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- [00:02]
A
You're listening to the Cyberwire Network, powered by N2K. Welcome to Spycast, the official podcast of the International Spy Museum. I'm your host, Sasha Ingber, and each week I take you into the shadows of espionage, intelligence, and covert operations across the globe. As part of his 26 years at the Drug Enforcement Administration, retired Special Agent Chris Feistel was on a team that brought the demise of the Cali cartel in Colombia. One of the world's biggest crime syndicates. It earned billions each year, from selling marijuana in the 1970s to harder drugs in the decades that followed. The so called godfathers of Cali bribed judges, lawmakers, police commanders, and military officers. They used Boeing 727s to haul drugs outside of Colombia. And they even funneled millions to a candidate who won the 1994 presidential election, effectively buying the race. The details are told in Chris's book. After Escobar and and season three of Narcos, Chris sat down with me to discuss Callie's intelligence tactics and capabilities and how he brought it all down. Hey, Chris. Welcome to Spycast.
- [01:38]
B
Hi. Good afternoon. It's great to be with you.
- [01:41]
A
So let's start in the 80s and the 90s. This is a time when the Cali cartel is fighting with Medellin and Pablo Escobar specifically. They realize that intelligence could be useful for them, and they ultimately get this nickname called the Kali kgb. Can you tell me more about what that really meant?
- [02:04]
B
Sure. So at the time, Kali's intelligence and counterintelligence arm was so advanced and so sophisticated that the DEA and the CIA started referring to them as the Kali kgb. And part of the reason that they did that was because the Cali cartel was able to corrupt a great many people. On one of the raids that we went on, we found a list of 2,800 corrupt officials, and there were thousands more. And because of that, they were able to insulate themselves with all of these corrupt officials, and they offered them some sort of protection from enforcement action by the Colombian government. And just to give you an example, there was, you know, a six year investigation by the Colombian government. And during that time, they found 36,925 checks from 90 different bank accounts that had moved $500 million. So you can see how well insulated they were.
- [03:04]
A
Wow. One list, 2,800 names, millions of dollars per year. And also There was a US raid in 1994 which found a computer worth one and a half million dollars. What was on it? That was notable.
- [03:23]
B
So at the time, this seizure of this Computer was the most advanced and sophisticated technology that the US Government had seized from drug traffickers. And it was an IBM AS 400 mainframe computer. It was about 7ft high, 4ft wide, had an incalculable amount of storage. And there are only about four or five of these in the world at the time. And what they did is they stored all of their technology and their information on here. So it was sent to the U.S. and after about three weeks, the U.S. was able to crack that technology. And they found that the Cali Cartel had the ability to wiretap over 400 telephones a month. They had this computer during the war with Escobar, so as a way to try to find informants or people who were cooperating with Medellin or the US Government. So any individual who was calling Medellin or calling the US Embassy, and then they were able to wiretap the phone of that person. And if they were an informant, they would immediately be killed. But that was because they had these contacts in the phone company that allowed them to intercept 400 telephones a month.
- [04:29]
A
And then there were the taxi drivers, so many different types of people who were recruited. They also used these low power walkie talkies, which were hard to trace, burner phones where they would throw them out before the judges issued search warrants. There was a modified Cessna aircraft who taught them about all of these things that allowed them to be able to conduct counterintelligence and intelligence operations of this nature.
- [05:04]
B
Well, the Cali Cartel used a lot of different individuals to get this expertise, which was able to help them in the war with the Medellin Cartel, as well as against the US Government and the Colombian government. They used the Spanish, the eta, which was a Basque separatist terrorist group. They were the ones that taught them how to use remote controlled car bombs. They used the British, the sas, the Special Air Service, the Special Boat Service, as well as people from the French Foreign Legion to come in and train them on combat weaponry, surveillance, things like that. There's also stories where you hear that some of the Israeli groups were coming in to train not only the Medellin Cartel, but the Cali Cartel as well. And plus, you also had a lot of very sophisticated and highly trained Colombian military officials, because at the time, they're fighting these left wing guerrilla groups, such as the farc, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and right wing paramilitary groups, the auc. So they had a very well rounded network of people that they could rely on.
