How Far the US Went to Rescue Hostage Bowe Bergdahl

Summary

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SpyCast Podcast Summary

Episode: "How Far the US Went to Rescue Hostage Bowe Bergdahl"

Date: May 5, 2026
Host: Sasha Ingber
Guest: Tony Schaefer (Retired Military Intelligence Officer)

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Main Theme / Purpose

This episode explores the covert, complex, and at times morally ambiguous efforts mounted by the US government to secure the release of Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, who was held hostage by the Taliban-aligned Haqqani Network from 2009-2014. Through a first-person account from Tony Schaefer—a retired military intelligence officer brought in to lead a backchannel operation—the episode sheds light on the unofficial, “track two” intelligence work deployed behind the scenes, the use of unwitting intermediaries (including members of Congress), backchannel contacts with Pakistani intelligence, and the inner workings and ultimate collapse of a covert plan to bring Bergdahl home.

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Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. How Tony Schaefer Got Involved

• Recruitment Back into Service
  • Tony describes spy craft as a field from which "we never really retire" (01:46). He was unexpectedly called to help via a secure, clandestine request and given access to an unusual location for a secure phone call—a Federal Reserve printing room "skiff" (02:18).
• Contact with Pakistani Intelligence
  • Schaefer was specifically tasked with reaching out to General Hamid Gul, a retired ISI (Pakistan’s intelligence service) leader deeply connected to the Taliban and the Haqqani Network.
  • The rationale: “We think [Gul] has more influence than the current ISI over Haqqani. That was the thinking.” (06:31)

2. Building a Track Two Operation and Creating Cover

• Cover Story: Economic Development
  • The operation required a believable, overt purpose to mask covert communication. Schaefer recruited Representative Walter Jones and others under the guise of exploring “economic development” in Pakistan’s tribal regions.
    • “As any good operation, you’re going to have to have a substantial and cohesive and believable cover story.” (09:53)
  • The Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS) was used as a think tank front—unbeknownst to its actual staff at the time (12:08).
• Layered Deception and Use of Unwitting Participants
  • Members of Congress, government contractors, and think tank personnel had no idea they were part of the operation:
    • “How common is it to bring in unwitting members of Congress...is that something that happens more than we realize?” – “Probably.” (11:08)

3. Negotiation Tactics and The Web of Covert Action

• Contacting General Gul through British Intelligence
  • British intermediaries enabled Schaefer to reach General Gul directly, under the pretext of economic talks (07:32).
  • The initial conversations subtly raised the Bergdahl issue, with General Gul reading between the lines and being open to discussions “motivated by money” (08:54, 09:45).
• Creating Complex Cover – The ‘Argo’ Moment
  • Further camouflage was provided by producing a real London-based pilot TV show, "Spy's Eye", giving Schaefer plausible reasons for travel and in-person meetings.
    • “It is our Argo moment.” (17:25)
    • Crew and cast had no idea what was really happening behind the scenes (18:35).
• Negotiation Progress and Intelligence Insights
  • Progress was made: Haqqani intermediaries suggested $10 million would suffice for Bergdahl’s release, but the team anticipated a last-minute request to double the payment (13:57, 19:55).

4. Policy Shifts and the Derailment of the Operation

• US Shift from Cash-for-Hostage to Prisoner Swap
  • The covert plan was ready to be executed: pay the money, have ISI take custody from Haqqani, then special forces mount a raid in southern Pakistan to retrieve Bergdahl (23:13).
  • The operation was abruptly shut down at a senior level (24:17):
    • “I get a call...they say we’ve got some bad news, we're not going to be able to go with your option.”
• Obama’s Decision
  • Instead of a cash operation, the Obama Administration chose to exchange five Taliban detainees from Guantanamo Bay in return for Bergdahl, seeking to make progress on closing the detention facility (26:23).
  • The deal was marred by poor alignment—the Haqqani-aligned Taliban holding Bergdahl did not care about most of the released detainees, requiring a last-minute change to include the relevant Haqqani operative (27:06).

