The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster

Summary

Short History Of...

Episode: The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster

Host: John Hopkins
Guest: Dr. Matthew Hirsch, Space Historian
Date: July 12, 2026

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Overview

This episode examines the tragedy of the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, tracing its roots through the ambitions, compromises, and culture of NASA’s shuttle program. The episode tells the story from the perspective of the cold January morning in 1986, explores the technical, managerial, and human causes behind the disaster, and reflects on its enduring legacy for spaceflight and risk culture.

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Key Discussion Points and Insights

The Build-up to Challenger

• The Promise of Routine Spaceflight
  • NASA proposed the shuttle as affordable and as safe as a commercial jet, convinced the public and Congress of its reliability, all while internal estimates suggested a 1-in-100 risk of catastrophic failure.
  • Shuttle was envisioned as the path to space democratization: “It will be so comfortable and easy to fly that everyone will be able to fly into space on it.” (Dr. Hirsch, 08:06)
• Political Realities and Design Compromises
  • The Nixon administration slashed initial budgets, forcing technical shortcuts—such as segmented solid rocket boosters with vulnerable joints to facilitate overland transport from Utah to Florida.
  • Military and commercial demands added further complexity, cramming shuttle development with divergent objectives and untested technologies.
• Unaddressed Technical Worries
  • The shuttle’s thermal tiles “kept falling off,” making the orbiter’s ability to survive re-entry an open question.
  • The O-ring design in the boosters had repeatedly shown signs of dangerous leaks when exposed to cold—a point crucial to the subsequent disaster.

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Christa McAuliffe and the Teacher in Space

• Cynical Political Calculus
  • NASA’s decision to include a civilian teacher was meant to boost public interest and prove the shuttle’s safety; it was “for very, very cynical political reasons.” (Dr. Hirsch, 18:52)
• Training and Public Reception
  • Christa McAuliffe underwent intensive astronaut training, becoming a media darling and symbol of hope for millions of US schoolchildren.
  • She famously described the rigorous but open application process:
    “There were eight basic essay questions… But the unique thing about it was it didn’t ask how old you were. It didn’t ask your marital status. It didn’t ask if you were in good health. It was a very open type of thing, really looking for somebody who’d be a good communicator first.” (Christa McAuliffe, 20:56)

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The Day of the Disaster

• Decision-making Under Pressure (24:12 – 28:29)

  • O-ring vulnerability in cold was a known concern. The night before launch, Morton Thiokol engineers urged against proceeding below 53°F (12°C); forecast was far colder.
  • Management overrode engineering concerns:
    “A vice president of Morton Thiokol told Morten Thiokol engineer to take off his engineer hat and put on his management hat… and recognize your… obligations to the company.” (Dr. Hirsch, 27:48)
  • Final go-ahead faxed despite engineering warnings. “The launch will proceed.” (John Hopkins, 28:04)

• The Launch and Explosion (29:02 – 33:56)

  • On January 28, 1986, Challenger launched in front of 2.5 million students, millions more TV viewers, and family members gathered at the site.
  • “At 11:30am Eastern Time, the solid rocket boosters ignite and Challenger lifts off.” (John Hopkins, 02:56)
  • “But moments after Commander Scobie replies, the camera tracking the Challenger shows something that makes the student’s breath catch in her throat. The spacecraft has disappeared and in its place is a fireball… The cheers fall silent…” (John Hopkins, 03:52)
  • NASA’s public affairs:
    “Obviously, a major malfunction.” (Dr. Hirsch/PAO, 33:48)

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The Investigation

• Presidential Commission and Whistleblowers (35:31 – 43:08)

  • The Rogers Commission included astronauts and Nobel physicist Richard Feynman, who highlighted both technical and organizational failures.
  • Alan McDonald, a Thiokol engineer, broke ranks at the hearings to reveal management’s pressure to launch, putting professional ethics ahead of career risk.
  • Feynman’s famous demonstration:
    “He compresses it with the C clamp... reaches for a nearby pitcher of iced water… the rubber remains pinched and deformed... He explains... the material has no resilience when exposed to the temperature at which water freezes. ‘I believe... that has some significance for our problem.’” (Paraphrased, 39:26–41:21)
  • Feynman’s appendix:
    “For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled.” (43:33)

• Findings and Warnings

  • Official cause: right SRB O-ring failed due to cold, causing catastrophic tank breakup.
  • Culture of “normalization of deviance” within NASA—dangerous anomalies became routine, warnings ignored, and schedule pressure trumped caution.

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Legacy and Repercussions

• Aftermath and Further Disaster
  • Shuttle program paused three years; boosters redesigned; whistleblower McDonald was fired, then reinstated by act of Congress.
  • STS flights resumed—87 more missions—but in 2003, Columbia broke apart during re-entry after foam-damaged its wing, echoing Challenger’s culture of overlooked risk.
• The End of the Shuttle and Ongoing Lessons
  • The shuttle program concluded in July 2011; over $200 billion spent.
  • “Reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled.”
  • Challenger Centers established, keeping the memory of the crew alive by educating new generations about science and the cost of exploration.