- [06:10]
A
And then when Pablo Escobar is killed in a shootout in the mid-1990s. Now Cali really is able to exert power here, buying more officials, as you had described, from government to law enforcement. And I'm wondering what it was like for you, knowing that law enforcement in Colombia could be compromised and how much more difficult it would be to then try to arrest the Cali leader, Miguel Rodriguez.
- [06:43]
B
Well, it was very difficult at first. And when myself and my partner, Dave Mitchell, we first got to Cali, we were assigned to work with the police and the military search blocks, which were designed to go after the biggest and the baddest narcos at the time. And we had very strict rules and protocols in what we can do and what we couldn't do as far as rules of engagement. So, initially, when we got there, we were never allowed to leave the police or military base without an escort, and we weren't allowed to conduct any kind of unilateral activity. But after time on the ground there, we found out that all of the operations that we were doing with the search blocks were compromised. So we figured, and we suspected that many of the people that we were working with and dealing with were corrupt.
- [07:25]
A
Had you ever been in a dynamic quite like that? At what point were you in your career?
- [07:31]
B
No, I was six years removed from the DEA Academy. I was young. I had just turned 30 by the time I had got there. I had never worked in an environment like that. Colombia at the time was the most dangerous country in the world. And plus, let me add one other thing. Myself and my partner, I'm a good 6 2. My partner is a good 6 3. And at the time, there was no Americans in Cali at all because of the danger and the security. So it's very difficult for us to move around to operate. We had to do stuff at night. So we had a lot of challenges when we first got there. So we had to eventually remove ourselves from the search block. We had to establish safe houses where we lived on our own. We had to get our own vehicles. We had to do our own surveillances. We had to do our own reconnaissance missions. We had to plan and coordinate our own operations. And we had to do everything at night under the COVID of darkness because we couldn't be seen during the day talking with some of our assets, because if that was the case, then they would immediately be identified as assets for the US Government and killed. So it was very difficult and challenging for us to do our job.
- [08:41]
A
And you ultimately ended up working with a specific police unit that had been attached to the CIA. Can you tell Us about who they were.
- [08:52]
B
Sure. So after almost about a year on the ground and operation after operation being compromised, so we developed intelligence. The only way that we could do that was to utilize a very small covert group from Bogota that was attached to the CIA. And this group was trained in the United States by the agency. They were polygraphed. They were drug tested. They had worked on a number of sensitive investigations. And we figured that that was the best shot that we had to circumvent the corruption at the search block. Because the search block was a quick reactionary force designed to overpower their targets with speed and, you know, overwhelming firepower. That's not what we needed. We needed a covert surveillance unit, and the only one that we could utilize was the one attached to the CIA.
- [09:41]
A
Does the day and night blend? Are you collecting exhaustion day by day as you continue to hunt down Miguel and ultimately his brother Gilberto Rodriguez, who are both in charge of the cartel?
- [09:57]
B
We weren't sleeping a lot. Our circadian rhythms were completely destroyed. We had lost a lot of weight. We weren't eating properly. So we were always coming and going at all hours of the night, just depending on what we needed to do. But, yeah, a lot of times, night, day, they. They all blended together.
- [10:14]
A
And the big break in this case came with Jorge Salcedo. That's a name that people might know if they watched season three of Narcos. And he is the head of Cali security. Tell me more about him.
- [10:29]
B
So Jorge Salcedo was an engineer by trade. He was recruited into the cali cartel in 1989. He worked as a reserve officer in the Colombian military. His father was a very famous general in Colombia. He had spent time in the United States at Fort Benning. So he spoke English. He was highly trained.
- [10:53]
A
He lived in Kansas for two years while his father attended an army college.
