Statecraft Podcast Summary

Episode: How Diplomacy Works in Africa
Host: Santi Ruiz
Guest: Judd Devermont, former Special Assistant to the President and NSC Senior Director for Africa
Date: November 12, 2025

Overview

This episode features an in-depth conversation with Judd Devermont on the practical realities and challenges of U.S. diplomacy in Africa. Drawing from decades of frontline experience in intelligence and policy roles across multiple administrations, Devermont offers candid insights into where U.S. strategy succeeds, falls short, and struggles to adapt amidst both global crises and continent-specific dynamics. The discussion covers resource prioritization, presidential engagement, statutory and bureaucratic obstacles, the balance of values and interests, and what actually constitutes good diplomatic practice.

Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. Resource Allocation: Africa vs. the Global North

• Recommendation for More Resources in Africa:
  Devermont argues U.S. invests disproportionally in relationships with European allies at the expense of Africa, despite long-term strategic interests in the continent growing.

  "There's too much legacy, I think, in the investment in Europe and not enough investment in where the bulk of the population of the world is, which is in the global South." — Judd Devermont (03:17)

• 'Care and Feeding' in Diplomacy:
  Regular high-level engagement (White House visits, meetings with senior officials) is essential to mutual respect; Africa rarely gets equivalent access as European or Asian leaders.

  "If you don't have a peer to peer relationship with Africans, it is going to be to your detriment." (05:14)

2. Patterns of Presidential Engagement with Africa

• Bush vs. Later Presidents:
  George W. Bush is the post-Cold War outlier for substantive engagement, credited with more development initiatives and actual time spent with African leaders.

  "President Kennedy spent 25% of all foreign leader meetings with Africans. He truly believed that if we were going to shape the Cold War, shape the international order, that we had to be working with Africans." (08:23)

• Modern Decline in Focus:
  Subsequent administrations (Clinton, Obama, Trump, Biden) have deprioritized Africa, partly due to shifting global dynamics and bandwidth limitations.

3. Obama vs. Biden: Contrasts in Africa Policy

• Obama Strengths:
  Obama brought a senior team with genuine regional focus, enabling big programs (e.g., Power Africa, YALI) and decisive action (e.g., U.S. military in Ebola response)—but often fell into paternalistic rhetoric.
• Biden Administration:
  Less preachy, actively promoted African voices in international bodies (e.g., AU to G20), but was hampered by the overwhelming demands of the Ukraine and Gaza crises and lacked an "echo chamber" of Africa-focused advocates.
• On Discrepancy between Vision & Reality:

  "We write checks that we can't cash... we're stuck with some very aspiring rhetoric about where we want to take the relationship. And then the reality that we didn't meet that." (13:39)

4. Navigating Coups and Legal Constraints

• Engagement with Coup Governments:
  Devermont stresses the need for nuanced, flexible engagement rather than blanket isolation, recounting personal negotiation and transition experiences (e.g., Gabon, Niger, Burkina Faso).
• Legal & Aid Limitations—Section 7008:
  Statutory requirements to restrict aid after coups often hamper U.S. influence and can be counterproductive.

  "They're highly problematic... because they don't allow you to have a flexible toolkit." (18:30) Explains a more incremental, incentive-based approach piloted in Gabon versus all-or-nothing aid cutoffs.

• Internal Advocacy for Engagement:
  Career and political officials often push conflicting approaches to senior engagement with "bad guys" vs. rewarding "good behavior," leading to double standards not seen in other regions.

  "I would pull my hair out. I don't have much hair. ... because the day before that, you know, they didn't get engaged with a leader from the Middle east or for Southeast Asia or from Latin America who had an equally torrid past. So I think there's a lot of double standards in the African engagement space. And I think that it's not to our benefit." (24:46)

5. The Choreography of Diplomacy: Symbolism and Protocol

• Photo Ops, seating, and Absurdity:
  Significant energy is spent on signal-sending via seating arrangements, photo ops, and whom American officials are seen with—sometimes escalating into "kabuki dance" that distracts from substance.

  "At the end of the day, was it as important as all of the stress that we had? Some of this is probably just politics." (32:14)

• Who is it for?
  The target audience is often presumed to be U.S. domestic players worried about congressional or activist backlash, rather than foreign officials themselves.

  "You're fighting against a potential future... you're trying to ward off... a scenario that would be uncomfortable." (34:05)

6. Summits, Initiatives, and the Problem of Vaporware

• Irreplaceable Value of Big Summits:
  Besides quantifiable outcomes (initiatives, deals), Devermont emphasizes the unique ecosystem and attention generated by D.C.-based Africa leader summits.

  "For three days, this town is about Africa... It's both symbolic and it's actual literal." (37:05)

• Presidential Initiatives: Why Most Fizzle:
  Only a handful (e.g., PEPFAR, Power Africa) are developed with adequate runway and stakeholder buy-in. Most are rushed to generate "deliverables," leading to a parade of short-lived initiatives.

  "The best way to do an initiative... is without a hook." (40:45) "There's a good way to do initiatives, and there's a bad way..." (40:05)

• Middle Path:
  Devermont experimented with launching smaller "pilots" as crack-in-the-door projects, trying to build sustainability after the summit hype fades.

7. Balancing Values and Interests: Democracy, Minerals, Realpolitik

• Integrating Complex Interests:
  Rather than picking between democracy vs. economic or security interests, the approach is to "take countries in full," weighing progress on various fronts and recognizing tradeoffs.