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Notable Quotes and Memorable Moments

• On Risk and Culture
  • “There were so many things about the space shuttle that could possibly go wrong... they accepted the likelihood that the shuttle was going to fail at some point. But that was the business that they were in.” (Dr. Hirsch, 18:17)
  • “Normalization of deviance”—accepting risks as normal was fatal for NASA.
• On the Tragedy’s Human Impact
  • “[Christa] was told that she was going to undertake something that was profoundly safe... When behind the scenes, the astronauts were basically stewing and fuming about a vehicle that wasn’t working well.” (Dr. Hirsch, 23:50)
  • “Evidence recovered from the silt, including activated emergency air packs and switches moved on the pilot’s panel, proves that at least some of the crew were conscious, desperately trying to save themselves until the very end.” (John Hopkins, 36:16)

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Timestamps for Key Segments

• 00:56: Opening narrative; students and McAuliffe’s classroom
• 03:14: Shuttle launch and disaster in real time
• 06:31: Historic context — moon landing and birth of shuttle program
• 08:06: Shuttle’s sky-high ambitions and the seeds of trouble
• 10:09: Design compromises and technical headaches
• 13:20: NASA’s public messaging vs. internal risk assessments
• 18:52: Teacher in Space program and cynical motives
• 20:56: Christa McAuliffe describes the application process
• 22:27: Crew overview and internal tensions
• 24:12 – 28:29: O-ring concerns, management pressure, and failed warnings
• 29:02: Final preparations and launch sequence
• 33:48: Immediate aftermath: “Obviously, a major malfunction”
• 35:06: Reagan’s national address
• 38:36 – 41:21: Feynman’s hands-on demonstration at the commission
• 43:33: Feynman’s searing criticism of NASA’s management culture
• 45:02: Columbia disaster repeats patterns from Challenger
• 46:49: The shuttle program’s end and lessons learned
• 48:15: Dr. Hirsch’s personal reflections on the value and limitations of space exploration

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Reflections & Tone

The episode balances narrative storytelling with sobering analysis, highlighting not only technical flaws but deeper organizational pressures that contributed to the tragedy. By interweaving historical context, firsthand accounts, and emotional resonance—especially through voices like Christa McAuliffe and Dr. Hirsch—the podcast renders the Challenger disaster as both a cautionary tale and a testament to human curiosity.

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“Human beings are curious animals . . . We want to know. And when I used to look at the telescope as a small boy and see the vastness of space and the rings of Saturn, I was almost in awe, frightened at just the incredible vastness and bigness and how much was left to be discovered. I think we should keep on doing that.”
— Dr. Matthew Hirsch (48:15)

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Transcript

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[John Hopkins]

it's the morning of 28 January 1986 at Concord High School, New Hampshire. A 14 year old student joins her classmates as they burst into the auditorium, as well as over a thousand fellow students and staff. Camera crews are lined up in the aisle. After all, it's not every day that your teacher gets to be an astronaut. But that's exactly what's happening here, because 37 year old social studies teacher Christa McAuliffe has been picked from over 11,000American educators to be the world's first teacher in space. She's even promised live lessons once she's in orbit, including one called the Ultimate Field Trip. As teachers wheel in the bulky TV sets, the students settle. The camera operators focus on their faces as they prepare to watch the liftoff. An estimated 2.5 million US schoolchildren are watching the launch live on NASA's satellite feed, and CNN is carrying it on cable. After a decade when space travel has started to feel routine, this is anything but. On the screens, excited anchors at the Kennedy Space center in Florida fill the time before the big moment. Right now, the seven crew members are already out of sight, strapped into their seats in Challenger, one of the four orbiters in NASA's space shuttle program. The teenager just hopes it actually happens this time. Yesterday the launch was stopped because of technical hitches, and overnight Florida has frozen Icicles have even formed on the launch structure. But the student knows she doesn't need to worry about they've all been told the shuttle is as safe as a passenger jet. In fact, the orbiter on the TV looks like a small version of an airplane, except it's mounted vertically nose Facing towards the sky, it's flanked by a massive external tank and two cylinders. The solid rocket boosters, almost 150ft tall that will provide most of the thrust at liftoff. Now the hall falls silent as the launch counts down. At 11:30am Eastern Time, the solid rocket boosters ignite and Challenger lifts off.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

And liftoff. Liftoff of the 25th space shuttle mission. And it has cleared.

[John Hopkins]

It's like something out of a movie. The teacher they love in that shuttle. The orbiter climbs through the blue sky to over 35,000ft in the Concorde auditorium. The conversation between the crew and the controllers at the Cape is broadcast live under the pictures. With the craft now traveling at around 1,000 miles per hour. An order comes through the speakers telling Commander Dick Scobee to increase the power to the main engines for the climb to orbit.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

Challenger, go at throttle up. Challenger, go at throttle up.

