is that the universal that's at work? Philosophy asks a question that presumes equality. It assumes rationality and a certain ethical dialogue between the members having the debate. But the world seems to teach us something vastly different, that there are certain people who are silenced. There are certain people who don't get to participate in that dialogue. So the question of whether or not the universal can present itself to everyone equally is something. Is something that I reject on the basis of anthropology. I believe that there are certain people that are created as non humans, that the Enlightenment birth these categories where people don't matter and do not seem to fit within the category bent for recognition. And given that, I think that the discussions we have, as rhetorically powerful and effective as they may be at swaying your emotions, fundamentally, don't have the power to contour the way the societies are being constructed and the way that power manipulates good and bad for its own ends.

[D]

Alain, you talked about ideals in your opening, but do you think that there is an extent to which these can mask practical realities?

[F]

Sure. I mean, we have to think about the history of the modern nation state, because the modern nation state has, you know, traditionally had this idea of equal value and dignity to all. And the modern nation state is. Comes very late on in the history of groups together. It's essentially saying, you're not going to love your fellow citizen, but there will be equal value and dignity among all. So it's really trying to remove a kind of affective relationship between citizens. The citizens, they don't need to love each other even to know each other. The number one thing they need to do is to give each other equal value and dignity. And we're not going to create a grouping based on enthusiasm, on love, if you like. That's not how we're going to do this. And I think that many of the debates around immigration and around nationalism, et cetera, have got this issue rumbling in the background. What is a nation to be? Is it simply a group of people living under the tenet of equal value and dignity to all who may not like each other at all? They've got nothing in common. They don't want to break bread together, they don't want to hang out together. But there's equal value and dignity versus another kind of vision where a group of people who have much closer effective ties are also going to set about maybe denying equal value and dignity to those with whom they are not breaking bread and those that they don't have preferential relations with. And this is the kind of tension of the modern state, modern state sits on the way I read it.

[D]

Do you think that Tom is right, that it can be easy to say, well, we're going to develop this system by which we treat everybody Equally. But rather than saying there are certain people that we don't treat equally, we say, no, no, we've got this wonderful ideal of human equality. It's just that these people don't count. And that's sort of a different approach to doing the same thing.

[F]

Yeah, I mean, look, I think it's a shocking historical fact that Kant, who really is the bellwether of this equal value, equal dignity, moral universal himself, had outgroups. I mean, it's a striking thing. You think, oh, my goodness. Well, if that's. That's how it started. So it's a useful reminder that even those who espouse moral universalism frequently can't fully believe it. So that's a welcome reminder.

[D]

Shelley, you said you had some choice words for Kant.

[B]

I mean, there are very few thinkers in the canon of Western thought, maybe also including some thinkers closer to our period, who have accepted universal human equality. I mean, it's become fashionable to beat up on Kant because we know his anthropology was based upon a theory of human species differentiation. Okay, this is the 18th century. Not all 18th century thinkers thought this way. Herder, in a very surprising way, had an idea of the, you know, human beings having equal, you know, equal worth in terms of their cultural communities. But for me, this raises really a methodological question, and I want to provoke my colleague Tommy here because as someone who came of age also with the feminist critique of philosophy, we always had to make the distinction between deconstructing and reconstructing the tradition. Okay, so what do we do? Do we throw Kant out because of his work on anthropology, or do we try to understand why, in fact, he believed in the premises that he believed? And I think, Tommy, the issue here is that there was an idealization, in my opinion, of the concept of the rational male log on ethos. Right. And when the essence of humanity is understood in terms of this Western concept of ratio or rationality, certain human beings are excluded from this premise, including, of course, women. And not just people of color of different race. So the issue then that we face is how can we reconstruct these philosophies and expand and enrich our notion of humanity rather than doing away with the premise of humanity altogether?

[D]

Well, yeah, of course.

[C]

So I disagree with that strongly.

[B]

Okay, all right.

[C]

I like you, but I disagree.

[B]

It's okay.