5. Aftermath and Reflective Analysis

• Surprises, Outcomes, and the Ethics of Secrecy
  • Senior US military leadership was kept in the dark about the prisoner swap decision for “political reasons” rather than operational security (28:27).
    • “The man in charge of the war should always know whatever’s happening.” (28:42)
  • Bergdahl’s own fate: tried for desertion, found guilty under the UCMJ, but ultimately a free man (29:28).
• Unwitting Participants’ Reactions
  • After the operation was exposed, Schaefer “came totally clean” to members of Congress involved, who expressed “a little bit of shock” but “were just fine with it” (30:04, 30:22).
• Hostage Negotiation Lessons
  • Taliban factions are not monolithic; understanding their fabric is crucial for effective negotiation (31:24).
    • “You have to understand the very fabric of the organization to be effective...what the motivation is of those leaders and then act on that motivation.” (32:09)
  • Patience and adaptability are essential: “You can influence events, but those events can influence you as well.” (32:58)

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Being “Retired” from Espionage:
  • “We never really retire. It’s kind of like being in the mafia. They always call you back when they want something.”
    — Tony Schaefer (01:46)
• On Operation Irony:
  • “It was a grand irony that...they're trying to prevent me from having access to my book and classified information at the same time. I’m actually executing a highly classified operation.”
    — Tony Schaefer (04:47)
• On Using Economic Development as Cover:
  • “Wouldn’t it be nice, Congressman, if we set up a track two with Pakistan...He agreed...next thing you know we got a cover working in real time...”
    — Tony Schaefer (10:08)
• On Hidden Negotiations Behind a TV Show:
  • “You could have stood right next to me...and you would have never known I was negotiating with Pakistani intelligence guys for the release of Bo Bergdahl.”
    — Tony Schaefer (18:57)
• On Political Calculations:
  • “The man in charge of the war should always know whatever’s happening. If...the commanding general...tells me he can’t influence this, then there’s something else going on.”
    — Tony Schaefer (26:23)
• On Lessons Learned:
  • “The Taliban is not a monolithic organization...You have to understand the very fabric of the organization...Sometimes you can do it through money, sometimes through intimidation, but you’ve got to understand...who the individuals are and what part of the Taliban is.”
    — Tony Schaefer (31:27, 32:25)
• On the Never-Ending Oath:
  • “I took the oath of office, and the oath of office never expires.”
    — Tony Schaefer (33:24)

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Timestamps for Key Segments

• [01:46] – Tony called back into action, "never really retire"
• [04:47] – Irony of being under lawsuit for classified material while running an off-the-books op
• [06:31] – Why General Gul, not current ISI, was key
• [09:53] – Creating cover through economic development and unwitting Congressional involvement
• [12:08] – Using think tanks and contractors as fronts
• [17:25] – “Argo moment”: TV show as cover for negotiations in London
• [23:13] – Outline of the planned cash-for-hostage operation
• [24:17] – Operation shut down, the emotional and practical fallout
• [26:23] – Obama’s switch to the prisoner exchange, rationale, and execution
• [28:27] – Top US general surprised, shut out of decision
• [29:28] – Bergdahl’s legal and personal resolution
• [31:24] – Lessons for negotiating with the Taliban
• [32:58] – “You can influence events, but those events can influence you as well.”
• [33:24] – Schaefer’s view on his continuing sense of duty

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Additional Insights & Reflections

• Covert operations often require multi-layered, creative cover stories, and a willingness to utilize unwitting participants for operational security.
• The divides between policy, intelligence, and military leadership can impact hostage rescue operations profoundly—even derailing them at the finish line.
• Negotiations with organizations like the Taliban are complicated by their fractured, factional nature; understanding internal dynamics is critical.
• Political aims can override operational intelligence, sometimes at the cost of effectiveness or clarity.
• Despite emotional investment, intelligence professionals must be ready to walk away when policy shifts.

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This episode provides a rare, intricate, and sometimes astonishing look at the real mechanics of wartime intelligence, the many layers of cover and deception, the role of policy versus practical action, and the human dimensions of crisis negotiation. It is as much about what happened as about how the US government—and the intelligence community—operates when no official solutions exist.

Transcript

[A]

You're listening to the Cyberwire Network powered by N2K.

[B]

Welcome to Spycast, the official podcast of the international spy Museum. I'm your host, Sasha Ingber, and each week I take you into the shadows of espionage, intelligence and and covert operations across the globe. In 2009, Bo Bergdahl walked away from his army post in eastern Afghanistan, only to be abducted and held hostage until 2014. He was captured by the Taliban and then handed to the Haqqani Network, an aligned terrorist group. And U.S. officials said they kept Bergdahl in a metal cage and in total darkness after he tried to escape. By 2012, the US government was turning to Tony Schaefer for help. The retired military intelligence officer had directed several special mission task forces that conducted black operations. Now Tony was asked to create a track 2 non official scheme to help secure Bergdahl's release. A ploy that pulled in Congress, back channels in Pakistani intelligence, and British and American media outlets. Here's Tony.

