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[00:02]
A
You're listening to the Cyberwire Network, powered by N2K.
[00:15]
B
Welcome to Spycast, the official podcast of the International Spy Museum. I'm your host, Sasha Ingber, and each week I take you into the shadows of espionage, intelligence, and covert operations across the globe. For decades, Cuban intelligence has been seen as a force that punches above its weight. Shaped during the Cold War through cooperation with the Soviet Union, its intelligence officers received extensive training by the kgb. But where does its spy service stand today, especially as it faces pressure from Washington? Retired FBI Special Agent Peter Lapp, who wrote Queen of Cuba, came in to discuss Havana's capabilities. The Americans who spied for Cuba and the Cubans who spied for us.
[01:14]
A
Welcome, Pete. Good to see you again.
[01:16]
C
It's always great to see you, Sasha. Thank you for having me. I appreciate it.
[01:20]
A
So let's get right down to it. What was it like being in the FBI working counterintelligence, going after the Cubans?
[01:29]
C
Surreal. And also kind of an experience where I didn't think that's what I was going to do in the FBI. My background was I was a cop outside of Philadelphia, and I was a criminal justice major. And I thought the FBI and its infinite wisdom would put me working the cool stuff, the gangs and drugs and homicides. And they said, no, you're going to work Cuban counterintelligence. I had no idea what that was and what that meant. And I. I could find Cuba on a map, barely. And that was about the extent of it. And I was. I say I was. When I got the assignment and got to the field office in D.C. in September of 1998, I was a little disgruntled, to be honest with you, because I thought I wasn't working the cool stuff yet. The cool stuff is what has me sitting down here today, because if I didn't work the Cubans, I wouldn't be here. So life works out the way it's supposed to.
[02:21]
A
Yeah. It was all really so that you could sit down with Spycast 100%. So what was the learning curve take us into? Just day to day? What it was like learning about what the Cubans were up to.
[02:34]
C
The Cubans are a lot different than China and Russia. You know, Cuba is a small intelligence service. It's not big, but it's mighty. They're always, in my opinion, accomplishing a lot more than their numbers in terms of how many people they have working for it. They've got a great ability to find individuals who aren't motivated by money and aren't Cuban by descent. But have this visceral empathy for what Cuba is trying to accomplish, whether it's in Latin America or throughout the rest of the world. So they have a unique way of operating. The difficult part of getting to understand the Cubans was really focusing, in my opinion, not on the day to day activity of the intelligence office we were following, but the. The UNSUB investigations, the unknown subjects, the people that were later identified as Animantis or the folks down in Miami. All of those cases were the core, in my opinion, part of the program, the Cuban program that required a lot of focus and creativity, luck in trying to find some of these individuals because those were the core individuals that were inside our government spying against us, trusted insiders, but who were actually loyal to the Cubans. That was the big learning curve that I had. And actually the real intriguing puzzle of trying to identify any one of these individuals, these unsubs, as we call them. And you know, with regards to Montes, we got. We got lucky with one and then subsequently several after that.
[04:02]
A
And you actually broke into her home here in Washington.
[04:06]
C
Legally, I had. We had a court order. I had to make sure that we, you know, got the legal part right.
[04:11]
A
But she didn't know you were doing it. Let's just say that she did not know that you were walking in that door. And she had spied for Cuba for 17 years. She was recruited as a student, rose to the top position as Cuba analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency. What was it like when you finally opened the door to her home?
[04:30]
C
Oh, oh, surreal. Like the cat burglar kind of thing. It was a pretty cool moment, I have to be honest with you. I had, as a police officer, I had done some things where you were potentially going to get shot. And the adrenaline and the exhilaration of that is pretty significant. But when you have the key and you're sneaking in, I felt the adrenaline even higher because the possibility of getting caught either by a neighborhood or, you know, she was in Miami at the time, and we had surveillance on her, so we knew she wasn't going to come home. But what if we put a book back the wrong way? And she knew that that book was in a certain way. So that kind of exhilaration, it was really pretty, pretty cool. And you're also not just going and sneaking around and just walking into her apartment. You're looking for elements of the intelligence craft that she was using and trying to prove that she was committing espionage.
[05:26]
A
And what did you see when you finally stepped in the door?
[05:29]
C
A lot of books. She was well read. And she wasn't getting paid for her espionage. So she lived pretty modestly. Although I will say it was a very nice co op building in Cleveland park in a very nice neighborhood, not too far from the National Zoo. So if you come visit the zoo, you could go see Anna Montes old home. But we spent a lot of time carefully, meticulously going through. We found her laptop computer under her bed the very first time we, we got into her apartment. And that was critical because we could prove that the Cubans had tasked her to purchase that exact computer. The irony is the computer should have been thrown in the bottom of the Potomac River. And if it had been, you're sitting down talking to somebody else today because she never would have went to prison.
[06:15]
A
What did you find on it and why do you think she hadn't thrown it out when she seemed to have been very careful?
[06:21]
C
She was incredibly careful. She thought that everything on that computer was deleted. The Cubans gave her, as part of her covert communication plan and system, they gave her a decryption encryption software and then they also gave her a wipe software. Whether she didn't apply the wipe software correctly or the Cubans, their software wasn't very good, I don't know. But there was 11 pages of Spanish text from her to the Cubans and from the Cubans to her. And in that we found the conspiracy to commit espionage. We found national defense information. We found classified information. We found a special access program that belonged to the National Reconnaissance Office, the NRO that operates all the spy satellites. And I call it the four sentences. Those four sentences could have been death penalty eligible evidence.
[07:19]
A
That is a very classified program that she got access to to this day.
[07:24]
C
To this day. Yeah.
[07:25]
A
Still hurting the nro.
[07:27]
C
Yeah, she was read into the program and just the telling her, telling the Cubans of the existence of the program was potentially death penalty eligible type evidence.
[07:37]
A
Now we're talking specifically about the Directorate of Intelligence, the di. They received training from the kgb. How did the service evolve after the fall of the Soviet Union? And are there aspects of Cuban tradecraft that other countries have copied?
[07:58]
C
The Cubans did get a leg up with the relationship they had with the Soviet Union and kgb. I think they've gone well beyond that partially because, you know, the FBI does the counterintelligence for the United States. In the United States as the lead. The Cuban Intelligence Service conducts counterintelligence on the island of Cuba against its own citizens like no other and isn't restricted by the privacy and the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment. That the United States has. That the FBI has to. So gets a lot of practice doing counterintelligence and intelligence against its own people. And. And in my opinion, it's what's helped the regime stay in power for now, almost 70 years or so. They do intelligence like no one else off the island in the United States and also in Cuba as well.
[08:50]
A
Can you talk to me about some of the defectors that you interviewed in the course of writing this book about Anna Montez? What did they tell you?
[08:59]
C
So I had a chance to talk to three different defectors, only one of whom I'd actually talked to previously as part of when I was at the FBI. Fascinating stories. And really, you get a good impression of. These were individuals that, when they worked in Cuba for the Cuban intelligence services, were treated very well as compared to your average Cuban. And these three individuals collectively just got really disgusted with the regime. The corruption within the Castro regime. Fidel, the way he lived, really started to disgust these individuals, and they started seeing through the veil of communism in the veil of. Of, you know, the regime and how that was so disgusting to them. So they started building grievances, and then, little by little, they would provide the US Intelligence community with information that ultimately helped us, you know, with punching back against the Cubans. And in a number of cases, one of them being obviously Montez, and one
[10:03]
A
of them actually had the opportunity to kill Fidel Castro. He had been a security officer who was traveling with Castro. Can you talk about more of that moment and why he ultimately didn't and whether he regretted it?
[10:19]
C
He was down that grievance road. He. He knew he was going to defect at some point in time. He was. I believe he was already working with US intelligence, and the Cubans gave him a Smith Wesson.45 caliber weapon to protect Fidel when Fidel went on a. Like, a state visit to another country. He told me the story where Fidel had his entire bedroom shipped to this place that he was staying at so that he could get a good night's sleep. His mattress, his sheets, the whole thing. And he was just disgusted with this. You know, your average Cuban is living in poverty, and Fidel needed his own bed and his will be and his, like, nightgown and all that kind of stuff. He had close access to Fidel every night. And he made the decision not to kill him because he knew that it would be essentially a death sentence for him. He told me, he said nothing would have changed. The regime would have stayed in power. And, you know, history kind of proved Him. Right. When Fidel retires and Raul Castro takes over, nothing changed. So we say these things like, why doesn't someone near this person just kill them? And it's like it's. There's a human being that would have to pull that trigger and potentially, you know, be a death sentence themselves.
[11:44]
A
Right. That's a sacrifice many would not be willing to make.
[11:49]
B
When we come back, we look at Kendall Myers and Manuel Rocha, two other US Government officials who spied for Cuba.
[12:08]
A
And what did they say about the Directorate of Intelligence in terms of putting together pieces of this picture of how Cuba's primary intelligence service operates?
[12:20]
C
All of them told us that, you know, the United States is their top priority. So if you flip that around for the United States, our top priority is China, you know, followed by Russia and followed by pretty much everyone else, whereas Cuba, the United States is their top priority. So all of their resources are against the United States. They focus on who makes the foreign policy for the U.S. government, and those are their top priors. Know, folks like Ambassador Rocha, folks like Kendall Myers were technically actually a higher priority.
[12:51]
A