[John Hopkins]

But moments after Commander Scobie replies, the camera tracking the Challenger shows something that makes the student's breath catch in her throat. The spacecraft has disappeared and in its place is a fireball. The cheers fall silent as the teenager stares. Is that normal? Multiple trails of smoke scar the blue sky plummeting down towards Earth. The student stares at the teachers faces as they change from confusion to horror. And somewhere at the back, someone starts to sob. In 1986, seven astronauts boarded space shuttle Challenger for what was meant to be a routine 10th flight of the orbiter. 73 seconds after liftoff, the shuttle broke apart in front of millions of viewers in what remains one of the worst disasters in the history of human spaceflight. But how did a craft NASA claimed was as safe as an airliner come to fail in full view of a watching nation? Who knew the risks? And when? And why, 17 years later, did it happen again? I'm John Hopkins from the Noiser Podcast Network. This is a short history of the space shuttle Challenger disaster. Humans have always looked up to the night sky and wondered what lies beyond the Earth. But in the mid 20th century, travel into space becomes a reality. During the Cold War, the Soviets take an early lead in what becomes known as the Space Race with the launch of Sputnik 1 in October 1957. Four years later, Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin becomes the first human in space. It is a blow that spurs the Americans into dramatic action. Just six weeks after Gagarin's flight, President John F. Kennedy makes his ambitious announcement to put a man on the moon before the decade is out. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA pushes its technology and budget to the limit. But in wider society, many argue that space exploration is not a priority. Dr. Matthew Hirsch is an historian at New York and Harvard Universities and author of Dark A New History of the Space Shuttle.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

As the moon landing approaches in 1969, there are voices from both the right and the left saying that the program should be shut down, that it's a waste of money and it's not even confronting or dealing with the critical problems of the day. The nuclear arms race, the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the issues of civil rights and race in the United States, and the questions of poverty.

[John Hopkins]

Despite the dissenters, the seemingly impossible is achieved on 20 July 1969, when the Apollo 11 astronauts, Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin become the first humans to set foot on the moon. As the crew return to Earth to huge celebration, the question is, what next? That year, a new Space Task Group recommends the development of a space station, a lunar base and a Mars mission. President Nixon, however, rejects all of these as too expensive.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

He famously told congressional aides that he wasn't a space cadet, that he didn't care at all about this, and that he thought it was a complete waste of money.

[John Hopkins]

Yet he can't ignore the excitement that surrounds the moon landings. In addition, contracts for space exploration mean jobs, which is particularly valuable in states where politicians need votes. So on the 5th of January 1972, Nixon announces approval of the space shuttle program for the creation of a reusable, cost effective spacecraft. Right from the start, the project has almost impossibly broad ambitions.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

This is a vehicle that will democratize space exploration because it will be so comfortable and easy to fly that everyone will be able to fly into space on it. In fact, there might be hundreds of these vehicles, some owned by private companies, that would take tourists into space just for fun. And the idea that this kind of space vehicle would be a perfect environment for science and that it would, as a result, solve Earth's environmental crisis because we would launch all kinds of environmental scientists into space who would study climate and pollution and solve those problems, and that it would also be a tool of international diplomacy that would be everything to everyone, that would pay for itself. That would be like pennies from heaven. And all we had to do is sign on the dotted line.

[John Hopkins]

The issue is that no one is even quite sure what it'll look like, and that basic research and development will take years. Cost is a huge issue. NASA's early design needs roughly 10 to 14 billion dollars to deliver.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

When the Nixon administration sees that, they say that's not gonna work. Cut that in half and build whatever you can for half of that. And therein lies the problem. You see multiple rounds of designs that are trying to do what the space shuttle is supposed to do, but on a budget. I really see NASA in a tremendous bind here. It wants to do the right thing, but it can't. It's being pushed largely by political forces to make something it doesn't want, that it doesn't need, and that won't work. But that's the only way that it can continue in the spaceflight, because there's really no other program that's on the drawing boards for which anyone can get any kind of support or money.

[John Hopkins]

The original vision is a fully reusable two stage vehicle. One part does the heavy lifting to the edge of the Earth's atmosphere, then returns to Earth. The second part, the orbiter, keeps going with its passengers and cargo. But budget constraints force NASA to adopt a compromise design, using solid rocket boosters and a disposable external tank. And the aeroplane, like design, is not without its issues either.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

When you're traveling in space, of course, there's no air around, which means that you have no need for wings. Once you get through Earth's atmosphere. You don't need to look like an airplane in order to fly successfully in space. In fact, wings just make it harder. They can be very difficult to keep cool, especially during re entry, when the space vehicle has to strike the atmosphere at very, very high speeds, producing tremendous temperatures. The stresses placed on an airframe under these circumstances potentially could destroy it. So the idea of using a space plane multiple times seemed problematic. It was a technology that seemed very hard to build, hard to fly. And every time someone had tried to build it, beginning in the 1940s, they failed.

[John Hopkins]

Undeterred, NASA forges ahead. And in July 1972, the prime contract for the orbiters is awarded to the aerospace and industry conglomerate Rockwell International. Other contracts are deliberately spread across many congressional districts to generate more jobs and lock in political support. The contract for the solid rocket boosters, for example, is given to the Thiocol Chemical Corporation, later merged to become Morton Thiocol, in the high desert of Utah, over 2,000 miles from the launch pad. But this creates a logistical problem. At 149ft in length, the boosters are simply too large to ship to Florida in one piece. As a workaround, the rockets are built in segments, which are then loaded separately onto rail cars for the long journey east. When they finally arrive at the base at Cape Canaveral, Florida, technicians must stack them on top of one another, like giant building blocks, sealing the joints with giant rings made of high performance synthetic rubber. More design constraints are added with when the government insists that NASA works with the US Air Force, which needs to launch reconnaissance satellites into space. But these are the size of school buses, and accommodating them requires fundamental changes to the design. To add insult to injury, the Air Force don't contribute to the cost. By the late 1970s, the vision moves from the drawing board to the factory floor. But as the physical orbiters take shape, the pressure to meet impossible deadlines and shrinking budgets begins to compromise the build.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

