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We continue our SoH (Strait of Hormuz) Crisis Takeaways series with a check-in on our Obliterating Peak Oil Demand theme that rejects the idea that anyone can know today what decade let alone year oil demand will ultimately peak and subsequently plateau or decline. We have yet to see a scenario from major agencies, banks, or consultants that solves for everyone on Earth some day becoming energy rich, which, in our view, is the ultimate direction of travel. The massive unmet energy needs of the other 7 billion people on Earth points to growth in all current major energy sources and technologies. Energy’s natural hierarchy of needs points to a high motivation by especially billion-person-scale developing countries to crack the code on new energy technologies. How is there still any doubt that we will of course need rising amounts of both traditional and new energy sources and technologies for many, many decades to come?

There is some thought among energy observers that the SoH Crisis will accelerate the timing of “peak oil demand.” It is a view we reject. Even under our base-case of a messy stalemate between the U.S. and Iran and volatile oil flows out of the Strait, we are highly skeptical we could see the kind of sustained, large-scale substitution out of refined oil products into alternatives that would result in even a plateauing of global oil demand at global GDP rates of 2.7% or higher. In fact, growth in EVs (electric vehicles) and LNG (liquefied natural gas) trucks is likely helping economic resiliency in countries like China and others in southeast Asia during a time of SoH-driven stress and therefore keeping global GDP at better levels than might otherwise be the case. The ultimate driver of all forms of energy, including crude oil, is GDP growth. The biggest risk from the SoH Crisis was (or maybe still is) a deep global recession that would hit demand for oil and other energy sources in the short run.

The combination of the April 7 ceasefire and June 17 MOU—as imperfect as both agreements have been—significantly reduced worst-case “$200 oil / global recession” risks. There is also plenty of evidence that neither side is looking for the kind of prolonged full-scale ground war that could drive a more substantial and ongoing disruption of oil supplies out of the region. As such, we are skeptical the duration of the crisis has been anywhere near long enough to accelerate more meaningful behavioral change, even when measured over a longer time frame than just the next few years.

As always, we keep an open mind and welcome pushback or different points of view. With that said, our confidence in this core view has only grown since we first unveiled our “Obliterating Peak Oil Demand” series three years ago (here). We use the popular Q&A format to address the main questions we receive on the failing peak oil demand thesis.

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Question 1 (Q1): You had pushed back on the so-called “peak oil demand” view that was most prevalent during peak “energy transition-climate crisis” years of 2021-2023. Does the SoH Crisis mean “peak oil demand” is back on the table?

Answer (A): No.

We continue to push back hard on the idea that anyone today can model with any certainty when oil demand will peak, plateau, or possibly decline when the unmet energy needs of the other 7 billion people on Earth are as massive as they are. That has been and remains a core ethos of ours. There are no major external forecasters that we are aware of that have modeled full global prosperity—i.e., everyone on Earth enjoying the basic human right of being energy rich.

Q2: Isn’t there growing evidence that peak oil demand is at least on the horizon even if you don’t think it is imminent?

A: No, there isn’t. In fact just the opposite. There is more evidence that it is nowhere in sight.

At a big picture level, we disaggregate growth in oil demand into two component pieces: (1) global GDP growth; and (2) an “efficiency gain” metric that is the change in the number of barrels it takes to generate a $ of GDP (Exhibit 1). Incorporated into our efficiency gain metric are all the things that would improve the multiplier of GDP to oil demand, including substitute products like EVs and LNG trucks as well as fuel economy gains. It’s all captured in that one metric.

Our key conclusion is that every year we use slightly fewer barrels to generate a $ of GDP, but that the rate of improvement is well short of what is needed to even flatten global oil demand. The common mistake of every “peak oil demand” forecast we have seen, in particular those from the IEA and leading major oil companies, is a massive over-estimation of future efficiency gains. Typically, too quick of a ramp in EVs and other substitute products is compounded by an assumption that despite fuel economy targets having been missed by 75%-95% historically, they will be achieved at something approaching a 100% success ratio going forward. It has honestly been ridiculous how willing otherwise smart analysts have been to over model and at times double count those two impacts in particular.

Exhibit 1: Oil demand derivation

Source: Goldman Sachs Research, IEA, OPEC, Veriten.

Q3: What is the risk to oil demand?

A: It would be extended recession-like global GDP.

Global GDP hasn’t exactly been booming over the past several years, but at 2.7%-2.8% it has been good enough to drive around a 1 million b/d per year oil demand growth reality. Our number one concern when it comes to oil demand is always the health of the global economy. It is why we did not celebrate (from the perspective of traditional energy companies) the upside risk of $150-$200/bbl as you saw from the perma bulls. The reason being that the kind of oil price needed to motivate a global recession is hardly a bullish outcome for traditional energy companies.

Q4: Aren’t rising EV sales a risk to future oil demand?

A: We disagree with the ICE (internal combustion engine) versus EV zero sum mindset that almost everyone has (there is common ground among the climate-is-the-top-priority crowd and oil sector enthusiasts on perceiving ICE vs EV as a zero sum game).

There is no chance that especially the billion-person scale economies like China and India are going to want to subject themselves to the magnitude of oil imports that would come from achieving rich-world economic status but only with traditional energy products. We already know this from observing China and fully expect India to diversify its energy sources and technologies in order to ultimately limit oil imports relative to a scenario where alternatives did not exist. We have long championed the benefits of energy source and technology diversification as good for all forms of energy. As noted above, we believe global recession is the biggest risk to oil demand.

In the case of the SoH Crisis, we believe new technologies like EVs, LNG trucks, and the ability to work-from-home via Zoom and related products has added critical flexibility to offsetting a major supply loss as has occurred with the SoH closure. To be sure, that flexibility alone did not remove the worst-case scenario of oil needing to spike to $150-$200/bbl in order to force global recession, but it certainly was part of a series of mitigations along with the material SPR and commercial inventory reductions and pipeline redirections.

Let us repeat this to ensure the point is made: growth in new technologies like EVs, LNG trucks, and Zoom has been positive for oil demand in that it has been a contributing factor to ensuring ongoing global economic growth.

Q5: Won’t the SoH Crisis drive an even faster shift to non-ICE vehicles?

A: Yes, we are bullish on global EV sales, especially in large parts of Asia.

New vehicle sales are as good of an indication of healthy economic growth as any. If EV sales are growing rapidly, this is good for economic activity and hence oil demand.

Q6: But those EV sales represent miles driven that won’t be using gasoline?

A: Correct. But they will also represent economic activity that perhaps wouldn’t be occurring helping support other oil products.

We would guard against analyses that show “oil demand avoided based on EV sales to date” we see being published by the IEA and others. Like the issues we see with peak oil demand in general as well as the on again-off again “oil glut” calls, these single-variable extrapolations do not tell the full story for oil demand. The fact is that you don’t see the impact in our efficiency gain metric.

To be sure, we agree that the outlook for gasoline is weaker than for other products like diesel, jet fuel, and petrochemical feedstocks, in part driven by rising EV sales. However, the existing ICE car park is massive and is expected to grow at a modest clip in the coming decades as highlighted in OPEC’s most recent World Oil Outlook 2026 report (link).

Looking at Exhibit 2, it is not obvious to us that gasoline demand will globally decline in the coming decades—a view that even many in the oil sector broadly accept. It also highlights how massive the existing stock of ICE vehic...