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- [00:00]
A
Jesse I'm Jesse Thorne. Lakeith Stanfield is starring in another Bonkers Boots Riley movie. Is it really that bonkers if you think about it? You know, I think it's a matter of perspective because I often view the world we live in as wacky, fantastical and beyond belief. That's on Bullseye. Find us in the NPR app@maximumfun.org or wherever you get your podcasts. There was never a day where I said I have some extra time left over to be Secretary of State. Never once.
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Jake's Sullivan spent four years as National Security Advisor to President Biden. He has thoughts on the wisdom of his successor, Marco Rubio, trying to do that job, plus another big one on top. This is Sources and Methods from npr. I'm Mary Louise Kelly. Jake Sullivan left the White House, left government service in January last year. Today he serves as the Kissinger professor of the Practice of Statecraft and World Order at Harvard's Kennedy School. And when I pointed out that Henry Kissinger himself had managed to serve simultaneously as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, Sullivan replied, different era. Jake Sullivan and I sat down a few days ago before a live audience at the 2026 WBUR Festival for a wide ranging chat about life as a former national security advisor. We also talked Iran, China, Ukraine, Cuba, Afghanistan and more. This is the first of two special episodes we're dropping in your feed this week while I am off watching my son graduate from college. Shout out and thank you to my colleague Scott Detrow for holding down the fort. He will be here with you for your regular Thursday episode and I'll be back at it next week. Here is my full conversation with Jake Sullivan. The last time I sat down to interview you, it was an exit interview. It was like a year and a half ago. You were leaving the White House and I was asking what you had planned. And your top priority, sleep. How's that going?
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A
Not as good as I hoped because of the state of the world and just watching everything unfold. And also because one thing I didn't fully account for when I left the job is the job really affects your basic wiring. It does something to your chemistry. And even after at this point, I've been gone for 16, 17 months and I still, when I see an event, you know, for example, a Russian drone just hit an apartment building in Romania and immediately my wiring starts vibrating, going something, you have to do something. And then I realize, oh, I can't do anything. But nonetheless, it has not allowed me to shift into relaxation mode.
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B
I wonder the kind of old thing, conventional thinking about jet lag was that it's going to take you an hour for every hour that you are moving. It's gonna take you that many nights to catch up. So if you're going to London and it's five hours ahead, it's gonna be five days before you're truly on that time. Do you think it's like corresponding month for month?
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Yeah, maybe. Yeah. I've got a couple more years to go here.
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B
How do you get your news these days? You used to get the pdb, the President's Daily Brief delivered to your desk. That's I assume how you were learning a lot of like that a Russian drone just hit there is a right answer because we're sitting on a WBUR stage, right. How do you get your news?
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A
Public radio? No, this is actually it's an insightful question because when you operate in the National Security Council, in the White House, the information flow to you is overwhelming. But it's also incredibly reliable in the sense that every hour of every day you are getting the latest up to date feed coming in from the situation Room, from the National Military Command center, from the State Department operations center and you're sitting at the end of this funnel of news flowing into you. When you're out, it's like no, you're logging onto the Internet and going out and looking for all of that news. And of course NPR is a favorite source. But I have now a method of looking at literally dozens of different news websites which themselves have all gotten into the habit of doing a lot of updating, just rapid updating. And then I actually read a ton of substacks which those substacks then point me to sources in particular areas more like trade press, say for example in the AI space or semiconductors or industrial strategy or whatever. So then I do a lot of trade, trade press reading to stay up to date on things that aren't top of the headline news. But it's an evolving thing. I do less on now following Twitter or X or whatever you call it. But still that is a place to get breaking news in particular. So some of that, but not as much as I used to.
