The Road to the Iraq War | 8. Shock and Awe

Summary

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Slow Burn – Season 5, Episode 8: “Shock and Awe”

Date: June 16, 2021
Host: Noreen Malone, Slate Podcasts

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Episode Overview

This episode of Slow Burn illuminates the disastrous lack of planning for the aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Through personal recollections, archival tape, and expert analysis, it explores who was responsible for failing to prepare for what would happen once major combat ended—and the profound consequences for Iraq and its people.

The central question: Why did the Bush administration not make a real plan for post-invasion Iraq? The episode focuses on internal power struggles, bureaucratic dysfunction, and faulty assumptions that shaped America’s legacy in Iraq.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

The Uncertain Planning for Postwar Iraq

[00:32–04:52]

• In January 2003, three Iraqi exiles, including writer Kanan Makia, met with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.
• The meeting’s main takeaway: confidence that the U.S. would be welcomed in Iraq (“sweets and flowers”).
• President Bush described a two-phase process: one army to topple Saddam, another to rebuild Iraq. But Kanan Makia noticed uncertainty in the room:
  • Quote:
    “As he said this, he suddenly lifted up his eyes and looked at Condoleezza Rice and... her eyes looked to the floor as she said yes.”
    —Kanan Makia [01:19]
• Makia’s concern about inadequate planning deepened after meeting Jay Garner, newly appointed to head postwar rebuilding. Garner had just started his job, with minimal support.

Deep Bureaucratic Dysfunction

[02:35–04:52]

• Despite President Bush’s business background, there was profound mismanagement. Top officials—Powell (State Department) and Rumsfeld (Defense Department)—held radically different visions and rarely debated directly.

• Many critical issues fell through the cracks, with some officials avoiding confrontation and others engaging in bureaucratic sabotage.

• Frank Miller (National Security Council):

  • Tasked with addressing concrete military logistics, found the State Department’s Future of Iraq Project to be all talk, no action.
  • Quote:
    “What they told us was sort of philosophical things, not action oriented things. ... We were trying to fix things.” [04:58]

The Battle between State and Defense Departments

[04:52–07:25]

• The State Department, under Colin Powell, believed the U.S. had a responsibility to rebuild Iraq (“Pottery Barn rule: If you break it, you own it.”).
• The DoD, under Rumsfeld, did not want to handle reconstruction—coining phrases like “we don’t do windows” (i.e., not responsible for humanitarian efforts).
• Robert Draper (author of “To Start a War”):
  • Rumsfeld ultimately muscled out the State Department, took control, yet had no inclination for postwar complexity.
  • Quote:
    “If there was going to be a bicycle seat and hands on it, [Rumsfeld] sure didn’t want it to be Colin Powell.” [06:44]
• Rumsfeld’s background in corporate restructuring influenced his approach—he liked efficiency and quick exits, not nation-building.

Glaring Failures in Decision-Making

[07:25–09:26]

• Rumsfeld employed disruptive tactics in meetings, such as pretending to doze, then rerouting discussions—making decisions harder to reach.
  • Frank Miller:
    “One of Don Rumsfeld’s tricks was to pretend to doze during a meeting ... and sort of completely throw discussions with the President off track.” [07:32]
• Miller recalls a meeting where General Tommy Franks (invasion chief) told Bush the military would maintain law and order after victory—though there was no such plan.
  • Noreen Malone: “Why do you think he didn’t tell the truth?”
  • Frank Miller: “I have no idea.” [08:25]
  • When asked how angry he was to learn the truth: “Hugely. Hugely.” [08:30]
• This lack of clear, honest planning led to chaos once military action ended.

The Central Legacy: A War Without a Plan

[08:34–09:26]

• Noreen Malone summarizes: all the energy in the U.S. government went into initiating the war, with little focus on its aftermath.
• The disastrous execution of the invasion’s aftermath became one of the defining legacies of the Iraq War.

