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Foreign. It's Tuesday, June 16, 2026. I'm Albert Moeller, and this is the Briefing, a daily analysis of news and events from a Christian worldview. President Trump is headed for the Alps. He is headed for Evian, the city these days in the United States primarily known for a brand of water. It's an historic spa there in the Alps, and it is the gathering place for the leaders of the G7 nations. That's the group of six. This is arguably the most powerful democratic group in terms of the joining together of these seven nations. You have the United States, France, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. So you'll notice that this is global because Japan is in this list. And this has to do with the size of the economy. It has to do with the fact that these are all democratic systems of government in terms of active, enforceable constitutions. We're talking about seven allies, and that turns out to be a crucial issue. This really is a natural alliance of allies again, U.S. france, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom. Now, one of the most interesting things we need to consider is the fact that if you had read this same list at some point early or even at the midpoint of the 20th century, people would wonder what in the world you're talking about. And this turns out to be a really big issue, and we're going to give it some attention today. The G7 meeting brings together not only the chief executives and the heads of state, it also brings together the chief defense chief, economic, and chief foreign policy officials in the respective governments. So this really is a big meeting. President Trump doesn't particularly like this kind of meeting. And as a matter of fact, in the last two G7 sessions, he left early, which turns out to be a problem. Now, the French president, Emmanuel Macron, has decided to try to fix that problem by holding a dinner, basically a state dinner for President Trump in his honor at the palace of Versailles after this meeting. And so it's a pretty transparent attempt to keep President Trump in the meeting. One of the reasons President Trump expresses frustration with these meetings is because in so many cases, they don't really do anything. But that actually is something that's worthy of our consideration. Some of these groups exist for the relationships that occur under the level of the heads of state. You have the heads of state, the heads of government in a room that doesn't always make a lot of progress. Sometimes the progress is actually achieved by people who have other specialized responsibility for defense, for the economy, for foreign policy. But it also is a very important sign of democratic solidarity over against world challenges and in particular, China and Russia. That turns out to be a very interesting part of the background to all of this. By the way, when you're looking at this, you also recognize that there are stresses and strains within the G7, no doubt about it. But there are historic stresses and strains. And this is why, for example, you have even among nations that are very close in so many ways, say the UK Britain on the one hand, and then add France and add Germany, well, those have a lot in common. But the UK Has a much closer relationship historically with American presidents and American presidential administration, certainly since the midpoint of the 20th century, go back to Roosevelt and Churchill. But it's also clear that when you're looking at, for example, France, well, Emmanuel Macron, who is now at least approaching the second half of his final term in office as the French president, he obviously feels like he has some political mobility because he's not running for reelection. That's not really a political question at stake. He probably feels like he has some room for negotiating, for maneuvering in this that, for example, the German and the British officials don't have. Okay, so let's also look at the fact that there will be a lot of attention directed at this meeting. Security issues are going to be at the top of the list. And as you're looking at this, you also need to recognize that you have a difference between the United States and our European allies on at least two of these issues, or the two biggest military issues, which have to do with right now, Iran and Ukraine, that is to say, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the U.S. israeli action against Iran. Always in the background to this, of course, is the challenge posed by China. But when you think about some of these issues, it really does get interesting. So, for example, one of the things we need to note is that you have Europe and the United States, even our European allies, who aren't exactly on the same page, but particularly when it comes to Iran. And a lot of attention has been given to the fact that several of these European leaders are saying this was an American action and America has to take responsibility for it. President Trump has spoken openly of his frustration with the fact that European nations, our allies, have not joined in this effort in terms of active military support. You are looking at the fact that even though this is a body with a lot of unity and a lot of history and a lot of common concern, the fact is that it's not exactly the same thing. The United States, particularly President Trump, very frustrated with the European nations for being standoffish on all of this and furthermore, for putting pressure on the United States in terms of the blockage there in the Strait of Hormuz, undertaken, of course, by Iranian military action, basically a shutdown. The fact is that there has to be more common ground than areas of difference. And that's likely to be where there's going to be a lot of conversation. It's also clear the timing of the G7 meeting was important to President Trump in terms of being able to announce, if not to release, at least to announce that a ceasefire agreement, a substantial ceasefire agreement had been reached through the mediation of Pakistan between the US And Iran. Now, that also comes even when it clocks in, which is now, we are told, on Friday, that also comes with a significant 60 day period for dealing with the most difficult issues. So we are told right up front, the most difficult issues still remain. We know at the top of that list is the uranium, the enriched uranium possessed by Iran. The United States began this. President Trump initiated this by saying that a nuclear Iran was unthinkable unless this action was