The astronauts themselves are very concerned because as this vehicle is being built, it's not being built well. There are lots of problems. The computers don't work. It's problematic in all kinds of ways. It has an untested thermal protection system composed of ceramic tiles, which not only may not actually protect the orbiter from the heat of reentry, but as NASA workers, including a lot of college students working on their summer break, try to glue these tiles to the orbiter, they all keep falling off. And in fact, they fall off so frequently that the rate at which tiles can be applied to the exterior skin in the orbiter is about one and a half per person per day. It just takes so long to glue these to make sure that they stay on that it seems unlikely that the space shuttle is ever going to fly.

[John Hopkins]

Yet NASA projects a very different version to the public and Congress, insisting they are developing a craft that will be as safe to fly on as a passenger jet. Meanwhile, as the days to the first launch tick down, their internal assessments estimate the risk of catastrophic failure at roughly one in a hundred. Oblivious to this level of danger, when that first shuttle, Columbia, finally goes into orbit on 12 April 1981, the public is awestruck

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

when the space shuttle actually does in 1981, with a skeleton crew of two aviators, both equipped with ejection seats. Because of the possibility that this thing may not make it off the ground, there is the kind of enthusiasm we see every time the United States launches astronauts into space. Even if people have no idea who they are or why they're there, it just seems like an exciting thing that's happening. And the space shuttle was new in that the launch was rather spectacular and it landed like an airplane, the first space vehicle to actually do that. And then the astronauts wound up just walking down a staircase instead of being plucked out of the ocean. I remember as a young schoolboy myself, writing a letter to the first crew John Young and Robert Crippen and receiving a letter back with a nice auto pen signature. I collected patches and memorabilia. It was exciting for me. For the first time in my awareness, the United States was flying in space again.

[John Hopkins]

This first mission, STS1, is a spectacular triumph, with the astronauts gliding back to earth and landing smoothly on a Runway. This machine doesn't just work. It makes space travel look as elegant as a commercial flight. Five orbiters are eventually operational. Columbia, Challenger, Discovery, Atlantis, and later Endeavour. But for the public at least, the novelty wears off. As more missions are launched,

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

It gradually dawned on me, and it dawned on lots of other people too, that the astronauts floating around in space aren't really doing very much while they're there. There's less and less television coverage. It's unclear why they're there, what they're doing. The experiments that they're conducting don't seem very sophisticated at all. A lot of it is just bring some stuff into space and see what happens. And the thing that the space shuttle was supposed to excel at, depositing satellites into orbit and picking up derelict satellites from space is incredibly boring to watch. It's like watching paint dry.

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[John Hopkins]

Through the early 1980s, shuttle missions become increasingly routine. NASA had originally claimed the shuttle would fly 24 or more times a year, but 1985's nine flights would prove to be the actual peak. The shuttle carries guests including members of Congress, but also payload specialists, technical civilians who are brought along specifically to supervise cargo or run experiments. All the while, budget pressures are constant, as are the safety issues that keep cropping up. On one trip, one of Challenger's main engines shuts down early, forcing them to abort their planned high altitude orbit in January 1985. The coldest launch to date highlights worrying issues with the joints on these solid rocket boosters. It's just one of the issues that's concerning NASA personnel, not least those who hoped to go into space.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

There were so many things about the space shuttle that could possibly go wrong, that rather than lulling themselves into the feeling or the belief that everything was fine, they accepted the likelihood that the shuttle was going to fail at some point. But that was the business that they were in. And that was true among engineers and true among astronauts as well. The people who didn't know about that were the American public, members of Congress, and the tourists who were flown on the space shuttle.

[John Hopkins]

Conscious of the dwindling public interest, NASA comes up with a new idea to put an ordinary civilian into space.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

The reason why NASA undertook an effort to put an ordinary person into space after literally two decades of being completely averse to the idea was for very, very cynical political reasons. In order for the space shuttle to thrive as a commercial vehicle, it would have to demonstrate its safety. And the way you do that is by launching ordinary people and showing that they come back alive.

[John Hopkins]

For President Reagan, under fire for cuts in education, there seems an obvious profession from which to select his new astronaut. After he announces the Teacher in Space Project, 11,000 hopeful educators apply, filling in the lengthy forms and waiting for the shortlist of 114 to be announced. Roughly two from every state and territory. They are then whittled down to a final 10 who are sent to Houston for a week of grueling medical and psychological exams. On 19 July 1985, Vice President George H.W. bush announces that Christa McAuliffe, from Concord, New Hampshire, has won her place in the shuttle. Barbara Morgan, an elementary school teacher from Idaho, is named as her backup.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

Christa McAuliffe, when she was selected, was kind of a weird choice. Because she wasn't a science teacher. She was a social studies teacher who claimed to know nothing at all about space exploration.