- [10:58]
B
Correct? He did. He lived in Georgia and as well as Kansas, I believe, as well. So he had a lot of the qualities that the Cali Cartel was looking for. He was, you know, an experienced military operative. He had an intelligence and counterintelligence background. He spoke English. He had contacts with British mercenaries. So while he was a captain in the reserves for the Colombian military, he had come in contact with a lot of these mercenaries from the United Kingdom. So they saw him as a valuable commodity. So they recruited him into the cartel to utilize those mercenaries to go after Pablo Escobar. But, you know, he realized he didn't have much of a choice. The cartel had told him his plan. He realized he couldn't Say no, he would have never walked out of that room. So he said that he would help them, provided that after Escobar was killed, he would no longer be part of the cartel. He would be free to leave. Of course, that didn't happen, and he was stuck in the cartel.
- [11:58]
A
So his army background and his mercenary connections were what made him valuable to Cali. And his dissatisfaction with having to stay in Cali is what made him valuable to the dea. But tell me more about what happened on that first approach.
- [12:17]
B
So I was finally able to get a telephone number for Jorge Salcedo. And we called him one morning, and I basically said, hey, I'm a friend of Eddie Kasiorowski, who was a customs agent in Miami. I said, I think we should talk. There's, I think, a few things where we may be able to help each other out. So we set up a meeting later that afternoon at 3:00 clock to discuss what it is that he could potentially do for us and then what we could do to help him.
- [12:53]
A
Okay. But we just talked about how Callie had phone tapping. They were keeping a close watch on everybody. So how did you know that you would be able to make this call?
- [13:06]
B
We had arranged to have the conversation in advance. So what he did, because he's the head of security, he knows the capabilities of the Cali kgb. He went to a business, like a public business, which he had, was kind of a friend of his, an associate, where he knew that the cartel or the police weren't listening or intercepting that phone call. We knew that he knew exactly who we were anyway, just because of all the spies reporting back to him that we were the only DEA agents working in Cali at the time.
- [13:39]
A
So it sounds like he is going to work with you. What is that first meeting like and where does it happen?
- [13:46]
B
So our first meeting, it's probably one of the most surreal meetings that I've ever had in my life in law enforcement. During the phone call, he says that I will meet you at 3 o' clock at seatt, which is a joint agricultural center about an hour from where we were. It's basically in the middle of nowhere. It's surrounded by sugar cane fields. There's nothing else out there. So when he said that, I immediately had visions of being kidnapped, killed, tortured, because why would we be meeting in such a remote area an hour from Cali? So it started to set off a lot of alarm bells, and it only got worse, the conversation to set this meeting up, because then he tells me I would have to come alone And I said, I'm absolutely not coming alone. We need to meet somewhere closer to the city. I need to bring my partner because we need a little bit more protection and cover. And he says a few things that really almost start to terrify me at that point. He says, well, if we're seen together, then it's not going to end well for either one of us. So by this time I'm thinking, like, is he trying to talk me out of this meeting or what? Because he's putting all these roadblocks and these red flags up. And I said, no, I have to come with my partner. He finally agreed to that, but then he said, no Colombians because he was the one that was paying a lot of the Colombian officials, the spies. So he didn't trust them. So he wanted to see two Americans that he could easily identify as being from the US Embassy.
- [15:16]
A
So you're driving to this remote area, to these sugarcane fields. It's an hour long drive. What are you and your partner talking about in the car?
- [15:28]
B
So we got there to the meeting three hours early. We were very, very heavily armed. You know, we had rifles, pistols, backup weapons. We were very heavily armed, but no vests, no recording. We found a good strategic spot for us where we can surveil the entire area and see everything. And we said, if we're there early enough, we'll be able to notice if it's a trap or an ambush. So, you know, Cali is extremely hot. We were sitting in the sun, just waiting, and we didn't see anything. And then finally, you know, at exactly 3 o', clock, he pulled down the road. And through our binoculars, we were able to determine as best we could that there was one occupant in the vehicle. So he showed up. We searched his car real quick. We searched him real quick. Nobody in the vehicle. He didn't have any weapons. And, you know, there it was. We were. We were meeting with the head of security for the Cali cartel.
- [16:19]
A
So what happened after that? You're standing there with him. What do you say to him? What does he say back?