And we're talking about the US Ambassador to Bolivia, Manuel Rocha, Kendall Myers, who worked at the State Department in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and both spied for Cuba, correct?
[13:04]
C
Correct. They would have been higher priorities for the Cuban intelligence service because their top priority is the White House, the Congress, and the State Department, the folks that make the foreign policy for the United States of America. So they gave us a lot of interesting information about where their priorities are, how they operate. You know, would they pay a source, or would they see that as, you know, being not really how their intelligence service operates. I mean, they're very frugal, but they also are very leery of a source. Like, on, if they were to walk in and say, I'll do this for a million dollars, like a Hanson or an Aldrich Ames, they would be very leery of that. You've got to have this visceral empathy with what Cuba is trying to accomplish.
[13:47]
A
So when we think about where we are today in May, CIA Director John Ratcliffe goes to the island and he actually meets with intelligence officials. What is the significance of that?
[14:02]
C
So it's interesting. I was thinking about that because, you know, former Director of Central Intelligence Bill Burns under the Biden administration did a lot of diplomatic type meetings involving Ukraine and Russia. So my sense is that, you know, with Secretary Rubio being a little busy with, you know, one of his two jobs, it made sense that the administration would send Ratcliffe to have this meeting. We know that the relationship with Cuba and Venezuela between both the governments and the intelligence services was very strong. So sending a strong message that we know that Cuban intelligence is very involved with the Cuban government sends a strong message to them. You know, I don't know if there's an intelligence message versus more of a diplomatic message, if you will. And I think that sending someone of that prominence sent a strong message probably to the Cubans that, you know, there's. There's a seriousness that this administration has with seeing change in Cuba.
[15:10]
A
So essentially a warning.
[15:11]
C
I would say a warning. Yeah, I would say a strong warning. And I think the other thing that was really interesting, the United States brought ahead of the military part of the law enforcement mission in venezuela that killed 32, I believe, Cuban military individuals who were supporting Venezuela. And they specifically introduced him as that guy who helped kill 32 of your people. Another pretty strong message, if you will.
[15:40]
A
Now, who leads the Directorate of Intelligence now?
[15:43]
C
They're very secretive about, you know, their leadership within the Cuban intelligence service. Although it's kind of funny, some of the individuals that I had seen or actually had investigations on in the past are on Facebook. I honestly don't know a lot about the head of Cuban intelligence. I do know that it's a person of significant trust. I mean, they put a lot of trust into those positions. They're highly, highly trusted.
[16:11]
A
So with Cuba's weakened economy, with President Trump's oil blockade, with the economic sanctions, is Cuban intelligence still something to take very seriously today? And has it changed their capabilities and priorities that they are suffering on another level, a deeper level, because of Washington?
[16:35]
C
Yeah, my, my complaint against multi administrations is that we put a lot of focus on China and Russia and we've forgotten about Cuba. We don't appreciate, we don't respect it. And Cuba has utilized that to fly under the radar, to be able to accomplish things from an intellig perspective, because there's not the same emphasis that the FBI, the CIA, the intelligence community, has put against, as compared to Russia and China. Is Cuba weakened currently? Yes. But does that mean that their intelligence service is weakened? I would not say so. I would think that folks that are cooperating currently within our government, who have a dual loyalty, who are agents of the Cuban intelligence service, are probably ramping up what they're doing and trying to provide as much help as they can to Cuba as they probably see, like, Ana, did you know, this United States, this big country, picking on this little island and probably see an imbalance of resources and magnitude and all that kind of stuff. So I think that they're probably ramped up quite a bit right now from an intelligence perspective against our country.
[17:48]
A
So let's talk more about what that would look like, you know, if we're talking retaliation or something else. And I think it's worth noting that as you and I have discussed, the Cubans operate very strongly out of New York where they have their diplomatic mission to the UN as well as Florida, where there is a large portion of their diaspora. So what does this look like to you?
[18:14]
C
I have no doubt that our government is still penetrated by the Cuban intelligence service. I can all but guarantee there are agents working for them amongst us. So I would say that those two places are probably still significant from an intelligence perspective. Intelligence services don't change over time very quickly. And you know, I think back to Ana, where they were as high tech as they were in that, in that age. I mean, it's been 25 years since she was arrested. And when the folks in Miami were arrested in 1998, instead of going to the next generation of COVID communication, like let's go to the new stuff, they went backwards to basically using chalk and brush passes and like the old school intelligence stuff. So I would say that that's probably still the way it is today. I doubt the Cuban intelligence Service is using A.I. you know, maybe they're using deep fakes and all that kind of stuff that other folks are using. But I don't think they've reached to that next generation of technology and starting to use, you know, that as, as part of their handling. They're just, they're kind of an old school intelligence service and they, they know it's worked in the past, so they're comfortable with that versus, you know, the new stuff, if you will. That's my impression.
[19:38]
A
We saw this Axios article that said that there was intelligence that Cuba had hundreds of drones that could be launched at the United States. Weaponized drones, Unlikely.
[19:51]
C
You have to consider it as a possibility. But I just don't see them right now doing something. They're not dumb. And that would be an incredibly dumb act that this administration, I don't think would, would just let go by.
[20:08]
A
What about the networks of illegals? I'm thinking about the WASP network in Miami that involved many Cuban spies who tried to infiltrate the U. S. Southern command headquarters. They were indicted in the 90s.
[20:25]
C
Yeah, I mean, their intelligence, their illegal program is phenomenal. Any country's illegal program is, is their crown jewel.
[20:33]
A
So what makes their program phenomenal?
[20:36]
C
It's kind of funny, you know, watching the Americans. Right. That TV series was very realistic on the. The illegal operations of. Of many countries. The illegals are very difficult for the FBI to get onto. The illegals. They're. They're like ghosts because they blend in. They're next to their neighbor. They maybe work as a janitor somewhere, but they have flexibility where they. And do brush passes and have lunch meetings with Anna and clear dead drops and do all that kind of work. It's very difficult to uncover an illegal network.
[21:09]
A
And these are people who memorized fake life stories. They took on separate jobs. They lived in meager ways as far as I can understand. Can you say more about them?
[21:23]
C
They're intelligence officers who are here illegally. So there are intelligence officers who are here legally. They're recognized by the State Department because they're assigned to the Cuban Embassy or the Cuban mission to the UN for example. The illegals don't have diplomatic immunity. So the WASP network, intelligence officers who were here illegally, who infiltrated through themselves and through agents, the Cuban American community spying on them and also spying on military bases down in South Florida areas that would have had oversight of some kind of invasion of Cuba if the President had ever said go. So a critical network for Cuba in a very critical spot in South Florida.
[22:09]
A
If we continue on this idea of a potential response by the Cubans to what the United States has done. Will do. Cuba also offers proximity to our adversaries, namely China and Russia. And that is particularly important when it comes to SIGINT signals intelligence. China has several listening stations on the island. The Russians have Lourdes, which is a complex that reportedly, according to the Insider, a publication said, is now a hub for Russian intelligence personnel again after having been used by the Soviets. Do you see the Cubans leveraging that somehow?
[22:54]
C
Oh, absolutely. They've always bartered intelligence. It's part of what has kept the regime in power for all these years. You know, they collected human intelligence through like a Montez. They're helping with signals intelligence of other groups. Whether there's a quid pro quo of cash or oil or food or whatever. Sometimes it's been influenced because, you know, they want regional influence, but other reasons too. So, yeah, I think. I think they're definitely cooperating with those folks that are traditionally adversarial to the United States. It's just. It's just the way they've been for
[23:31]
A
70 plus years and the intelligence sharing between these three countries.
[23:36]
C
It's significant. You know, the National Reconnaissance Office Special Access Program that we talked about that would have impacted Cuba a little bit from a defensive perspective. Like, okay, if we could figure out where that satellite is, does that help us? Huge asset to China, Russia, Iran. So that was a chip they absolutely played and gave to other intelligence services. So they've always bartered intelligence and traded it and shared it with, you know, folks that are like minded to them.
[24:08]
A
What about the intelligence officers who were posted outside of the United States? We know that in years past they supported leftist movements. What are your thoughts on what they could be doing today?
[24:22]
C
Department M1 is the United States, M2 is Latin America. So shows to me that the Latin American region is their second top priority. I would argue that they're probably spending a lot of time in Latin America working with leftist governments, trying to keep them propped up and keep them supporting them. I mean, could they be recruiting Americans that are assigned, you know, stationed in Latin America with the State Department that possibly they could be targeting. But my thinking is that they're probably more aligned with helping them and their government stay afloat to keep that part of their government, the leftist part of the government in power, if you will.
[25:03]
A
Would they have the resources to do that right now with the blockade?
[25:07]
C
It would be limited. There is a finite. Any intelligence service has a finite amount of resources. And you know, Cuba is no different. There's a limited amount of resources that they have to spend time in Latin America and really be productive. You know, to be honest with you, I think the United States is their top priority still. And I'm sure that they're putting the vast majority of their resources against us.
[25:31]
A
What would the tertiary priority be? If US is number one, Latin America is two.
[25:37]
C