[C]

So a few things. A few things. I think the question of methodology is important here. Right. So in Kant's own work, he makes a distinction between his critical philosophy and then his pragmatic philosophy. So in 1798, when he's writing his pragmatic anthropology, the question is, well, what do we do with the condition of freedom? Right. And the critical philosophy, of course, informs that, but that's not how he thinks societies actually operate or individuals rationally operate. So given the condition of freedom, what world do we construct? And I think in that world, Kant understands that citizens are beholden to nations. That, you know, questions of the effective and rational nature of white men and women complement and differ from one another. But that is structurally different than the position of people who are in torrid zones like Africa and the equator. Right. There may be a case where women are lesser civilized, are lesser human beings than white men. And then there's the question of not being the human being at all. And that's the piece that I'm interested in, that if I'm in the warm, torrid climates, that my nose spreads because of iron particles and my hair is woolly because of the saturation of the heat, those groups of people didn't have the same conversation. So now if we move to the question of reconstruction, where we understand that there are certain people that were outside of even Kant's moral philosophy in the first place, I don't think it's possible. You know, I'll just say this really quickly. I think that when people. When people think about the question of race or blackness in philosophy, we often think about it polemically. We think about it as a criticism of the modern epoch. And that's fine for most people. But consider this, for instance. What if the people who are doing theories about race or the Africana philosopher takes as their fundamental starting point in humanity or non being? So what if the primary starting point of the philosophical conversation is not the presumption of humanity, but the absence of it? And then trying to move forward in terms of asking, does modernity make sense if you were never subject to its alleged wonders of rationality? I think this is where Kant fails, because the act of participating in saying that we can reconstruct Kant means that we have to wash away a whole lot of normative ideas that Kant himself shared, not specific to his time, but in terms of his aspirations. So when you look at cosmopolitanism, for instance, if we think about that about

[B]

which I've written about,

[C]

but if we look at his cosmopolitanism, he has a vision where certain groups of people no longer exist. African people, savage peoples, these people will die out in the move towards civilization and progress. So when we look at this idealism, does this moral universalism allow us to imagine a world where freedoms Democracies, opportunities and can be imparted to people that we thought were fundamentally savage. And my other question would be, why are we so invested in Kant? Like Kant comes from a very particular tradition. I know that somehow the Germans and the German fowls like Chamberlain enjoy Kant's idealism. But why does he matter so much for the UK and the rest of the world? He's this historical figure, right? A miserable person. From what I read about him, he just wasn't a joy to be around. But somehow we think there's a utility in the canonical reparations and rehabilitation of Kantian's thought beyond what Kant himself was believing. There are other ways, there are other great thinkers. And while the universalism may speak to something, Europe has certainly never been beholden to it, especially Germany. So why then does the idea of an individual that itself was flawed, that was never respected within. Even the historians that wrote about Kant, like Spengler, who talks about the failure of history and the need to recuperate the Teutonic idealism over the Anglo Saxon ideas. Why does all that disappear? Because in the 21st century we like how it sounds. Our societies are falling precisely because universalism can't control behavior. And it doesn't change the way that people are structured to perceive people that are outside of their kin group, their society and their nation, in my view.

[D]

So we've got more themes to cover, but I do want to give Shaler an opportunity to.

[B]

I like you too, but we do disagree.

[C]

We do disagree. Yes. I knew it. When I saw you, I knew it.

[B]

I just, I mean, look, it's not fetishization of Kant. I happen to be someone who was trained in German philosophy and late Wittgenstein, Alasdair MacIntyre was also one of my teachers, et cetera. So it's a certain tradition out of which I come. But that's not the issue. Let's talk about John Stuart Mill.

[C]

Okay?

[B]

Okay. Let's talk about the savages who sat on the rock and those people who were capable of nation formation and those people who were not and those who deserved to be taught how to become nations. I mean, the entire post colonial critique of colleagues from India in particular show that there is this fundamental problem at the heart of liberal modernity, liberal nationalism. But the question is again, how do we conceptualize it? I mean, I'm not understanding something that you're saying. Are you saying that as some, it's non as Africana pessimism that the philosophical tradition, okay, cannot consider the black person as a human being. Or are you saying that these philosophers had their limitations, both conceptual, personal and historical, and we all do, and that there is stuff in their thinking and so on that we must reject? If you are saying that the philosophical tradition is incapable of conceiving the African person as a human being, I don't quite understand that. We are talking, we are interacting, we trade with each other, we love each other. What are we saying? I don't understand that denial of common humanity.