[A]

Tony, welcome. Thank you for coming.

[C]

Good to be here. Thanks for having me.

[A]

So you're retired and how do you get linked up with Boeberg Doll's abduction?

[C]

So, as you guys probably know from being at the spy museum, we never really retire. It's kind of like being in the mafia. They always call you back when they want something, and that's what happened here. So I was driving down Constitution Avenue and I get a call from a number.

[D]

We'll just leave it at an unlisted number.

[C]

And the question was, hey, could you. We need to talk to you on a secure line.

[D]

Can you get to a secure line?

[C]

And my answer was like, well, you know, I don't have a clearance. Like, come on, we know you can get to a secure line. Get to the secure line now.

[D]

We need to talk to you.

[C]

It's like, okay. So I did what I was asked to do by this organization that will remain nameless, but people can probably figure it out from listening to what we're talking about. I go to where I have access, believe it or not, to the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve actually has a skiff, a secure information facility in their printing room. And I'm not joking, it's like, it was like out of a movie. You have to get into the building, which I had clearance to get into. And they walk you down this long hall of all these printing machines, literally. And you'd think you're in the basement of some industrial building, and next thing you know, there's a little door to the left you get into and there's this whole command center. And so I get in there and I say, look, I gotta take a secure call. And they say, sure.

[A]

Had you ever taken a call in this printing room?

[C]

Skiff maybe.

[A]

So what did they say?

[C]

So I get the call and I get on the phone with their point of contact and they said, do you know anything about Bo Bergdahl? And it's like, not really. I mean, I know he had walked away from his post in Afghanistan, there was a big search for him, but

[D]

it's not something I'm really paying attention to.

[C]

And the next question was very telling. It's like, how long would it take for you to get in touch with Hamid?

[D]

Goal?

[C]

I don't know, probably about two days.

[A]

This is a three star general who had served as the head of Pakistani's inter services intelligence ISI in the 1980s. So before we get to who he is, do you have any idea what you're getting roped into at this point?

[C]

None whatsoever. I mean, zero clue, nothing. There was a whole range of things which had popped up that were of interest. And the notable feature of just being an intelligence officer, it's kind of interesting when people recognize a skill set and

[D]

they want you to use it for a certain purpose.

[C]

And this was kind of that. It's just out of the blue, can

[D]

you do something to help us? And that's where this started.

[A]

And there's a little bit of irony here because you had been in Washington D.C. to deal with access to classified information, if I'm remembering this correctly.

[C]

So yeah, it's an interesting irony. So as this developed, and I think it's great to bring this up, we were in a legal battle at the time regarding Operation Dark Heart. There was over 256 redactions of my

[D]

memoir, Operation Dark Heart, Special Operations on the Front Line of Afghanistan and the Path to Victory.

[C]

And we were in a legal battle, you know, that came out in 2010, this is now 2012. And one of the grand ironies is that during the time we were fighting in court later the same day, I'm in this secure facility talking to special, these special operations folks over Top secret, clearly off the books operations that we didn't want to acknowledge. So it was a grand irony that in one case, they're trying to prevent me from having access to my book and classified information at the same time. I'm actually executing an off the books, highly classified operation. It's one of those things that could

[D]

only happen in Washington.

[A]

It could only happen in Washington or in the movies. So let's talk about General Gould. Why is it that you're now being

[B]

asked to contact him?

[A]

Why would he hold the cards instead of the current ISI director?

[C]

That's an excellent question. So there are two reasons I eventually learned about. First, I did know at the time that he was the father of the Taliban. Basically it was his efforts in the 80s to create the mujahideen that we'd worked with, we Department of Defense and CIA to push back against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

[A]

He actually worked with the CIA?

[C]

Absolutely.

[A]

To push the Soviets out of Afghanistan.

[C]

Absolutely. He was part of the team. But as a consequence of that, the Taliban sprang up and became something of a issue for both countries. The, the Haqqani network was one of those networks which we believed, and I've seen nothing to counter my belief, that were wholly, wholly owned subsidiary of the Pakistani intelligence service still to this day, by the way. So it turned out, while I didn't know at the moment of the question, how long will it take for you

[D]

to get a hold of, of Hamid Gould?

[C]

The, the rationale was by the folks who asked me to run the op is we think he has more influence than the current ISI over Haqqani. That was the thinking.

