Another Iran War? with Professor Vali Nasr (Hot War Summer 2025 Remix)

Summary

Podcast Summary: Smart Girl Dumb Questions

Episode: “Another Iran War? with Professor Vali Nasr (Hot War Summer 2025 Remix)”

Host: Nayeema Raza

Guest: Professor Vali Nasr

Date: March 2, 2026 (Taped June 2025)

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Episode Overview

This episode revolves around understanding Iran’s complex politics, nuclear ambitions, regional alliances, and its evolving relationship with Israel and the United States, especially after the 12-day Iran-Israel war in the summer of 2025. Host Nayeema Raza brings in Middle East expert Professor Vali Nasr to answer the “dumb questions” many hesitate to ask but are crucial for grasping current Middle Eastern dynamics. The conversation covers Iran’s grand strategy, the real stakes for ordinary Iranians, the myth and reality of regime change, and America’s retreat from its historical role as the “indispensable nation.”

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Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. Post-War Realities: How the 2025 Conflict Changed Perceptions

• The War’s Lessons
  • Israel sees Iran as its top adversary, and vice versa; now, even ordinary Iranians regard Israel as the primary security threat.
    • “I think the war has established very clearly that for Israel, Iran is its principal enemy ... even Iranian people understand that the one country that can threaten them ... is Israel.” — Vali Nasr [01:44]
  • The U.S. once viewed as the core enemy, is now often seen as acting in Israel’s interests rather than its own.
    • “Iran used to see Israel as an instrument of the United States, and now they see the United States as an instrument of Israel.” — Nayeema Raza [02:59]
    • “They’ve realized that they can’t cut a deal with the United States as they did in 2015. Israel comes in and torpedoes that ... to fulfill what is essentially Israel’s national security policy.” — Vali Nasr [03:07]

2. Iran’s Nuclear Strategy: From Leverage to Deterrence

• Shifting Incentives
  • Previously, Iran’s nuclear program was a bargaining chip for sanctions relief; after being bombed by nuclear powers, many Iranians (regardless of political stance) see a bomb as necessary deterrence.
    • “For many, many years ... Iran’s nuclear activity ... was leveraged in order to get the United States to the table ... But now Iran has been attacked by two nuclear powered armed countries ... it’s going to be very tempting for them to say we need a bomb.” — Vali Nasr [05:54]
    • “Even among Iranian people, irrespective of whether they're pro regime, anti regime ... this is becoming a stronger argument ... They don’t like to be bombed. And they say basically this can't happen again.” — Vali Nasr [06:50]

3. Iran’s Political Structure: Who Holds Power?

• The State, The Clergy, and the Guards
  • Iran has a complex split system: the powerful, unelected Supreme Leader atop layers of (sometimes elected) institutions, the IRGC (Revolutionary Guard), and a fragmented political class.
    • “Iran has military forces. The most important ... is Revolutionary Guards ... But Iran also has regular military as well ... Iran has a very big political class ... There are hardliners, reformists, moderates, some are clerics...” — Vali Nasr [10:11]
  • Overview of the Council of Experts (picks Supreme Leader), Guardian Council (vets candidates and laws), and President (elected, but not truly in charge).
    • “You have a legislature ... you have another body ... that chooses the next supreme leader.” — Vali Nasr [11:23]
    • “There is one which is called Council of Experts ... but then they're elected ... all are clerics ...” — Vali Nasr [11:52]

4. Information, Society, and Modernity in Iran

• Despite state censorship and periodic internet blackouts, Iranians are well-informed, digitally savvy, and access global media.
  • “Iranians have access to information outside ... people watch varieties of outside sources ... There is plenty of discussion of corruption in government.” — Vali Nasr [14:04]
  • “Iran’s entire economy is pretty much digital. Nobody uses cash in Iran.” — Vali Nasr [14:36]

5. Proxy Wars and Regional Influence

• Iran’s creation of proxy forces (Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis, Iraqi militias) is “opportunistic” — filled vacuums left by others’ interventions.
  • “In every case that Iran set up in militia, the opportunity was created by others ... Iran came up with this idea of forward defense ... to defend ourselves inside the Arab world ...” — Vali Nasr [16:13]
  • “Why couldn’t Iran set up a militia in Jordan? Because it had a state. It's not penetrable...” — Vali Nasr [18:11]

6. Sectarian Divisions: Sunni vs. Shia

• Comparisons to Catholic/Protestant divides in Europe — rooted in history and identity politics, flaring up as tools of power.
  • “Shia and the Sunni are like Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Periodically, these things can be part of identity politics or be used by powers for identity politics.” — Vali Nasr [19:55]

7. Succession, Regime Change, and Political Futures

• Khamenei’s longevity; speculation on succession but little chance for opposition exiles or coups.
  • “Everything in Iran is about the succession, including this war, the nuclear deal, etc. Khamenei has ruled Iran for 36 years...” — Vali Nasr [21:35]
  • The exiled Shah’s son is “an influencer ... not a political leader ... unless there are American troops in Tehran.” — Vali Nasr [24:38]
• Regime change in Iran is a “hope, not a policy” without a ground war.
  • “Regime change ... is hope. It's not a policy. It only becomes a policy if you ... have the muscle to do it.” — Vali Nasr [27:45]
  • “There’s also other kinds of regime changes ... regime transition ... like China or the Soviet Union, not parachuting new people in.” — Vali Nasr [29:08]