[D]

Given that this is direct question, I suppose I want to give you an opportunity to answer that. But before, because otherwise I'll get fired, I want to mention that we've got these themes we're supposed to be going through here, and one of them is about how the. How the excesses of moral universalism might have contributed to a rise of populism and nationalism. A bit of a detour. However, I wanted to ask Alain about something you said earlier, which is sort of better and worse ways to prefer people. Most people think that having a preference for your own children might be excusable. But you gave as an example of a bad reason to prefer someone or favor someone. National borders or land borders is what you said. And that sounds sensible, but then there is this question of to what extent does that just remove the ability to conceive of a nation? If a nation is not just a literal landmass, but interaction of people within it, if some kind of favorability for people within that landmass is arbitrary or wrong, where do we get the nation? And if we can't, would that explain why we have this rise in people who are, who are more attracted to nationalism?

[F]

Again, as a response, okay, so we're never meant supposed to mention taxi drivers. And the example of taxi drivers is just always, you know, it's a low point, but let's just go to the taxi driver because we often, you know, it can be useful. So there I was a week ago. I knew this debate was coming up. I'm riding in a taxi from city, airport or somewhere. Anyway, white taxi driver, middle aged man, you can imagine what's going to ensue. I mean, essentially the argument, the argument, if we're going to be really generous, his argument was it's too hard. Moral universe is too hard. So like I would like this. I. I know in my hearts that I am Kantian. I mean, he wasn't saying it, but in my heart I'm a Kantian. But it, but it's too hard and, and let me tell you some reasons why it's too hard and he started going through some reasons. My daughter, she's in a class. Every other girl is, you know, in a hijab. The neighbors, their cooking smells very different, etc. Reason, reason, reason, reason. Right. But don't get me wrong, I am a Kantian. He didn't say it, but I am a Kantian. But I'm under pressure and I need you to realize. So in that ride between City and Hope, there was an articulation of a lot of these themes of like, a layer of lip service paid to a kind of universalism and an embarrassed but nevertheless defiant critique. I do have preferences. I like everyone. But those people, their cooking really does smell different. Forgive me, I need to draw a line here, and that's where I'm going to draw it. And all of the history of philosophy was in that black cab, as it were. So this is. I'm just bringing it. That's the front line. You know, this was a generous conversation. They get a lot more fraught. But these are the dividing lines in 2025, and it may just be worth bringing in my distinguished fellow panelists onto this. If you were in the taxi, if we were all in the taxi, what would be going on? How do you read that?

[D]

That's a fine question, and I do want to hear the answer, but I also want to directly know. Do you think we can make sense of the concept of a nation at all? If there isn't some sense in which you just, on principle of where someone's from or what landmass they're living in, have some kind of preferential treatment, at least from the government?

[F]

Sorry, absence of preferential treatment. In other words, a treatment for all. Equal value and dignity for all.

[D]

Is it possible if there's no such preferential treatment for someone in this landmass or someone in this landmass, is it even possible to conceive of what a nation is?

[F]

I think it's essential. It's essential to have equal value and dignity for every citizen within a landmass and indeed across the world, ideally. That is absolutely something that we must have and fight for. The problem is that under certain conditions which seem to have arisen now in the UK in 2025, this idea, which might have seemed like common sense, it was approaching common sense, you know, at certain points in our history, Even in the 20th century, it is now a seriously embattled concept. And, well, I guess we're all slightly wondering, what do we do about this? And I think this is part of what we're trying to resolve. I Just wanted to bring this, as it were, up against the, you know, the real issue right now.

[D]

Yes, I. So, Tommy Free reign here because you were asked some questions by Shayla, but also now by Alain, what would you have said to the taxi driver? And what do you want to say to Shayla?

