John Spencer on Gaza: Wrestling With the Unbearable Questions of War

Summary

Podcast Summary

Podcast: The Comedy Cellar: Live from the Table
Episode: John Spencer on Gaza: Wrestling With the Unbearable Questions of War
Date: September 26, 2025
Host: Dan Natterman, Noam Dworman, Al Ashenbrand
Guest: John Spencer, Chair of War Studies at the Madison Policy Forum

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Episode Overview

This episode centers on a deeply philosophical and analytical exploration of the Gaza war, featuring John Spencer—one of the world’s leading experts on urban warfare, a decorated US military veteran, and widely cited commentator (including by Netanyahu). The hosts tackle the recent recognition of a Palestinian state, the unbearable moral and strategic dilemmas of modern war, and the unique, often painful double standards Israel faces. Heavy ethical questions on proportionality, civilian protection, and the nature of warfare in today’s climate underpin the debate.

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Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. Recognition of a Palestinian State: Reality or Political Theater?

• John Spencer (01:59): The recent recognition of a Palestinian state by some countries is labeled as “performative politics.” Spencer asserts that essential statehood questions—clear borders, government, agreements—remain unresolved, making these recognitions hollow:

  “It’s just performative politics...when you say I am recognizing a state, well, what’s the borders of the state? Who are the population of the state? Who’s the government of the state?...These nations are actually performatively designating an idea, a state.”

• Noam Dworman (04:08): Raises concerns that such recognition essentially rewards Hamas, a group that has always rejected a side-by-side state with Israel, undermining the Oslo process and all prior peace efforts.

• John Spencer (05:41): Notes that statements by leaders (like France’s Macron) about “peaceful coexistence” are often not backed up by real conditions or actionable frameworks.

2. Moral and Strategic Calculus of War: How Much Suffering is Too Much?

• Noam Dworman (08:13): Opens up about the personal, existential crisis of war’s morality and the challenge of weighing national security against horrific human loss in Gaza.

  “How do you weigh them and weight them such that you feel that this is the position you support, despite all the loss of life, having been there, having risked your life?”

• John Spencer (10:36): Provides a “professor’s answer,” referencing centuries of just war theory, strategy, and the evolution of international law, emphasizing the agonizing choices nations must make in self-defense.

  “I always try to be as analytical and objective...I do have my own views that have been shaped on right and wrong. I will not say that’s wrong, but I acknowledge that it is...what we agreed to is right and wrong as in we, as in societies.”

• Noam Dworman (15:15): Grapples with whether there is any price tag too high in fighting evil like Hamas, and if post-war hindsight will make the deaths seem unjustified.

3. Comparisons and Double Standards in Modern Warfare

• John Spencer (17:23): Highlights that Israel is held to a higher “Israeli standard” in warfare, facing scrutiny and constraints not applied elsewhere. He also notes that actions by other players (like Egypt refusing to allow refugees) receive little if any criticism:

  “There is a double standard in war and then there’s an Israeli standard... There is only one country right now who has the sole ability to reduce this human suffering in Gaza, and that’s Egypt.”

• Noam Dworman (22:15): Points to the hypocrisy of the world’s reaction, arguing the US or any state would respond forcefully to cross-border rocket fire, with little patience or hand-wringing about existential threats.

4. Civilian Protection: Could Israel Have Done More?

• Noam Dworman (24:48): Challenges Spencer: Could Israel have done more to protect innocents?

• John Spencer (25:20): Calls proposals to move Gaza civilians into Israel or mass-evacuate as unrealistic and ahistorical:

  “The only alternative I have heard from... is to move the civilians out of Gaza and put them in Israel...militarily to create a camp...then you have to secure it...just practically from guarding it...it’s just a nightmare.”

• On Hamas’s Tactics: Multiple speakers underscore that Hamas’s human shield strategy makes improved civilian protection almost impossible, as protecting civilians runs counter to Hamas’s military strategy.

5. Hostage Dynamics and War Protraction

• Noam Dworman (29:05): Observes the unique dynamic where keeping hostages is not simply about avoiding death, but rather about protracting war and generating continued suffering for both sides.

• John Spencer (30:50): Asserts that Hamas’s stated aim is not coexistence, but the total destruction of Israel, regardless of civilian suffering.