8. America’s Role: From Indispensable to Dispensable

• The U.S. is retreating from its role as the world’s “indispensable nation,” focusing on transactional interests and pulling back from soft power and democracy promotion.
  • “We have a set of issues that we want to address, and those in President Trump's mind is often transactional ... we are in retreat.” — Vali Nasr [35:06]
  • “When the term America being an indispensable nation was used ... we’re indispensable to that ... Obama began backing away from that ... To that extent, it’s the same with Trump.” — Vali Nasr [36:55]

9. Proliferation and the Death of Deterrence

• The attack on Iran is cited as signaling the end of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; more countries may now seek nuclear weapons for self-preservation.
  • “With this act of unprovoked aggression ... the non Proliferation Treaty is dead. Every country in the world will think there is no international rules...” — Vali Nasr [39:06]
  • “In a situation of law of the jungle ... the only weapon ... is really nuclear weapons. And so I do think that that is in danger.” — Vali Nasr [40:29]

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “If you want to go to war with the country, at least bother learning the name of it.”
  — Vali Nasr [00:12]
• “I think disco is more likely [than restored US-Iran relations].”
  — Vali Nasr [04:18]
• “To be liked makes you an influencer. It doesn’t make you a political leader.”
  — Vali Nasr [24:38]
• “Regime change is hope. It’s not a policy.”
  — Vali Nasr [27:45]
• “Victory is a political narrative.”
  — Vali Nasr [23:06]
• “The more [Iranians] are integrated into the world economy, the larger their influence, the more they will have the power to change the state.”
  — Vali Nasr [31:30]
• “What do 9 billion irrelevant people who have nothing to do do?”
  — Vali Nasr [41:25]

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Timestamps for Important Segments

• Opening/Iran vs. Iran Pronunciation: [00:00–00:25]
• What Did We Learn From the 2025 War: [01:44–04:04]
• Iran’s Nuclear Program and Shifting Incentives: [04:55–06:50]
• Iran’s Political System 101: [09:52–13:05]
• Information, Internet, and Society in Iran: [13:26–15:21]
• Proxy Groups and Regional Influence: [15:21–19:23]
• Sunni-Shia Rivalry Explained: [19:23–20:20]
• Khamenei Succession & Stability: [21:03–24:25]
• Exiled Opposition and Limits of Regime Change: [24:25–29:08]
• How Regimes Fall (or Change) Organically: [29:08–32:36]
• America as Dispensable Nation: [32:36–38:49]
• Nuclear Proliferation Risks: [39:06–40:33]
• Lightning Round—What Makes Vali Nasr Dumb? (on AI and Human Relevance): [40:33–42:11]

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Tone & Style

• The discussion fuses expertise, humor, and casual, accessible explanations.
• Nayeema keeps the tone bright and curiosity-driven; Vali Nasr is both scholarly and wry, often using analogies to explain complex geopolitics.
• The episode excels at demystifying “dumb” questions, making global politics feel approachable.

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Closing Thought

This episode is an invaluable primer on today’s Iran, clarifying myths about its government, regional wars, nuclear ambitions, and the changing American role on the world stage. Both host and guest drive home the importance of context, strategic empathy, and resisting reductionist narratives about a region that remains pivotal—and ever volatile—in global affairs.

Transcript

[Naeem Arza]

If a person says Iran instead of Iran, do you feel like they're more likely to want to wage war?

[Vali Nasr]

I actually think they're asking a question. We say Iran, I say where to?

[Naeem Arza]

I love it.

[Vali Nasr]

Yes, but actually, if they combine Iran with going to war, that's actually most offensive because I say if you want to go to war with the country, at least bother learning the name of it.

[Naeem Arza]

Naimee, I'm Naeem Arza. This is Smart girl, dumb questions. And with everything going on in Iran right now, I wanted to bring you a bit of an Iran 101. This was taped with Middle east expert Bali Nasser, who's a professor at the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Sais he was also a former dean there, as well as a former Obama State Department advisor. Now, very importantly, this conversation was taped in June 2025. A lot has happened since. But because it was taped at the end of that 12 day war between Israel and Iran last summer, there's a lot that actually holds up. Even better post because I got to ask him all those dumb questions we have at dinner parties, but instead of asking out loud, we kind of like Google or ask, chat under our phones, like, does the Ayatollah even do anything? Who would replace him if and when he died, which has happened. And why do the Sunnis and the Shias even have beef now? There's a lot that's happened since summer 2025, including massive protests in Iran, the fall of dominoes across the region, and the strikes that we have seen in these last 48 hours. And so for all of that, you should check out the news. You should check out Vali Nasr's most recent writings and interviews, including one he just gave to Fareed Zakaria. That I thought was great. But what this episode is meant to do is give you some context and some perspective to ground your curiosities outside of that doom scroll. And so I hope you'll enjoy it. And by the way, I started off by asking Vali Nasser what anyone had learned after that last 12 day war in the summer of 2025.

[Vali Nasr]

But I think the war has established very clearly that for Israel, Iran is its principal enemy adversary in the region. And I think for Iranians, it's now established that Israel is its principal national security threat. And that doesn't mean only for the Islamic Republic. But I think even Iranian people understand that the one country that can threaten them and threaten them in this manner is willing to take the kind of actions that he took against Iran is actually Israel.

[Naeem Arza]

And would Iran not add the US to that? Because in some ways, the US has been Israel's most effective weapon.