I mean, they, they targeted one of the defectors I talked to. He targeted industrial information trade secrets that belong to whoever, the United States, yes, but other countries, Germany. And he was active in trying to steal trade secrets to provide that back to Cuban industry or that Cuba could provide to other countries to see if they could commercialize and make something out of it. They were absolutely very focused on industrial espionage as well.
[26:06]
A
Taking a cue from the Chinese there.
[26:08]
C
Well, I would say the Chinese maybe took a cue from them, to be honest with you, because they were doing these types of operations as far back as the 80s. And I don't know that China was really that advanced at that point in time in targeting trade secrets. I feel like that came a little bit later. Now again, I don't know if they learned from the Cubans or they, they organically developed this capability. But you know, Cuba just didn't target American classified information. They also target trade secrets.
[26:34]
A
And another prominent spy beyond Ana Montez was Kendall Myers. He just passed away in prison in May. He came from an incredibly elite family with Alexander Graham Bell, who had invented the telephone, and Gilbert Grosvenor, who's the editor of National Geographic. And from a previous spycast interview from someone who had been involved in that investigation, I learned that he had even been approached by the East German Stasi and chose to spy for Cuba instead. Doing this at the State Department in their intelligence and research unit. Is there more that you can share about Meyers from your perspective?
[27:19]
C
It was a really interesting investigation. I had a small role in it. I actually handed the case off to an agent who inherited when it was an unsub case. We were trying to figure out who he was. There was medical information that was part of our intelligence. Like, we knew that the person's partner had a tumor. Kendall's a really interesting individual because when he's arrested, he's brought into a hotel room where I'm sitting there. And I said, hi, I'm Pete. I was part of the team that arrested Ana. I know everything about you. So your time right now is limited because if you have actionable intelligence, your value to us and to you ends when you make your first appearance, which is going to be in about two hours in front of a judge, because then the media is going to be there and they'll find out about it. Now's your chance. And he said, I don't have. If I had anything actionable, I would give it to you. So it showed to me that he had a desire to help himself out in the moment, you know, having his worst moment ever, but didn't have any information that could help him. That operation was really, really fascinating to watch because they did what's called a false flag, where we had a Cuban walk up to him on his birthday outside of the school he was teaching
[28:37]
A
at sais Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
[28:41]
C
Yeah. Here in D.C. used to be on Massachusetts Avenue. And he was walking out of class in a undercover Cuban, handed him a Cuban cigar on his birthday and said, on behalf of your friends, we want to wish you a happy birthday. And we'd like to talk. And he was like, oh. Because he hadn't been in touch with them in years, he called his wife and said, we have a meeting. And she said, is it mandatory? And he said, yes.
[29:08]
A
Right. He supposedly told this undercover FBI agent, we've really missed you. And I mean, he even went on to say, that, you know, the Cubans have been a really important part of
[29:21]
B
our lives, and, quote, we have felt incomplete.
[29:25]
A
Did you really believe that he didn't have anything he could share? Because it sounds like he was deeply, deeply loyal to them?
[29:32]
C
Yeah, I did, but. But he's thinking of his wife in that moment. Her health had been an issue. But it shows. And I like to say this about the Cubans, because I think compared to the Russians, who find kind of slimy individuals, people are just in it for the money. Cubans find people that have a higher moral calling. I mean, they're committing the same crime. They're both committing espionage, but they're doing it for what they see as moral reasons. I'm not justifying it, but I'm saying that they at least had a belief that what they are doing is right. I wouldn't say Robert Hanson and Aldrich Ames ever thought that what they were doing was right. They were getting paid money by the Russians. So I think that, you know, that reaction to us when we kind of cold call them, obviously, we weren't really us. We were, you know, disguising who we were to a degree. But they did miss that part of their life and that part of helping and being a part of that visceral empathy for what Cuba in their mind stands for. Like, well, if you support the regime, you then also have to support how they oppress their people, how they. They oppress the freedom of speech and religion of all these other things that we take for granted. Mr. Descendant of the Bell telephone, you know, you're living well, and you can. You have this freedom of speech, and you're supporting people that don't allow their own people to protest and do the things that you can do. It's just that dichotomy is just really hard to grasp for me.
[31:05]
A
So when we think about the fact that the Cubans are good at recruiting on that sort of idealistic level where you may believe that you're supporting these people who have been so repressed by the evil United States, do you think that they might be trying to leverage animosity that some people hold toward the Trump administration, which certainly has its critics?
[31:32]
C
Absolutely. I, you know, you go back to mice, money, ideology, coercion, ego. They've added the R for revenge. Ana is often seen as an ideological spy. I think she's more of a revenge. And her attitude was, how dare the United States dictate how Cuba should run itself? That's up to the Cuban people in
[31:56]
A
keeping in line with whether or not Cuban Intelligence would try to somehow contort feelings on the Trump administration and its policies toward Cuba. Can we also talk about former career diplomat and U.S. ambassador to Bolivia, Manuel Rocha, who had spied for Cuba for about 40 years as part of his cover, he purported to be this, quote unquote, right wing person. He spoke highly of President Trump. How does that play into this?
[32:30]
C
I think deception, you know, providing a cover that would make people, if they suspected him, maybe be skeptical. Like, how could he be working with the Cubans if he's so, you know, staunch Republican, staunch, you know, right wing, kind of anti Castro kind of person? I think it was probably just more of a deception, frankly, covering for what he was really doing and what his real beliefs were.
[32:58]
A
And interesting that that would be his choice to. To make it seem like he was in line with the Trump administration. Earlier in this conversation, you had referred to three Cuban defectors. Can you talk more about who they were and what they shared with you in terms of exposing spies here in the United States and how much the Cubans really have to worry about infiltration?
[33:29]
C
Well, just like we have to worry about, you know, folks that are the insider threat that are cooperating with Cuba, they have to worry, too, frankly. You know, going back to that meeting between Ratcliffe and his, you know, peer in the Cuban intelligence service, one of my big wonders is whether the administration will say, in order for there to be regime change, we need this. And also we'd like the CIA and the FBI to come into your file room and take a look around and see who's been working for you within us.
[34:03]
A
Wouldn't they have to be crazy to say yes?
[34:06]
C
Well, you know, it depends on, you know, part of the. What's on the table. What, you know, in terms of the whole bigger picture of DIPLOMAC negotiations, there's precedent in history for that kind of activity. And that's where I would say, if you're currently working with Cuban intelligence in our government, I would not consider yourself safe, frankly, because would I put it past the Cubans to provide your names as part of this diplomatic thing that's going on right now? No, I wouldn't. You know, when they're at a point of trying to just survive, what the Cubans do need to worry about, you know, even though their intelligence officers in Havana are well treated, they're all going through blackouts and oil issues and food issues, I mean, the economy and what's going on in Cuba. Sure. The regime and those that are supporting it are protected to a degree. I have no doubt. They're making some comfort of living type sacrifices. And the more they become disgruntled, the more the possibility is that they start working with US Intelligence.
[35:12]
A
And can you talk about the defectors who had their own fascinating stories?
[35:20]
C
We should look at them as American heroes. They really are heroes. And the Cubans look at them as traitors. Two of the three escaped on a raft, a dinghy, not even a raft, I mean, had a 7 1/2 horsepower outboard engine, 5 gallons of water, 5 gallons of gas. And they didn't need the gas because about two hours into their escape, the engine stopped working and they literally just drifted in the Florida Straits dodging Cuban coast guard boats. They actually saw an American coast guard boat, but they couldn't wave and get their attention. And they were finally rescued by American fishermen out of Marathon Key, Florida. And they've been living free and free and helpful lives ever since. But these guys are really American heroes. You'll never know their name, you'll never know who they, who they truly are, but they've provided so much help to the FBI and the intelligence community and
[36:20]
A
a harrowing journey, to be sure.
[36:23]
C
Yeah.
[36:23]
A
What about the third guy?
[36:26]
C
Well, third guy was in, was in Russia at the time. He comes back from Russia and his buddies are gone. And that's how much they had his oh crap moment. The Cubans eventually arrested him and convicted him of espionage and sentenced him to life. His father had been a high ranking Cuban intelligence officer, which is why I think they spared him his life. That guy was exchanged in 2014 when during a spy swap during the Obama administration.
[36:54]
A
These defectors have provided valuable intelligence on Cuba. But what questions do you still have?
[37:03]
C
Who's currently committing espionage in our government for Cuba? I mean, it's a $64,000 question who is currently still in place, potentially damaging our national security. And that's a question only a select few within the Cuban intelligence service can answer. Even today, even though I'm retired now for six years, I'd love to know who's currently in our government who's not loyal to us, but loyal to Cuba.
[37:30]
A
Pete, thank you so much for your time.
[37:32]
C
Thanks for having me. I appreciate it.
[37:35]
B
Thanks for listening to this episode of Spycast. If you like the episode, give us a follow on Apple, Spotify or wherever you get your podcasts and leave us
[37:45]
A
a rating or review.
[37:47]
B
It really helps. If you have any feedback or, or you want to hear about a particular topic, you can reach us by email@spycastpymuseum.org I'm your host Sasha Ingber and the show is brought to you by N2K Network's goat rodeo and the International Spy Museum in Washington, DC. In the modern AI enterprise, adversaries no longer break in. They log in as autonomous AI agents and machines gain privileged access. Your risk is becoming invisible and legacy tools can't keep up. Introducing IDERA from Palo Alto Networks. IDERA is the next generation identity platform built for the scale of the AI workforce. It helps you discover hidden risks instantly, eliminate static privileges with just in time enforcement, and automate governance at machine speed. Secure every identity, human, machine and agentic with IDERA by Palo Alto Networks. Visit paloaltonetworks.com Idira to get started.

