Slow Burn – Season 5, Episode 8: “Shock and Awe”

Date: June 16, 2021
Host: Noreen Malone, Slate Podcasts

Episode Overview

This episode of Slow Burn illuminates the disastrous lack of planning for the aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Through personal recollections, archival tape, and expert analysis, it explores who was responsible for failing to prepare for what would happen once major combat ended—and the profound consequences for Iraq and its people.

The central question: Why did the Bush administration not make a real plan for post-invasion Iraq? The episode focuses on internal power struggles, bureaucratic dysfunction, and faulty assumptions that shaped America’s legacy in Iraq.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

The Uncertain Planning for Postwar Iraq

[00:32–04:52]

• In January 2003, three Iraqi exiles, including writer Kanan Makia, met with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.
• The meeting’s main takeaway: confidence that the U.S. would be welcomed in Iraq (“sweets and flowers”).
• President Bush described a two-phase process: one army to topple Saddam, another to rebuild Iraq. But Kanan Makia noticed uncertainty in the room:
  • Quote:
    “As he said this, he suddenly lifted up his eyes and looked at Condoleezza Rice and... her eyes looked to the floor as she said yes.”
    —Kanan Makia [01:19]
• Makia’s concern about inadequate planning deepened after meeting Jay Garner, newly appointed to head postwar rebuilding. Garner had just started his job, with minimal support.

Deep Bureaucratic Dysfunction

[02:35–04:52]

• Despite President Bush’s business background, there was profound mismanagement. Top officials—Powell (State Department) and Rumsfeld (Defense Department)—held radically different visions and rarely debated directly.

• Many critical issues fell through the cracks, with some officials avoiding confrontation and others engaging in bureaucratic sabotage.

• Frank Miller (National Security Council):

  • Tasked with addressing concrete military logistics, found the State Department’s Future of Iraq Project to be all talk, no action.
  • Quote:
    “What they told us was sort of philosophical things, not action oriented things. ... We were trying to fix things.” [04:58]

The Battle between State and Defense Departments

[04:52–07:25]

• The State Department, under Colin Powell, believed the U.S. had a responsibility to rebuild Iraq (“Pottery Barn rule: If you break it, you own it.”).
• The DoD, under Rumsfeld, did not want to handle reconstruction—coining phrases like “we don’t do windows” (i.e., not responsible for humanitarian efforts).
• Robert Draper (author of “To Start a War”):
  • Rumsfeld ultimately muscled out the State Department, took control, yet had no inclination for postwar complexity.
  • Quote:
    “If there was going to be a bicycle seat and hands on it, [Rumsfeld] sure didn’t want it to be Colin Powell.” [06:44]
• Rumsfeld’s background in corporate restructuring influenced his approach—he liked efficiency and quick exits, not nation-building.

Glaring Failures in Decision-Making

[07:25–09:26]

• Rumsfeld employed disruptive tactics in meetings, such as pretending to doze, then rerouting discussions—making decisions harder to reach.
  • Frank Miller:
    “One of Don Rumsfeld’s tricks was to pretend to doze during a meeting ... and sort of completely throw discussions with the President off track.” [07:32]
• Miller recalls a meeting where General Tommy Franks (invasion chief) told Bush the military would maintain law and order after victory—though there was no such plan.
  • Noreen Malone: “Why do you think he didn’t tell the truth?”
  • Frank Miller: “I have no idea.” [08:25]
  • When asked how angry he was to learn the truth: “Hugely. Hugely.” [08:30]
• This lack of clear, honest planning led to chaos once military action ended.

The Central Legacy: A War Without a Plan

[08:34–09:26]

• Noreen Malone summarizes: all the energy in the U.S. government went into initiating the war, with little focus on its aftermath.
• The disastrous execution of the invasion’s aftermath became one of the defining legacies of the Iraq War.

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Kanan Makia on Condoleezza Rice’s Reaction:
  • “Her eyes looked to the floor as she said yes.” [01:19]
• Frank Miller on State Department Planning:
  • “Sort of philosophical things, not action oriented things ... We were trying to fix things.” [04:58]
• Robert Draper on Rumsfeld’s Vision:
  • “We're going to take our hands off the bicycle seat... An incredibly condescending thing... But that was his view.” [05:38]
  • “If there was going to be a bicycle seat and hands on it, [Rumsfeld] sure didn’t want it to be Colin Powell.” [06:44]
• Frank Miller on Rumsfeld’s Disruptive Tactics:
  • “Pretend to doze during a meeting … and sort of completely throw discussions with the President off track.” [07:32]
• Frank Miller’s Response to Military Falsehoods:
  • Malone: “Why do you think [Franks] didn’t tell the truth?”
  • Miller: “I have no idea.” [08:25]
  • Malone: “How pissed were you when you found out?”
  • Miller: “Hugely. Hugely.” [08:30]

Important Timestamps

• 00:32 — Iraqi expats meet Bush; Makia’s impressions
• 01:19 — Bush’s “two armies” plan; Rice’s telling reaction
• 02:22 — Jay Garner’s last-minute appointment
• 03:43 — Frank Miller describes his planning role
• 04:52 — Powell’s “Pottery Barn rule”; policy split exposed
• 05:38 — Rumsfeld’s hands off philosophy and departmental maneuvers
• 07:32 — Rumsfeld’s disruptive behavior in meetings
• 08:09 — General Franks’s misleading answers on postwar planning
• 08:34 — The consequences for Iraq and the war’s legacy

Conclusion

This episode reveals the Bush administration’s shocking lack of preparation—and accountability—for postwar Iraq. Conflicting visions, bureaucratic in-fighting, and wishful thinking left Iraqis vulnerable to the chaos that followed. The consequences, the episode makes clear, are ongoing—affecting Iraq and America alike.

The tone is one of retrospective disbelief and urgency, asking: How could these mistakes have happened—and who paid the price?