6. The Endgame: Can Hamas Truly Be Defeated?

• Noam Dworman/John Spencer (40:11–42:52): Debate whether anything can deter or break Hamas’s resolve, considering their near-suicidal, martyr-based worldview.

• John Spencer (42:55): Believes Israel can achieve “victory” by so diminishing Hamas’s power that a new reality or authority can emerge, even absent formal surrender:

  “You can still achieve Israel’s three goals without Hamas surrender, because you weaken its power so much so that something else can exist.”

• Uncertainty over Gaza’s Future: International peacekeeping or current regional actors are unlikely to step in until total security is restored.

7. Casualty Numbers and Morality of Urban War

• Noam Dworman (51:29): Probes the oft-cited “civilian-to-combatant” casualty ratios and accuses critics of ignoring Hamas’s control over those numbers.

• John Spencer (53:32): Explains why ratios are contested, why numbers provided are often misleading, and why legal definitions of war don’t rely on such metrics for judging right or wrong:

  “I can say factually that yes, Israel has a low civilian to combatant ratio in these battles compared to…modern history. But what I can say with even stronger conviction is that there’s not one bit of evidence saying that Israel has targeted civilians in the West.”

• Noam (60:49): Contrasts Gaza with Britain’s evacuation during WWII and laments Hamas’s orders for civilians to stay, reinforcing the argument that high civilian casualties are a consequence of Hamas’s choices.

8. Why the International Double Standard? Is It Antisemitism?

• D (62:51): Asks bluntly if the world’s unique rage at Israel is rooted in antisemitism.

• John Spencer (63:00): Concludes decisively:

  “There is no other answer but antisemitism. Because using Natan Sharansky’s double standard, I can validate…at least 10 double standards applied only to Israel…At the heart of that…is antisemitism.”

• Noam Dworman (65:08): Cautions against painting all critics as antisemitic, seeing also a moral panic, herd behavior, and social pressures shaping Western attitudes.

9. A Political Note: Trump’s Role in US-Israel Relations

• Noam Dworman (67:12): Offers a striking personal reflection on Donald Trump as a singular US figure in supporting Jews and Israel despite all controversy and despite MAGA’s turn against Israel:

  “He is the little Dutch boy with his finger in the dike on the left and the finger dike on the right...the best friend that the Jewish people have ever had in my lifetime.”

• John Spencer (70:08): Agrees with Trump having taken rare, high-risk, politically difficult decisions to support Israel, implicitly contrasting him to recent predecessors.

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Recognition of Palestine:
  John Spencer (01:59)

  “You quickly know that this is just performative politics. Has no meaning.”

• On rewarding Hamas:
  John Spencer (03:26)

  “It definitely rewards terrorism while you can give a speech how it doesn’t. And my, you know, eighth grader could say, yeah, but it does.”

• On Right, Wrong, and War:
  John Spencer (10:36)

  “I always try to be as analytical and objective...I have my own views that have been shaped on right and wrong, but...what we agreed to is right and wrong as in we, as in societies.”

• On Civilian Suffering and Egypt:
  John Spencer (17:23)

  “There is only one country right now who has the sole ability to reduce this human suffering in Gaza, and that’s Egypt...And the world will air the photo to every civilian around the world who doesn’t know any better, has never seen a war.”

• On Unique Double Standard:
  John Spencer (17:23)

  “There is a double standard in war and then there’s an Israeli standard.”

• On Hamas’s Mentality:
  John Spencer (30:50)

  “It is solely by their statement since October 7, the destruction of Israel and the death of all the Jewish people.”

• On Anti-Semitism and Double Standards:
  John Spencer (63:00)

  “There is no other answer but antisemitism...the delegitimizing Israel’s right to defend itself, and then the demonization of Israeli leaders, IDF soldiers, everybody—that’s the definition of…anti-Semitism.”

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Timestamps for Key Segments

• Palestinian State Recognition: 01:59–07:20
• Weighing War and Morality: 08:13–15:15
• Double Standards & International Reaction: 17:23–22:15
• Could Israel Protect More Civilians?: 24:48–28:19
• Hostage Dynamic and Hamas Strategy: 29:05–33:24
• Victory & Post-War Scenarios: 40:11–44:01
• Debating Civilian Combatant Ratios: 51:29–60:39
• Is the World's Response Antisemitic?: 62:51–65:08
• Trump’s Role in Israel Policy: 67:12–71:08

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Tone, Language, and Atmosphere

The conversation is dense, analytical, and emotionally charged, marked by philosophical rigor from the hosts and guest. There’s a relentless emphasis on facts, history, and comparative analysis, combined with personal reflections and raw perplexity over moral questions that defy easy answers.