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Kanan Makia on Condoleezza Rice’s Reaction:
  • “Her eyes looked to the floor as she said yes.” [01:19]
• Frank Miller on State Department Planning:
  • “Sort of philosophical things, not action oriented things ... We were trying to fix things.” [04:58]
• Robert Draper on Rumsfeld’s Vision:
  • “We're going to take our hands off the bicycle seat... An incredibly condescending thing... But that was his view.” [05:38]
  • “If there was going to be a bicycle seat and hands on it, [Rumsfeld] sure didn’t want it to be Colin Powell.” [06:44]
• Frank Miller on Rumsfeld’s Disruptive Tactics:
  • “Pretend to doze during a meeting … and sort of completely throw discussions with the President off track.” [07:32]
• Frank Miller’s Response to Military Falsehoods:
  • Malone: “Why do you think [Franks] didn’t tell the truth?”
  • Miller: “I have no idea.” [08:25]
  • Malone: “How pissed were you when you found out?”
  • Miller: “Hugely. Hugely.” [08:30]

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Important Timestamps

• 00:32 — Iraqi expats meet Bush; Makia’s impressions
• 01:19 — Bush’s “two armies” plan; Rice’s telling reaction
• 02:22 — Jay Garner’s last-minute appointment
• 03:43 — Frank Miller describes his planning role
• 04:52 — Powell’s “Pottery Barn rule”; policy split exposed
• 05:38 — Rumsfeld’s hands off philosophy and departmental maneuvers
• 07:32 — Rumsfeld’s disruptive behavior in meetings
• 08:09 — General Franks’s misleading answers on postwar planning
• 08:34 — The consequences for Iraq and the war’s legacy

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Conclusion

This episode reveals the Bush administration’s shocking lack of preparation—and accountability—for postwar Iraq. Conflicting visions, bureaucratic in-fighting, and wishful thinking left Iraqis vulnerable to the chaos that followed. The consequences, the episode makes clear, are ongoing—affecting Iraq and America alike.

The tone is one of retrospective disbelief and urgency, asking: How could these mistakes have happened—and who paid the price?

Transcript

[Podcast Host/Advertiser]

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[Narrator/Interviewer]

2003, three Iraqi expats came to the White House. They met with President Bush, Vice President Cheney and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. The purpose of the meeting, which came two months before the US invasion, was a little unclear. The writer Kanan Makea was one of the Iraqis.

[Kanan Makia]

And my overall impression is that the whole thing was essentially a public relations exercise. The questions were pro forma, but among them was how do you think the Americans will be received? And I think we all answered that they would be received positively.

[Narrator/Interviewer]

Makea actually told the President that they'd be greeted with sweets and flowers. But what he remembers most about the meeting is the plan that Bush laid out for after the invasion.

[Kanan Makia]

President Bush suddenly announced that there would not be one army going into the, into Iraq, but two armies. And I remember it was myself who asked him, what do you mean? And then he said the first army would be to topple the regime and very shortly thereafter there would be the second army to rebuild Iraq and to relaunch the country. Now as he said this, he suddenly lifted up his eyes and looked at Condoleezza Rice and I think his words were right, meaning have I described it correctly? And then the odd thing that I remember is that Condoleezza Rice, her eyes looked to the floor as she said yes.

[Narrator/Interviewer]

For Makia, Rice's body language was a tell. The plan for after the invasion might not be fully baked. Makia's suspicion was confirmed when he met with retired Army General Jay Garner. Garner was the guy who'd be in charge of the so called second army rebuilding Iraq.

[Kanan Makia]

He was in an empty office with one secretary and hardly any files. And he said he had just started his job the week before and I was utterly shocked by this.

[Narrator/Interviewer]

Garner had worked in Iraq during Desert Storm. Now he was taking a four month leave from his job as a military contractor to manage the post war effort. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld seemed to think that was plenty of time. George W. Bush was the first American President to hold an mba. He was supposed to bring managerial skill to the executive branch. But the Bush White House turned out to be a bureaucratic mess. And nowhere was that clearer than in the planning for post war Iraq. The President's top foreign policy people had radically different ideas about what the US should do. But most of the time they didn't make their pitches to the President and let him decide. Some administration officials soft pedaled their views. Others used bureaucratic sabotage to get their way. Colin Powell, who ran the State Department, had always been skeptical of invading Iraq, although he never explicitly told the President not to go ahead with it. On the other hand, Rumsfeld's Department of Defense was all in on the war. The job of getting those different agencies to work together to plan the war in its aftermath fell to Frank Miller. He worked for Condoleezza Rice.

[Frank Miller]

The task that I was given was to examine all the nuts and bolts issues that had to be addressed if the United States went to war against Iraq. Obtaining overflight rights, things like that that nobody was taking care of.