Summary6 min read

SpyCast Episode Summary: “Cuba’s Spies, Defectors, and the Ex-FBI Agent Who Met Them All”

Host: Sasha Ingber
Guest: Peter Lapp, Retired FBI Special Agent, author of Queen of Cuba
Release Date: August 11, 2026

Episode Overview

In this episode, SpyCast host Sasha Ingber interviews retired FBI special agent Peter Lapp, who spent years tracking Cuban espionage activity and is the author of Queen of Cuba, a book that delves into the high-profile case of Ana Montes and broader Cuban spy operations. The conversation covers Cuba’s intelligence prowess, key spy cases, defector insights, tradecraft, and the evolving nature of U.S.–Cuba intelligence confrontation. Lapp pulls back the curtain on both Cuban and American defectors, reflects on the FBI’s approach, and highlights the moral motivations behind Cuba’s recruitment — all set against the shifting political backdrop of recent years.

Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. Peter Lapp’s Path to Cuban Counterintelligence

[01:20–04:02]

Lapp’s entry into Cuban counterintelligence was unexpected:

“I was a little disgruntled… I thought I wasn’t working the cool stuff yet. The cool stuff is what has me sitting down here today, because if I didn’t work the Cubans, I wouldn’t be here. So life works out the way it’s supposed to.” (Peter Lapp, 01:39)
He describes the steep learning curve, emphasizing the difference between Cuban and Russian or Chinese tradecraft.
Cuban Intelligence is small, but effective, “always… accomplishing a lot more than their numbers.”
Central challenge: identifying “UNSUBs” (unknown subjects)—insiders loyal to Cuba, like Ana Montes.

2. The Ana Montes Espionage Case

[04:02–07:36]

Lapp describes the legal break-in at Montes’ home:

“It was a very nice co-op building in Cleveland Park in a very nice neighborhood... We found her laptop computer under her bed … the Cubans had tasked her to purchase that exact computer.” (Lapp, 05:28)
The laptop was crucial evidence — Montes believed she had deleted incriminating files, but 11 pages of Spanish-language communication survived:

“Those four sentences could have been death penalty eligible evidence.” (Lapp, 06:21)
Montes’ information included sensitive national defense data, including a Special Access Program from the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).

3. Evolution and Style of Cuban Intelligence Tradecraft

[07:36–10:03]

Cuban intelligence capabilities were shaped by extensive KGB training but have developed their own ruthless effectiveness:

“They do intelligence like no one else… off the island and in Cuba as well.” (Lapp, 08:49)
Their counterintelligence is especially robust at home due to fewer legal constraints.

4. Perspectives from Cuban Defectors

[08:58–11:44]

Lapp spoke to three defectors, shedding light on their treatment and disillusionment:

“They started seeing through the veil of communism … so they started building grievances.” (Lapp, 09:20)
Notable story: one defector, a security officer close to Fidel Castro, considered killing Castro but chose not to (“nothing would have changed. The regime would have stayed in power.” – Lapp, 10:35).

5. Cuba’s U.S. Spy Priorities: Rocha and Kendall Myers

[12:08–13:46]

The Directorate of Intelligence (DI) targets the U.S. as its top priority:

“All of their resources are against the United States.” (Lapp, 12:20)
High-value spies like Ambassador Manuel Rocha and Kendall Myers were especially prized targets due to their influence over foreign policy.

6. Modern Diplomatic Maneuvering and Intelligence Warnings

[14:02–15:40]

Reference to CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s diplomatic visit to Cuba:

“Sending someone of that prominence sent a strong message … there’s a seriousness that this administration has.” (Lapp, 14:45)
Asserted as a “strong warning” to Cuba.

7. Current Strength and Tactics of Cuban Intelligence

[16:10–17:48]

Despite Cuba’s economic woes and U.S. pressure, Lapp warns:

“I would not say [the intelligence service is] weakened… they’re probably ramping up what they’re doing.” (Lapp, 16:42)
Critiques U.S. neglect of Cuban espionage relative to Russia and China.