necessary. That's going to have to come down to deliverables on how exactly Iran is going to be prevented from further enriching that uranium. Okay, so let's just go back also to the other big theater here, which is Russia's invasion of Ukraine. What's the big story today? The big story right now is that Russia's invasion of Ukraine, an aggressive territorial. Well, it was a brazen attempt to try to take Ukrainian territory and incorporate it into Russia. It has been a colossal failure when it comes to that end on the part of the Russians. The Russians were confident that they would win this thing almost immediately. Some of the Russian official officers in the general class actually took dress uniforms, expecting in a matter of days, maybe weeks, to be involved in a victory parade. But it hasn't happened. Instead, what has happened, well, here's the big headline news. The war in Ukraine, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the war that followed has now lasted longer than World War I. As the new York Times reports, quote, the war in Ukraine has often been compared to World War I for its brutal infantry assaults and heavy casualties. Yet the idea that it could by any measure surpass a conflict so long and bloody that French soldiers hoped it would be the last of the last once seemed unthinkable. But that's exactly what happened. The exact day was last Thursday. Thursday of last week, the Ukrainian war became a war that has lasted longer than World War I. Now, when you look at this, you do recognize that this is a humiliating reality for Russia. It has to be a humiliating reality for Russian President Vladimir Putin. It also gets to the fact that when you look at Russia's situation right now, it's not likely to get a whole lot better unless there is some major change in the game. Furthermore, when you look at the casualties now in the hundreds of thousands, the vast majority of those casualties have come on the Russian side. By the way, that's not unusual when it comes to an invading force. You just look at the history of warfare, long invasions, that is to say, invasion forces that take a long time generally suffer an incredible amount of casualty and attrition. And that's exactly what has happened in Russia. So much so that even as you have in Vladimir Putin an autocrat, the reality is that political pressure is building on him, and there is no good way for Putin now to move forward. Now, looking at military strategists, it is interesting to see how many are pointing to at least one similarity between America's frustration in terms of the situation in Iran and Russia's frustration in Ukraine. They're not equal, that must be said. But as some have argued, the thing that is in common is that both Russia, in invading Ukraine, now that was an aggressive attempt to take territory as compared to the American Israeli attempt to take military action against Iran. That was not to gain territory. It was to reset a situation in which Iran has basically been at war with the United States since 1979. The thing that is in common for both is that it's very difficult to do any kind of accurate analysis of what a military action is going to accomplish. That just turns out to be very frustrating in the historical context. But it turns out that the equation of military action is rarely so predictable as you might think. Now, you talk about the United States military action against Grenada decades ago. Of course, that's pretty predictable. That's really simple. But when it comes to something more complex, let's just make a statement that if it's complex, it's not simple. Okay, here's something else. Complex costs the bigger power more than it does the smaller power. That's also really interesting. The biggest powers tend to have very complex systems, very complex governments, complex technologies, complex politics, complex. When it comes to the smaller, often far more simple. There's also something else that's morally clarifying. If you look at Russia's invasion of Ukraine, what's morally clarifying for Ukraine is that they were invaded and they must fight back in order to protect their national destiny, not only to protect their territory, but their national honor, even their national identity. When it comes to the US And Israeli action against Iran, the fact is that Iran just has to survive in order to claim some kind of victory. That's all it has to do. It is really clear that Iran's normal military has been degraded extensively, particularly its air force and its navy. But it's also clear that in this asymmetrical situation, Iran still has options. But the biggest difference here is that you have politically accountable governments. When you look at the US And Israel, you're talking about two constitutional systems of government the voters get to elect. When you're looking at Iran, it's another story entirely. And at least in terms of tenacity on the ground, it turns out that the Iranian leadership, given its own ruthlessness, is willing to do just about anything to stay in power. That reduces the options open to Western nations. But when it comes to the big lessons of history, there are some giant headlines, really big issues that are, at least in terms of the twists and turns of history, somewhat unexpected. Okay, so one of them is the fact that you have a political crisis in the United Kingdom, a political crisis in Britain right now, precisely because John Healy, who was the Defense Secretary, and Al Carnes, who was the armed forces minister, they both resigned from the government of Prime Minister Keir Starmer, a Labour Party government precisely because they say Britain's defenses are too weak and the Starmer government's not doing enough to strengthen them. As the Defense Secretary, in his resignation statement, said the Starmer government was unable to deliver the funding the UK Military desperately needs. And so this was an act of political protest. And it came as the Starmer government is already besieged and unlikely to continue, at least to continue for very long. But then you had, after the resignation of these two officials, you had a new defense secretary put in place, Dan Jarvis. He said he was going to fix the problem. He urged the government to meet the moment. However, the Prime Minister has come out and said he's going to have exactly the same amount of money that led to the resignation of the other two officials. So it is pretty clear that Britain is in a situation. The labor government there, Liberal government, the Labour Party, at least historically tied to