[Vali Nasr]

I mean, if we go back to the whole history of the Islamic Republic, which the animosity with the United States and adversarial relations started at the beginning, the Iranians saw the United States essentially as the enemy. The foreign policy was arrayed against the US to protect Iran's independence from the US to break US Containment, to push us out of the Middle East. And they thought that Israel was basically an instrument of the U.S. just like, let's say they thought Saudi Arabia was, or the Arab alliances. I think in recent years, they have a greater appreciation that actually the tail may be wagging the dog.

[Naeem Arza]

I think what you're saying is Iran used to see Israel as an instrument of the United States, and now they see the United States as an instrument of Israel.

[Vali Nasr]

I mean, yes, I mean, it was that United States was the Great Satan and Israel was the little Satan, and that they had this vision and still maybe some of it lingers, that the United States with this great imperialist power. Power. And a lot of this came from leftist literature of the 1960s and 70s, this sort of worldview that they're combating a global imperialist power. And so United States was really the architect of the world that they were fighting against. Israel fit into that, but Israel by itself was not a concern to them. Now, increasingly, they've realized that they can't cut a deal with the United States as they did in 2015. Israel comes in and torpedoes that Israel has all this power in Washington to essentially deploy the entirety of American might, financial, diplomatic, military, in order to fulfill what is essentially Israel's national security policy.

[Naeem Arza]

Before we dig into the more substantive topic of nuclear war and alliances, which 70s, pre revolution comeback do you think is more likely? US Iranian relations like they were in the kind of heyday under the Shah or disco?

[Vali Nasr]

I think disco is more likely in the short. I think going back to that kind of a degree of a relationship, it may not happen in my lifetime, but I hope at least see daily steps in that direction. But I hope I stand to be corrected in a major way because I was in great disco.

[Naeem Arza]

Well, I like disco, too. So this is the thing. But I like peace more. Peace and security more. Does this mean that we're going to be back in this exact same situation between Iran, Iran, Israel and the US Pretty soon? Like, is Donald Trump going to be Bill Murray on Groundhog Day? Like, is this going to keep on happening?

[Vali Nasr]

I think for A while we do. Unless and until the United States gets a solid deal with Iran, there is no incentive on Iran's part to stop its activity. Because if anything, Iran's nuclear activity for many, many years, I think, in my opinion, was not intended to build a bomb, but was leveraged in order to get the United States to the table to negotiate over sanctions. That's why Iran went to Geneva in 2015. They didn't ask the United States anything other than in exchange for X, Y and Z, we want these sanctions lifted. And then when they came back this time, again, what was on the table for Iran was sanctions. So the Iranians understand that the United States, it doesn't come to the table for any issue other than nuclear issue. Right. Not like you could just send an invitation and say, let's have a conversation about Hezbollah or Hamas and the US Is going to show up.

[Naeem Arza]

Yeah, let's just go like in the 1970s now.

[Vali Nasr]

No. So they. So until now, the value of this was really leverage. But now Iran has been attacked by two nuclear powered armed countries and their argument is that you're defenseless, we own your skies, we can obliterate you, we can bomb you at will, anytime we want. And of course, Iran can hit back with missiles, but it has finite ability vis a vis the combined power of Israel and the United States. So from here on, it's going to be very tempting for them to say we need a bomb, not for offensive purposes, but because it's the ultimate deterrent.

[Naeem Arza]

Just to recap for the audience, you're saying your understanding of the Iranian grand strategy here, the Iranian nuclear program was intended as leverage to bring the Americans to the table, not as deterrent necessarily for any kind of foreign intervention. But now those incentives have changed as they have seen actual war in a way that we have not seen in this region.

[Vali Nasr]

And in fact, even among Iranian people, irrespective of whether they're pro regime, anti regime, secular or not, this is becoming a stronger argument because even if it's somebody like yourself, myself sitting there, they live in Iran. They don't like their government, but they don't like to be bombed. And they say basically this can't happen again.

[Naeem Arza]

So, Vali, you talk in your book the Grand Strategy, you talk about Iran as this existential state, right? It exists out of a concept of threat. It's mobilized around narrative and decades of resistance. I guess there's nothing better for selling a book called Iran's Grand Strategy than a war against Iran that captures the headlines and imaginations and world War three concerns of people for a couple of weeks. Has it been good for book sales?

[Vali Nasr]

I hope so, and I expect so. But it's unfortunate. It's actually the wrong reason. I would have liked people to be paying attention, but for a while I had been thinking that Iran is becoming a bigger and bigger issue for the United States, for Saudi Arabia, for Israel, a central point of our foreign policy. And we really don't appreciate or know as a people, not only as policymakers, as a people, how do Iranians calculate why they calculate their decisions the way they. I mean, we're playing a game of chess with them. We have no understanding of the strategy of the other side.

[Naeem Arza]

And part of that is that because since the Carter era, there has been no diplomacy between these two countries and very limited intelligence. Right. Actually. But then you have things like Stuxnet and you wonder, well, isn't there more intelligence than we think there is?

[Vali Nasr]

Well, intelligence. I learned when I even worked in the government that raw intelligence is like looking at one tree at a time. It doesn't necessarily give you a picture of the forest. And CIA can tell you exactly what was said in Tehran last night, but they're not necessarily very good at telling you generally what is the context in which this information is said or this information is received. The other reason is that we're mesmerized with Khamenei's turbo. Just deflects the attention that. Okay, because this guy's got a turban on his head. These guys are sort of fanatical, deranged, illogical, irrational Islamic robots. And that explains their hatred of Israel, hatred of America. And they just basically are on a bigger version of the caricature we had of fundamentalists after 9 11. Before 9 11. And what I'm trying to say is that don't be distracted by his turban. I mean, basically, there's a strategic calculation there. It may be based on wrong assumptions, wrong analysis, wrong conclusions. I don't subscribe to the way he sees it, but you would be underestimating and deluding yourself if you didn't understand that he's making strategic calculations before we get there.

