Slow Burn – The Road to the Iraq War

Episode 3: Mushroom Clouds

Date: May 5, 2021 | Host: Noreen Malone (Slate Podcasts)

Episode Overview

This episode of Slow Burn investigates how the specter of "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD) became the Bush administration’s centerpiece rationale for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Through the voices of intelligence officers, White House insiders, and journalists, this episode dissects the evolution of faulty intelligence, the manipulation of public messaging, and the mounting pressure inside Washington that pushed the U.S. to war on the premise of dangers that ultimately did not exist.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Emergence and History of WMD in Iraq (01:02–10:21)

• The Phrase Takes Hold: "Weapons of mass destruction" (WMD) becomes the political catchphrase in 2002, saturating media and politics.

  • [01:26] Dick Cheney: “Iraq is in possession of weapons of mass destruction.”
  • [01:29 & 01:31] Robert Draper, George W. Bush: Variations of the WMD mantra.

• Inspections in the 1990s:
  Former Australian intelligence officer Rod Barton recounts grueling UN weapons inspections in early 1990s Iraq. Despite Iraq’s obligations after the Gulf War to destroy such weapons, inspectors find signs of ongoing concealment and partial cooperation.

  • [02:48] Rod Barton: “It was hell on earth... the chemical weapons plant had been heavily bombed... chemical alarms went off. So there was poisonous gas in the air.”

• Dr. Germ and Al Hakam:
  Iraq’s biological program, led by Dr. Rihab Taha (a.k.a. “Dr. Germ”), comes to light. Inspections are stymied until her emotional breakdown leads to reluctant admissions.

  • [06:16] Rod Barton recounts Dr. Taha sobbing when confronted: “...if she’d given anything away, she would be jailed, perhaps tortured, perhaps shot, who knows?”
  • [07:06] Secret confession: “They really had to confess to having a biological weapons program.”

• Aftermath of Defections and Sanctions:
  Saddam’s son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, defects and provides documentation. Barton and the UN team conclude most WMDs were likely destroyed, but uncertainty remains.

  • [09:57] Rod Barton (post-inspection): “We’ve destroyed at least 95% of everything... Iraq is not a threat.”

2. The Return of the WMD Threat and the Bush Doctrine (10:21–13:53)

• Bush’s 2002 Rhetoric:
  Despite prior conclusions, President Bush resurrects WMD fears in his State of the Union address.

  • [10:33] George W. Bush: “The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons for over a decade... This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.”

• Strategic Shift:
  The Bush administration shapes the “Bush Doctrine” — prioritizing preemptive, unilateral action to prevent potential threats post-9/11.

  • [12:48] George W. Bush: “You’re either with us or you’re against us in the fight against terror.”

3. Manufacturing the Case: Intelligence, Pressure, and Misrepresentation (13:53–26:22)

• White House Pressure on the CIA:
  Jane Green, then-chief of the CIA’s Iraq Group, details White House hostility toward agency analysis that debunked Iraq–Al Qaeda connections. Facing disparagement from Cheney, some CIA analysts become “more forward-leaning” under mounting political pressure.

  • [15:09] Jane Green: “Cheney hated the briefing... we didn’t think that Iraq had anything to do with 9/11 and he believed the opposite.”

• Intelligence Filtering and Raw Intel Dumps:
  Vice President Cheney demands raw, unvetted intelligence—contrary to agency norms—seeking any thread to reinforce the case for war.

  • [17:54] Robert Draper: “The office of the Vice Presidency kept these many vaults of raw intelligence… actual vaults. I think they had like a half a dozen of them.”

• Information Entrepreneurs: Ahmed Chalabi’s Role:
  Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi and his group feed stories to eager officials, including fabricated links between Saddam, Al Qaeda, and the 9/11 hijackers.

  • [18:56] Jane Green: Tells an anecdote about a woman claiming she saw Osama bin Laden in Saddam’s palace—“It was totally made up... she was saying what certain people wanted to hear.”
  • [19:57] Dick Cheney (Meet The Press): “It’s been pretty well confirmed that he [Mohammad Atta] did go to Prague and did meet with a senior official of the Iraqi Intelligence Service...”

• Pushback Ignored:
  The intelligence community, especially the CIA, repeatedly reports no credible link between Iraq and Al Qaeda. But the administration keeps asking the same questions—hoping for a different answer.