8. Tradecraft Details: Illegals and Old-School Methods

[17:48–22:08]

Cuban operations continue to rely on deep-cover “illegals,” with New York and Florida as prime sites.
“They went backwards to basically using chalk and brush passes… old school intelligence stuff.” (Lapp, 18:36)
Illegals blend seamlessly, making detection extremely difficult.

9. Strategic Partnerships: China, Russia, and SIGINT Bartering

[22:08–24:07]

Cuba hosts Chinese and Russian SIGINT facilities and barters intelligence with adversaries:

“They’ve always bartered intelligence… for cash or oil or food.” (Lapp, 22:54)
Example: data from Montes’ NRO program was a chip for Russia, China, Iran, etc.

10. Cuban Intelligence Activities in Latin America and Beyond

[24:07–26:34]

Latin America (Dept. M2) is secondary to the U.S., focusing on supporting leftist governments and potentially recruiting stationed Americans.
Industrial espionage is a third priority — not just against the U.S., but also Europe:

“They were absolutely very focused on industrial espionage as well… I would say the Chinese maybe took a cue from them.” (Lapp, 25:36, 26:08)

11. Moral Motives and the Case of Kendall Myers

[26:34–31:04]

Myers, from a prominent family, felt “incomplete” without Cuban contact; his motivation was largely ideological:

“Cubans find people that have a higher moral calling.” (Lapp, 29:31)
Contrasts Cuban recruitment, which finds true believers, with Russian recruitment for money.

12. Emotional and Ideological Leverage in Recruitment

[31:04–32:58]

Cuban intelligence leverages grievances and feelings of U.S. repression.
Recent spies, like Rocha, even presented as right-wing Trump supporters to maintain cover.

13. Defectors: Fates, Heroism, and Risks Inside Cuba

[32:58–36:54]

Defectors face grave risks:

“These guys are really American heroes. You’ll never know their name… but they’ve provided so much help.” (Lapp, 35:19)
Some defectors escaped by raft; one was captured and imprisoned, later swapped in a spy exchange.
Both sides face insider threats, and the U.S. might pressure Cuba to reveal its American agents.

14. Lingering Questions

[36:54–37:29]

Lapp’s major unresolved question:

“Who’s currently committing espionage in our government for Cuba? …the $64,000 question.” (Lapp, 37:02)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

On the tension of entering Montes' home:

“But when you have the key and you’re sneaking in, I felt the adrenaline even higher…” (Lapp, 04:30)
On the significance of not underestimating Cuban intelligence:

“We don’t appreciate, we don’t respect it. And Cuba has utilized that to fly under the radar…” (Lapp, 16:35)
On Cuban recruitment priorities:

“Cubans find people that have a higher moral calling… they’re doing it for what they see as moral reasons.” (Lapp, 29:31)
On defectors’ heroism:

“We should look at them as American heroes. They really are heroes. And the Cubans look at them as traitors.” (Lapp, 35:19)

Important Timestamps

[01:20] Lapp’s entry into Cuban counterintelligence
[04:02] The break-in at Ana Montes' home
[06:21] The damning evidence on Montes’ laptop
[08:58] Cuban defectors’ disillusionment
[10:35] The defector who could have killed Castro
[12:20] DI’s focus on the U.S. as a top priority
[13:46] Recruitment motives: empathy over money
[14:45] John Ratcliffe’s visit as a warning
[16:42] Cuban Intelligence isn't "weakened"
[18:36] Cuban tradecraft: sticking with old-school methods
[22:54] Intelligence bartering with Russia/China
[25:36] Industrial espionage, not just classic spycraft
[29:31] Cuban spies’ moral motivations
[35:19] Defectors’ heroism and sacrifice
[37:02] Lapp’s “$64,000 question” about current moles

Final Thoughts

Lapp’s account provides a rare, candid look inside the complex world of Cuban espionage, raising the specter that U.S. institutions may still harbor undetected spies driven by ideology as much as money. The conversation underscores Cuba’s spy service as a persistent, underestimated adversary with a nuanced understanding of human motivation — a warning and a call to vigilance for U.S. counterintelligence.

For more on Cuban espionage, check out Peter Lapp’s Queen of Cuba, and visit the International Spy Museum’s resources.