- [05:15]
B
We are going to take your questions. Let me just flag that you have the app and if you want to submit, I have got a handy iPad here and I'm going to be checking as we go. So if you see me looking down, that's what I'm looking at. See your questions coming in. I may stack some for the end but if you have something about something we're talking about right now. Send me a question. I'll do my best to work it in, but I want to start just doing a little bit of a hopscotch around the globe. Some of the issues that are very much in the headlines right now and how they may look different now that you are outside the White House in the SITUATION Room. I'll start with the obvious one, Iran. What has the war achieved for Iran? Well, you can start there. Is that an easier question than what
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A
it's achieved for the US but if you take a step back, before President Trump launched this war in February of this year, Iran's regime was under immense pressure from its own people and under immense pressure economically. Iran was prepared to come to the nuclear table and negotiate a nuclear deal. And in fact, in the weeks leading up to the start of the bombing, they were putting proposals on the table that actually look more forward leaning than what we're seeing now in some ways. And the Strait of Hormuz was open. Now today the Strait of Hormuz is closed. The nuclear deal seems to be getting further away, not closer. You have the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps even more hardline regime in place and frankly, seemingly solidly in place. And so I think we are in an extremely difficult spot.
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B
Has the US Gained anything?
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A
It's hard to see right at the moment what we've gained. Now if we can get the strait back open and if we can get a nuclear deal, that would be good to have the strait open. But remember, it was open before this started. So that's be back to the status quo. And by the way, it probably won't even be back to the status quo because from a de facto control perspective, Iran will have shown that it can hold this strait at risk. So almost by definition that's a net loss. We could eventually get to a nuclear deal. That nuclear deal is going to look a lot like the deal that President Obama, John Kerry, Wendy Sherman and people like me negotiated years ago that Donald Trump pulled out of. And we'll be back to something like that having paid all of these costs when we never had to pull out in the first place. So it's hard to see how you can have a credible, objective net assessment of this circumstance and see how the US Comes out in a better position than we went into this.
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B
While we're on Iran and the nuclear issue, I'm going to work in one of your questions. Thank you for sending them. Please keep it up. Chloe Kraft would like to ask in 2021, you said you were briefed that Iran had no nuclear capability. How has your belief in that shifted since? How does it play into current negotiations?
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A
Well, I guess what we were briefed. What has been the US intelligence community assessment since 2007 in the Bush administration, is that Iran has not made a decision, a strategic decision, to build a nuclear bomb that is different from pursuing nuclear capability, which, of course, they've been doing for decades. And they've been trying to build out their enrichment capability, among other things. But that has been both to get leverage against the United States and to get an option to build a bomb in the future if they chose to do so. But they had not chosen to do so when we entered office. They had not chosen to do so when we left office. Now, the question is, after multiple rounds of military action, are they more likely to want to choose to go for a bomb in the future than they were in the past? And there's a lot of credit because
- [09:20]
B
it would be the only way they could avoid a repeat, rinse and repeat cycle of this and the US And Israel potentially coming back.
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A
Yeah. They may say, look, we gotta get a nuke so we stop getting bombed. On the other hand, they may say we have this other method of deterring the US Israel and others, which is the Strait of Hormuz. And they may decide that is their best way forward, holding that at risk in the future. But I do think when the Trump administration and Israel took out the supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, he had essentially a policy that said, we're not going to build a bomb. We're going to try to get to the threshold of it. We're going to try to get the option of it, we're going to try to get the leverage of it, but we're not formally going to go actually build a bomb. That was his policy. And that's how the intelligence community of the United States assess things. Well, he's gone now. So is that going to be the policy of the new guy, his son? And the hardliner is. We don't know.
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B
We don't know because he hasn't appeared.
- [10:19]
A
Yeah. And we don't know to what extent it's going to be the Revolutionary Guard hardliners making that call. And some of those Revolutionary Guard hardliners have for years argued Iran should go for a bomb. And their voices now seem to be ascendant.
- [10:32]
B
So understanding it sounds like, in your view, fair to say you're not a fan of this war and the way that it was conducted, launched and where we are. However, we are where we are. If you were back in your old office, what would be your counsel to get the US out of this? How does this end?