  • [21:44] Jane Green: “We gave Wolfowitz generally the same answer each time... But still he would come back with a slightly different wording of the same question in order to... get an answer that was more useful to him.”

• Alternative Intelligence Efforts:
  When unsatisfied, the White House turns to the Defense Department’s Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group—tasked mainly with connecting Saddam Hussein to terrorism at any cost.

  • [23:00] Robert Draper: “What it really was, was ‘let’s figure out every single way we can to tie Saddam Hussein to these terror groups.’”

4. Mainstreaming the WMD Argument (26:22–35:33)

• From Theory to Public Relations:
  The White House Iraq Group orchestrates a campaign featuring high-profile faces (Cheney, Rice, Powell) and carefully crafted language. The media (notably the New York Times) amplifies stories about Saddam’s supposed nuclear ambitions, often fed by administration leaks.

• “Mushroom Cloud” and the Framing of Fear:
  A memorable phrase used repeatedly in media appearances and speeches conjures the existential threat of nuclear catastrophe.

  • [34:29] Condoleezza Rice (quoting White House Iraq Group speechwriting): “We don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.”

• Bush’s UN and Cincinnati Speeches:
  President Bush personally conflates Saddam with Al Qaeda and magnifies the nuclear threat, often sidestepping the CIA’s skepticism.

  • [36:26] George W. Bush: “We know that Iraq and Al Qaeda have had high level contacts that go back a decade...”
  • [37:49] George W. Bush: “We cannot wait for the final proof—the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”

• Critique of Presidential Rhetoric:
  Even years later, Bush maintains his case was sound, but journalists and historians denounce the Cincinnati speech as historically reckless.

  • [38:09] Robert Draper: “That speech deserved to be condemned as really the most irresponsible and fact-free presidential address up to that point since, say, President Johnson falsely claimed that submarines had been attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin... It was irresponsible, it was based on intuition... not on any intelligence that connected those various dots.”

5. The War Clock, Groundwork, and What’s Next (39:06–end)

• Logistical Reality and Timelines:
  The military’s deadline (March 2003) looms. Troops already wait near Iraq’s border as officials focus on securing public, congressional, UN, and allied support—within five months.

• Preview of Next Episode:
  The coming debate among liberal hawks and neoconservatives about the intellectual justifications for war:

  • [40:23] Rod Barton: “Even if there was a less than 5% chance of success, I would be morally bound to fight for it and to argue for it.”

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the subjective reach for evidence:
  [23:53] Robert Draper: “There would be all of these squiggly lines that would connect the two. This or that occasion, this or that meeting, this or that rumor. It goes to show you the kind of effort that was made to establish these links conclusively and was truly an obsession.”

• On the administration's message discipline:
  [33:25] Ken Adelman: “This is the brilliance of the propagandists at the Bush White House. Dick Cheney, Condi Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, all fanned out onto the Sunday morning shows and pointed to what would turn out to be an erroneous New York Times piece as evidence of what was brewing in Iraq...”

• On the intelligence community’s dilemma:
  [28:56] Ken Adelman: “What does the intelligence community really want to avoid doing? Like any institution, they want to avoid their mistakes from before. So what did they do? They highballed things... They vastly overestimated what Saddam Hussein had.”

• On public fear-mongering:
  [37:49] George W. Bush: “We cannot wait for the final proof—the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”

Important Timestamps by Segment

• 01:02–10:21 — UN inspections, Barton’s testimony, background on WMD in Iraq
• 10:21–13:53 — Bush Doctrine emerges, shift in post-9/11 strategy
• 13:53–26:22 — White House pressure on intelligence, Chalabi’s fabrications, futile search for Iraq–Al Qaeda link
• 26:22–35:33 — White House Iraq Group, PR strategies, mushroom cloud narrative
• 35:33–39:06 — Bush’s Cincinnati speech, historical context, preparation for war
• 39:06–End — Military timelines, preview of political/intellectual justifications ahead

Tone & Language Notes

• The episode is factual, pointed, and critical, using first-person recollections and contemporary soundbites to capture the intensity of the political environment and the pressures felt within intelligence agencies. The Bush administration’s rhetorical tactics and intelligence failures are scrutinized without hyperbole, letting participants’ words and admissions reveal the urgency, fear, and ultimately, the false premises that propelled the nation into war.

Recommended for anyone seeking an in-depth, insider recounting of how the U.S. government’s faulty case for the 2003 Iraq invasion came to dominate not just politics, but the collective American imagination.