The episode maintains a tone of urgency, gravity, and honesty, with the hosts (especially Noam) wrestling out loud with the unbearable moral cost of this conflict—while John Spencer provides expert context and hard truths about what war means in both theory and ghastly reality.

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Final Takeaways

• The Gaza war’s dilemmas cannot be separated from the modern laws and realities of war, moral philosophy, and the unique position of Israel.
• Hamas’s strategies are both militarily effective and devastating for their own civilians—by design.
• International responses are often driven by political theater, moral panic, and, according to Spencer, a thread of anti-Semitism.
• The philosophical questions—about acceptable cost in war and where to draw ethical lines—are truly “unbearable” and for now remain unresolved.

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Transcript

[A]

This is Live from the Table, the official podcast of the world famous comedy seller. Available wherever you get your podcasts and in particular available on YouTube for that multimedia experience. Dan Natterman here, along with Noam Dwarm and the owner of the Comedy Cellar and political pundit making. Making a name for himself. Bit of a name for himself.

[B]

A little bit.

[A]

A little on. On Twitter X. I call it Twitter and. And will die on that.

[B]

Hill Perry.

[A]

Al Ashenbrand is with us.

[C]

Hello.

[A]

And we have with us John Spencer, Chair of War Studies at the Madison Policy Forum, Executive director of Urban Warfare and.

[B]

Yes.

[A]

And former armory officer as well.

[B]

Yes.

[C]

Translated into how many languages you're talking about?

[B]

My manual I wrote for Ukraine that's translated in 16 different languages. The mini manual for the Urban Defender.

[C]

So translated into 16 languages. And he was cited by Benjamin Netanyahu in one of his speeches as being one of the people that Netanyahu learns from.

[B]

Yes, he's actually quoted me like a lot. But there's one speech that mattered the most to, I guess everybody was when he addressed Congress. Yeah, he brought my research in.

[A]

You also might remember John Spencer from he. From his clash with Dave Smith on Piers Morgan.

[B]

I believe it was.

[C]

All right.

[B]

And many Hassan.

[C]

So so. And many Hassan. Yeah. So John, you know, I told you I like to have you on and I want to, you know, us to want to ask some tougher questions because I think that actually people do. Look, people do better when they get tougher questions. Like, you know, and I know you're not afraid of tough questions as long as they're in good faith. But before we get into that, since it's recent, what is your take on this recognition of the Palestinian state and what will be the consequences to the war and to Israel long term?

[B]

It's a good question. I mean, as a war researcher, somebody who taught strategy, understands the framework of nations, then you quickly know that this is just performative. Politics has no meaning. Even if you know the history of the United Nations. A General assembly vote versus a Security Council vote. But when it's very ahistorical, when you say I am recognizing a state, well, what's the borders of the state? Who are the population of the state? Who's the government of the state? Can the state now make agreements with anybody? All the definitions of the Monroe Doctrine or the the doctrine which a state can become. A state isn't present. So these nations are actually performatively designating an idea, a state.

[C]

But what about what are the consequences of giving Hamas what Appears to be a kind of victory of injecting them with something they can point and say, listen, look what we accomplished. Abbas over there couldn't have accomplished that.

[B]

Right. And didn't. Right. And how many times he was offered Arafat, Abbas. I mean, they were offered a Palestinian state. Gaza was de facto an autonomous area after 2005, 2007. It definitely rewards terrorism while you can give a speech how it doesn't. And my, you know, eighth grader could say, yeah, but it does.

[C]

Right.

[B]

And this gets to the ramifications of if you allowed Hamas to win, if you allowed October 7th to be Palestinian Independence Day, you can tell me that's not what they're saying. But by sheer just recent history, this happened on October 7th. Now you want to throw away the 50 plus years of work that every US president, everybody who's ever tried to create a Palestinian state have done, just say, well, because of October 7th and everything that's happened since then, you're right, you're saying, and the Hamas is saying that they'll celebrate October 7th as their independence Day. And, and you will increase the cycle of violence in that area. You won't give peace to anybody, not to the Palestinians and definitely not to the Israelis.