- [10:52]
A
You know, it's interesting. I was talking to a senior former US Military official who's worked on Middle east issues over multiple administrations. It's now out of government. And I said, if you were in there with President Trump, do you think there is a military solution to get us out of this for the finish the job crowd? Is there a way the US Military could go in and just do something that opens the strait deals with Iran's nuclear program and all the rest? And he basically said, no, we have to essentially regroup by doing a near term deal along the lines of what's been reported, even though it's incredibly thin. And then from that position, try to eventually, over time, get ourselves into a better spot strategically than we're in now. So I would probably tell the president, as bad as I think the option of the current framework is, it's better than just letting this drag or even worse, escalating militarily into a further dead end with more loss of life, more damage, more destruction. So I would say do a deal. We shouldn't have been in this place in the first place. Do it. And then we figure it out from there.
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B
What is your sense of how much sway Benjamin NETanyahu has over US policy toward Iran and the broader Middle East? To what extent is President Trump influenced by.
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A
Well, there was a remarkable New York Times story that went into great detail about the start of this war and how the prime minister went into the Situation Room, which is very unusual. I'd not heard of anything like that before, a foreign leader to lay out the case for why to do it. And so I think that the persuasion and the influence at the front end of this to get the war going was significant. I think now today, President Trump is probably less, you know, focused on precisely what Israel wants than him sitting there thinking, I'm in a bit of a bind here. How the heck do I get out of it? What are my ways out of it? And it looks like he may be heading towards a deal that I think Israel will not like.
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B
Let's take a break. When we come back, we continue our journey around the globe. Cuba, Ukraine and Greenland. That's coming up on Sources and Methods from npr. We'll be right back. Cuba. President Trump is hinting strongly at military action in Cuba. He says, and I'm quoting, this was May 21st in the Oval. Other presidents have looked at this at intervening for 50 years, 60 years looked at doing something and it looks like I'll be the one that does it. First question on this, when he, Trump says other presidents have looked at this.
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A
Did President Biden look at this at invading Cuba? He did not. No. By the way, he said the same thing about Iran. He said for 47 years going back to 1979, every president has looked at this and I'm the one who's going to do it. Well, how did that turn out? Because previous presidents looked at the question of taking military action against Iran directly, striking them, and said, you know what might happen if we do that? They may close the Strait of Hormuz and all the rest of it, and chose not to. But on the Cuba piece, no, because I think we really have to ask ourselves, when we use military force, is there a direct threat to the United States? Is military force the only way to deal with any threat that does exist? And does it have the informed consent of the American people? And I think the answer to all three of those questions is no. So to me, the idea that we would start bombing Cuba is, is outside the bounds of serious statecraft.
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B
What if it's not bombing Cuba? What if it's going in doing a Venezuela style? Just stay with me. Extracting Raul Castro, bringing him to the US and hoping that a Delsey Rodriguez like character will emerge.
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A
And what is the end goal of that?
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B
That's my question.
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A
Yeah, I mean, this is the problem is, is President Trump has been very straightforward about his end goal in Venezuela. Get a compliant dictator who helps us and especially his friends get access to the oil. Okay, I don't agree with that objective, but at least I can coherently understand it. Okay, you go get Raul Castro or you go get President Diaz Canel and someone else comes in Cuba. Is the lives of the Cuban people getting better as a result of that? Is some threat to the United States getting alleviated as a result of that? Is some interest of the United States being vindicated? I do not see any of that. And so from my perspective, the best way to actually help the Cuban people over the long term is to work to try to open up Cuba, not to blockade it. And you know, as far as I'm concerned, the current strategy is likely to end in something that actually does involve a degree of escalation, potentially even military escalation. And I don't think anyone is going to end up better off as a result of that.
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B
So to the why and the why now question, neither of us are inside Donald Trump's Head or Marco Rubio's head, who appears to be wielding considerable sway here. But it's not like US Policy toward Cuba was in great shape under any past administration. You can argue with me if you want, but you know, no American president has figured out. Going back to jfk, what is your best sense of why the sudden urgency around Cuba?