[A]

Now, this is not only a person who had worked with the United States, but then did become disillusioned with it.

[B]

And he was said to have warned

[A]

the Taliban when there were missile launches targeting the Taliban. So what was the logic in thinking that this man would prove useful in securing Bergdahl's release money?

[C]

So Hamid and I were friendly in the fact that we'd been on BBC talking about the war, having served in Afghanistan, when the powers that be here in Washington decided we wanted to have this potential for a off the books, under the radar contact. They knew I, they knew I knew him. And they basically the question was, how long will it take for you to

[D]

get in touch with him?

[C]

And it was two days.

[A]

So if it takes two days, how do you end up getting in touch with him?

[C]

So there was a network that still exists within the United Kingdom, within the British, that basically help the Pakistani intelligence service. So I went through my contacts in England to say, look, we'd like to have informal contact with Hamid Gould. And they said, yeah, that's fine. And they gave me his phone number

[D]

and said, you can reach out directly.

[A]

So what was the pretext of the call? And then what was that question? What was that first call like?

[C]

So the tribal area was the context. So as you probably still know, there's right now as we speak, as we're taping, there's some friction between the Pakistanis, Afghanistan, just a little. Just a little. There's a common, almost a war there. And so it's all about.

[A]

Pakistanis have been launching missiles into Afghanistan.

[C]

So it's about this tribal area. So one of the things, the reason was perfectly logical. I want to talk to Hamid about some potential economic development concepts that would maybe bring stabilization to the, the ungoverned area. And that was the premise for the call.

[A]

Okay, so the, the phone's ringing. General Gould picks up. Then what?

[C]

So General Gould was open to the conversation. And we hinted during the first phone call that there was issues we'd like to meet or regarding certain good faith

[D]

options we'd like to look at.

[C]

And without getting into detail, we kind of hinted. I kind of hinted that the Bergdahl

[D]

issue would be something we'd want to talk about. And he was open to that.

[A]

So tell me more about what he was like, because I know that he died. He had a brain hemorrhage at the time.

[C]

He was of extraordinarily sound body and mind, and he was very irascible. He's like any other retired general who has an attitude. He had an attitude, and that's okay. He knew who I was. So he knew that, that when I contacted him, it wasn't just some other think tank guy. And he knew that this was a

[D]

call about something else.

[C]

It wasn't so much about economic development. But he played along. I mean, spies kind of know when

[D]

you're talking about secondary issues which are going to be the primary thing you get to eventually.

[A]

So he's motivated by money. He's reading between the lines.

[C]

Absolutely.

[A]

And are you pulling in members of Congress under the guise of economic development in tribal regions?

[C]

Yeah, I did. And they didn't know it, so. So as we start developing this, as any good operation, you're going to have to have a substantial and cohesive and believable cover story. So one of the first places I go is to my friend Walter Jones.

[D]

Representative Walter Jones, God rest your soul, one of my friends and mentors. He was a representative from North Carolina.

[C]

And I've been working with him. And I said in a meeting, it's like, wouldn't it be nice, Wouldn't it be nice, Congressman? Wouldn't it be nice, Walter, if we set up a track two with Pakistan so we can kind of open and open this informal negotiation and try to take the heat off the administration? And Walter agreed. It's like, that's a great idea. Why don't we do that? And next thing you know, we got to cover working in real time and as the primary effort of being economic discussions with the country of Pakistan, with

[D]

members of Congress and former military folks.

[A]

Okay, so let's just pause for a second. How common is it to bring in unwitting members of Congress, our diplomatic corps, members of our military? They have no idea that they are being used. Is that something that happens more often than we realize in intelligence operations?

[D]

Probably.

[A]

So anytime someone says, I have a good idea, well, there's.

[C]

This town is full of good idea merchants. Don't get me wrong. I mean, you can't swing a dead cat in this town without hitting a good idea merchant. What. What makes good ideas good ideas which are actually actionable is having an understanding of the environment and people. So in this case, it just so happened I had the right ingredients to put together the team that was necessary

[D]

to be the overt cover for the operation.

[A]

So while these economic development efforts are underway, how did you start trying to negotiate for Bergdahl? Did you hear the general making any subtle demands? Was he showing any cards here?

[C]

So, yeah, let me go into the shape of the operation. I think the shape will help you understand the answer to your question. When we did this, we did it as a think tank. It was the center for Advanced Defense

[D]

Studies, which is still here in Washington.