[C]

I mean, I believe, I know the answer to this, but just to be sure, I believe that everyone at this table would like the Palestinians to have a state along the lines of the deals that were discussed at Camp David and with Abbas and Olmert, if they would want it. But what this seems to me is that the party that has sworn they will never ever accept a state side by side with Israel, that wants from the river to the sea, they are now the recipients of this recognition. So why would they ever want to pursue the compromise state which was the Oslo dream?

[B]

Right? I mean, it's just, it's, it's almost insanity in so many levels to discuss it the way it's being discussed, let alone from how it works in any other part of the world. So we can just start designating states and other people's countries, because that's part of this, is the lines and all of this agreement. No, no, we're going to say today we're recognizing the Palestinian state, even though we don't know where it is. You're 100% right, that that's not what Hamas says they want. They want a state. They don't want a state where Israel is not a part of it. They want Jerusalem as the capital. They don't want Israel to exist. And they said, thank you and if all of these countries, which, you know, that it's not what they want, you know, it's for their domestic political concerns. If they would just say we agree on a path to a Palestinian state with these reasonable conditions.

[A]

Isn't that what France said, essentially we want a state that's next to Israel, you know, in peace?

[B]

No, they actually said before they made their announcement that if Israel would stop the war in Gaza, then they wouldn't make their declaration of recognizing the Palestinian state. So bs. But in their speech, Macron's speech, he said he wanted all these things. This gets you back to what we were talking about before the show of. Most people say, like, of course Hamas has to not be a part of this, has to lay down their weapons, give the hostages back. But then they rush this decision of we're going to have this big performative Palestinian state and not address the Hamas question.

[C]

Yeah, I mean, I mean maybe this is infantile, but another thing you could imagine them saying is if you release the hostages and take safe passage out of Gaza, you we will recognize a Palestinian state. Like, if you're going to recognize the Palestinian state, at least put those conditions on it.

[B]

Yeah, but even then you're like you said, you're giving Abbas a pass at everything he said no to. Like, do you recognize that Israel should exist and that you want to live in coexistence? No, I can't say that. Do you recognize you don't want to. The Palestinian people can't have the right of return back to Israel now. I can't say that. You know, I can't say that. Do you want to give up? What? The pay for slave program? Well, I will, but I really won't like all these.

[C]

Or actually update the charter. I don't believe they ever even actually updated the charter to no longer call for the destruction of Israel.

[B]

Which one? Hamas or plo?

[C]

Plo.

[B]

Yeah.

[C]

I don't think they actually did.

[B]

They've watered it down. But this is the insanity of even having the conversation. And I'm as an American very happy that the United States isn't playing this silly game of this is just stupid to discuss.

[A]

What role does the PLO currently play? Because we hear about the Palestinian Authority and we hear about Hamas and I don't hear as much about the PLO as I used to back in the old days.

[B]

Yeah, they transferred to the Palestinian Authority. PLO is the Palestinian Authority. But there was one election for the Palestinian Authority there, one election for Hamas, and there hasn't been one for decades. Since. But if you held a vote today, this is to include in Judea Samaria, what they call the west bank and Gaza. Hamas would be the ruler of both. If you voted and you gave people this, what otherbody might want to say, like, oh, yeah, you've got to give them self determination. Well, they would vote for Hamas today. They being polling, you know, I don't. With some of our passwords with like people like papal. The polling doesn't matter to me as much. But you can't give something that doesn't exist state status.

[C]

All right, so that's, that's that. So let me, let me ask you some deeper question now. You, you have risked your life for your country. You have lost dear friends, I'm assuming, in wartime.

[B]

Yeah.

[C]

And you were prepared yourself to die, which is a whole aspect of, of manliness in a way. I mean, I have another way to put it and, and bravery that, you know, I, I wish I had an understanding of that. I feel almost, you know, inadequate in a certain way because I can't really identify with that. Her husband, has he, he was, he didn't fight in a war, but, you know, he fought in a war. He fought in a war. My partner George fought in a war.

[D]

And, and he lost very close friends as well.