[Naeem Arza]

I think we need a little bit of a 101 for anyone listening here. So can you kind of break down the key forces in Iran, the key political forces, The Ayatollah, the igrc, the military, the elite Quds Force. Just give us like a one minute stakeholder map.

[Vali Nasr]

So like many other countries, Iran has military forces. The most important military force in Iran is Revolutionary Guards. They're the sort of elite force that was born up for the revolution. They are the ones that are closest to the regime. But Iran also has regular military as well. You put these two together, they will look to you something like Egypt's military, Pakistan's military. And they are intrusive in the economy and politics, just like those militaries in those countries are. Rules are a little different, but the idea is the same. And then Iran has this sort of. Iran has a very big political class that is kind of very disjointed and has different factions. There are hardliners, there are reformists, there are moderates, some are clerics. And they have ties to religious centers. Some of them are not clerics, have ties to varieties of economic and other organizations. And then Iran also has a very amorphous state. So on the top, you have the supreme leader then, but you also have an elected president which is kind of like the Prime Minister of France. In other words, he's in charge of the administration of the country, but he's not the.

[Naeem Arza]

Yeah, but he's not Macron.

[Vali Nasr]

Macron, exactly. The supreme Leader is unelected and unaccountable. The president is elected and is accountable. You have a legislature which is elected and it's not just the parliament. You have another body that is elected that chooses the next supreme leader. You have another body that's elected that decides who can run and what laws.

[Naeem Arza]

What is that body called? The one that selects the supreme leader. And is it kind of like a politburo in China or Vietnam?

[Vali Nasr]

There is one which is called Council of Experts, which is only really, really important when he has to choose on whether a supreme leader is senile or who would replace him.

[Naeem Arza]

So he says, and how many dudes are on that? I assume they're all dudes.

[Vali Nasr]

They're all dudes? Yes, they're all dudes. Because that one all are clerics, actually. Because supposedly this is a clerical. This is a theocracy on paper. So they're all. I know there are dozens on that. But then they're elected. Then you have a Guardian Council, which actually has also members of supreme leader points to who's on it. The Guardian Council decides vets, all candidates who run for office, from low level mayor to parliamentarians to president. And then it also has a veto power over legislation that comes out of the legislature. Basically. You have a level of state functioning and democratic voting and decision making, which kind of looks very western, but it's controlled and overseen. This other layer on top of it, which is authoritarian and is not accountable and sometimes not elected.

[Naeem Arza]

We gotta send Doge to Iran. I think you have to send Doge

[Vali Nasr]

to Iran for varieties of reasons. But you see also because this kind of plumbing makes also the economy look like that. These different have their own relationships in the economy. It becomes who knows who what the networks are, who has relationship with whom.

[Naeem Arza]

And I've heard you say this elsewhere, that the flow of information is actually happening in Iran. It's a relatively informed and liberal place for information flow, which always kind of shocks me because Iran ranks 176, I think, out of 180 countries on press freedom when it comes to the report from Reporters Without Borders. There's also Internet blackouts that we've seen at key moments. I mean, we see them in key intervals of, you know, important democratic or activist moments in Iran. So is it really like, is it relatively well informed? I mean, how do you think about that?

[Vali Nasr]

Well, first of all, Iranians have access to information outside. So much so that exiled television stations were extremely important in disturbances that in the, in the riots and revolt that happened two years ago. So people watch them. People watch varieties of outside sources. But even within the press in Iran, yes, there are red lines and, and they don't criticize the supreme Leader. There are no go places.

[Naeem Arza]

Yeah, you can't poll about his popularity. There's no approval rating.

[Vali Nasr]

There is plenty of discussion of corruption in government, corruption here, corruption there. And then you have a population that is 90% literate and is fairly sophisticated. And it's very online. In other words, you know, this is a highly digital society. Iran's entire economy is pretty much digital. Nobody uses cash in Iran.

[Naeem Arza]

Right. Until there's Internet blackout. But even then there are ways.

[Vali Nasr]

Well, no, you're right. Internet. The reason they need Internet blackout is exactly because short of shutting down the Internet, they cannot control information as a sensor cannot just basically say, okay, there are five newspapers and three television stations and we can control this. So when they get overwhelmed, the only option they have is to pull the plug out of the wall.

[Naeem Arza]

So we've just painted a picture of all these forces in the state of Iran and also in the society of Iran. But then there's external forces that are proxies. You know, we've talked about some of them. Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis. By the way, do you have to have an H to be an Iranian proxy? Like Harlem Globetrotters could be eligible.

[Vali Nasr]

The name of the collective name of Iraqi militias is also Hasht Al Shavi. So that also starts with an H, although in English we call him pnf.