[C]

They didn't know we were doing it

[D]

either at the time, but they do now.

[C]

They do now. It's okay, Dave.

[D]

All is forgiven.

[C]

Anyway. And we did it in such a way that we engaged a big government contractor. I don't want to say the name because they get upset about it, too. And they were a partner in this, too.

[A]

I'm noticing a trend, Tony, but I digress.

[C]

The big government contractor kind of knew

[D]

what was going on.

[C]

Just saying.

[A]

I'm never getting coffee with you for the record, but okay, so you brought them in.

[C]

This was a tapestry of individuals and organizations that would offer up a legitimate. And by the way, who could argue with the idea of actually trying to find a path to economic development, to bring stability to the. To the ungoverned zone? It was a good idea. And so the COVID actually took on a life of its own, which is a good thing. Nobody would ever want to stand in the way of actually doing this. So the tapestry of the COVID was actually completely legitimate and actually functioned to create the conditions for the negotiation. So this was an extensive effort that people had to understand, Look, I'm doing this economic development.

[D]

But the real issue is Bo Bergdahl.

[C]

And that's how it started. And so we started recognizing as we were building this that we had space and time to do the informal discussions with Hamid and the crew. So we started hinting pretty early on there's going to be money involved, and this is what we think you'd be willing to take. So we were able to figure out through these informal contacts that they were going to be willing to be paid about $10 million to convince the Haqqani

[D]

network to release Boberg Doll.

[C]

And then we had a scheme to

[D]

go get him and everything in addition to that, if that was going to work.

[C]

So we had to start preparing for

[D]

face to face negotiations.

[A]

So let's turn to Bergdahl specifically. I assume that his desertion from his battalion doesn't influence the actual intensity of the negotiation. I'd like you to confirm that. And number two, affect how valuable he was perceived to be by the Haqqanis because he is labeled a deserter.

[C]

The first part, did his attitude affect

[D]

our effort to return him? No.

[C]

I've been heavily criticized by a number

[D]

of folks because I did this during the Obama administration.

[C]

I'm a spy. My job is to protect and defend our country. And if the. The people in charge say we want him back, my job is to help get him back. Second part of the question, the PA

[D]

Standing Intelligence Service were militarily centric. I think they recognized that. That he was a resource worth exploring.

[C]

And I think, frankly, whoever. Whoever set me off on this analyzed

[D]

correctly what the ISI was interpreting regarding his value.

[A]

Okay, so now It's January of 2013. You're planning to meet General Gould in London.

[C]

Yeah.

[A]

Can you tell me about some of the work on the back end to make the meeting happen?

[C]

So General Gould had upset the British to be polite, and so I had to go meet with members of Parliament.

[A]

What did he do?

[C]

Well, it had to do with, I don't know, financial schemes, which really, you know, are maybe illegal. I didn't want to get into it, to be honest with you. It's like, whatever he did, I don't want to know.

[A]

There's a little bit of a don't ask, don't tell situation here.

[C]

Yeah, definitely. And there was essentially a warrant out

[D]

to arrest him in England.

[C]

So it's like, hey, could we get that warrant kind of set aside? Because I'd offered to go other places to negotiate face to face, and I'd often go to Pakistan. It's like, no, under no conditions. Are you going to Pakistan? Like, yes, I was that crazy. I would have gone anyway. They said, no, no, we have to

[D]

pick a third spot that we feel that it'll be sufficiently neutral for both sides to sit down and have a worthwhile and detailed conversation. So England, London was the place that we picked for that.

[A]

Are the Brits amenable to your saying, hey, this person who is basically Persona non grata in your country, we would like to bring him here?

[C]

Well, the British members of Parliament were going to be willing to use their authority to talk to the British authorities. So the answer is, yeah, I think there was sufficient interest in cooperating on this. Yes.

[A]

Under the guise of economic development in the tribal areas.

[D]

That's correct. Yes.

[A]

Okay.

[C]

Yes. The COVID was used for purposes of getting General Gould to England.

[D]

Yes, that's correct.

[C]

And during the time I was in England, we used the COVID for me being there to do all this was the production of a pilot for Travel Channel called Spy's Eye. London is one of the world's truly great cities. A dream location for tourists from around the world. I'm going to show you what a different side of London, a secret side of espionage and intrigue that most people never know exists.

[A]

And so this, you tell me, is your Argo moment.

[C]

It is our Argo moment.