- [16:50]
A
Look, it's difficult to put myself in the mind of Donald Trump. I think it is for most of us. But I do think I perceive one thing that is going on here is it is frequently the case that second term presidents do turn more to foreign policy and certainly turn more to questions of leg. And there was an interesting Atlantic piece not too long ago that said that President Trump is now starting to compare himself not just to past presidents, but to past figures like Alexander the Great and Napoleon. Okay. I think there is a certain sense in which he thinks 47 years in Iran, I'm going to solve the problem. You know, since 1959, 61 in Cuba, I'm going to solve the problem problem. I'm going to enlarge the territory of the United States, whether it's Canada or Greenland or the Panama Canal or all of them. I'm going to win the Nobel Peace Prize. It has been a through line of this presidency, this constellation of things. And I think it all plays to a certain view of his place in history. And what's interesting about it is it is so at odds with the argument he made to the American people about why he should be reelected. It's like the literal opposite of the argument.
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B
But I think that's getting us out of.
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A
I think that's what's going on. And then on top of that, you have a Secretary of State and National Security Advisor who cares passionately about this issue, Cuba. And frankly, one can look at Venezuela and see it as essentially the opening act to the main event, with the main event being Cuba. First, take away the oil pipeline, not literal pipeline, but the flow of energy from Venezuela to Cuba. Take away the client in Maduro. Next, go right at Cuba. And I think Marco Rubio has a lot to do with that.
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B
Ukraine, we are now at four plus years of all out war. I referenced the exit interview I did with you when you were stepping down as National Security Advisor. And I remember you told me what has so far proven true. This war is not going to end on the battlefield. It will only end with a deal, a diplomatic deal. And you were kind of upbeat about that because you said, look, Donald Trump likes making deals. This could work. Why has he been unable to get one on Ukraine.
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A
Honestly, I think the biggest reason he's been unable to get one is because from the beginning, he has misdiagnosed the war in two fundamental respects. First, he believes that it is Ukraine, not Russia, that is the main obstacle to a just peace, and that is 180 degrees wrong. And second, he has believed that by engaging Putin, both personally and through his team, he would reason him around to a better position as opposed to really increasing the pressure on Putin and the support for Ukraine that would force Putin's hand at the negotiating table. And I think for those two reasons, we find ourselves in a circumstance where a deal is not close at hand. But I still believe that the fundamental objective is to put Ukraine in as strong a position as possible on the battlefield so that they are in a strong position, a position as possible at the negotiating table. That was true two years ago. It is true today.
- [20:28]
B
Yeah. You also told me that if the only way out for Ukraine and ending that war is getting a deal, that you hoped that the then incoming Trump administration wouldn't pull the rug out from under Ukraine right from the get go, because that was going to make it that much tougher. With that in mind, that image of pulling the rug out from under Ukraine, what went through your mind as you watched President Zelensky at the White House in February of last year in a shouting match with Trump and Jay Gantz?
- [21:02]
A
It was a really, just genuinely astonishing moment, and I think so difficult for anyone to watch this courageous leader of an embattled democracy facing brutal invasion from an authoritarian aggressor, trying to stand up in the face of that for Ukraine's freedom and for the broader defense of the west, and to have the president turn to him and basically say, you don't have the cards. You're the problem. You have to give in. I thought it was an absolutely terrible moment. It also was a signal moment for a lot of people around the world to say something is off here with the way the United States is operating. And I think it had a reverberating effect, especially in Europe. And what's been interesting is that Ukraine has had to deal with a massive reduction in American support across every dimension in this war. And yet, month by month, they have simply increased their own capabilities, including their technological capabilities. And it has allowed them to actually enhance in the last few months their position on the battlefield, to push back against the Russians, to hold at risk a lot of the things that Putin holds dear. And the net result of all of that is they are now standing on their own two feet to a much greater extent, even without the support of the United States.
- [22:30]
B
While we're on Europe, we have a question coming in from the audience. Bobby Frazier would like to know. Sorry, hold on. I just lost the question. It's disappeared from my screen. But, Bobby, if this was not your question, forgive me, but someone out there would like to know what's with the fixation on Greenland?