[John Hopkins]

Over the next few months, the mother of two undergoes an intensive course in astronautics. She practices moving in her bulky flight suit. And endures the notorious Vomit Comet. A parabolic flight that provides 30 second bursts of weightlessness. Often followed by crushing nausea. There's also lesson preparation to be done. For the classes she plans to teach live from orbit. With her brown curly hair and approachable charm, she becomes an instant national treasure. She's asked for autographs wherever she goes. Especially after a confident appearance on the Tonight show with Johnny Carson. Talking about how the application process worked.

[Christa McAuliffe]

There were eight basic essay questions dealing with everything. Why do you want to be the first private citizen in space? How do you foster international awareness and your students? And a space shuttle project that I had to prepare. I had to have recommendations from the community and from my school. But the unique thing about it was it didn't ask how old you were. It didn't ask your marital status. It didn't ask if you were in good health. It was a very open type of thing, really looking for somebody who'd be a good communicator first. Yeah.

[Richard Feynman]

Are you in any way frightened of something like that?

[John Hopkins]

It's a normal question. Because just the other day it was kind of.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

They had a frightening lift and one

[John Hopkins]

of the engines went out.

[Christa McAuliffe]

Yes. I really haven't thought of it in those terms. Because I see the shuttle program as a very safe program.

[John Hopkins]

The introduction of civilians alongside highly qualified pilots. Does bring real tension.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

The attitude of the professional astronauts. From Dick Scobee, the commander, to others aboard. Was that we've trained our whole lives to be in a position to fly into space. And now you've basically taken someone Whose principal qualification is they have no qualifications. You've given them a couple of months of training. And now are asking us to share the stage with them. And to treat them like they're the most important thing happening in this mission. And it was galling. She was told not to touch anything in the space vehicle. She would conduct some lessons in space that were so rudimentary. That there was probably no reason for them to be done.

[John Hopkins]

Alongside Dick Scobee, an experienced Air Force test pilot. Will be Michael Smith, a Navy test pilot on his first shuttle flight and three mission specialists. Judith Resnik is the second American female to travel beyond the Earth's atmosphere, while Ellison Onizuka is the first Asian American in space. Ronald McNair is not only a laser physicist, but also a jazz saxophonist. He is planning to be the first to record a piece of music in space, a solo in orbit for a new album by the French composer Jean Michel Jarre, as well as Christa McAuliffe. The other civilian on board is aircraft engineer Gregory Jarvis. But although the crew and their families socialize together during time off, NASA's Military Origins means there is a firm pecking order.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

Although NASA and certain public entertainment likes to imagine the space program as one large family, it was actually an incredibly hierarchical, incredibly competitive environment.

[John Hopkins]

The mission is Originally scheduled for 22 January 1986. The crew's primary job will be the deployment of a satellite and the release of a unit to study Halley's comet, which is making its closest pass of the sun. But as Krista completes her training, she and her family are not given the full picture of the risks.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

She was told that she was going to undertake something that was profoundly safe, that there was no risk to her, that this wasn't dangerous, and that she would be fine. When behind the scenes, the astronauts were basically stewing and fuming about a vehicle that wasn't working well, that was behind schedule, that already had profound technical problems and flaws associated with it, and was being asked to do more and more difficult and dangerous things.

[John Hopkins]

One of the concerns is around the solid rocket boosters, where that cold weather launch a year earlier has left engineers deeply uneasy. The joints between the separate sections, sealed with what are called O rings, are at the mercy of gravity, wind, vibration and the force of ignition, which can cause these weak points to flex slightly.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

Imagine a series of firecrackers that are basically bolted or glued together end on end, and when that seal works, they work fine. But you're talking about a lot of joints and a lot of places for gases to escape. Already, by the time of the Challenger's flight in 1986, NASA had realized that on virtually every flight, the solid rocket boosters tended to rotate a bit about their joints, and in the process, they would eject exhaust products from combustion. Literally, they would start to squirt rocket propellant and burnt fuel out the sides. This was troubling.

[John Hopkins]

Even so, though, NASA forges ahead to meet the deadline it has set itself. The launch is postponed, first for bad weather, then because a simple bolt on the escape hatch won't Budge. It takes hours to find a hacksaw and by then the launch window has been missed. The delays are incredibly tense for the astronauts. Having isolated each time to avoid illnesses, they are twice kept strapped in their seats awaiting clearance for hours before the launch is called off. The presence of Krista on the flight has focused the world's attention on the launch. Every time it's postponed, the media slate NASA for perceived failure and incompetence. And the embarrassment grows along with the pressure. The launch is rescheduled for the fifth time for 28 January, but with record low temperatures forecast, the experienced astronauts don't believe it will go ahead. NASA, however, is in no mood for another postponement.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

There was tremendous political pressure to launch and there is tremendous pressure that NASA was putting upon itself to meet the expectations of the Reagan administration, of its congressional backers and of hard charging leaders within the organization, for which failure was never an option and no was never an answer.