[Naeem Arza]

But, but, well that's actually conspiracy here about the letter. H. But yes, that's right, that's right. But how are the external forces, Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis doing right now? How strong are they? Particularly with everything that's happened in Gaza in the case of Hamas, in Syria and Lebanon in the case of Hezbollah and you know, Houthis, in terms of their kind of checked out ness, I would say of the Iran war of

[Vali Nasr]

late, it seems, well, Iranians are not using them in this. First of all, Hezbollah has been diminished. Hamas is, is being battered. So yes, Iran's position collapsed in Syria and Lebanon recently, but that doesn't mean that it didn't work for a very long time. Look, in every case that Iran set up in militia, the opportunity was created by others. Israel went into Lebanon in 1982, destroyed PLO, left a vacuum and occupied south Lebanon, which annoyed the Shias. It gave Iran the opportunity to stand up Hezbollah. The United States went into Iraq, destroyed Saddam's government, created chaos. And that chaos helped, first of all, a Sunni insurgency in the north which was supported by Syria, who was also an ally of Iran. And that provided an opportunity for Iran to organize militias and organize the politics and basically operate in Syria. Then you have the Arab Spring which destroys the central governments in Yemen and Syria, allows Iran to also move into those places. So there was opportunity. But the logic was that when Iran went into Iraq in particular, it came up with this idea of forward defense. In other words, it is best for us to defend ourselves inside the Arab world against Arabs and Americans rather than inside our own border like they're doing right now with Israel.

[Naeem Arza]

People might hear what you're saying and say, okay, there were opportunities for all of these groups to be created through other foreign policy that created or even domestic revolt that created vacuums. People might think, oh, that's kind of victim blaming, Vali, you know.

[Vali Nasr]

No, no, I mean it was a real strategy. You could read discussions of it in Iran, right? Was it a wise strategy? Was it not wise strategy? Why couldn't Iran set up a militia in Jordan?

[Naeem Arza]

Why not?

[Vali Nasr]

Because it had a state. It's not penetrable, Right. It's not like you could actually go get a group of angry Jordanians, organize them around the movement.

[Naeem Arza]

You're not endorsing the strategy or saying it's a non belligerent one. You're just saying, hey, those are opportunistic. And by the way, Vali, I think the question about why didn't they do that in Jordan is kind of a smart guy, smart questions episode that I did not know the answer to myself. I have to say no, no.

[Vali Nasr]

But actually now, first of all, any kind of a military strategy ultimately is not innocent because it's designed to inflict pain, kill, intimidate. That's what military is. It's just to think about where does Hezbollah fit in. Iran's strategic thinking is, yes, it's an ally, yes, we want to help him, but Hezbollah is important deterrence tool against. In fact, it is the reason it is the collapse of Hezbollah that leads Israel to say Iran is weak. But the reality is that with Hezbollah and Syria gone, then Israel no longer feels deterred from attacking Iran directly.

[Naeem Arza]

In 60 seconds or less, can you explain why the Iranians and the Arabs have beef? Explain Sunisia and kind of the history here.

[Vali Nasr]

Well, it's kind of like saying, why did the French and the Germans have beef? I mean, recently I asked somebody, like, if the Germans rebuild an army because the US Is leaving NATO, aren't you afraid? He said, yes, but this time we have nuclear weapons, which means that, yes, it's always on the card, or you just need to scratch the surface to discover how much the French and the British love each other, or the British and the Germans love each other, or

[Naeem Arza]

the Indians and the Pakistanis at least

[Vali Nasr]

have a live issue that still hasn't been resolved. But. But in reality, these ethnic groups, as rivalries in the region, go a long way. Shia and the Sunni are like Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Periodically, these things can be part of identity politics or be used by powers for identity politics. So it's not that mysterious to the outsiders. Just need to look at their own history.

[Naeem Arza]

The IJRC is very closely aligned with the Ayatollah.

[Vali Nasr]

It is very closely aligned with the Ayatollah. But also this Ayatollah is somebody who's ruled over Iran for 36 years.

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[Vali Nasr]

The IRGC cannot rule Iran without him. But if they remove them, they're going to create so much chaos that they can't control.

[Naeem Arza]

And the military, the other military, they're just not good enough.

[Vali Nasr]

They're not positioned in a way that they could stage a coup.

[Naeem Arza]

Yeah, right. But this guy's no spring chicken. I think he's, like, seven years older than Trump, four years older than Biden. He's got those good Persian genes.

[Vali Nasr]

They don't have a Biden situation.

[Naeem Arza]

They don't have a Biden situation. Yeah, he's got those Persian genes. But what is the succession plan?

[Vali Nasr]

Everything in Iran is about the succession, including this war, the nuclear deal, et cetera. Khamenei has ruled Iran for 36 years. That makes him, like, I think, maybe the third longest ruling leader of Iran in the past 200, 300 years. Right. You have to go. Right. So there was one in the 19th century, which is 49 years, and the Shah was 37 years. So next year, if Khamenei survives, he would be the second longest and on par with the Shah.

[Naeem Arza]

But that makes me feel like his time ahead is shorter, Vali, not longer.

[Vali Nasr]

I'm not sure about that. Okay. I think, first of all, the read is that Iran lost this war. I think that's much more the Western narrative than necessarily the way they see it or the way that Iranians see it. They see it that they went against the world's greatest superpower and the most advanced military in the Middle east, and they held their own. The military didn't collapse. They have their nuclear. Most of the nuclear things intact. They're still standing. And they actually forced a ceasefire in Israel. They don't need to prove that. Just listen to President Trump and Steve Bannon. They're making the case that Israel was getting a beating. Steve Bannon, for instance, said today, yesterday that this ceasefire was as much to bail out Israel as it was to bail out Iran. And I'm not saying this is a factual thing that you need to Factually.

[Naeem Arza]

Yeah. You're saying it's the narrative, the understanding.

[Vali Nasr]

Victory is a political narrative.

[Naeem Arza]

Yeah.