- [22:52]
A
So the President has a picture of James K. Polk in his office. James K. Polk was the president who expanded American territory through the Mexican American War. And I think President Trump believes that a way to etch yourself into history as an American president is to add to the overall territory, to expand, enlarge the territory of America. And as a real estate guy, he thinks in terms of real estate, and I genuinely believe he looks at a map. And the map that you look at is a Mercator projection. So Greenland is especially big on that map. It's out of.
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B
It is big, to be fair.
- [23:34]
A
It is big, to be fair, but on the map, it looks a lot bigger than it actually is. And he looks at that and is like, that would be an incredible piece of real estate. And anyone who's played the game risk, Greenland is a great piece of real estate. Right. So I say all that a bit lightly, but this is actually really, really deadly serious, because this is the President of the United States saying we may potentially invade the sovereign territory of an ally Denmark is in association with, under the broad sovereignty of Denmark. Denmark is one of the best American allies we have had in recent decades, as you know well from having traveled the world and dealt with all the conflicts and initiatives in which Denmark has stepped up. And I think we underestimate just the sheer depth of feeling, not just in Denmark, but across Europe, about how offensive this is that we are pressing on this point, particularly since the Danes have said, whatever you need, if you need more military bases, if you need access to critical minerals, if you need us to work on the threat from Russia and China, we're ready to do it. But, no, we're not prepared to just hand over our territory to you.
- [24:46]
B
Yeah. This is a question coming in from Jeremy. Given your experience as National Security Advisor, can one effectively serve in that post while simultaneously serving as Secretary of State?
- [25:05]
A
Well, so I will tell you that I served four years as National Security Advisor. There was never a day where I said, I have some extra time left over to be Secretary of State. I wish I could just add that to my Never once. Basically, the answer is no. In today's era in particular, if you think about what national security is, it's not just the traditional hard power issues or even traditional diplomacy. It's supply chain resilience. It's the impacts of artificial intelligence. It's building America's industrial might in the frontier industries of the future. It's how we effectively deal with development and humanitarian aid around the world. It's economic statecraft of all different kinds, from sanctions to commercial diplomacy. The person in the role of national security advisor has to coordinate all of that. And that means every agency of the U.S. government, from the Ag Department to the Defense Department to the Commerce Department, you name it. And so that role is so distinct and simply can't be filled by the same person who's America's chief diplomat. And I think it's a challenge that right now both jobs are being filled
- [26:29]
B
by a single person and you are speaking with your hat on as the inaugural Harvard Kennedy School professor of Kissinger professor of the Practice of State Craft.
- [26:40]
A
Yeah, he did it.
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B
Could Kissinger do it now?
- [26:42]
A
So no different. I mean, just a completely different era where that whole set of things I just laid out, what comes across the national Security advisor's desk is just, it's so profoundly different. And that's particularly true at a moment when economics and national security and technology and national security have intersected in such dramatic ways.
- [27:05]
B
Time for our last break. When we return, China, the ongoing US Responsibility to Afghanistan, plus what is bringing Jake Sullivan hope these days. That's ahead on Sources and Methods from npr. We'll be right back. Let me see if we can get to a couple more places. China, and let me focus you on China and AI. Is there room for two superpowers to play in that sandbox?
- [27:38]
A
Yes, because that's what's happening. I mean, this is not do I believe in it? I'm seeing it right every day. China has made significant progress at the frontier of artificial intelligence. The United States has made even more progress. We're ahead at the frontier. And I think we can continue to lead and grow, grow our lead, especially given our massive advantage in computing power. China also is putting a huge priority on deploying artificial intelligence in its economy, in its military, and in other dimensions of its national policy. And so both China and the United States will be significant players on artificial intelligence. And one of the interesting things that came out of the summit between President Trump and President Xi in Beijing a couple of weeks ago, which didn't get a lot of attention, was a statement on each side, somewhat lacking in detail but pretty clear that they are talking about having a dialogue and diplomacy on the risks of artificial intelligence. I think this would be a very good thing. I think the US And China have to do this. It has to be properly scoped with the right agenda and the right people at the table. But the US And China have a responsibility to each other and to the world to sit down and talk about the growing risk that AI poses from cyber to bio to ultimately, over time, the potential for scenarios where we even lose control of a technology we don't fully understand.