- [16:25]
B
Well, the first thing we said to him was after we, you know, researched him and said, jorge, are we American enough looking for you? And it kind of broke the tension because, you know, I'm not going to lie to you, it was very high stress. We were very nervous. We just kept looking over our shoulder, waiting for something to happen. So, you know, he laughed, broke the ice a little bit. And then we got him into our car and the first thing he said Was, hey, this is a one time meeting. It's not going to last long. I'll try to help you find Miguel Rodriguez. Yeah, I'm not interested in the Colombian reward. And I'll pass you some information. And, you know, the only thing I want is safe passage for me and my family to the US he was a seasoned professional, right. He's in his, you know, late 40s, probably early 50s at that time. Here we are, two kids basically, in Colombia, trying to bring down the biggest drug trafficker in the world at the time. So he was a little bit concerned about our youth, about our experience in Cali and working in Colombia. But over time, we were vetting each other, we proved our bona fides. He was asking us questions, we responded with the right answers. And what turned into a quick one time meeting lasted three hours. We got an incredible amount of information and intelligence. We got more in three hours than we did in a year on the ground. And he agreed to keep meeting with us to help us go after Miguel Rodriguez. So it was a very productive meeting, that first one.
- [17:52]
A
And then you did meet him again. And he ended up having to think on his feet and made up quite the story.
- [18:00]
B
He did. Just as we're getting ready to leave, a police vehicle comes down, lights flashing. They come out, they, they pull Uzis on us. Salcedo, out of nowhere, probably our best undercover acting of my career, finally says to the Colombian police officers, hey, please just leave us alone. We're gay. And the police officers, like, they looked at me because of course I had long hair and, you know, they kind of shaking their head at me. And ultimately we were able to bribe the police officers to leave us alone because they bought the story that we were just out in the middle of a dark sugar cane field because we were gay.
- [18:37]
A
How much did Salcedo give you in that first meeting?
- [18:42]
B
He gave us, as the head of security, he gave us all kinds of intelligence that we didn't know anything about. He gave us intelligence about the security apparatus, where they would be set up, Miguel's habits, how he liked to stay up until very, very early in the morning, talking on the phone to, you know, Italian mafia, Russian organized crime figures. He told us the general area where Miguel Rodriguez was living at the time. So all of this information that we obtained during that time was very helpful for us on all of the raids that we did, and especially that next raid, the first raid that we did to try to capture Miguel Rodriguez, because what he told us to do was go up into the hills and watch the area. And whatever lights the stayed on last was where he was most likely at because he stayed up till 4 or 5 o' clock in the morning. So that's exactly what we did. We did surveillance. We were able to isolate apartments that had their lights on until 4 or 5 in the morning. We were able to drive by with the assistance of him and pinpoint the apartment and launch a raid.
- [19:47]
A
When we come back, Chris describes the raid that led to the capture of Cali cartel leader Miguel Rodriguez. In the world of covert operations, superior intel can be the difference between mission success and total compromise. Your enterprise is a high value target. Stop letting threat actors breach your digital perimeter. Palo Alto Networks provides the zero trust security platform you need to gain the upper hand. They turn noise into actionable intelligence. Automating your defenses across cloud network and endpoints. Don't operate in the shadows. Gain total visibility and help secure your mission. Visit paloaltonetworks.com and fortify your digital defenses. Today, Just a few days into working with Salcedo, you attempt to arrest Miguel Rodriguez. And it ultimately doesn't work out what happened that first time.