[Vali Nasr]

Victory and defeat is in the eyes of the beholder. So, first of all, he hasn't lost the war. He basically has come through. The Iranians will have a lot of questions about why were we at war, how the war was conducted, and where do we go from here. But there is not a crisis of leadership in a sense. Right. I mean, this is much more the regime change narrative abroad and this expectation that, okay, the whole military must be angry with them, the conduct of the war is failing, we should take over. That's not the case. Then they will say there's going to be tens of thousands of Iranians on the street and the IRGC will feel compelled to stage a coup either to lead the the people to something better or to put them in prison and shut it down. That's not happening either. I mean, you have a picture today which is the commander of the Quds Force, which was reputed to actually have been assassinated by Israel, is walking in the middle of the crowd in Tehran in the celebrations of the end of the war and Iran's victory. That doesn't give you a sense that these guys feel humiliated. They need to take. Maybe they should. I'm not saying they shouldn't, but as I said, conception of victory and defeat is in the eyes of the beholder.

[Naeem Arza]

Yeah. What about this? Okay, there's this dude in DC who has become a meme, the heir to the Pahlavi fortune, the son of the last shah. What about him? Because people seem kind of obsessed with this story.

[Vali Nasr]

They are, but this story, yes, I think he did have a lot of following in Iran, but he had no ground game, no coalition. I mean, just to be liked makes you an influencer. It doesn't make you a political leader. You could have one and a half million followers. Everybody may dote on you, love you. But to be a political leader, you have to have a ground game. You have to have a political organization. Polygamous. Not only he doesn't have it, which doesn't tell me exactly how would he become leader of Iran unless there are American troops in Tehran the way they were in Kabul or Baghdad. If you have troops in Tehran, you could decide who's on the throne, who's off the throne, and then you could keep your troops there like we did in Afghanistan for 20 years to keep the regime that we set up in power. Most of this picture is before he became a collaborator with Israel. Right. I don't think his reputation would survive this war because he didn't have the political acumen to, off the bat, come out and say, I condemn the violation of my country's territorial sovereignty. I condemn an invasion of Iran, and I'm standing with my people, and I feel they're suffering because civilians have been killed. And I give my condolences to all of those innocent civilians who've been killed. So he came out, didn't condemn Israel, said it's Khamenei's fault, but I'm not condemning Israel. No civilians have been killed. All the people have been killed, has been essentially regime people. And he said that he doesn't believe that Israel is actually targeting Iranians. He didn't say anything with Israel or Trump said that Tehran has to be evacuated. So essentially he looked like the Vichy government in France after Hitler took over. And I don't think he can survive that. I think this is yesterday's news now.

[Naeem Arza]

So, yeah, you're saying not only is he not hooked up enough to make it happen, he actually fumbled and is showing himself to be a traitor.

[Vali Nasr]

Look, moments like this war make you or break you. It's like when Yeltsin, who was a mayor of Moscow, was a Communist party leader at the moment where the pro communist Russian military wanted to stage a coup, went out of the parliament and stood on a tank. And that moment made it right. And this was a moment that could have turned him into something much bigger, but it actually basically ended up supporting an aggressor. I mean, look, one thing I know is that at this moment, this second in Iran, anger at Israel is running at fever pitch. You cannot have pictures with Didi Netanyahu not denouncing his attack and also expecting that you could become your popularity in Iran would increase.

[Naeem Arza]

Right, that makes sense. So let's talk about this idea of regime change. I mean, you're kind of saying you can't have regime change without a ground war.

[Vali Nasr]

Well, regime change, Naima, is hope. It's not a policy. It only becomes a policy if you can implement, and you can only implement it if you actually have the muscle to do it. So we had regime change in Baghdad and in Kabul, in Berlin at one point, in Tokyo at one point. Or the British had it in Iran in 1941. But each time it was after occupation, which you had a troops that could basically enforce regime change. Otherwise you could stand back and say, I hope that this war will topple Khamenei. I hope that Iranian people will do X, Y and Z. But this is hope. This is not a policy.

[Naeem Arza]

But if it were to become the policy, what would be the right analogy for regime change in Iran? You just talked about a couple that have Iraq, where it changed. It took a ground war, took ton of intel. Afghanistan, Kabul. You're right, there was regime change and then there wasn't. The Taliban's back in power 20 years later. Deja vu. You know, they wish they could go back to the old guy. They were hoping Sayf Al Islam could run for office. They could have him in. And Egypt, they went back to Mubarak. If there is regime change, will there always be a lust for this ayatollah who you've said is the third longest serving to date.

[Vali Nasr]

Well, it depends. I mean, it's kind of like the lust for Stalin. When Putin became president and all of a sudden Stalin looked like a hero to Russia. They didn't live to. They hadn't lived under him, they had no notion about him. Yeah, I mean, you could have this kind of historical revisionism in the minds of a population depending on where they are. But the reality is there's also other kinds of regime changes. The way regime changed in China, there's a way that the regime changed in the Soviet Union, which is more regime transition from where it is to somewhere different. But it's not with the personnel that you parachute from the outside. Same people. I mean, still the Communist Party that rules China, we had good times with them. Now we're not having so good times with them. But it's basically the same people who used to work for Mao, came out and wore suits, parked their bicycle somewhere else, bought cars, started getting engaged with the world. The same thing. Everybody in Russia, Yeltsin, Putin, they all came out of the old system. It's not like the Romanovs went back to, to Russia. So something like that could happen in Iran. But that's not the way we're thinking about it. We're thinking about something radically, radically different. Which then raises the issue, yes, you can give money to exiles, you could spend money on uprisings, et cetera, but first of all, you don't know the outcome. Secondly, you may not like the outcome. Like right now, you need a nuclear deal. Same thing with Obama. You want to put your hands on that 400 kilograms of enriched uranium. You want to make sure that there's nothing else. You need to have a government that actually you need to make this deal with. If you go down the path of undermining the government that you're going to be dealing with, it's counterproductive in that sense.