- [29:06]
B
The broader US China relationship beyond AI. Anonymous has sent a question. Thank you, Anonymous. You may all claim credit for this one. What do you make of the US Relationship with China? China is no longer identified in current national security policy as an enemy state. I didn't know that.
- [29:24]
A
Well, it's not an enemy state. We didn't define it as an enemy state. What we defined it as, which honestly the first Trump administration also defined it as, was a strategic competitor. Intense competition across multiple dimensions. Technology, economics, geopolitics, you name it. China is seeking to surpass the United States as the world's leading economic, technological, diplomatic, and military power. And there is a competition underway, given that fact. But at the same time, China isn't going anywhere. So we have to learn to live alongside one another's major powers, which means managing that competition so it doesn't tip into conflict. Now, the Trump administration has decided to accept a formula that China put forward at this summit, which was something like a constructive partnership of strategic stability. Why does China want a formula more like that that de emphasizes competition and emphasizes stability? Because the Chinese leadership believes fundamentally that America is in decline and China is inexorably on the rise. And so their view is, if we can just keep America calm, keep things stable while these forces take shape, we can pass them with a minimum degree of friction. I think the United States needs to compete vigorously. We need to step up our game in a bunch of different areas, but we need to do so in a way that is careful and that also involves deep diplomacy with China and does not see them as an enemy, but as the complex player on the world stage that they are.
- [31:05]
B
Name one. What's one example of where we should step up our game that wouldn't obviously come to mind?
- [31:10]
A
Well, I'll give you two examples. So, one, in the Biden administration, we imposed a series of export controls on advanced semiconductors and the equipment that makes those semiconductors. The Trump administration is not fully enforcing that, not updating it, and in some cases, relaxing it. I Think that's a huge error. We should not be letting China use our technology to gain an advantage over us and our allies. A second area is that China is investing massively in the frontier industries of the future. Clean energy, biotechnology, robotics, quantum. And the United States is doing better in some of those areas worse than others. But we are not pulling with every muscle in our being to maintain the cutting edge, not just in inventing the technologies of the future, but building them at speed and scale. And the only way we can do that effectively is with allies. And so part of competing well is cultivating your alliances and not seeking direct them.
- [32:14]
B
One more this is. I could talk to you all day and we would do the whole globe. But there's one country I want to be intentional about raising because it has fallen out of the headlines, and that is Afghanistan. And I'm asking you, Jake, about it specifically because the chaotic, messy, deadly US Withdrawal from Afghanistan after two decades came on President Biden's watch. Your watch. What Is the ongoing U.S. responsibility to that country?
- [32:48]
A
I think we have two deep responsibilities. One is to continue to provide the full spectrum of humanitarian development assistance to help alleviate the suffering of the people of that country. And we did that through the Biden administration. The Trump administration administration has basically cut that off. And the second is to continue.
- [33:07]
B
Sorry to interrupt, but is there even a channel to do that with the current Taliban leadership?
- [33:11]
A
I think you can't. We didn't do it directly through the Taliban. We did it through NGOs, through UN organizations. Now, does the Taliban touch that in some way? Because they're the government. They do. But I think you can do the maximum of support for the people with the minimum degree of Taliban at involvement and not take a purist approach because of the responsibility we have to provide for people. And the second thing that we have a responsibility to do is for those people who served alongside U.S. forces and NATO forces to give them an opportunity through after proper vetting to come to the United States. We did that not just during that withdrawal, but throughout the entire time of the Biden administration. And the Trump administration there, too, has cut that things off. But I will say that when President Biden made the wrenching decision to end America's involvement in Afghanistan, he just reached the conclusion that as much as he would have liked to have been able to stay and support the full range of human flourishing there, including women's rights, he was not prepared to have United States service members enter their, you know, third decade of war fighting and dying for that purpose. And he felt after 20 years, it was time to end America's longest war. And when he left office, he was the first president in the 21st century who left office with the United States not at war. And I think that's really important for us, even as we try to support Afghanistan in other ways that don't involve the continued deployment of thousands of American military personnel.