[John Hopkins]

The afternoon before the launch, engineers at Morton Thiokol, the Utah company that builds the solid rocket boosters, hear about the weather forecast and panic. In an urgently convened conference call involving NASA flight managers and the Kennedy Space center team in Florida, the Thiocol engineers present their data. The synthetic rubber O rings get dangerously stiff and lose resilience when cold. They recommend not launching below 53 degrees Fahrenheit or about 12 degrees Celsius. But overnight temperature at Cape Canaveral is expected to plummet to a bone chilling 18 degrees Fahrenheit, roughly minus 8 Celsius. Even by the scheduled launch time the next morning, the Mercury is not expected to rise above -3 Celsius. It's far colder than any previous shuttle launch and well below the engineer's safe limit for the O rings. NASA pushes back, demanding to be shown data to prove the plan is unsafe. But as the pressure moves through Thiokol's chain of command, the higher ups don't seem to share their engineers concerns.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

A vice president of Morton Thiokl told Morten Thaikl, engineer, to take off his engineer hat and put on his management hat to stop thinking like an engineer of how to fix things and make things better and recognize your duties and obligations to the company.

[John Hopkins]

Roger Boigelet, the fire call engineer who most strenuously opposed the launch, still refuses to sign the authorization, but the rest are persuaded. Thiokol's man on the ground at Kennedy, Alan McDonald, watches as the fax rolls in from his head office to confirm it. The company has reversed its position. The launch will proceed.

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[John Hopkins]

Is just after 7am on Tuesday, January 28, 1986, at the Cape Canaveral launch pad, a member of the six strong closeout crew stands in the biting Florida cold. He is responsible for getting the astronauts ready for launch, which means he'll be one of the last to talk to them and touch the spacecraft before it leaves Earth. He breathes out a thick cloud of white vapor as he mentally runs through his task list further down the structure. The ice inspection team is still at work hours after starting at 2am using little more than brooms and their gloved hands, they are systematically knocking foot long icicles off the metal service towers. The pad's fire suppression system was left running overnight to prevent the pipes from bursting, but the water is frozen, turning the walkways into a treacherous skating rink. Even as the sun rises, the right hand rocket booster still sparkles with frost. The technician treads carefully as he steps into the elevator. It's basic, not much more than an open cage, but as he travels 195ft above ground level, it affords him a bird's eye view. Looking east past the steel skeleton of the tower, he can see beyond the marsh of the Cape. The Atlantic Ocean is vast and gray except for the white waves whipped up by the same 50 knot winds that brought the freeze. He passes the massive orange flank of the external tank filled with 535,000 gallons of volatile fuel. Once the elevator, he steps off into the white room, the small sterile chamber that wraps around the shuttle's hatch and the lift doors close. When they open again a few moments later, out step the astronauts in their light blue flight coveralls. The technician greets the teacher, Christa McAuliffe, reassuring her that another earlier crew have already stowed her personal items in her onboard locker her grandmother's watch and her son's favorite plush toy frog. She grins, but he wonders if she's feeling as confident as she appears after all the delays. Now Commander Dick Scobee, a former aircraft mechanic who knows this machine, better than anyone, clambers in through the small circular hatch. The technician follows him into the cramped cabin and pulls the heavy nylon harness tight across Scoby's chest. He does the same with the other six crew members. After wishing them a safe trip, the technician crawls out onto the narrow platform of the white room. It is time to seal the ship. He pulls the hatch shut and inserts a T shaped metal key into the lock. To ensure the seal is perfect. He angles a small dentist's mirror towards the bolts. When he's sure it's secure, the last thermal tiles are pressed into place around the hatch. The technician and his colleagues take the elevator down and climb into the van to drive to the roadblock three miles from the pad. Their job's complete. All they can do now is hope nothing else gets in the way of the launch, and pray that the rumors that the temperature could be dangerously low prove false. As the countdown reaches its final minutes, the families of these seven astronauts make their way to the roof and the fourth floor observation deck of the launch control center. From here, they have an unobstructed view of the shuttle stack, a shimmering white needle against the blue morning sky. And finally it happens. The engines ignite, the ground shakes. And when the countdown reaches zero, in a roar of fire, the shuttle lifts smoothly into the air. Several thousand spectators cheer as they tilt their faces to the sky, watching the ascent. But after 73 seconds, the unthinkable happens. At 46,000ft, the shuttle disappears into an enormous fireball and breaks apart. There is a long silence on the live broadcast before NASA's public affairs officer speaks again.

[Richard Feynman]

My controllers here looking very carefully at

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

the situation, obviously a major malfunction.

[John Hopkins]

Some of the wreckage, including the crew cabin, continues to coast upward to around 65,000ft before falling. For most of those watching, including the families, it's unclear what's happening. One of the astronauts daughters even believes that the flames are normal and keeps taking photos. But in the control room, where all electronic readings return static, the catastrophe is clear. Some stare in silence. Others begin to cry. The flight controller orders all telecommunications with the outside world to stop. Everything is now evidence. It is initially assumed that the crew will have perished in the fireball. All their rescue teams are scrambled within minutes. They can only watch from a distance as white hot wreckage and trails of unburnt propellant rain down into the sea. As the search begins, the President cancels his State of the Union address. Instead, at five o' clock that evening, he speaks to a grieving nation about courage. And sacrifice.

[Richard Feynman]

We will never forget them, nor the last time we saw them. This morning as they prepared for their journey and waved goodbye and slipped the surly bonds of Earth to touch the face of God.