[C]

Yeah. And I don't know how to process. In a way, maybe it's unprocessable, the loss of life of the soldiers and also the terrible loss of life of the Palestinian people. And I have trouble with the question of, you know, how many of their lives can we rest, you know, rest our heads and feel that when I say we, I mean Israel, that we behaved morally. How much of that depends on the outcome? Meaning that the people who fought for South Korea had a death toll associated with their fight that they can say, well, in retrospect, look at this country and people who fought for North Korea have a dust hall and say, what the. We sacrifice all these lives for this and we don't know what that's going to be yet.

[A]

Daryl and some of the others would make the same point about World War II.

[C]

Yes. So it's all very philosophical, but these are the weightiest issues of all and we don't really spend much time talking about them. So how, without any clear question, how do these things all go through your mind and how do you weigh them and weight them such that you feel that this is the position you support despite all the loss of life, having been there, having risked your life.

[B]

Yeah. It's a deep question. My own military service right. 25 years and thank you. And not that I view that makes me have a more authoritative voice in somebody else. I've of course seen the realities of war.

[A]

You will agree that you're more manly than. No.

[B]

I also taught war at West Point. I taught strategy. I taught the history of war, the theories of war, the creation of nations, the evolutions of our societies and the great wars and those awful events. I understand the evolutions of the laws of war going fine. We recognize that wars will happen. They shouldn't happen. Matter of fact, we've actually. War of aggression is a war crime by today's. I understand the context of the evolutions of this awful human experience that is war, which is death and destruction. I do believe even if you go back to theologians, Theo, you're gonna say that theologians, you know, Saint Aquinas just war theory, like war is necessary because there are evil people that rise up who have evil intentions. And we have now what we call the global international order. Most people won't even acknowledge it on. We have what we call nations. We have a framework of nations Westphalian. So when I view it, I have a very. What we call with depth and context of analyzing what war are we talking about? What are the reasons that both sides are fighting? Is it a just cause? Self defense, of course, is one of the few causes that most people agree that is a just reason in which to fight for your freedom, not to be subjugated. You could get to other things, the grand strategy. So you ask a deep question like that, I'm going to give you a lot of. Please kind of like professor elements of it. My character though, does come out in my research. Of course I do believe in right, wrong, evil, good. But I always try to be as analytical and objective to look we can talk about like, you know, I had. This wasn't a debate with Dave Smith about the morality of war. Like he thinks he's the first person to ever think about the morality of death in war. And what is intentional? What are the actual just war theory, as in when can you start a war and when can you. How do you fight a war? Like, let's acknowledge all the work that's been done before. Yes, any killing is bad. But under the framework in which the entire world, literally the entire world has agreed to. These are how wars are fought, when they are fought, how they will be fought, when they are fought. So when I look at when I make my positions of a certain situation and you know, I didn't start Studying war on October 7th. War with Israel. I study war around the world. I try not to make. I'm a human. So I have like, that's wrong, you know, like the stealing of babies out of Ukraine and giving them to Russian parents. I personally, as a father view that is very wrong. But I look at, through it at an objective, analytical perspective. It's listed as a war crime on the Genocide Charter to do that. So that's a fact. Like, I'm not giving my opinion or my personal beliefs. I'm trying to be analytical about it.

[A]

There's a place for both. There's a place for your personal beliefs and a place for the application of the law.

[B]

Right? And then some of the people that have popped up since October 7th can't separate those. And that's to me, a novice observer of war. I can acknowledge the awful death and destruction in war, but then I can separate my personal beliefs of right and wrong to this is how we as human beings and governments and nations and say it will work. What's right, what's wrong, what's a war crime, when other people will intervene based on this, Especially post World War II, right? We did awful things in World War II and we can talk about those. And I tried to have that conversation with the Pape guy, like, yes, I acknowledge that we did things in World War II that we say we will not do today, although there are nations like Russia, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, where they don't follow these rules that we created after World War II. And that's a part of the conversation. I try to do it as objectively as possible, but I do have my own views that have been shaped on right and wrong. I will not say that's wrong, but I acknowledge that it is. What we agreed to is right and wrong as in we, as in societies.