[Naeem Arza]

And actually, I mean, I think about this a lot. In some ways, the least democratic thing, what you're talking about, this regime transition, not regime change, is organic. It's often domestic. It comes from the country itself. And I've often thought that the most undemocratic kind of result you can have is an imposed democracy, a democracy imposed by a foreign nation.

[Vali Nasr]

Actually, ironically, Iran is the best case for this. And where the United States could have helped, even in 2015, and even now, it's actually opened up. You have this massive middle class, business class, which is highly digital, who's highly educated. You need to empower them. You cannot empower them by impoverishing the country and close them off. The more they are integrated into the world economy, the larger their influence, the more they will have the power to change the state. In other words, our policies, we want them miracle in Iran that somehow this government would evaporate and something else takes its place. But in reality, every successful velvet revolution that we've had has been accompanied with globalization. When economies of countries integrated into the world economy, the middle classes became wealthier, they became a bigger voice, they had a vested interest in relations with the rest of the world, and they gradually sidelined those who said no.

[Naeem Arza]

Right. This actually makes me think about your penultimate book. I'm reading your book the Grand Strategy now. I just almost finished it in time for our interview. But I did read your book that was published, I think, 10, 12 years ago called the Dispensable Nation. And you talk about American foreign policy and retreat, I think is the subtitle of it that. That is such a powerful subtitle. I mean, I think about growing up in the 90s abroad and America having such a soft power. And, you know, I have an American passport, was born in America, and so I felt that soft power. And now when I'm outside of the US Right now, I certainly haven't felt it. I haven't felt it probably since the Iraq War is really when that decline started. Is American foreign policy in retreat right now? Is it back up under Trump? What's happening?

[Vali Nasr]

Well, it's difficult to characterize it. I mean, it's definitely changing in a big way. It's in retreat in the sense that maybe in a good way, it's in retreat that we're not trying to shape the world everywhere anyhow, preaching to countries that you must become this and that. So in some ways, I think people around the world will be more comfortable that the relationship with America is not always about changing your culture and changing your women and changing your men and changing your education. And that level of it was actually also was problematic. So to the extent that we're not doing that, we are retreating. When Trump says, I don't want to change governments here and there, there's a problem I have with him. I want to talk to him about that. I want to deal with that. In other words, give up your nukes. I don't care what your government is with the Taliban. You do this one that I don't care what your issues are. In a way, that's a retreat because we're used to an American foreign policy that is like a Spectrum. You start with heart issues and you just keep going. It starts with something, then it ends up with, why are your women wearing a scarf? And, you know, why aren't you doing this? Like you would tell them, they would say, why aren't you democratic? We have democracy.

[Naeem Arza]

Yeah. This infusion of liberal values into the aid packages or the strategic settlement. Right.

[Vali Nasr]

So we've backed away from that. Right.

[Naeem Arza]

So, yeah, I mean, they're literally defunding a lot of these programs.

[Vali Nasr]

So, yes, we backed away from economic development, we backed away from soft power. So, yes, you could say that we are in retreat. We have a set of issues that we want to address, and those in President Trump's mind is often transactional. He wants to withdraw from Europe in large ways, from engagement with European Union, trade engagement, economic integration, NATO. He wants to withdraw from the kind of integration we have with China. He wants to withdraw from that. So, yes, we are in retreat. And actually, this time, the American foreign policy establishment is very, very unhappy with that. They call it either isolationist, transactional, and. Yes, and there are a lot of faults with it.

[Naeem Arza]

By that, you mean by the foreign policy establishment, you're not talking about Marco Rubio and Pete Seth. You're talking about the Council on Foreign Relations and these kinds of organizations.

[Vali Nasr]

It's the intellectual parts of it, it's the political class, but it is also senators and congressmen, et cetera. I mean, after all, American foreign policy since World War I, since World War II, has grown up on a basis of a set of assumptions about America in the war. These have to do with American leadership, with the importance of alliances with America's soft power, with promotion of democracy. All of these things have been embedded in. Yeah.

[Naeem Arza]

Doesn't it, though, like, mean that this. Can you. The title of your book was the Dispensable American Foreign Policy and Retreat. In this case, the kind of retreat you're talking about could make America more powerful, more open for business with other countries, more indispensable under the Trump foreign policy.

[Vali Nasr]

I think when the term America being an indispensable nation was used by Madden Albright to say that we're absolutely essential for maintenance of world order, that there's no. The world order would fall apart without us. We're the backbone of its economy. We're the backbone of peace and security. The Europeans need us, the Asian need us. We're the one who are basically providing this global public good, which is peace and stability and prosperity, and we're indispensable to that. Right. So there's not Going to be any peace without us. There's not going to be any war without us. Obama began backing away from that, I mean, especially in the Middle east, saying, look, we have no business. Saudi Arabia and Iran figure it out on their own.

[Naeem Arza]

Yeah, there's a red line. There's not a red line.