- [21:07]
B
So because of some of the intel that Salcedo gave us and the surveillance that we did, we were able to pinpoint two apartments that we thought Miguel Rodriguez was living in at the time. So what we did is we coordinated an operation. We brought troops over land from Bogota, which included the CIA vetted unit because we wanted to circumvent the corruption at the search block. But we had to use the search block at some point because they needed to secure the perimeter. So once we get to the to the target location, we secured it and then we called the search block and we started our search. We went into the apartment. Salcedo told us a bunch of things to look for to make sure that we were in the right place. Miguel only drove Mazda 626. We found one in the garage. He told us about this relay station that he had to transfer phone calls. We found that set up that he only ate certain kinds of food because he was hypoglycemic. We found that so his executive assistant was there. So we knew we were in the right place, but we had to try to find them. And we knew that they utilized sophisticated, what they call coleta, secret hiding spots. And we knew there was one there. We couldn't find it. We were in the apartment for about 10 hours that day. Finally after that, we were able to locate a hidden passage in the bathroom wall. We started to drill into the wall with With a drill, with a sledgehammer. We found the compartment. We are just getting ready to extract Miguel because we didn't see him, but we knew he was there. And a corrupt prosecutor came in from the regional office and basically told us, you are to cease and desist immediately. You're conducting an illegal operation. You're damaging Colombian property. Didn't say anything about that in the warrant. So they basically shut the operation down. We got arrested and we got removed from the apartment. And part of the reason that it happened was because of our liaison at the search block who was a corrupt captain. He was there on the raid. He was feeding intelligence back to the cartel. So the minute that we started to get close to where Miguel was at, they sent in their reinforcements and basically shut down the raid.
- [23:24]
A
Oh, that must have been a really, really painful moment for you, Chris.
- [23:29]
B
It was the lowest point in my career because we let Salcedo down, right? He put his life in our hands. And then we found out afterwards that the police went back in after we had left, and they shut the raid down. They went back in several hours later, and they found that hidden compartment broken open. And they found the compartment. They found bloody clothing, they found oxygen mask, they found. But the corrupt captain went back into the apartment, removed Miguel from the hiding place, walked him down into the garage, put him in the trunk of his car, drove him out, and they relocated him to a new safe house. So our initial thoughts were that Salcedo would be identified as the informant and that he was going to be killed.
- [24:14]
A
Why wasn't he suspected?
- [24:15]
B
Well, he was, by some people. There were four or five people, maybe even more, that thought he was one of the people that could be responsible for the raid. But the only vote that mattered at that time was the head of the Cali Cartel, Miguel Rodriguez. And he didn't believe Salcedo could be the spy. Because Salcedo, at the time, he didn't know the exact apartment that Miguel was staying in. He didn't know anything about the compartment in the wall in the bathroom. And he didn't know anything about the secret compartment in the desk where we seized those documents, the 2800 names. So in Miguel's mind that he didn't know any of this information, how could he possibly have led the DEA and Colombian security forces to the apartment?
- [24:59]
A
Now It's August of 1995, and this is when Miguel Rodriguez is ultimately captured. Can you tell us about that?
- [25:10]
B
So after we go back to Bogota after the first raid, we don't hear from Salcedo. For at least five days. So in our minds we're thinking that he was killed, right, because the cartel, if they don't know exactly who was the spy, they suspect four or five people. Oftentimes they'll kill all five people just to be safe. So we thought that that was probably what was going to happen. So ultimately we're able to reconnect with him. He told us that he was under suspicion by the cartel. Some of his security duties were, were lightened. So he didn't know exactly where Miguel was staying. He knew the area. Ultimately he was able to because of everything that we had talked about. The location, the one way in backed up to the mountain. He was able to determine a certain area. He sent us a couple photographs of two apartment buildings in downtown Cali. So after that, my partner Dave Mitchell and I, we went back to Cali and we started working completely unilaterally without anybody, just me and him. We were out doing surveillances. We were at a statue with binoculars, watching these two apartment buildings, waiting to see which lights went out last. Salcedo had told us that he had cleaned house, he had got rid of his executive assistant, he had got rid of his domestic staff, that he hired two new Afro Colombian maids. One morning in early August, I was looking through binoculars at one o' clock in the morning and I happened to see two maids working in the kitchen preparing meals for Miguel because he was hypoglycemic. So as a result of that, we thought that we had identified the location. We brought the troops back over land and we launched a hillside, almost like commando operation down the mountain to come in. So we were able to knock the door down and one of the equivalent of The Columbia Navy SEALs was able to get in there and actually grab him as he was entering the hidden compartment.
- [27:13]
A
He is grabbed. Does he fight back? Does he say something?