[A]

This is a reference, of course, to the fake film that was used to rescue American diplomats who were hiding out in revolutionary Iran. Except we're not talking about a fake film production. We are talking about a real TV show.

[C]

It's. It's available on the Internet right now. It was a pilot that we were paid to. To film in London. And by the way, I think it's a great series.

[D]

I just want to pick it up.

[A]

Well, you're biased.

[C]

I am biased. I'm the star, so. Of course. So we filmed Spy's Eye in the. All around London. And during that time, we were. I was having time to meet with our Pakistani intelligence contacts to start the

[D]

negotiations, the earnest negotiations for Bow Bergdahl. That's where the real negotiation started.

[A]

So let me wrap my head around this. Yeah, You're. I don't know if you're in a studio, if you're sitting at a restaurant eating fish and chips, if there's, you know, a producer around, how is this all taking place?

[C]

It was happening right there on with the crew. We actually had producers, we had actors, we had the crew. This was like a dozen people.

[A]

Were any of the cast or the crew?

[C]

I had no idea. No, it's a Running joke now. Anytime I talk to them, it's like

[D]

they had no idea what we were

[C]

doing, what I was doing on the side.

[A]

So what were these conversations that you were having and how could you coordinate both at the same time?

[C]

Well, again, it's, it's all about trying to create the perception of cooperation between

[D]

some of these folks and the negotiations.

[C]

You could have stood right next to me during this session and you would have never known I was negotiating with Pakistani intelligence guys for the release of Bo Bergdahl because we, we, we knew what we were talking about. But for the third party, just observing would have had no clue, would have had no clue that we were actually

[D]

negotiating about trying to get Bowberg doll

[C]

back and talking about what prices were

[D]

going to be willing to do. It was all hidden kind of in open text language.

[A]

Did any of that audio make it onto the actual series?

[C]

Maybe you have to go. Look, this is I think a good example of kind of, you know, everything coming together for a little microcosm of,

[D]

of what Argo did.

[A]

Right. So we're in sort of like life imitates art and art imitates art and art imitates life spiral pretty much. Did progress get made in trying to get Bergdahl out?

[C]

Absolutely. So after our Argo moment, we figured out after the fact, based on some

[D]

other intel, which I don't want to

[C]

get into, how we knew that they

[D]

were going to at the last minute ask for double. They were going to ask for like $20 million instead of $10 million.

[A]

When you're going through the airport in London, Heathrow, when you're leaving, are you thinking to yourself what is happening here? How have I spent all this time? What's going through your head as these days are going by and you're meeting with the former head of Pakistani intelligence and having all of these interactions with other people.

[C]

It's another day in the office. No, I mean for anybody who reads my intel bio, it's my retirement bio

[D]

goes through and talks about this. I mean, I ran the first undercover cyber unit back in the 90s before anybody figured it out. I've been working high level operations where I debriefed the White House on a regular basis.

[C]

So to me this is just another operation that I wanted to see successful.

[D]

That's it.

[A]

What is the US government officially doing to try to get Bergdahl out?

[C]

I was aware of everything because there were multiple efforts. The military was doing any number of operations regarding trying to consider doing raids to go grab him.

[B]

When we come back, Tony Explains how

[A]

the promising negotiations for Bergdahl's release totally fall apart.

[B]

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[A]

All right, so now we're in 2014. The London meeting happened. How close do you feel you are to actually securing Bergdahl's release? You have this information, they're going to ask for 20 million. Are you getting close?

[C]

Yeah, we had already gotten that all cleared. The issue really became more of policy than capacity. So I think people on our side were convinced this would work. The intelligence and other folks who would have to action this part of the concept, believe it or not, was pay the money and then I'll just tell you what the plan was to basically have the Haqqani network release Bergdahl to the isi. Because the isi, those guys, the same, it's like the retired guys and active guys, they're kind of interchangeable.

[A]

So.

[C]

So the plan was then once that the Pakistani ISI had taken charge of him from the Haqqani network to move Bergdahl to a southern port city in Pakistan where the special operations guys would do a raid to capture him. So basically what I did, what we did, would have never been known. And that's basically what I really wish would have happen. Would have done this heroic nabbing of Bergdahl and everything would have been back to normal.

[A]

Now, I know you say that this is what you wished had happened. President Obama chose a different track.

[C]

He did.

[A]

Before we talk about what he chose, how did you find out that this was not going to go the way that you had thought it would?

[C]

So I get a call and I am requested by two of the intelligence

[D]

officers from the three letter agency to come meet to talk about the operation.