socialism, certainly tied to the political left. Sometimes they're called the. The center left precisely because there are some more radical parties on the left. But the reality is that this is one of those situations in which you're facing a political crisis in the United Kingdom. And so it's going to be very interesting to see how this works out but there's another big historical story here. Let me give you a headline, and it actually comes from the New York Times. I'm going to give you a second headline from the Economist, published in London. Okay, Here are the two headlines. Number one, Germany and Japan are rearming again 80 years after World War II. The other headline, why France is uneasy about German Rearmament. Okay, we talked about now Russia's invasion of Ukraine leading to a war that's lasted longer than World War I. Let's go back to the 20th century. World War I and World War II. Germany was a belligerent against European neighbors and eventually against the United States. In both of those world wars, one of the goals of the United States and the Soviet Union and and other allied forces in terms of the effort to shut down Nazi Germany, one of the big assurances that was absolutely demanded by those powers of Germany is not only unconditional surrender, but basically what amounted to the end of any kind of offensive ability on the part of the German armed forces. It was a declaration of the fact that Germany didn't have to disarm, but it had to basically take a position in which it had no major offensive ability. This was required by France. France and Germany have gone to war in terms of modern history, four times. So France. Let's just say you don't have to have a very long memory to understand that one of the biggest issues in France is having a defense capability greater than that of Germany. Because otherwise, at least in terms of history of the last couple of centuries, it hasn't gone well for France. France, by the way, now sees itself as in a superior position for one reason, if for no other reason, and that is that France has an independent nuclear weapons capacity that Germany doesn't have. As you're looking at Europe right now, you're talking about Britain very much allied with the United States, France also a NATO member, but having an independent nuclear capacity. Those are the only two European nations that have that capacity. Frank, France does have nuclear weapons. Germany doesn't. But here's the big thing. Germany is aiming to become what the Economist in London calls the benchmark military power in Europe. And by the way, why is it doing that? Does it want to build up an army against France and England? Of course not. It wants to meet the challenge now posed by a very aggressive Russia. German Chancellor Friedrich Mearz has stated that it is his goal to make the Bundeswehr, that is the German armed forces, quote, the strongest conventional army in Europe. That requires a 40% increase in troops by the year 2035. Okay. So the United States has been very, very, very frustrated with our NATO allies, especially European allies, because they have failed to rearm and to contribute to their own defenses as required. By the way, Germany, the game changer was the Cold War and the fact that Germany was on the front line of the Cold War. And so as a NATO power, it was true that there were a lot of NATO forces, including a lot of American forces that were deployed there, but there was also the acknowledgement that Germany's going to need. At that point, it was Western Germany is going to need a substantial armed forces. And now you also have the fact with a unified Germany and with the threat of a very, very ominous Russia, now you have Europe wanting Germany to rearm. That's an unusual situation. We just ought to pause and think about how history can change Europe. Europe dreaded Germany having guns for a very long time. Now they want a very strong Germany because they need a bulwark against Russia. However, that other headline from the Economist says that France is uneasy about this for a couple of reasons. Number one, French pride. The French have been very proud about having a more powerful military. But France is also in an economic situation where it says it cannot increase that spending, as Germany now is promising a 40% net increase in troops by 2035. And so France is looking at the fact that Germany is now saying, for its own survival and for the protection of its allies, the entire project of Western Europe, it's going to have to really invest in a much larger military. And here's the astounding turn in history. Most European nations, virtually all European nations facing the threat of Russia, have decided that a much stronger Germany is a very good thing. How history can turn. But of course, I also mentioned that in the G7, you have Japan, you have this Asian power that is very much a part of this, the Pacific power. Also just mentioned World War I, but in Japan's case, especially World War II, the threat of Imperial Japan, that was the entire Pacific theater threat in terms of World War II. And the headline that has grabbed a lot of attention is that now Germany and Japan are rearming. This is 80 years after World War II. So just 80 years after Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were defeated by massive, incredibly costly military effort, what became known as World War II, the most cataclysmic war in human history. Now the United States is absolutely counting on Japan to rearm, absolutely counting on Japan to represent a very substantial counter threat to China and to take its own place in terms of the defense. Now Japan has been willing to do that in terms of especially its home territory and its home waters. But the reality is, right now, the United States needs much stronger allies. The United States and our allies need much stronger allies all over the world. And that is especially true when you get to the Pacific and you get to Japan. But the big issue in the 20th century was offensive capability. When it came to Japan and Germany. One of the most interesting parts of this is that this big swing in terms of military investment for Japan and for Germany, it is not in any sense offensive. This investment is not in offensive weapons or offensive forces. It is in defense. And when it comes to a challenge, for example, coming from both China and now from Russia, defense is a big part of maintaining world peace and stability. Okay, so let's switch to something that has to do with the United States in particular. It's not limited to the