- [27:18]
B
He's in complete shock because imagine it's 4:30 in the morning, you're sound asleep. Someone breaks your door down. He's in a T shirt and boxer shorts. He's running around, he's frantic. He's trying to get into the compartment to hide so that his, his ex wife can put the drawers in and seal him back up. And as he's getting in, he gets grabbed and he's, you can see on his face that he went through three stages of emotions very, very quickly. He, the first one was he was trying to figure out what was going on. He's like he was awoke from sleep. He didn't know exactly what was happening. And Then he figured out and it was just the rage. You can see in his eyes that, you know, he had the worst like thousand yard stare you've ever seen, where you look into his eyes, you go, yeah, that guy's killed a lot of people. And I told him in Spanish, I said, like, it's over. There's nothing you can do now. It's over. And then the third stage, he realized there was nothing he could do.
- [28:19]
A
That is remarkable. So ultimately, what becomes of him?
- [28:24]
B
He's arrested, he's transported back to Bogota. Him and his brother plead guilty to drug trafficking and money laundering charges in Colombia because at the time, there was no extradition of Colombian nationals to the United States. So in their minds, they thought, let's plead guilty. If extradition does come about, we're safe. But as they're spending time in prison, they're continuing to run the cartel from prison. They develop new charges in the United States, extradition is re implemented in Colombia, and ultimately both Miguel and Gilberto Rodriguez are extradited to the United States. In 2004 and 2005, they get sentenced to 30 years in prison.
- [29:04]
A
So now the clock is ticking, and you know that you need to get out Salcedo. But when you tell him that he's going to be exfiltrated, he comes back with something you I think, didn't expect. Can you tell us what that is?
- [29:22]
B
The plan always was, even after the first raid, we offered to exfiltrate him because we thought he would be suspected of cooperating. He said no. So the plan was, is that if we captured Miguel, this was the last chance. Either we captured him or we didn't. Salcedo was going to be taken out of the country. So when we approached him immediately afterwards, I called him on the phone and I said, hey, we got him. Start making plans. And he said, not yet. And we're like, what do you mean, not yet? That's just a plan. You have to get out of here. And he, he said, no, I want to help you try to recruit and exfiltrate Guillermo Palomari, who was the chief accountant for the Cali cartel. And he said that in order to keep these guys in prison and in order to completely dismantle their financial infrastructure, you need to have Guillermo Palamari on board. And Palomari was in hiding. He was under threat by the cartel. They knew that they were trying to kill him. So we thought, okay, we have a chance to possibly approach Guillermo Palmieri, recruit him and do the same thing with him, get him to the states, put him into witness security, and then, in exchange for his cooperation, to tell us everything he knows about the Cali cartel and their financial infrastructure, as well as the millions of dollars that they donated to the 1994 presidential campaign of Ernesto San Peer.
- [30:44]
A
Okay, so let's talk about getting Palomari, recruiting him, exfiltrating him, how all that went down.
- [30:52]
B
So Salcedo told us that Palomari's wife, Patricia Palomari, worked at a computer networking business downtown. And he said, if you approach her, try to get a message to her to relay to Guillermo Palamari, there's a good chance that he'll cooperate. So we had known about his wife for some time, but the problem was, is that the cartel was surveilling Palomari's wife in hopes that they would lead. She would lead them to him because they were trying to kill him, and they didn't know where he was at. So meeting with Patricia Palomari was very risky because she was under surveillance by the cartel. So ultimately, we were able to go to her business. We were able to talk to her. She came to the embassy. We told her everything that we knew about the plot to kill her husband. You know, what she can expect as far as witness protection. And ultimately, she was able to get a message to Guillermo Palamari. He agreed to cooperate with us, but he was under threat. The cartel had an assassin by the name of Cesar Usti, who had located Palomari's apartment building. He had located his apartment. They tapped his phone, and they were actually going to try to kill him the night that we were going to extract him. So it was a very, very dangerous operation to try to get him out of Cali. Ultimately, we were able to secure Guillermo Palamari, march him past the police at the Cali International Airport in disguise, take him to Bogota, and then ultimately get him out of the country.
- [32:25]
A
Okay, but not a happy ending for Palomari in that his wife ended up ultimately not making it out.