[C]

And. But once, once we. And I think that the easiest thing, I mean, even the people who hate Israel claim to acknowledge that Hamas is awful. Even Omar Bartolov said, yes, Hamas needs to be defeated. But then the question is, what's the price tag? And is, does any price tag justify. Is any price tag justified by the fact that Hamas is evil? And are you haunted by that? I mean, I'm more and more scared that Hamas just never going to surrender, that they're going to kill X number of innocent people and we can get to what that number is and that they will have nothing really to show for it that they couldn't have had a year ago. And then all these extra deaths will be hard to justify. I mean, it's exposed facto It's Monday morning quarterbacking, but that, that's what we'll have to be engaged in and it'll be right to do so because many people warned that that was where it might be heading.

[B]

Yeah, I think I have a little bit of a curse of knowledge. Right. So I know if this is the context we want to talk about the war against Hamas in Gaza. I come with all of these case studies. How anybody else has dealt with this, similar dilemmas of this evil irreconcilable power that wants to see its population killed. Although there is some uniqueness to that human sacrifice strategy that Hamas employs that other militaries, not the Nazis, should talk about that. Yeah, yeah, not the Nazis, not the Imperial Japan, not any. Even ISIS didn't say and develop a strategy in which the goal is to get their own population killed. That's the goal of Hamas. They, they've stated it and they do it by how they've created Gaza, the tunnels and the strategy they use. But I come at a question about, like, what's too much? With a long view of everything that's come before.

[C]

Right.

[B]

All these. I do a lot of comparative analysis. So I can take the awful number, whatever the number is, and compare it to not World War II, but recent things, you know, the Yemen war, the Sudan War, Korean War. Like, I can compare and go, so what do you say about this? Like, well, that's different. That's not Israel. And this gets to, you know, I've been very vocal as there is a double standard in war and then there's an Israeli standard. But yes, if you want to talk about the very human aspect of the cost, this is where there's a real famous quote by a real famous military historian about the good intentions on the road to destruction. So everybody, this is the, you know, when you, you know, I've had this conversation with everybody from CNN to Piers Morgan about, well, we all agree that Hamas should go, but not this way. Like, okay, I can tell you how it's ever worked in the past. And this is the good intention factor here. Like, everybody wants will say that they want Hamas to go and that Israel has the right to defend itself to try to get his hostages back. There are a couple other historical events with hostages, but it's the good intention thing here, right? From the people that don't know anything about the history of war, military strategy, how Israel could do this even if it wasn't Israel, Right. Their good intentions have caused more human suffering in Gaza, specifically the United States would have ended this of course a lot quicker and done it a lot differently because they can't. But because of this Israeli standard to include the Egypt thing that, you know, I talk about how Egypt closed its borders and said not one civilian unless they have pay me a lot of money gets out of Gaza. You got to stay in that combat zone is very ahistorical from the history of war, even during World War II, let alone after World War II. And that should be the international protest that you. There is only one country right now who has the sole ability to reduce this human suffering in Gaza, and that's Egypt. And because I also though can say that and say I agree in the rules of nation states, you can't force a nation to do anything. Of course a lot of people want to force Israel to do something, but I can't force Egypt to create a humanitarian zone in the Sinai Desert that would save. You can move every 2 million people could be moved with ease. I fought in a neighborhood of Baghdad of 2 million. But there's one country that can do that. There's all this good intentions that has led to protracting this war. This is not in scale. It's very big military, the Hamas military, like 40,000, you know, the tunnels, the rockets and everything. That's not that big of a challenge in the grander scheme of for a military like the IDF to deal with. But if you factor in, well, the population has to stay there and every number will be counted as a civilian and the world will air the photo to every civilian around the world who doesn't know any better, has never seen a war, doesn't know what a war looks like, doesn't know what happened in a few years ago in this or that location. What is too much? This gets you to, okay, for civilian death, we can have that conversation for a nation's right of survival. You know, this is the recent IPC report about there is no genocide in Gaza, but the claim of genocide said that October 7th wasn't an existential threat to Israel. That's not factual. I mean, just by the sheer number of people that invaded Israel and held portions of southern Israel with the intention of Hezbollah joining in, the west bank joining in, Iran joining in, that was as an existential threat as it comes. And when you talk about, okay, what's too much? How much is the survival of Israel worth to Israel? A lot. Does that mean they don't have the right to defend themselves?