Loading summary

Transcript91 lines

[00:02]
A
You're listening to the Cyberwire Network, powered by N2K.
[00:15]
B
Welcome to Spycast, the official podcast of the International Spy Museum. I'm your host, Sasha Ingber, and each week I take you into the shadows of espionage, intelligence, and covert operations across the globe. For decades, Cuban intelligence has been seen as a force that punches above its weight. Shaped during the Cold War through cooperation with the Soviet Union, its intelligence officers received extensive training by the kgb. But where does its spy service stand today, especially as it faces pressure from Washington? Retired FBI Special Agent Peter Lapp, who wrote Queen of Cuba, came in to discuss Havana's capabilities. The Americans who spied for Cuba and the Cubans who spied for us.
[01:14]
A
Welcome, Pete. Good to see you again.
[01:16]
C
It's always great to see you, Sasha. Thank you for having me. I appreciate it.
[01:20]
A
So let's get right down to it. What was it like being in the FBI working counterintelligence, going after the Cubans?
[01:29]
C
Surreal. And also kind of an experience where I didn't think that's what I was going to do in the FBI. My background was I was a cop outside of Philadelphia, and I was a criminal justice major. And I thought the FBI and its infinite wisdom would put me working the cool stuff, the gangs and drugs and homicides. And they said, no, you're going to work Cuban counterintelligence. I had no idea what that was and what that meant. And I. I could find Cuba on a map, barely. And that was about the extent of it. And I was. I say I was. When I got the assignment and got to the field office in D.C. in September of 1998, I was a little disgruntled, to be honest with you, because I thought I wasn't working the cool stuff yet. The cool stuff is what has me sitting down here today, because if I didn't work the Cubans, I wouldn't be here. So life works out the way it's supposed to.
[02:21]
A
Yeah. It was all really so that you could sit down with Spycast 100%. So what was the learning curve take us into? Just day to day? What it was like learning about what the Cubans were up to.
[02:34]
C
The Cubans are a lot different than China and Russia. You know, Cuba is a small intelligence service. It's not big, but it's mighty. They're always, in my opinion, accomplishing a lot more than their numbers in terms of how many people they have working for it. They've got a great ability to find individuals who aren't motivated by money and aren't Cuban by descent. But have this visceral empathy for what Cuba is trying to accomplish, whether it's in Latin America or throughout the rest of the world. So they have a unique way of operating. The difficult part of getting to understand the Cubans was really focusing, in my opinion, not on the day to day activity of the intelligence office we were following, but the. The UNSUB investigations, the unknown subjects, the people that were later identified as Animantis or the folks down in Miami. All of those cases were the core, in my opinion, part of the program, the Cuban program that required a lot of focus and creativity, luck in trying to find some of these individuals because those were the core individuals that were inside our government spying against us, trusted insiders, but who were actually loyal to the Cubans. That was the big learning curve that I had. And actually the real intriguing puzzle of trying to identify any one of these individuals, these unsubs, as we call them. And you know, with regards to Montes, we got. We got lucky with one and then subsequently several after that.
[04:02]
A
And you actually broke into her home here in Washington.
[04:06]
C
Legally, I had. We had a court order. I had to make sure that we, you know, got the legal part right.
[04:11]
A
But she didn't know you were doing it. Let's just say that she did not know that you were walking in that door. And she had spied for Cuba for 17 years. She was recruited as a student, rose to the top position as Cuba analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency. What was it like when you finally opened the door to her home?
[04:30]
C
Oh, oh, surreal. Like the cat burglar kind of thing. It was a pretty cool moment, I have to be honest with you. I had, as a police officer, I had done some things where you were potentially going to get shot. And the adrenaline and the exhilaration of that is pretty significant. But when you have the key and you're sneaking in, I felt the adrenaline even higher because the possibility of getting caught either by a neighborhood or, you know, she was in Miami at the time, and we had surveillance on her, so we knew she wasn't going to come home. But what if we put a book back the wrong way? And she knew that that book was in a certain way. So that kind of exhilaration, it was really pretty, pretty cool. And you're also not just going and sneaking around and just walking into her apartment. You're looking for elements of the intelligence craft that she was using and trying to prove that she was committing espionage.
[05:26]
A
And what did you see when you finally stepped in the door?
[05:29]
C
A lot of books. She was well read. And she wasn't getting paid for her espionage. So she lived pretty modestly. Although I will say it was a very nice co op building in Cleveland park in a very nice neighborhood, not too far from the National Zoo. So if you come visit the zoo, you could go see Anna Montes old home. But we spent a lot of time carefully, meticulously going through. We found her laptop computer under her bed the very first time we, we got into her apartment. And that was critical because we could prove that the Cubans had tasked her to purchase that exact computer. The irony is the computer should have been thrown in the bottom of the Potomac River. And if it had been, you're sitting down talking to somebody else today because she never would have went to prison.
[06:15]
A
What did you find on it and why do you think she hadn't thrown it out when she seemed to have been very careful?
[06:21]
C
She was incredibly careful. She thought that everything on that computer was deleted. The Cubans gave her, as part of her covert communication plan and system, they gave her a decryption encryption software and then they also gave her a wipe software. Whether she didn't apply the wipe software correctly or the Cubans, their software wasn't very good, I don't know. But there was 11 pages of Spanish text from her to the Cubans and from the Cubans to her. And in that we found the conspiracy to commit espionage. We found national defense information. We found classified information. We found a special access program that belonged to the National Reconnaissance Office, the NRO that operates all the spy satellites. And I call it the four sentences. Those four sentences could have been death penalty eligible evidence.
[07:19]
A
That is a very classified program that she got access to to this day.
[07:24]
C
To this day. Yeah.
[07:25]
A
Still hurting the nro.
[07:27]
C
Yeah, she was read into the program and just the telling her, telling the Cubans of the existence of the program was potentially death penalty eligible type evidence.
[07:37]
A
Now we're talking specifically about the Directorate of Intelligence, the di. They received training from the kgb. How did the service evolve after the fall of the Soviet Union? And are there aspects of Cuban tradecraft that other countries have copied?
[07:58]
C
The Cubans did get a leg up with the relationship they had with the Soviet Union and kgb. I think they've gone well beyond that partially because, you know, the FBI does the counterintelligence for the United States. In the United States as the lead. The Cuban Intelligence Service conducts counterintelligence on the island of Cuba against its own citizens like no other and isn't restricted by the privacy and the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment. That the United States has. That the FBI has to. So gets a lot of practice doing counterintelligence and intelligence against its own people. And. And in my opinion, it's what's helped the regime stay in power for now, almost 70 years or so. They do intelligence like no one else off the island in the United States and also in Cuba as well.
[08:50]
A
Can you talk to me about some of the defectors that you interviewed in the course of writing this book about Anna Montez? What did they tell you?
[08:59]
C
So I had a chance to talk to three different defectors, only one of whom I'd actually talked to previously as part of when I was at the FBI. Fascinating stories. And really, you get a good impression of. These were individuals that, when they worked in Cuba for the Cuban intelligence services, were treated very well as compared to your average Cuban. And these three individuals collectively just got really disgusted with the regime. The corruption within the Castro regime. Fidel, the way he lived, really started to disgust these individuals, and they started seeing through the veil of communism in the veil of. Of, you know, the regime and how that was so disgusting to them. So they started building grievances, and then, little by little, they would provide the US Intelligence community with information that ultimately helped us, you know, with punching back against the Cubans. And in a number of cases, one of them being obviously Montez, and one
[10:03]
A
of them actually had the opportunity to kill Fidel Castro. He had been a security officer who was traveling with Castro. Can you talk about more of that moment and why he ultimately didn't and whether he regretted it?
[10:19]
C
He was down that grievance road. He. He knew he was going to defect at some point in time. He was. I believe he was already working with US intelligence, and the Cubans gave him a Smith Wesson.45 caliber weapon to protect Fidel when Fidel went on a. Like, a state visit to another country. He told me the story where Fidel had his entire bedroom shipped to this place that he was staying at so that he could get a good night's sleep. His mattress, his sheets, the whole thing. And he was just disgusted with this. You know, your average Cuban is living in poverty, and Fidel needed his own bed and his will be and his, like, nightgown and all that kind of stuff. He had close access to Fidel every night. And he made the decision not to kill him because he knew that it would be essentially a death sentence for him. He told me, he said nothing would have changed. The regime would have stayed in power. And, you know, history kind of proved Him. Right. When Fidel retires and Raul Castro takes over, nothing changed. So we say these things like, why doesn't someone near this person just kill them? And it's like it's. There's a human being that would have to pull that trigger and potentially, you know, be a death sentence themselves.
[11:44]
A
Right. That's a sacrifice many would not be willing to make.
[11:49]
B
When we come back, we look at Kendall Myers and Manuel Rocha, two other US Government officials who spied for Cuba.
[12:08]
A
And what did they say about the Directorate of Intelligence in terms of putting together pieces of this picture of how Cuba's primary intelligence service operates?
[12:20]
C
All of them told us that, you know, the United States is their top priority. So if you flip that around for the United States, our top priority is China, you know, followed by Russia and followed by pretty much everyone else, whereas Cuba, the United States is their top priority. So all of their resources are against the United States. They focus on who makes the foreign policy for the U.S. government, and those are their top priors. Know, folks like Ambassador Rocha, folks like Kendall Myers were technically actually a higher priority.
[12:51]
A