[Narrator/Interviewer]

None of these conversations were smooth or easy, especially the ones about what was supposed to happen after the invasion. That's because the two main players, Rumsfeld and Powell, were thinking about that problem very differently. Powell believed that Iraq after Saddam would be the US's responsibility. He subscribed to the Pottery Barn rule. If you break it, you own it. His State Department had a group called the Future of Iraq Project. They were trying to think about what kind of government might emerge in Iraq. But they didn't have any real power. Kanamikiah was in those State Department meetings.

[Kanan Makia]

I thought it had to be a federal state and there are very many different kinds of federalisms. Should it be administratively structured federalisms or should it be ethnically structured federalisms? So we were having those kinds of debates since none of us were doing anything practical.

[Narrator/Interviewer]

Miller met with the Future of Iraq project once. He didn't find their conversations particularly useful.

[Frank Miller]

What they told us was sort of philosophical things, not action oriented things. And they never asked to come back and see us again. And we didn't ask to see them because that wasn't what we were about. We were trying to fix things.

[Narrator/Interviewer]

So when it came to the hands on work of rebuilding Iraq, that State Department project was all talk, no action. But Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense, didn't even want to talk. Rumsfeld liked the phrase we don't do windows, meaning we, the military don't do humanitarian stuff. Robert Draper, the author of to start a war, says Rumsfeld also tossed around a second catchphrase.

[Robert Draper]

We're going to take our hands off the bicycle seat and let them learn how to ride the bicycle for themselves. An incredibly condescending thing, I have to say, to say of the Iraqi people. But that was his view. We're going to do them this monumental favor of relieving them of this tyrant by. But we're not going to sit around and have soldiers hammering schoolhouses together and keeping the peace. That's for the Iraqis to do.

[Narrator/Interviewer]

Before Rumsfeld ran the Defense Department, he spent a decade in private business, and he got sort of obsessed with efficiency. He liked taking over companies and downsizing them. In 2001, the US military had forced out Afghanistan's Taliban and installed a transitional government. A year later, it wasn't yet clear that American forces would remain in the country for decades to come. At that point, Afghanistan was Rumsfeld's vision of modern warfare. Quick, targeted strikes and a speedy resolution with a minimum of expense and lives lost. Rumsfeld wanted to get in and get out. He wasn't interested in reconstruction, but he also didn't want to give up that turf to anyone else.

[Robert Draper]

When it became clear that there would be some kind of post Saddam occupying force, then Rumsfeld seized the moment and decided, well, if that's going to happen, it sure as hell is going to be the Pentagon. It's not going to be the State Department. If there was going to be a bicycle seat and hands on it, he sure didn't want it to be Colin Powell. So Rumsfeld really muscled out the State Department. The Defense Department then became in charge. And this really had disastrous consequences because Rumsfeld himself had a personal disinclination to immerse himself in the details, the very complicated details after the invasion when it was clear that it was not going to be, as some had said, a cakewalk.

[Narrator/Interviewer]

The way Frank Miller describes it, Rumsfeld could be incredibly annoying. He liked to play mind games.

[Frank Miller]

One of Don Rumsfeld's trick was to pretend to doze during a meeting. And as things wound on, he would say, well, what about X, Y, or Z? Which had already been discussed and decided 20 minutes earlier, and sort of completely throw discussions with the President off track, which made for difficulty in running a meeting and reaching conclusions.

[Narrator/Interviewer]

Miller remembers one meeting in particular about rebuilding plans. Tommy Franks, the general in charge of the invasion, was also there. In that meeting, General Franks outlined the same plan that Bush mentioned to Kanan troops. Sticking around to rebuild the country.

[Frank Miller]

The president asked Franks, as our forces swept forward, who was going to maintain law and order behind them. And Frank said it was the US military. And of course, there was no plan for the military to do that. But we didn't know that. We asked that twice.

[Narrator/Interviewer]

Why do you think he didn't tell the truth?

[Frank Miller]

I have no idea how.

[Narrator/Interviewer]

How pissed were you when you found out?

[Frank Miller]

Hugely. Hugely.

[Narrator/Interviewer]

A spokesman said General Franks had no comment. This is Slow Burn. I'm your host, Noreen Malone. In this series, we focused on the ideas and the people that launched the war in Iraq. That's where all the energy was among the American foreign policy leadership. And that decision to invade Iraq is what set everything else into motion. But the way the invasion was executed had enormous consequences. It remains in many ways the legacy of the Iraq war. So why didn't the administration make a real plan for what to do after the bombing stopped? Who was most responsible for that failure? And what were the consequences for the people of Iraq? This is episode eight, Shock and Awe.

[Podcast Host/Advertiser]

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