- [34:49]
B
Sorry I have to push you on that. He also left Afghanistan after two decades of the US fighting and spending blood and treasure in the service of taking out Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership and keeping them from coming back and spent 20 years fighting for peace and democracy in that country. And here you and I sit in 2026 and those guys are back.
- [35:15]
A
They're back. Now let's remember why we went to Afghanistan in the first place. We went because we were attacked on 9, 11 and we went to get the people who attacked us. And in 2011, based from Afghanistan, we took out Osama Bin Laden. And at that point we had degraded Al Qaeda to the point where it didn't represent the kind of threat to the United States. It was still a threat, but not the kind of threat it had been before. And President Obama said, we're going to start drawing down our forces. We'll be out by 2014, then 2015, then 2016, 2017. Throughout all that period, we had suppressed the threat from Al Qaeda to it being just a shadow of its former self. So the fundamental reason we went to Afghanistan was accomplished. Was accomplished. Now that does not for a moment mean that the deep human factor, the people who live in Afghanistan, who now suffer under the yoke of Taliban rule, especially women and girls, that that should not be a factor in US foreign policy. It should, but we have to ask the question is the way to try to support them basically an open ended war where we have the United States fighting there forever. President Biden just could not look the American people in the eye and say yes to that question.
- [36:40]
B
I have a nice small easy question. Start bringing us toward a close. Thank you again. Anonymous. There has been a lot of talk about the USA being a declining superpower. Anonymous Rights, how do you assess our position in the world order?
- [36:56]
A
You know, it's interesting, every few decades we get this story like America's a spent force. You know, there was a period when, when President Obama came into office in 2009, everyone was talking about how basically it was the end of America's, you know, ability to produce oil. And then fracking came along, right? And then all the talk through the late 2000 teens was you know, China's the technology power of the future, America's the past. Then America basically invents generative AI and pushes the frontier. Something like when I entered office in 2021, ChatGPT did not exist. Okay? No one had heard of OpenAI. Now look at it a few years later. I use those examples to say America always seems to find a way through reinvention, through entrepreneurship, through innovation, to continue to press the cutting edge and come up with solutions and answers that allow us to deliver for our people and for people everywhere. So I do not believe America is a spent force. I think our biggest challenge does not come from another country in the world. It just comes from ourselves and whether we can pull ourselves together into a cohesive form. Because if we do that, if we come together around a set of common purposes, there's no country on the planet that I think has the combination of attributes and capacities that the United States of America has.
- [38:33]
B
That's a really nice segue to my last question. With thanks to all of you that we didn't get to all of your questions. I'm going to exercise moderator prerogative and give myself the last one. If this is a softball, so be it. I tend to air these days on the side of giving people some hope to walk out the door because, Lord, do we need it. That's my question. What's giving you hope these days?
- [38:58]
A
Well, so I'm teaching and you asked this softball question and I'm going to give the what is technically a lame answer, but it's also a deeply true answer. Honestly, what gives me hope is I do think that we have younger people in this country, upcoming generations who are digital natives, are deeply connected to communities around this country and around the world, are deeply principled and are can do. And I think when you look at any classroom full of young people, whether it's high school, college, grad school, whatever, it's hard not to think, hey, this is going to all work out okay in the end.
- [39:39]
B
Jake Sullivan, this has been a pleasure. Thank you.
- [39:42]
A
Thank you.
- [39:44]
B
I'm Mary Louise Kelly. We are back with our regular episode on Thursday. Until then, thanks for listening to sources and methods from N.