[C]

Oh, God. But I think I really like the taxi driver exam. I can see the cycle. That's great. But I think that's the problem. This is why I think philosophy's not fit for purpose, to be honest with you, because that requires therapy or it requires the elimination of a certain set of biases that have been aspirationally constructed by the society. Right, so. And this is, this is the problem, Right. As a philosopher, I'm able to say I think any theory can be amended and adjusted to solve a problem. It's how you play with ideas. But as like a social scientist, as someone that's interested in facts, I'm constantly pushed back by the facts and the reality that we have before us. And the cab driver is that real reference point, so to speak. So given that there are biases, the biases are not individual failings. This is what I'm trying to communicate. Individual biases are not failings of rationality necessarily. They can fit within the aspiration that society has for its own well being. So take America for instance. Trump is winning because there are people in the society that are individually racist and sexist and classes, et cetera, but they aspire for a world that mirrors their beliefs. So they define the good as their racism, their misogyny, their bias, et cetera. And they have power now to make that a reality, to make their version of what we called gross, disgusting, immoral, et cetera, moral. Given that problem, right, that we see in the taxi driver, the taxi driver then reflects what he thinks can be the reality, namely, that other people feel that way, that his government feels that way, that his children will feel that way about people's smells and cooking, et cetera. Kant doesn't solve that problem.

[B]

Who sits there?

[C]

So when we say for instance. When we say for instance. Well, you know, we have this. I refuse to accept that philosophy can't incorporate black people as human beings, right? Or that we're talking and laughing, exchanging. That's interesting, because the people historically who are black that interacted with Khan, William H. Ferris, considering himself a black continent, right? You have people like Africanus Horton, who was at Edinburgh, engaging with the idealist tradition and the nonsense that Dougal Stewart was teaching around that time, all those people said, well, despite the Fact that I can read, despite the fact that I can do philosophy, despite the fact that I'm a Christian, the world still doesn't see me as a human being. It still practices slavery. It still practices colonialism. I have repeatedly said on these platforms, the errors of moral and ethical judgment among European philosophers are not mistakes. They are the manifestations of how philosophy has built into it a very specific audience. You don't make the same mistake for thousands of years and then say, oops, my bad in the 21st century on a panel. That's not what's happened. So we've constructed history and the notions around humanity to fit very particular groups of people. And I don't think philosophy can repair that. Conversations and dialogue do not change the contours of history and knowledge. It doesn't change who owns certain segments of countries and whether or not all the philosophers who are overwhelmingly white throughout the world, who were actually the descendants of colonizers, still view people that they've colonized differently. And all I'm saying is that if we want to be honest about moral universalism, sure, it's a great idea. Everybody should have human dignity. But then why is it so easy for the people that author those ideas to violate it? Why is it so easy for certain states to erase whole groups of people that exist? Moral universalism does nothing for us but play into our effectivity about rhetorical tropes that make us feel like we're good human beings. Because the reality of the situation is that Kant himself, idealism itself, democracy itself, et cetera, have been used to wipe out whole populations. And that's the human tragedy that we need to think about when we're talking about morality.

[F]

But, Tommy, can't we go back to this? Can't we come back to this notion of an ideal? In other words, you're saying, because these guys fell short of certain ideals, therefore throw the whole thing, or therefore the whole project is infected. Can't we allow. And this is the Christian notion.

[C]

Yeah, I was about to.

[F]

Because you are a sinner and you fail does not mean that the whole thing is nonsense. You are always on a path upwards, and we should expect distinguished philosophers to have skeletons in the closet, to fail, etc. That's not a sign that they can't be. That they must be forever discounted. Because, you know, your approach is slightly, you know, gotcha. It's like, you know, look, can't. And so therefore. But if you don't have a Christian point of view, it's like, of course, can't Fail, of course, he was saying one thing and doing another. That's what humans do, but with a sufficient, you know, looked at under kind of Christian eyes of love. It's like that doesn't block, you know, they're still climbing upwards.

[C]

That's fair, that's fair. And I'm sympathetic to that. But what happens when certain people can't go upward with you? So my question isn't that Kant made a mistake. My issues and my research is largely about how certain ideas have been animated throughout European modernity. Right. Zygmun Bowman makes the same argument, for instance, about the Holocaust. Right. What happens when those ideas were taken up and oops, I made a mistake and killed a whole race of people. And now those people no longer have the dignity or the opportunity to improve because I've eliminated them from the scheme and playing field of history. Do I come away with the same judgment? And that's the position that I'm coming from. Not the question of whether or not Kant was racist or Dougal Stewart was raised. We know that that's not debatable. The question is what of the cost of the ideal that did not imagine them on the human platform at all

[F]

then I think you're absolutely right. Yeah, absolutely right.