And we're talking about the US Ambassador to Bolivia, Manuel Rocha, Kendall Myers, who worked at the State Department in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and both spied for Cuba, correct?
[13:04]
C
Correct. They would have been higher priorities for the Cuban intelligence service because their top priority is the White House, the Congress, and the State Department, the folks that make the foreign policy for the United States of America. So they gave us a lot of interesting information about where their priorities are, how they operate. You know, would they pay a source, or would they see that as, you know, being not really how their intelligence service operates. I mean, they're very frugal, but they also are very leery of a source. Like, on, if they were to walk in and say, I'll do this for a million dollars, like a Hanson or an Aldrich Ames, they would be very leery of that. You've got to have this visceral empathy with what Cuba is trying to accomplish.
[13:47]
A
So when we think about where we are today in May, CIA Director John Ratcliffe goes to the island and he actually meets with intelligence officials. What is the significance of that?
[14:02]
C
So it's interesting. I was thinking about that because, you know, former Director of Central Intelligence Bill Burns under the Biden administration did a lot of diplomatic type meetings involving Ukraine and Russia. So my sense is that, you know, with Secretary Rubio being a little busy with, you know, one of his two jobs, it made sense that the administration would send Ratcliffe to have this meeting. We know that the relationship with Cuba and Venezuela between both the governments and the intelligence services was very strong. So sending a strong message that we know that Cuban intelligence is very involved with the Cuban government sends a strong message to them. You know, I don't know if there's an intelligence message versus more of a diplomatic message, if you will. And I think that sending someone of that prominence sent a strong message probably to the Cubans that, you know, there's. There's a seriousness that this administration has with seeing change in Cuba.
[15:10]
A
So essentially a warning.
[15:11]
C
I would say a warning. Yeah, I would say a strong warning. And I think the other thing that was really interesting, the United States brought ahead of the military part of the law enforcement mission in venezuela that killed 32, I believe, Cuban military individuals who were supporting Venezuela. And they specifically introduced him as that guy who helped kill 32 of your people. Another pretty strong message, if you will.
[15:40]
A
Now, who leads the Directorate of Intelligence now?
[15:43]
C
They're very secretive about, you know, their leadership within the Cuban intelligence service. Although it's kind of funny, some of the individuals that I had seen or actually had investigations on in the past are on Facebook. I honestly don't know a lot about the head of Cuban intelligence. I do know that it's a person of significant trust. I mean, they put a lot of trust into those positions. They're highly, highly trusted.
[16:11]
A
So with Cuba's weakened economy, with President Trump's oil blockade, with the economic sanctions, is Cuban intelligence still something to take very seriously today? And has it changed their capabilities and priorities that they are suffering on another level, a deeper level, because of Washington?
[16:35]
C
Yeah, my, my complaint against multi administrations is that we put a lot of focus on China and Russia and we've forgotten about Cuba. We don't appreciate, we don't respect it. And Cuba has utilized that to fly under the radar, to be able to accomplish things from an intellig perspective, because there's not the same emphasis that the FBI, the CIA, the intelligence community, has put against, as compared to Russia and China. Is Cuba weakened currently? Yes. But does that mean that their intelligence service is weakened? I would not say so. I would think that folks that are cooperating currently within our government, who have a dual loyalty, who are agents of the Cuban intelligence service, are probably ramping up what they're doing and trying to provide as much help as they can to Cuba as they probably see, like, Ana, did you know, this United States, this big country, picking on this little island and probably see an imbalance of resources and magnitude and all that kind of stuff. So I think that they're probably ramped up quite a bit right now from an intelligence perspective against our country.
[17:48]
A
So let's talk more about what that would look like, you know, if we're talking retaliation or something else. And I think it's worth noting that as you and I have discussed, the Cubans operate very strongly out of New York where they have their diplomatic mission to the UN as well as Florida, where there is a large portion of their diaspora. So what does this look like to you?
[18:14]
C
I have no doubt that our government is still penetrated by the Cuban intelligence service. I can all but guarantee there are agents working for them amongst us. So I would say that those two places are probably still significant from an intelligence perspective. Intelligence services don't change over time very quickly. And you know, I think back to Ana, where they were as high tech as they were in that, in that age. I mean, it's been 25 years since she was arrested. And when the folks in Miami were arrested in 1998, instead of going to the next generation of COVID communication, like let's go to the new stuff, they went backwards to basically using chalk and brush passes and like the old school intelligence stuff. So I would say that that's probably still the way it is today. I doubt the Cuban intelligence Service is using A.I. you know, maybe they're using deep fakes and all that kind of stuff that other folks are using. But I don't think they've reached to that next generation of technology and starting to use, you know, that as, as part of their handling. They're just, they're kind of an old school intelligence service and they, they know it's worked in the past, so they're comfortable with that versus, you know, the new stuff, if you will. That's my impression.
[19:38]
A
We saw this Axios article that said that there was intelligence that Cuba had hundreds of drones that could be launched at the United States. Weaponized drones, Unlikely.
[19:51]
C
You have to consider it as a possibility. But I just don't see them right now doing something. They're not dumb. And that would be an incredibly dumb act that this administration, I don't think would, would just let go by.
[20:08]
A
What about the networks of illegals? I'm thinking about the WASP network in Miami that involved many Cuban spies who tried to infiltrate the U. S. Southern command headquarters. They were indicted in the 90s.
[20:25]
C
Yeah, I mean, their intelligence, their illegal program is phenomenal. Any country's illegal program is, is their crown jewel.
[20:33]
A
So what makes their program phenomenal?
[20:36]
C
It's kind of funny, you know, watching the Americans. Right. That TV series was very realistic on the. The illegal operations of. Of many countries. The illegals are very difficult for the FBI to get onto. The illegals. They're. They're like ghosts because they blend in. They're next to their neighbor. They maybe work as a janitor somewhere, but they have flexibility where they. And do brush passes and have lunch meetings with Anna and clear dead drops and do all that kind of work. It's very difficult to uncover an illegal network.
[21:09]
A
And these are people who memorized fake life stories. They took on separate jobs. They lived in meager ways as far as I can understand. Can you say more about them?
[21:23]
C
They're intelligence officers who are here illegally. So there are intelligence officers who are here legally. They're recognized by the State Department because they're assigned to the Cuban Embassy or the Cuban mission to the UN for example. The illegals don't have diplomatic immunity. So the WASP network, intelligence officers who were here illegally, who infiltrated through themselves and through agents, the Cuban American community spying on them and also spying on military bases down in South Florida areas that would have had oversight of some kind of invasion of Cuba if the President had ever said go. So a critical network for Cuba in a very critical spot in South Florida.
[22:09]
A
If we continue on this idea of a potential response by the Cubans to what the United States has done. Will do. Cuba also offers proximity to our adversaries, namely China and Russia. And that is particularly important when it comes to SIGINT signals intelligence. China has several listening stations on the island. The Russians have Lourdes, which is a complex that reportedly, according to the Insider, a publication said, is now a hub for Russian intelligence personnel again after having been used by the Soviets. Do you see the Cubans leveraging that somehow?
[22:54]
C
Oh, absolutely. They've always bartered intelligence. It's part of what has kept the regime in power for all these years. You know, they collected human intelligence through like a Montez. They're helping with signals intelligence of other groups. Whether there's a quid pro quo of cash or oil or food or whatever. Sometimes it's been influenced because, you know, they want regional influence, but other reasons too. So, yeah, I think. I think they're definitely cooperating with those folks that are traditionally adversarial to the United States. It's just. It's just the way they've been for
[23:31]
A
70 plus years and the intelligence sharing between these three countries.
[23:36]
C
It's significant. You know, the National Reconnaissance Office Special Access Program that we talked about that would have impacted Cuba a little bit from a defensive perspective. Like, okay, if we could figure out where that satellite is, does that help us? Huge asset to China, Russia, Iran. So that was a chip they absolutely played and gave to other intelligence services. So they've always bartered intelligence and traded it and shared it with, you know, folks that are like minded to them.
[24:08]
A
What about the intelligence officers who were posted outside of the United States? We know that in years past they supported leftist movements. What are your thoughts on what they could be doing today?
[24:22]
C
Department M1 is the United States, M2 is Latin America. So shows to me that the Latin American region is their second top priority. I would argue that they're probably spending a lot of time in Latin America working with leftist governments, trying to keep them propped up and keep them supporting them. I mean, could they be recruiting Americans that are assigned, you know, stationed in Latin America with the State Department that possibly they could be targeting. But my thinking is that they're probably more aligned with helping them and their government stay afloat to keep that part of their government, the leftist part of the government in power, if you will.
[25:03]
A
Would they have the resources to do that right now with the blockade?
[25:07]
C
It would be limited. There is a finite. Any intelligence service has a finite amount of resources. And you know, Cuba is no different. There's a limited amount of resources that they have to spend time in Latin America and really be productive. You know, to be honest with you, I think the United States is their top priority still. And I'm sure that they're putting the vast majority of their resources against us.
[25:31]
A
What would the tertiary priority be? If US is number one, Latin America is two.
[25:37]
C