[C]

Well, well, I mean, you know, I'm asking these questions because. Because they're incredibly difficult and Although I may sound corny asking them, I think about them, you know, but I could definitely answer from through the other end of the telescope, which is that, you know, let's leave existential aside for a second. It's just very apparent to me that the United States of America would not tolerate rockets coming into Manhattan Island. Once would be enough and definitely not as a, as a chronic problem that we just live with forever. Just even if, and obviously it wouldn't be existential to the United States of America, but it would be something that we're just not going to tolerate and nations have a right to do these things. I don't think existential has ever been the standard of what you needed to.

[B]

Right. Even, even isis. You know, ISIS was an evil that populated and was unique because it was an evil terrorist organization that took ground inside of other countries and held ground. It was actually unique to Al Qaeda and all these others. It and 50 nations, if not more, joined in the fight to defeat isis. Right. And how many nations have joined Israel in the fight against Hamas? Well, zero.

[C]

They didn't join. And they also immediately backed off the clear moral and legal rules of war. I mean, the Geneva Conventions are legal, but they are based on morality. And the fact that, that almost that a tremendous number of the deaths of the innocent Palestinians happened as a result of, as you say, Hamas's strategy. The world was supposed to be outraged with Hamas. The law is very clear that this is Hamas's war crime. But instead they immediately, they couldn't stand the sight of what their own considered rules of war implied. And I, and I, and I confess to having similar cowardice or whatever words you want to put on it because it's just too terrible to see it. And there is this appearance that Israel is killing people in a pain and like, you know, you made your point and just protect the war, the wall better next time and, and kick the can down the road. But, but I feel, I know you agree, but not everybody does that they really can't kick the can down the road because technology is moving at such a rapid pace. And what we saw with Operation Spider's Web where they just swarmed Russia with drones, that drones cost less than $1,000 each five years from now to be less than a couple hundred dollars each. And Israel will not be able to defend against that and or uranium for a dirty bomb or any of the things that are coming down the pipeline. If Israel does not take care of this, it will be existential, if not next year, in 10 years. And they can't take that risk. So it's, you know, it's a bind.

[B]

I'm pretty big, I'm really big on definitions and you know, that like genocide, war, crime, all this stuff, insanity by definition is trying the same thing and hoping for a different outcome. Yeah. The kick the can leave them over there, just leave us alone strategy has been tried in Israel. Yeah. And that's what created Hamas.

[C]

It's so upsetting. So let me ask you this question then. Do you believe that Israel has done absolutely everything that it could to separate the civilians from the fighters? Like, couldn't they have just. It's, you know, it wouldn't be perfect taking every woman and child and sent them all to the beach or something like that. Was there anything they could have done to better protect the obvious innocent people or less threatening people?

[B]

So in, you know, from working in the Pentagon to teaching strategy, you know, you can create alternatives that aren't reasonable, feasible, suitable, sustainable. Like we have these acronyms, you know, as military guys. The only alternative I have heard from, I don't believe it would work as in politically or even to actualize is to move the practically legit, to move the civilians out of Gaza and put them in Israel. So put.

[C]

Have I to go mentioned that.

[B]

And I, I went on his podcast to talk to him about it and he's like, okay, I didn't think that through. One is that just militarily to create a camp in, let's say, the Negev, Then you'd have to guard that with a certain number of troops while you're fighting the seven Front war. You're talking thousands of soldiers, but it's a democracy. So after October 7, you think the Israel society would say, yes, I agree. Take our 10, 20,000 soldiers, leave them permanently deployed in and create this camp. That would look and sound a lot like a concentration camp, just not a work camp of all the civilians. But then who makes the decision which civilian is not Hamas? Right. Do they sign something? It's just practically from guarding it. But again, I believe in this nation state, nations have rights or what they must do, what they should do morally, what they should do is moving to say, a million and a half civilians into the Negev. Would the international community support the payment for that? Because that was around a $3 billion estimate of what it would cost to do that.

[C]

Well, I mean, are you finished, Adam?

[B]

No, no, because it, this is when.

[A]

The city, essentially, you're talking millions of people.

[B]

Correct.

[C]

It's a huge undertaking.

[B]

You could do it. But then you have to secure it. So now you have Israelis securing Palestinian civilians and what happens in the first attack, and there's some history there of even against the Gaza wall, the fence, when the first event happens there, what happens, it's just a nightmare, let alone if you, the society would agree that they should be doing it after October 7, because as you know, as many civilians cross the border on October 7th to do awful things in southern Israel as did Hamas.