[B]

Yeah. But I mean, my answer to that is that the cost of that, the conception of that ideal itself gets expanded in the course of human history and human encounter. I mean, you gave the names of a bunch of, I mean, of philosophers who couldn't call themselves Kantians. Look at Du Bois, who studied Watego. Look at what he learned or look at the dialogue that he created with Hegel. I mean, I would say, but I don't want to move away from the question of migration, nationalism and so on. After all, this is part of my research. But as a methodological point of view, I'm personally more interested in those thinkers who create and show the possibility of conversation and dialogue. I think that our approaches to the appropriation of philosophy, the history of philosophy in that sense, are very different. And I'm not sure that they can be just arbitrated in this context. But I want to say one thing about the question of migration and refugees, which is the political context, of course, on all our minds. Look at what happened in London a week ago with 150,000 people out on the streets. Or look at what's happening in the United States every day with ice raids against Latin looking people, Hispanic looking people, dark skinned people. It's really unbelievable. But I don't think that moral universalism has anything to do with that, I don't think our question is the pertinent question. I'm going to bring back Marx here. What is happening right now with the refugee question? Migration question isn't just a problem of moral universalism. Yes, states who are signatories to the 51 Refugee Convention, including the UK, most European nations, even the United States, who violates it every morning, have certain obligations. But what is happening is that we have come to a certain end of this anarchic neoliberal globalization. And there has been also a certain kind of appropriation of land and resources and minerals, et cetera. And there is climate change, there is desertification. There is a lot that is contributing to the increase in the number of global migration expansion. There is, of course, in Europe, war, Ukrainian refugees as obligations. And there is war in the Middle East. You know, is there another Nakba? There is another genocide, and I'm Jewish and I am. I should be saying that out loud. Where are the Palestinian refugees going to go? These are obligations. So I think that it's not just morality that has created this situation. It's the changing economic coordinates, it's the continuing conflict and states of war. And these are where our obligations are coming from, not because one subscribed to a universal morality or whatever.

[D]

I'm interested in asking you both what I asked Alain a moment ago, because even if, as we've sort of got it written, written here about moral universalism, maybe not being responsible for, but contributing towards the rise of nationalism and populism, and I suppose the only synthesis I can think of to put that into a question is this idea that by developing the idea that everybody, no matter who they are or where they come from, should be treated with the same level of preference, you essentially remove the ability to have a national identity, because what else could it consist in? And that's the kind of thing which is motivating people to go out onto the streets and say we want to bring that back. Do you think there's any truth in that? And if there's not, how can we conceive of national identity without this need to prefer certain people over others, essentially? Tommy?

[C]

Well, I mean, that's a great question. One that's debatable. You know, look, in the work that I do, I study how nations form largely from post colonial epics, right? So when you look at how certain groups of people were formerly slaves and then trying to be incorporated into Europe or the United States, what does that mean? What is it? What's the consequences for nations? And I don't see a way out of it. And what I mean by that is there is always a preference for the in group. You see that in social psychology. You see that in evolutionary psychology, you see that in sociology. I don't know what to tell you. Like, human beings suck in the terms that we were created as a species, you know, and people have different arguments for it. So I do not believe that we can separate moral universalism and as I've tried to point out, how we construct the good and the moral within a particular society from how people designate who are the good people capable of living in that society. Again, we like to say that everyone should have human dignity, but in the real world, that doesn't work. And what's more important about that is that the people that we think deserve human dignity seem to keep making systems that say they should be protected from people that threaten what they call their human dignity. So we have a real problem of people seeing outsiders as dangers and threats to their ways of life. It is an unfortunate reality. But given that we are in the midst of war and that we are in the midst of people who are reasserting ethno nationalism as the basis of state identity, I don't think that moral universalism has a persuasive argument against that, right? So even. Even when we admit that the world is terrible and that there's violence and war and ongoing genocide, it is not the idea, as shiny as it may be, that stops that problem. Because we have built systems like capitalism, like imperialism, et cetera, to exploit people. And the people that we have found in able to be exploited are the same people that tend to die a lot in these wars, in these conflicts, in these kinds of social problems. So I don't think there's a solution. And to be honest with you, humans have always resisted, right? Humans will find new values that they're going to assert, new identities, new kinships, et cetera, to fight back, or they disappear. But what I think we have to worry about being philosophers talking about this right now is how our standpoint doesn't necessarily respect the dignity of all the lives of the people who are lost. Because what we risk doing is having conversations that don't anticipate their existence. That's a real problem, right? When we talk about issues of racism in America, when we talk about what's going on with Gaza, we talk about the Ukraine war. The problem is that we don't know how to arrest the violence that our rights and our value said shouldn't be happening in the first place. And I think that as thinkers and philosophers, we have to kind of take stock of that failure rather than trying to necessarily reinvent systems that are ineffective.