I mean, they, they targeted one of the defectors I talked to. He targeted industrial information trade secrets that belong to whoever, the United States, yes, but other countries, Germany. And he was active in trying to steal trade secrets to provide that back to Cuban industry or that Cuba could provide to other countries to see if they could commercialize and make something out of it. They were absolutely very focused on industrial espionage as well.
[26:06]
A
Taking a cue from the Chinese there.
[26:08]
C
Well, I would say the Chinese maybe took a cue from them, to be honest with you, because they were doing these types of operations as far back as the 80s. And I don't know that China was really that advanced at that point in time in targeting trade secrets. I feel like that came a little bit later. Now again, I don't know if they learned from the Cubans or they, they organically developed this capability. But you know, Cuba just didn't target American classified information. They also target trade secrets.
[26:34]
A
And another prominent spy beyond Ana Montez was Kendall Myers. He just passed away in prison in May. He came from an incredibly elite family with Alexander Graham Bell, who had invented the telephone, and Gilbert Grosvenor, who's the editor of National Geographic. And from a previous spycast interview from someone who had been involved in that investigation, I learned that he had even been approached by the East German Stasi and chose to spy for Cuba instead. Doing this at the State Department in their intelligence and research unit. Is there more that you can share about Meyers from your perspective?
[27:19]
C
It was a really interesting investigation. I had a small role in it. I actually handed the case off to an agent who inherited when it was an unsub case. We were trying to figure out who he was. There was medical information that was part of our intelligence. Like, we knew that the person's partner had a tumor. Kendall's a really interesting individual because when he's arrested, he's brought into a hotel room where I'm sitting there. And I said, hi, I'm Pete. I was part of the team that arrested Ana. I know everything about you. So your time right now is limited because if you have actionable intelligence, your value to us and to you ends when you make your first appearance, which is going to be in about two hours in front of a judge, because then the media is going to be there and they'll find out about it. Now's your chance. And he said, I don't have. If I had anything actionable, I would give it to you. So it showed to me that he had a desire to help himself out in the moment, you know, having his worst moment ever, but didn't have any information that could help him. That operation was really, really fascinating to watch because they did what's called a false flag, where we had a Cuban walk up to him on his birthday outside of the school he was teaching
[28:37]
A
at sais Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
[28:41]
C
Yeah. Here in D.C. used to be on Massachusetts Avenue. And he was walking out of class in a undercover Cuban, handed him a Cuban cigar on his birthday and said, on behalf of your friends, we want to wish you a happy birthday. And we'd like to talk. And he was like, oh. Because he hadn't been in touch with them in years, he called his wife and said, we have a meeting. And she said, is it mandatory? And he said, yes.
[29:08]
A
Right. He supposedly told this undercover FBI agent, we've really missed you. And I mean, he even went on to say, that, you know, the Cubans have been a really important part of
[29:21]
B
our lives, and, quote, we have felt incomplete.
[29:25]
A
Did you really believe that he didn't have anything he could share? Because it sounds like he was deeply, deeply loyal to them?
[29:32]
C
Yeah, I did, but. But he's thinking of his wife in that moment. Her health had been an issue. But it shows. And I like to say this about the Cubans, because I think compared to the Russians, who find kind of slimy individuals, people are just in it for the money. Cubans find people that have a higher moral calling. I mean, they're committing the same crime. They're both committing espionage, but they're doing it for what they see as moral reasons. I'm not justifying it, but I'm saying that they at least had a belief that what they are doing is right. I wouldn't say Robert Hanson and Aldrich Ames ever thought that what they were doing was right. They were getting paid money by the Russians. So I think that, you know, that reaction to us when we kind of cold call them, obviously, we weren't really us. We were, you know, disguising who we were to a degree. But they did miss that part of their life and that part of helping and being a part of that visceral empathy for what Cuba in their mind stands for. Like, well, if you support the regime, you then also have to support how they oppress their people, how they. They oppress the freedom of speech and religion of all these other things that we take for granted. Mr. Descendant of the Bell telephone, you know, you're living well, and you can. You have this freedom of speech, and you're supporting people that don't allow their own people to protest and do the things that you can do. It's just that dichotomy is just really hard to grasp for me.
[31:05]
A
So when we think about the fact that the Cubans are good at recruiting on that sort of idealistic level where you may believe that you're supporting these people who have been so repressed by the evil United States, do you think that they might be trying to leverage animosity that some people hold toward the Trump administration, which certainly has its critics?
[31:32]
C
Absolutely. I, you know, you go back to mice, money, ideology, coercion, ego. They've added the R for revenge. Ana is often seen as an ideological spy. I think she's more of a revenge. And her attitude was, how dare the United States dictate how Cuba should run itself? That's up to the Cuban people in
[31:56]
A
keeping in line with whether or not Cuban Intelligence would try to somehow contort feelings on the Trump administration and its policies toward Cuba. Can we also talk about former career diplomat and U.S. ambassador to Bolivia, Manuel Rocha, who had spied for Cuba for about 40 years as part of his cover, he purported to be this, quote unquote, right wing person. He spoke highly of President Trump. How does that play into this?
[32:30]
C
I think deception, you know, providing a cover that would make people, if they suspected him, maybe be skeptical. Like, how could he be working with the Cubans if he's so, you know, staunch Republican, staunch, you know, right wing, kind of anti Castro kind of person? I think it was probably just more of a deception, frankly, covering for what he was really doing and what his real beliefs were.
[32:58]
A
And interesting that that would be his choice to. To make it seem like he was in line with the Trump administration. Earlier in this conversation, you had referred to three Cuban defectors. Can you talk more about who they were and what they shared with you in terms of exposing spies here in the United States and how much the Cubans really have to worry about infiltration?
[33:29]
C
Well, just like we have to worry about, you know, folks that are the insider threat that are cooperating with Cuba, they have to worry, too, frankly. You know, going back to that meeting between Ratcliffe and his, you know, peer in the Cuban intelligence service, one of my big wonders is whether the administration will say, in order for there to be regime change, we need this. And also we'd like the CIA and the FBI to come into your file room and take a look around and see who's been working for you within us.
[34:03]
A
Wouldn't they have to be crazy to say yes?
[34:06]
C
Well, you know, it depends on, you know, part of the. What's on the table. What, you know, in terms of the whole bigger picture of DIPLOMAC negotiations, there's precedent in history for that kind of activity. And that's where I would say, if you're currently working with Cuban intelligence in our government, I would not consider yourself safe, frankly, because would I put it past the Cubans to provide your names as part of this diplomatic thing that's going on right now? No, I wouldn't. You know, when they're at a point of trying to just survive, what the Cubans do need to worry about, you know, even though their intelligence officers in Havana are well treated, they're all going through blackouts and oil issues and food issues, I mean, the economy and what's going on in Cuba. Sure. The regime and those that are supporting it are protected to a degree. I have no doubt. They're making some comfort of living type sacrifices. And the more they become disgruntled, the more the possibility is that they start working with US Intelligence.
[35:12]
A
And can you talk about the defectors who had their own fascinating stories?
[35:20]
C
We should look at them as American heroes. They really are heroes. And the Cubans look at them as traitors. Two of the three escaped on a raft, a dinghy, not even a raft, I mean, had a 7 1/2 horsepower outboard engine, 5 gallons of water, 5 gallons of gas. And they didn't need the gas because about two hours into their escape, the engine stopped working and they literally just drifted in the Florida Straits dodging Cuban coast guard boats. They actually saw an American coast guard boat, but they couldn't wave and get their attention. And they were finally rescued by American fishermen out of Marathon Key, Florida. And they've been living free and free and helpful lives ever since. But these guys are really American heroes. You'll never know their name, you'll never know who they, who they truly are, but they've provided so much help to the FBI and the intelligence community and
[36:20]
A
a harrowing journey, to be sure.
[36:23]
C
Yeah.
[36:23]
A
What about the third guy?
[36:26]
C
Well, third guy was in, was in Russia at the time. He comes back from Russia and his buddies are gone. And that's how much they had his oh crap moment. The Cubans eventually arrested him and convicted him of espionage and sentenced him to life. His father had been a high ranking Cuban intelligence officer, which is why I think they spared him his life. That guy was exchanged in 2014 when during a spy swap during the Obama administration.
[36:54]
A
These defectors have provided valuable intelligence on Cuba. But what questions do you still have?
[37:03]
C
Who's currently committing espionage in our government for Cuba? I mean, it's a $64,000 question who is currently still in place, potentially damaging our national security. And that's a question only a select few within the Cuban intelligence service can answer. Even today, even though I'm retired now for six years, I'd love to know who's currently in our government who's not loyal to us, but loyal to Cuba.
[37:30]
A
Pete, thank you so much for your time.
[37:32]
C
Thanks for having me. I appreciate it.
[37:35]
B
Thanks for listening to this episode of Spycast. If you like the episode, give us a follow on Apple, Spotify or wherever you get your podcasts and leave us
[37:45]
A
a rating or review.
[37:47]
B
It really helps. If you have any feedback or, or you want to hear about a particular topic, you can reach us by email@spycastpymuseum.org I'm your host Sasha Ingber and the show is brought to you by N2K Network's goat rodeo and the International Spy Museum in Washington, DC. In the modern AI enterprise, adversaries no longer break in. They log in as autonomous AI agents and machines gain privileged access. Your risk is becoming invisible and legacy tools can't keep up. Introducing IDERA from Palo Alto Networks. IDERA is the next generation identity platform built for the scale of the AI workforce. It helps you discover hidden risks instantly, eliminate static privileges with just in time enforcement, and automate governance at machine speed. Secure every identity, human, machine and agentic with IDERA by Palo Alto Networks. Visit paloaltonetworks.com Idira to get started.