  "We have to take these countries in full... and not letting one be hostage to the other." (45:26) "Africans, more than any other region, believe in democracy... but they also believe that it is not delivering for them." (55:34)

• Relationship with South Africa as 'Most Mature':
  A prime example where U.S. and South African officials could openly disagree (especially on Russia/Ukraine), but still sustain a robust partnership.

  "I would say one of those countries is South Africa. We were having really difficult conversations with South Africa about Ukraine... President Biden and President Ramaphosa had really productive conversations." (47:24)

8. Envoys: When Are They Useful and When Are They Not?

• Why Use Special Envoys?
  Often a workaround for staffing shortages or bureaucratic gridlock, envoys can be a virtue signal more than an actual solution.

  "The envoy helps with... staffing issues and with bureaucratic seams and with focus. Now there's another thing that happens often... which is, sometimes it's virtue signaling too." (58:59)

• Failure Modes:
  Envoys given enormous briefs with tiny teams are ineffective. Lack of staff, unclear mandates, and friction with existing teams lead to confusion.

  "We didn't have the staffing to deal with the problem. We've named an envoy and that envoy has 1, 2, 3 people working for him or her." (60:35)

• Success Factors:
  Effective envoys are "people persons," skilled at relationship-building—not just with foreign interlocutors, but within the U.S. bureaucracy.

  "I'm a big fan of one of our envoys, Mike Hammer, who just is a really smart people person. ...knew how to work well, by the way, with the bureaucracy, which is also really important." (63:26)

9. NSC, State Department, and the Center of Gravity Problem

• Reorganization Fears:
  The folding of the Africa directorate into a larger Middle East team at the NSC is seen as a downgrade—risking less attention and analytic subtlety for a continent of nearly 50 countries.

  "For the first time, the Africa Directorate at the National Security Council has been folded into the Middle East directorate. ...That really concerns me." (69:07)

• Debate vs. Decision:
  The NSC’s value is partly in creating a regular, process-driven forum where competing interests (State, DOD, Treasury) can be discussed—lost if NSC is drastically reduced.

  "The NSC Provides a space at its best for debate and refinement and negotiation and a hearing of all the different things... for us to have a good policy. ...If you let State do its thing and DOD do its thing, they often go in different directions, particularly in Africa." (75:26)

10. Intelligence: The Value and Its Limits

• Intelligence in Crisis:
  Real-time analysis is rarely as valuable as retrospective/contextual analysis; the "crisis du jour" moves too fast.

  "The IC on the crisis Azure is much better with stand back pieces..." (79:15)

• The Problem of Competition:
  The unique analytic advantage of U.S. intelligence community has eroded as open source and private sector analysis proliferates.

  "There is more, more competition for insights than there has ever been before." (91:29) "The bar... became a lot higher for the analysis to break through and to say something different and to say something new." (92:53)

  • Twitter and open sources now provide "the 80% solution most of the time." (93:13)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Resource Allocation:
  "It's hard for me not to say put more resources in Africa. ...We just haven't done the legwork because we said that Africa as an area of focus is near zero. And I think that's really problematic." — Judd Devermont (02:10)

• On Double Standards:
  "I think there's a lot of double standards in the African engagement space. And I think that it's not to our benefit." (24:54)

• On Diplomatic Symbolism:
  "If you wanted to make a political point and say like, because our relationships are cordial enough that you're invited, but not warm enough that you need to be next to the President... it's a kabuki dance for I don't know who." (33:48, 33:57)

• On Summits as Events:
  "For three days, this town is about Africa... It's very important." (37:05)

• On Presidential Initiatives:
  "The best way to do an initiative... we're going to take the time, we're going to build stakeholder buy in, we're going to launch it, we're going to work with Congress. Those stand the test of time." (40:38)

• On the Realities of Policymaking:
  "70 to 80 reactive... in my last month every day we go through [our proactive goals]. ...it really helped focus us to kind of have that checklist and to keep nailing it as opposed to being more just pulled into the quagmire or whatever the problem of the day was." (81:08)

• On Strategy Documents:
  "We call them strategies. Most of them aren't even strategies, right? They're just a series of values and objectives, framing language." (86:45) "If I did it over again, Santi, I would just say we're going to do a vision statement... I wouldn't throw a whole bunch of objectives into it. And I wouldn't have a Christmas tree." (88:49)

Important Timestamps

• Resource Allocation & 'Care and Feeding': 02:10 – 05:14
• Presidential Engagement (Bush, Obama, Biden): 06:48 – 10:14
• Obama vs. Biden Africa Policy: 10:37 – 14:02
• Niger Coup & Diplomatic Flexibility: 14:42 – 18:04
• Section 7008 & Aid Constraints: 18:30 – 22:30
• Photo Op “Kabuki” (Symbolism in Diplomacy): 27:55 – 34:05
• Summits & Initiatives: 36:37 – 44:31
• Values vs Interests (South Africa, Angola): 45:14 – 50:18
• Envoys & Their Limits: 57:29 – 66:17
• NSC vs. State Dynamics: 68:27 – 77:52
• Intelligence Analysis – Value & Competition: 78:47 – 94:26
• Strategy Document Process: 84:49 – 91:06

Conclusion & Takeaways

This episode is an exceptional deep dive into the contradictions, improvisations, and realpolitik of U.S. foreign policymaking in Africa, punctuated by Judd Devermont’s candor, historical context, and willingness to critique the machinery he once operated. Highlights include the case for more—and better—investment in Africa; the need for humility and flexibility in the face of coups and democratic backsliding; and the persistent gap between grand strategies and actual execution on the ground. Devermont’s reflections on the importance of relationships, messaging, and institutional learning are valuable not only for Africa hands but for anyone interested in how America actually does diplomacy.