[Vali Nasr]

There's not a red line. And actually, you know what, he said it to the Atlantic or New Republic that, you know, yeah, tens of thousands of people are dying in Syria, but tens of thousands of people are dying in the Congo. We don't have a dog in the fight in Syria. Right. In a way, I'm limiting the size of the public good that we're offering. Yeah. Now, the argument that Obama was making, we got to pivot to Asia because most of the world GDP is created in Asia and we should be. There is an argument that Trump is also making, except he's putting it in a very different language. And I use that title because I wanted to bring home the fact that Obama appears to be part of the same fabric of foreign policy in America. These people are the same people, but this is different from what Matthew Albright was saying. He doesn't want to be the indispensable nation. He's not going to go prevent genocide in Syria or he's not going to stop the civil war. And he doesn't want to get involved here and there. And to that extent, it's the same with Trump.

[Naeem Arza]

It's the same there. Okay, two last questions. One, fast forward 10 years. What's your prediction for the dispensability or the indispensability of the United States and for nuclear weapons proliferating in Iran and maybe other countries as a consequence of this?

[Vali Nasr]

What happened really worries me. In fact, when Israel attacked Iran, the former head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, who's a very well known Egyptian diplomat, said that with this act of unprovoked aggression, as he called it, that the non Proliferation Treaty is dead. Every country in the world will think that there is no international rules. If a country like Israel feels comfortable to attack you, others can attack you, et cetera, and everybody wants to become nuclear. I think it's very easy to sort of say, okay, Iran is a bad actor. You could justify attacking it. But most countries of the world are not hung up on whether Iran deserved to be attacked or not. They're hung up on the fact that Israel could do so with impunity and with great confidence and that the international community, Europe and the United States and United nations, won't condemn it. And then the United States also joined it. And no country can basically prevent what happened to Iran unless they're nuclear. Then in a situation of law of the jungle, where the powerful can dominate and dictate to the weaker, the only. The only weapon that we can have at this point in time is really nuclear weapons. And so I do think that that is in danger.

[Naeem Arza]

What becomes indispensable is. Is nuclear weaponry.

[Vali Nasr]

Right.

[Naeem Arza]

I end every episode asking my guests something that they are dumb about. Some question that you've had that you have been afraid, perhaps Dr. Nasser, of asking out loud.

[Vali Nasr]

I have many questions like that. I mean, the interesting question to me is, is, you know, with all the conversation about AI and I'm particularly intrigued about why people are afraid of it for reasons that they say they're afraid of it, that why do they think that human beings will become dispensable, will become irrelevant. And if we become irrelevant, then what happens to us? The real question, let me put it this way, is what do irrelevant people do? That's actually more interesting to me, you know? Yes. What do 9 billion irrelevant people who have nothing to do do?

[Naeem Arza]

I feel like at times in my life I've been irrelevant. And I found it really exciting to be watching Netflix and going to the gym a lot. But, yes, what do r9 would be

[Vali Nasr]

relevant, which is they would actually have to run the gym. But to me, it's not so much like that AI will do this and that, but actually, what do humans do?

[Naeem Arza]

Yeah. You know who would be good to answer this question is someone like Brad Stolzberger. Stalberger, I think is his name. He's the motivation coach and kind of thinks a lot about athletes and motivation. I think he would be the person to ask this question.

[Vali Nasr]

Yeah.

[Naeem Arza]

But first we have to find out if we're going to be irrelevant. I think both questions are important.

[Vali Nasr]

Yep. And then the other question is, how do you entertain 9 billion irrelevant people?

[Naeem Arza]

Well, you have certainly entertained me, so thank you so much. Valiant. You are certainly not irrelevant right now. Nor is your book Iran's Grand Strategy, nor your past book, the Dispensable Nation, which I hope you'll update. I hope you'll do a second edition of that.

[Vali Nasr]

Actually, you gave me a chore to do. That's great to. That's great. I took something much more solid out of this conversation.

[Naeem Arza]

Call your editor at Princeton Press.

[Vali Nasr]

Excellent. Thanks so much for inviting me.

[Naeem Arza]

You know, human irrelevance sounds kind of nice right now. Instead, we're just driving towards war in the Middle East. But I so appreciate that conversation with Vali Nasser. I think he's excellent at just unpacking, explaining, fielding any question. I encourage you to check out how his perspective has evolved since this is a nine month old conversation, at least if I'm doing my math right. So definitely check out his most recent writings. Check out the interview he just gave to Fried Zakaria. You should check out all the major news that's happening in the region and I want to hear what you think of American foreign policy and where the world is going and where America's role in it is. You can send us an email you can slide into our DMs. You can call us at 1-855-MYDUMBQ I love hearing from you guys and yeah, I wanna know if you should think I should cover more foreign policy on this show. But I for one was really moved by Prime Minister Mark Carney's speech, the Canadian Prime Minister's speech at Davos this year. And I've been thinking a lot about how the World Order, which I grew up in and which my father worked in for so long, sits today. That is a big question which maybe links back to some of the questions that Vali Nasser had about irrelevance. That's it for this episode of Smart Girl Dumb Questions. We'll be back in a couple of days with an all new Smart Girl Dumb Questions for this week. And it's not going to be about war, it's going to be about the weather, that great unifying thing. Because you know, we need a little bit of break from the news. I'm your host. Name Raza. This episode was produced with Noah Friedman. It was edited by Colin Bryant Wallace and Dana Balute. Thank you guys for being here. I'll see you in a couple of days on Smart Girl Dumb Questions and hopefully it will be 82 and sunny and peaceful. Bye.

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[Naeem Arza]

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[Vali Nasr]

And breathe.

[Naeem Arza]

Oh, sorry. I almost couldn't breathe when I saw the discount they gave me on my first order. Oh, sorry. Namaste. Visit 1-800-contacts.com today to save on your first order, 1-800-contacts.