[John Hopkins]

At a memorial three days later, the families, the President and his wife Nancy, join NASA staff to commemorate the astronauts. Meanwhile at NASA, the efforts to understand the cause and apportion blame are already underway. And the focus is already on the very O rings that had led Morton Thiokol engineers to try to get the mission postponed. The night before the disaster, Reagan convenes the Presidential commission on the space shuttle Challenger accident, chaired by former Secretary of State William P. Rogers. Members include astronauts Neil Armstrong and Sally Ride and Nobel Prize winning theoretical physicist Richard Feynman. It's discovered that after launch, a plume of flame from the Wright solid rocket booster burned through the external tank's attachment strut which caused the tank to rupture, releasing liquid hydrogen and oxygen. It's not until weeks later, when the shuttle's cabin is finally located on the ocean floor, that NASA understands that the crew compartment did not explode, but rather broke away in one piece. The astronauts fell for 2 minutes and 45 seconds before hitting the water at over 200 miles per hour. Evidence recovered from the silt, including activated emergency air packs and switches moved on the pilot's panel proves that at least some of the crew were conscious, desperately trying to save themselves until the very end.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

So there was an effort to undertake rescue procedures and recovery procedures even though they were in basically an aluminum box that was falling into the ocean without parachutes.

[John Hopkins]

The commission gets underway, but the chairman understands that he's not expected to simply establish the cause of the accident and recommend corrective action.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

William Rogers was chosen because he knew very, very little about science but was a soldier in the Republican party. And the main instruction that he received was that nothing should come out of this investigative committee that would undermine Americans faith and confidence in NASA and the space program.

[John Hopkins]

But many of those involved in the commission are less malleable than expected.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

It turns out members of the uniformed military in the United States, particularly generals, don't like being told by amateurs what they should believe. And if they see something wrong, they want to speak up about it. Because the military lives and dies based on the truth about its past experiences.

[John Hopkins]

Though early hearings focus on the technical failure of the O ring seals, management tried to play down the warnings At a closed hearing on 10th February 1986. Engineer Alan McDonald attends. Unable to bear what he sees as misleading testimony, he stands up to break ranks and with other engineers. He explains in detail how the conference call went the night before the disaster. Richard Feynman is also carrying out his own research beyond the commission room.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

Very quickly, Richard Feynman found himself on the outs with the committee because rather than listening only to the testimony provided, he conducted his own interviews, mostly of low level NASA engineering staff. We told them all the same thing. We knew this was going to happen. We had a rough idea of when and we think the odds were failure of about 1 in 100.

[John Hopkins]

Before the committee has even finished hearing the evidence, he's decided he needs to get hands on to understand what really happened. It's just after 8 on a Tuesday morning in February 1986. Richard Feynman sits in the back of a cabin scanning the sidewalks for a hardware store with its shutters up. The 67 year old physicist, Nobel laureate, writer and bongo drummer is wearing the suit and tie he has adopted since arriving in the capital. It is an uncomfortable attempt to blend in with this city of officialdom, but Richard has a maverick mission that his fellow commissioners do not yet suspect. He has received a tip off that could change the entire direction of the inquiry. Spotting a shop that seems to fit the bill, he tells the cab to stop, pays, and heads inside. Today he is planning to turn a formal hearing into a live science lab, and for that he needs the right tools. He selects a small C clamp and a pair of pliers, then digs in his pocket for his wallet. Together they set him back a couple of bucks. He arrives back just as the session is called to order. As he takes a seat at the long table, the murmurs of the gallery fade as the official business resumes. Today they are examining the joints holding the massive solid boosters together. A life size section of the joint is being passed down the row of commissioners for inspection. When it gets to him, Feynman quietly reaches out with his pliers. He pulls a strand of the synthetic rubber O ring material from the model under the table, out of sight of the cameras. He compresses it with the C clamp he brought earlier to simulate the crushing pressure placed on the joint at the moment of launch. Then he reaches for a nearby pitcher of iced water. It's not as cold as the air was at the Cape on launch morning, but it's good enough. As the technical jargon of the hearing drones on, he drops the clamped rubber into his glass and waits. After a few moments, he fishes the clamp out and unscrews it. But instead of springing back the rubber remains pinched and deformed. When his turn comes to talk, he holds up the flattened scrap of rubber so the cameras can see. He explains what he has done and that the material has no resilience when exposed to the temperature at which water freezes. I believe, he says, that that has some significance for our problem. It is a low key statement with shattering implications. People in the gallery mutter, astonished as they take in the visual proof. Chairman Rogers, visibly shocked, immediately calls for a recess. The demonstration features on the evening news. Understated and devastating. For the price of a few dollars, he has perhaps demonstrated what caused a disaster that cost seven lives and billions of dollars. It later emerges that the crucial O Ring data had originally been given to Sally Ride. But as an active NASA astronaut, she was not allowed to bring this damning evidence into the record herself. While the commission was under pressure to protect the agency's public image, it might also have endangered her whistleblower. So she secretly passed the findings to a fellow commissioner, who in turn told Feynman, When the commission delivers its report the following June, the failure of the O Rings is confirmed as the technical cause of the accident. But the document also points to organizational issues, communication failures, flawed decision making and schedule pressure.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

The Rogers committee report was damning in certain ways. It showed that there are people at Morton, Thiokol and within NASA had allowed a launch to proceed that probably shouldn't have, for reasons that were kind of unclear. The parallel investigation conducted by Congress was a lot more damning and pointed to real structural problems and leadership deficiencies within NASA that made this happen and that were going unrepaired.