- [32:33]
B
Correct. And that's one of the tragedies of this story. What happened in Colombia, what happened with her was that when she came to the embassy, she said that she had to go back to Cali to sell some of her properties, to close out her accounts and sell some stuff so that she could be ready to leave the country. But in the meantime, she dropped off her children to us in Bogota. She flew from Kawi to Bogota with her children. We thought at that point in time that we were going to take her to her husband. We were Going to reunite with everybody. But she said, no, I need to return back to Cali. I still have stuff I need to do. And we sat in the airport in Bogota for well over an hour trying to convince her that if she returned to Cali, she'd most likely be killed. We were basically pleading with her not to go back, but she said she had to get her children's passports, she had to sell CDs. She returned to Cali. We took the children to reunite them with Guillermo Palamari. And ultimately she went back to her business. The cartel was surveilling her just as we told her they were. And they kidnapped her as well as another family friend. And, you know, they tortured and killed her. She was. Her body's never been found.
- [33:48]
A
Very sad, very sad. And Salcedo, how was he exfiltrated? And are we talking about COVID action here?
- [33:58]
B
Both of them were, were kind of COVID action. I can't get into all the details with that because a lot of it is still classified. Ultimately, we were able to. To fly into Cali on a DEA aircraft, pick up Salcedo and his family at a military installation, fly them back to Bogota. Once in Bogota, we had to make plans to ultimately get them to the United States. And ultimately we were able to get Jorge Salcedo onto a private aircraft and fly him out of Colombia into the United States.
- [34:30]
A
What ultimately led to the cartel's demise, Was it the grabbing of Palomari? Was it the fact that now Rodriguez is sitting behind bars?
- [34:44]
B
Yeah, I think it's a. It's a good question. You know, after Gilberto gets arrested in June of 95 and then Miguel gets arrested in August 95, he's the day to day manager of everything that's going on. Palomari is extracted. They're starting to provide this information against the cartel. Numerous properties are being seized, thousands of them, by the way. You know, millions of dollars are being seized. Corrupt officials are starting to be arrested. So it was kind of like the perfect storm that once Gilberto and Miguel were arrested, everything kind of imploded after
- [35:19]
A
that, after Salcedo made it to the United States. He's in witness protection program, clearly. Do you ever hear from him?
- [35:30]
B
I have. Every so often I would get a Christmas card or something sent to the DEA office where I was working at. I finally got to see him about 17 years later where we were contacted by this American Life, a radio show. And they asked if me and him would be available to do an interview. So we met out in California. We did that interview. And then a few years later, during the Making of Narco season three, he was brought in for a surprise, like Q and A as well with me. So I wasn't aware that he was going to be there. But I did meet him the last time, probably in 2017. So I have seen him only twice, have no idea where he's at, don't know what name he's going by, and I have not heard from him now in probably eight or nine years.
- [36:24]
A
So when Cali falls, a new cartel forms in its place. We're basically talking about not just a game of whack a mole, but a situation where what forms in its place is sometimes even more sophisticated, more complicated to break down. So what does it mean to have essentially ended Cali?
- [36:49]
B
Well, I mean, that's what we were sent to Colombia to do. That's what our job was as the DEA was to work in conjunction with Colombian security forces to go after these cartels. But, you know, the cartels are all about succession, and there's always someone else waiting in the wings to take their place. So when Medellin went down, you saw Cali come to the forefront, and when Cali went down, you saw the North Valley cartel rise up. You know, it was a good feeling to have them taken down, but we knew that there was going to be another one come up and we were going to be just as busy trying to work to take them down as well.
- [37:23]
A
Chris, thank you so much for taking the time to share what you did down in Columbia.
- [37:29]
B
Thank you. It was a pleasure talking to you and I always enjoy the conversation. You have very great questions.
- [37:36]
A
Thanks for listening to this episode of Spycast. If you like the episode, give us a follow on Apple, Spotify or wherever you get your podcasts and leave us a rating or review. It really helps. If you have any feedback or you want to hear about a particular topic, you can reach us by email@spycastpymuseum.org I'm your host, Sascha Ingber, and the show is brought to you by N2K Networks, goat rodeo and and the International Spy museum in Washington, D.C.