[D]

I just want to ask Shaila again then that same question. Take it wherever you like. Concept of a nation. Is it possible to have without some kind of anti universalism, some kind of preference for the in group?

[B]

I think it may be an anthropological feature that human beings have certain preference for what you call the in group. I think that modern consciousness is much more fractured, it's much more complicated. We have many in groups and none of them are hierarchical. Is it the family? Is it the kin group? Is it professional group? Is it our identity as intellectuals? I don't think that it is so obvious. In his opening remarks, Alain seemed to be referring to the nation as a community of strangers, right? And if we recall Benedict Anderson's wonderful work on the rise of nationalism, or Ernst Gellner's It's Nation, there are people who read the same newspapers. This was Benedict Anderson, 19th century. Of course, today, you know, just maybe some people here in this audience of my generation still read the newspaper. But what unites the nation? I believe that actually national cultures are always interactive, interactive cultures. And this may be obvious in the case of Great Britain, that was an imperial nation. But I feel also that, for example, with the United States, and this might last make America great again is making America awfully boring and impoverished again, as is without the contribution of the immigrants, without the contribution of Latin America, without the contribution. Or still there are black culture. But let's see if the vibrancy will continue. So in that sense, I don't see fortresses as being necessary to. To the cultivation of national consciousness.

[D]

I wanted to give Alain a chance to just basically have free rein to respond to anything. It seemed like you wanted to say something a second ago, some closing remarks, a response, whatever you like. And then.

[F]

Yes, I mean, I just wanted to counter Tommy's pessimism. You know, you say always a preference for the in group. I get it. But I think if you look at history, there are more or less acute periods. I think we can accept that always preference for the in group. And then there are very dark moments and less dark moments. So we want to try and identify what moments is the preference for the in group. At what moments does it become murderous, at what moments does it become, you know, tyrannical, et cetera. And we want to try and get it from the tyrannical to the bearable. That would be success enough.

[D]

Okay, please join me in thanking our panel. And thank you all for coming too. Thank you for listening to Philosophy for our times. What do you think? Could we ever live in a truly universally equal society? What do you think? Zeb?

[E]

Well, I don't feel personally qualified to answer a question that big, but I will say that I found the discussion about Kant's philosophy versus how he practically believes society operated particularly interesting. It reminds me of the question about whether we can truly separate artists from their art. I also liked Tommy's take about whether we should even really focus so much on Kant's philosophy, especially given the historical context.

[D]

Well, we would love to hear what you think. Please write to us using the email in our show notes.

[E]

And if you don't believe in podcast universalism and feel like showing a particular preference for our show, do like and subscribe for more. You can also head over to our website IAI TV for thousands more brilliant debates, talks and interviews from the world's leading thinkers.

[F]

Bye Bye.

[A]

Every day as a small business owner feels like solving a puzzle. One moment you're cruising along and the next there's a shipping snag that has you scrambling. But here's a surprise you will like with progressive Small business owners save 13% on their commercial auto insurance when they pay in full.

[B]

Send.

[A]

So go ahead, surprise yourself. Get a quote in as little as 8 [e-mail] Progressive Casualty Insurance Company and affiliates discounts not available in all states or situations.