U.S. but right now, it's a big political, political issue in the United States. This has to do with the construction of data centers all over American territory. And we are looking at something that was continuing apace. And it is because the demand for these data centers is absolutely massive. It's almost impossible to quantify how big the need for these data centers is. But as you look at that need, you also look at the fact that data centers are very different than other extensions of, say, industrial real estate. As you look at big industrial real estate in the 20th century, with that industrial investment came a lot of jobs. When it comes to AI and all the related things that are tied to these data centers, the actual promise is they may come with fewer jobs rather than a greater number of jobs. Furthermore, they are basically industrial. I mean, they look like big blocks because that's basically what they are. And thus, there are a lot of people saying, look, we don't want these data centers in our backyard. We don't want want them even out in the middle of the desert. We don't want them, you know, even in territory. A big story has to do with the state of Utah and the requirement that a giant farm of these data centers had to be cut down about 75%. So you only have about a quarter of what they were planning to do. Okay, so you look at this and you recognize, okay, so there's something political and cultural going on here. This is not just a manufactured issue, but there is a question as to whether or not at least some of it might be manufactured. More on that in just a second. But right now, let's just look at the fact that here's the Reality. Even as Americans say we don't want these data centers in our backyard, Americans have to recognize that we are increasingly moving into a digital age, including a digital age that is right down to our own personal use of these technologies. The fact is it does require more and more digital data processing, data computing power, and that requires these data centers. And so the fact is that we at least have to reckon with the fact that we say we don't want them in our backyard, but we kind of do want them in someone else's backyard. And so we are looking at something that is going to be absolutely necessary. And even as you now have not only Democrats, but you have some Republicans saying we really need to take seriously the fact that many people in the public don't want more of these people data centers. Well, they do and they don't. They certainly don't want to be without them. The other big thing is that as you're looking at the military threats against the United States, as you look at the challenge of China, the fact is that if the United States doesn't keep up in these data centers and then the massive computing power represented by them, then we will necessarily fall behind in a situation in which this would not only endanger our national security, it would basically put the United States in the back seat in terms of global competition with military as well as economic effects. Okay. You also have other things playing into this. For example, as I said just a bit ago, this is basically an American issue in terms of American headlines. And no doubt there are a lot of Americans who are upset about this. But there's also open conjecture among some in the American government as to whether or not there could be foreign powers contributing to this. That's the way so much in terms of social media now works. Could there be bad actors, and in particular, would it not be in China's interest to try to build up public opposition to these data centers in the United States? I'm not raising this because this is a clear worldview issue in which you have a yes or a no. I just want to state that the Christian worldview also accepts the fact that there is something to political realism and economic realism, and the fact that there is no way those data centers are not going to be built somewhere. The question is how can we rightly take environmental, population concerns and other things into account, even landscape issues into account, while recognizing that it is absolutely implausible that the United States would simply say, China, you charge right ahead. We will basically put our military, our industrial complex, everything at risk. But you know, for Americans, it's not just that. I think for most Americans they need to recognize the fact that in terms of personal use, they are actually demanding more and more when it comes to this. And the artificial intelligence revolution is just another example. But it is also, from the Christian biblical perspective, a reminder that there is no such thing as a morally neutral technology. There just isn't. There is no morally neutral technology. Even building a dam, building an airport, building a hospital, all these come with trade offs. But we understand the need for hospitals. We certainly do. We understand the need for airports. We do. We're going to have to understand the need for these data centers. And I'm not saying that as someone who has any stake in the industry, I'm just saying just look at American patterns of usage and you'll understand that Americans are demanding in their own way more of these. Of course it is disproportionate. The artificial intelligence industry is, is representing now a disproportionate share of the need for this expanded capability. That's going to have to be factored in morally and economically and politically as well. But it is important. With all the things we thought about today on the briefing, it's just important for Christians to realize we're the last people who could be surprised about the fact that we live in a dangerous world, that liberty, freedom, human rights, human dignity have enemies. And it really does matter as to whether or not we are looking at a world order that allows those things to continue or a world order that would seek to snuff them out. It's important for Christians to understand there are enormous worldview and moral issues attached to all of this. And we ought to be the people who at least understand. We'd better acknowledge honestly everything that has to be taken into account. Thanks for listening to the briefing. For more information, go to my website website@albertmohler.com you can follow me on X or Twitter by going to x.comalbertmohler for information on the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, go to spts.edu. for information on Boyce College, just go to boycecollege.com I'll meet you again tomorrow for the briefing.