[C]

And so we pick Joe Theismans down

[D]

in Old Town Alexandria, right next to the metro.

[C]

And we get a booth, sit down and they say we've got some bad

[D]

news, we're not going to be able to go with your option.

[C]

And it's like what we have just put together a massive effort, massive. I Mean, they, and they were aware of every component that was involved because of the senior officers. I had to read into it and it's like, yeah, there's a decision that

[D]

we're not going to do this.

[A]

So I mean, when you hear that, how, how difficult is it to shut your operation down from a functional standpoint and also.

[C]

Good question.

[A]

Emotionally. Well, because you've been so invested in

[C]

this emotionally, it's kind of like as a professional, it's like you're kind of like, seriously, after all this work, you're just going to walk away. And this happens more than people understand. I mean, it's like, okay, you know, fine. The turning it off because of the momentum of the COVID was a completely different issue. It's like this thing has a mind of its own now because there were still negotiations and meetings at the Pakistani embassy and in New York. I was actually meeting with the Pakistani diplomats in Manhattan over some of this stuff.

[A]

When you're like, I got food poisoning, I'm sorry, I can't make that meeting.

[C]

No, no, no, we continued. No, I was authorized to make whatever because it's a think tank thing. So, you know, I'm just doing think tank stuff. You can't. And that's one of the notable things I think most intelligent. You can't just be, have alerting behavior and say, oh, okay, things. No, no, you had to continue with the momentum, with the COVID no matter what. And which we did, by the way, and notably that night, because I was, I wasn't pleased. I'm not going to say there was no reaction. There was. I sent a screamer off to the commander of isaf, the commander commanding general of our forces in Afghanistan, saying, what the hell's going on? And I figure he, since he's the guy in charge of the war, would know. And he basically came back and said, I can't change this. Which was an odd answer from the guy in charge. So if the guy in charge, who's a four star general, tells me he can't influence this, then there's something else going on.

[A]

So Obama makes this calculation. He had wanted to shut down Guantanamo Bay. He had campaigned on that. And instead of just paying 10 or 20 million for Bergdahl, he decides that he can kill two birds with one stone or more birds in that he can switch these Taliban detainees, get them out of Gitmo, get Bergdalt back.

[C]

Yeah.

[A]

Today, as we sit here in 2026, Guantanamo Bay remains open. The Haqqani aligned Taliban are still holding people hostage. They are what did you think of this deal? And has your view on it changed?

[C]

That's a great question, and I'm going to give you a bit of a complex answer. So the. The exchange happened, the five Taliban for Bergdahl. The problem is this. There was only going to be four of the Taliban released. They had to add the fifth guy, the Haqqani guy, because they had intended to conclude an Haqqani guy. So that's how bad this deal was. It's like they didn't even recognize, like, no, no. The Taliban element holding Bergdahl doesn't care about these other four guys. They care about this one Haqqani guy. So they had to add the fifth guy at the end. But to your point, the policy was

[D]

we need to clear out Gitmo of all the Taliban. So I thought it was a horrible

[C]

decision, one which didn't actually get us anywhere, and we were still at war with the Taliban.

[D]

So I thought it was a bad move. I never supported it. I thought it was a mistake.

[C]

I'll say this, too. At the end, the commander of isaf,

[D]

the commanding general of isaf, who was General Joseph Dunford, Marine Corps General Joe

[C]

Dunford, he came back after he left

[D]

Afghanistan and he became Commandant of the Marine Corps.

[C]

And we had a meeting for a

[D]

number of reasons in his office.

[C]

And at the very end of our

[D]

meeting at the Pentagon, when he was

[C]

back, he stopped and said, tony, I

[D]

got to tell you something.

[C]

I said, what's that? He says, I didn't know.

[D]

It's like, what do you mean you didn't know?

[C]

He says, they didn't tell me. I didn't know until after the fact

[D]

that they were going to swap the five Taliban for Bergdahl.

[A]

Was that for operational security?

[D]

No, that was for political reasons, because the man in charge of the war

[C]

should always know whatever's happening.

[D]

And if you remember, the exchange of

[C]

Bergdahl happened where we had to go

[D]

into Pakistan with a special operations helicopter to grab him.

[C]

So it was notable that the commanding

[D]

general was not told about the political deal. Yeah.

[A]

And what happened to Bertdahl?

[C]

So, interesting question. He's now pretty much a free man.

