Frank Miller (3:43)

The task that I was given was to examine all the nuts and bolts issues that had to be addressed if the United States went to war against Iraq. Obtaining overflight rights, things like that that nobody was taking care of.

Narrator/Interviewer (4:00)

None of these conversations were smooth or easy, especially the ones about what was supposed to happen after the invasion. That's because the two main players, Rumsfeld and Powell, were thinking about that problem very differently. Powell believed that Iraq after Saddam would be the US's responsibility. He subscribed to the Pottery Barn rule. If you break it, you own it. His State Department had a group called the Future of Iraq Project. They were trying to think about what kind of government might emerge in Iraq. But they didn't have any real power. Kanamikiah was in those State Department meetings.

Kanan Makia (4:35)

I thought it had to be a federal state and there are very many different kinds of federalisms. Should it be administratively structured federalisms or should it be ethnically structured federalisms? So we were having those kinds of debates since none of us were doing anything practical.

Narrator/Interviewer (4:52)

Miller met with the Future of Iraq project once. He didn't find their conversations particularly useful.

Frank Miller (4:58)

What they told us was sort of philosophical things, not action oriented things. And they never asked to come back and see us again. And we didn't ask to see them because that wasn't what we were about. We were trying to fix things.

Narrator/Interviewer (5:13)

So when it came to the hands on work of rebuilding Iraq, that State Department project was all talk, no action. But Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense, didn't even want to talk. Rumsfeld liked the phrase we don't do windows, meaning we, the military don't do humanitarian stuff. Robert Draper, the author of to start a war, says Rumsfeld also tossed around a second catchphrase.

Robert Draper (5:38)

We're going to take our hands off the bicycle seat and let them learn how to ride the bicycle for themselves. An incredibly condescending thing, I have to say, to say of the Iraqi people. But that was his view. We're going to do them this monumental favor of relieving them of this tyrant by. But we're not going to sit around and have soldiers hammering schoolhouses together and keeping the peace. That's for the Iraqis to do.

Narrator/Interviewer (6:03)

Before Rumsfeld ran the Defense Department, he spent a decade in private business, and he got sort of obsessed with efficiency. He liked taking over companies and downsizing them. In 2001, the US military had forced out Afghanistan's Taliban and installed a transitional government. A year later, it wasn't yet clear that American forces would remain in the country for decades to come. At that point, Afghanistan was Rumsfeld's vision of modern warfare. Quick, targeted strikes and a speedy resolution with a minimum of expense and lives lost. Rumsfeld wanted to get in and get out. He wasn't interested in reconstruction, but he also didn't want to give up that turf to anyone else.

Robert Draper (6:44)

When it became clear that there would be some kind of post Saddam occupying force, then Rumsfeld seized the moment and decided, well, if that's going to happen, it sure as hell is going to be the Pentagon. It's not going to be the State Department. If there was going to be a bicycle seat and hands on it, he sure didn't want it to be Colin Powell. So Rumsfeld really muscled out the State Department. The Defense Department then became in charge. And this really had disastrous consequences because Rumsfeld himself had a personal disinclination to immerse himself in the details, the very complicated details after the invasion when it was clear that it was not going to be, as some had said, a cakewalk.

Narrator/Interviewer (7:25)

The way Frank Miller describes it, Rumsfeld could be incredibly annoying. He liked to play mind games.

Frank Miller (7:32)

One of Don Rumsfeld's trick was to pretend to doze during a meeting. And as things wound on, he would say, well, what about X, Y, or Z? Which had already been discussed and decided 20 minutes earlier, and sort of completely throw discussions with the President off track, which made for difficulty in running a meeting and reaching conclusions.

Narrator/Interviewer (7:53)

Miller remembers one meeting in particular about rebuilding plans. Tommy Franks, the general in charge of the invasion, was also there. In that meeting, General Franks outlined the same plan that Bush mentioned to Kanan troops. Sticking around to rebuild the country.

Frank Miller (8:09)

The president asked Franks, as our forces swept forward, who was going to maintain law and order behind them. And Frank said it was the US military. And of course, there was no plan for the military to do that. But we didn't know that. We asked that twice.

Narrator/Interviewer (8:22)

Why do you think he didn't tell the truth?

Frank Miller (8:25)

I have no idea how.

Narrator/Interviewer (8:27)

How pissed were you when you found out?

Frank Miller (8:30)

Hugely. Hugely.

Narrator/Interviewer (8:34)

A spokesman said General Franks had no comment. This is Slow Burn. I'm your host, Noreen Malone. In this series, we focused on the ideas and the people that launched the war in Iraq. That's where all the energy was among the American foreign policy leadership. And that decision to invade Iraq is what set everything else into motion. But the way the invasion was executed had enormous consequences. It remains in many ways the legacy of the Iraq war. So why didn't the administration make a real plan for what to do after the bombing stopped? Who was most responsible for that failure? And what were the consequences for the people of Iraq? This is episode eight, Shock and Awe.

Podcast Host/Advertiser (9:26)

Hi. I hope you've been enjoying listening to Slow burn. The last two episodes of this season are available only to Slate plus members. You can sign up by going to slate.com slowburn or clicking on the link in the show notes. It's only $15 for your first three months with your subscription. You also get access to bonus Slow Burn plus episodes with extra interviews and stories from behind the scenes. And your membership lets you listen to every Slate show ad free, not to mention gives you unlimited access to Slate's website. So to hear the rest of this season of Slow Burn and become a member, go to slate.com slowburn or click the link in the episode notes. Thanks for supporting our work.

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