[John Hopkins]

Feynman insists on adding his own appendix, which is far more critical of NASA management than the main report for a successful technology. One quote reads, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled. Later, a sociologist, Diane Vaughan, coins the phrase normalization of deviance to characterize the culture at NASA, one where potentially critical safety flaws are accepted as the norm. In the wake of the inquiry, engineer Alan MacDonald is initially demoted by Thiokol for speaking out. Shocked by this treatment of a whistleblower, politicians intervene, and he becomes the only person in American history to have had his job restored by an act of Congress. He is subsequently put in charge of of the successful redesign of the booster rocket joints. Shuttle flights resume in September 1988, almost three years after the disaster with the launch of Discovery. But the mood within NASA remains uncertain.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

There seemed to be a standing view within NASA and its contractors that the space shuttle was profoundly flawed, but that eventually Engineers would be given the go ahead to fix everything that was broken, and that would happen before they lost a crew. And people kept waiting for that moment to happen, but it never did because the shuttle couldn't make enough money.

[John Hopkins]

Over the next 17 years, NASA operates 87 more flights. But in January 2003, during a launch of the space shuttle Columbia, a piece of insulating foam breaks off and strikes the wing. The breach is seen by officials, but the level of damage remains unknown. And while the unsuspecting astronauts continue their mission, discussions are held to decide what to do. Appeals to use a spy satellite to take more detailed photographs are rejected, while options that might make re entry less hazardous are ignored.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

The kind of fatalism sets in, in which the administrator decides that none of these are likely to work, so none of them should be tried. And sure enough, what one would expect to happen actually happens. Hot gases, plasma starts to enter the hole, which gets bigger and bigger and bigger and starts to short out sensors and cause physical damage to the wings, causing a wing to rip off, which is a kind of failure for a space shuttle reentering the Earth's atmosphere that is not recoverable.

[John Hopkins]

On 1 February 2003, thanks to a catastrophic breach of the wing, space shuttle Columbia breaks apart during RE entry, killing all seven crew. An inquiry finds that foam shedding from the external tank had occurred on every previous shuttle flight and had been classified as an acceptable risk after the Columbia disaster. In orbit, inspections become mandatory, and an independent safety organization and formal routes for engineers to descent are established. But even as protocols improve, the space shuttle's days are already numbered.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

It was always hoped that the space shuttle would make flying into space so cheap that it would create a market for spaceflight that didn't actually exist, that the demand for space travel was elastic and that it was cheap enough, lots of people would do it. And it turns out that's not really the case. Only a finite number of satellites we'd need to launch into space. A finite number of crewed vehicles.

[John Hopkins]

In July 2011, the shuttle program completes its final flight across 135 missions. Its total cost, adjusted for inflation, is at least $200 billion. Four decades on, the Challenger disaster still influences how many professionals, both within and beyond the field of space exploration talk about risk culture. The astronauts who perished on Challenger, Columbia and in the 1967 fire on Apollo 1 are honored each year on NASA's Day of Remembrance. The lost crews legacy also lives on in the Challenger centers, founded in 1986 by the cruise families, they are an international network of over 30 hands on space science and and STEM learning bases for schoolchildren. Because despite its inherent risks, discovering the secrets of space still has the capacity to captivate humanity.

[Dr. Matthew Hirsch]

I have been a space flight enthusiast ever since I was 2 years old when I picked out of a catalog my very first bedspread, which is of Apollo astronauts on the moon. I looked through telescopes as a young man. I was convinced that by the time I reached the age that I am now that I would be living in space. And the more I studied being an astronaut, the more I learned how difficult and painful it is at times. It made me realize how much I appreciate being on Earth and ultimately we're kind of stuck here. At the same time, space exploration kindles in us the kind of sense of wonder and curiosity and creativity that I think is generally good for a society. Human beings are curious animals. It's one of the best qualities that we have. We want to know. And when I used to look at the telescope as a small boy and see the vastness of space and the rings of Saturn, I was almost in awe, frightened, almost at just the incredible vastness and bigness and how much was left to be discovered. I think we should keep on doing that. It's one priority of many and it doesn't necessarily mean that we have to engage in a series of stunts.

[John Hopkins]

Next time on Short History of we'll bring you a short history of Ireland's Easter Rising.

[Richard Feynman]

Like a lot of that generation, they feel that there's a rottenness at the heart of the established order. A lot of the 1916 leaders, they glory in the idea of a cleansing of that corruption, of that rottenness. Many of them believe in the power of blood sacrifice and the idea of redeeming Ireland soul. And we've got to consider those who were involved in orchestrating the Rising. Some of them had a very poetic sensibility. Some of them were poets, some of them were writers, educators, dramatist. As one historian put it, as far back as the 1960s, this rising was consciously staged as a drama.

[John Hopkins]

That's next time. You can listen to the next two episodes of Short History of Right now without waiting and without adverts by subscribing to Noizr plus just hit the link in the episode description or head to www.noiza.comsubscriptions to unlock more episodes.