[D]

He was eventually cleared in federal court of allegations of desertion. General Mark Milley, who was formerly chairman of the Joint Chiefs under President Trump,

[C]

was prior to that, the Chief of Staff of the army, where I had contact with him. Before that, he was Commander of Forces

[D]

Command, and he was the general who made the decision when he'd been returned to charge him with desertion.

[C]

Which, by the way, he was charged

[D]

with desertion, tried under the UCMJ Uniform Code of Military justice, and found guilty of desertion.

[A]

So have you had any conversation with Bergdahl since this happened? Does he even know that you were doing this?

[D]

Probably not.

[C]

I mean, other than there was some hearings on this after the fact.

[D]

If he had actually paid attention.

[C]

Some of this came up directly during

[D]

hearings regarding the whole Bergdahl issue.

[A]

So let's go back to Capitol Hill now. Members of Congress, how did they respond?

[C]

A little bit of shock.

[D]

I had to go back and apologize.

[C]

But I always pointed out, it's like, look, my job is to do things

[D]

which are necessary for the purposes of intelligence collection and special operations.

[C]

I came totally clean.

[D]

It's like this is something we were trying to do for the purposes of quietly getting him back without any drama.

[C]

And everybody I spoke to was.

[D]

Was just fine with it.

[C]

A little bit surprised, but, you know,

[D]

I don't think they were entirely surprised based on what I did for a living and what I do for a living.

[A]

So why did you have to tell them?

[D]

I felt ethically I had to do that. These people are. Were close friends and mentors and.

[C]

And they still are. I can say nobody was upset, which

[D]

I was very pleased with.

[A]

Are there aspects of what you learned then that would be useful in hostage negotiations today when we speak specifically of the Taliban, they're still holding Americans, and I want to take a moment to say who they are. Mahmoud Habibi. He was arrested by the Taliban after a drone strike killed Al Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri. He's been held since August of 2022, denied access to American diplomats, communication with his wife, with his daughter. Does what you went through provide any lesson that can be useful in negotiations here?

[C]

Yes and no. So the first lesson about the Taliban,

[D]

is there a tapestry? The Taliban is not a monolithic organization. You just can't go to one guy,

[C]

say, oh, he's the Taliban leader. We were doing a search for a

[D]

number of Taliban leaders based on the fact that there was different factions.

[C]

And often, like we talked about today regarding Haqqani, Haqani is like a wholly owned subsidiary of the Pakistani of Taliban, and they're different than the Afghan and Taliban. So going to negotiate with a Connie would mean nothing to the Taliban in Afghanistan? Holding an American citizen based on.

[D]

On someone being killed by, you know, the Zawahiri hit.

[C]

So the answer is, it depends because you have to understand the very fabric

[D]

of the organization to be effective in dealing with the organization.

[C]

And that's the first thing I would recommend those who are looking at this to actually figure out what the motivation

[D]

is of those leaders and then act on that motivation. Sometimes you can do it through money,

[C]

sometimes you can do it through intimidation. But you've got to understand down to a very granular level of who the

[D]

individuals are and what part of the Taliban is.

[A]

We also see that sometimes negotiations move slowly because of turf wars, issues with communication. Are there lessons there, too?

[C]

Well, the fact that this operation took over, you know, two years to develop and run. Yeah. You have to be very patient. And you can't always depend on people acting like you want them to act. You can't control people, places, or things. That's one of the first things you

[D]

learn as a case officer. You can influence events, but those events can influence you as well. So I think that's one of the lessons here.

[A]

I feel like any good therapist should be saying that. I wish my therapist told me that. Okay, last question, Tony. Let's say you get another phone call asking you if you can put the three letter agency in touch with somebody else. Are you saying yes?

[C]

So I took the oath of office,

[D]

and the oath of office never expires.

[C]

So, you know, I think that my

[D]

obligation as a, as a military intelligence, a military case officer, is to always support the objectives of our nation, even if I disagree with them at times.

[A]

A real pleasure speaking with you.

[C]

You too, ma'.

[A]

Am.

[D]

It's been great.

[B]

Thanks for listening to this episode of Spycast. If you like the episode, give us a follow on Apple, Spotify or wherever you get your podcasts and leave us

[A]

a rating or review. It really helps.

[B]

If you have any feedback or you want to hear about a particular topic, you can reach us by [e-mail] I'm your host, Sasha Ingber, and the show is brought to you by N2K Network's goat rodeo and the International Spy museum in Washington, D.C.