[C]

All right, so these, these are the reasons you think it wouldn't have worked. But, but the record also has to show that they didn't even try and they didn't suggest it and because it's.

[B]

Not feasible in my, from a society.

[C]

And you think that's the reason I.

[B]

Personally, but also practically right, as somebody who has guarded prisoners, like, you know, would the international community have stepped in and said, you can't, you can't do that?

[C]

Yeah, well, also, I mean, I would say we, we, we have the hindsight of seeing that the war is still going on after two years and like, you know, maybe if they had known this was going to be the outcome of the, of the strategy that they did adopt, then maybe they would have considered the, what you suggest, even if it might have been hard to do. But I don't think, you know, I, I think there was an excess of optimism in terms of what the Israeli army thought, thought they could accomplish. They didn't expect to be fighting for two years and still be knee deep in it like they are now.

[D]

It's also worth noting that several of the hostages were held by, quote, unquote, civilians, such as doctors and journalists.

[C]

I mean, Hamas not that long ago released this hostage video of this guy digging his own grave for a set and the world barely reacted to it.

[B]

Right.

[C]

I, I know Jewish people. I tell, no, I didn't see that it didn't. You'd think this would be, you know, as least as well known as Jimmy Kimmel's monologue, but it, but it's not. And this tells us something very big. And yeah, I, I, I, I don't know what, what point I want to make about that, but it's just, it's just remarkable to me that Hamas, it's very unusual that the, that the power that's keeping the hostages and the one that, the power that's making him dig his own grave is the one that wants to amplify it and make sure everybody knows about it and because I guess because, but this is what's dangerous. They don't want Israel to Stop. I mean, I asked somebody other day, well, why doesn't Hamas release the hostages? I mean, normally somebody doesn't release the hostages because the hostages are the kidnapper. Doesn't release it because you're going to kill me if I release the hostage. But no, they know very well Israel is going to kill them anyway. Right, so. And they also know that if they release the hostages, it's much more likely that Israel will lose its resolve in the war because the Israeli public is already teetering on wanting to end the war. And if all the hostages were released, we can imagine that the Israeli public will say no more. Hamas knows that they gain nothing by keeping the hostages, as I can understand it, except that it provokes Israel to keep the war going. So you have both sides wanting the same thing, which is a very dangerous dynamic. Israel wants to keep the war going and Hamas wants to keep the war going.

[B]

Why does Israel want to keep the war going?

[C]

Because they want to defeat Hamas and Hamas wants to keep the war. You think? Because they're, because they're, because they feel they're winning.

[B]

Yeah, it's a. There is again, I like to do a historical. Right. So even the. Moving the enemy's population into your own territory that's on fire would be ahistorical. Never happened in war. And I wouldn't expect any nation to do that. There's no nation that's ever been the Egypt of the world. And saying, not through us.

[C]

By the way, you know that Egypt once put poison gas. Coleman told me this. Put poison gas into the tunnels to prevent them from being used from Gaza. Imagine if Israel put poison gas in the.

[B]

Yeah, they put sewage water and seawater along. They actually kicked out 50,000 Palestinians on their side of the wall as well. And that's 2017 and nobody cared. Very few people made international news. The ideal that. You're right. So this is the problem, and you've argued with these people is that I don't like when people aren't factually about what Hamas wants. Hamas, like you said, doesn't want to give the hostages up because they believe it is not the best strategy to achieve their goal. Which isn't coexistence, it isn't self determination, it isn't better living conditions for their people. It is solely by their statement Since October 7, the destruction of Israel and the death of all the Jewish people. No matter what happens, they say, they.

[C]

Say the death of all the Jewish people.

[B]

That's the original charter that they then updated. They didn't make a new Charter. Absolutely. But then their statements have been. Absolutely. And this is the statements again, you can't. It's almost like they're irrational because they're not saying things that even somebody smart who wanted to win this war would say like I want to, I want to do October 7th over and over again until I get the job done. Not that they want a two state solution. And this is the point. When Macron did it, Hamas made a statement like thank you. But just to be clear, France, we want Jerusalem as our capital, we want Israel as our state. When people you talk to that are some of them good intentioned people, just naive about the way of the world and they want the world to work differently than it does, they impose their beliefs on Hamas. This idea of their freedom fighters. They don't say that.

[C]

Right.

[B]

And that they are trying to improve the conditions of the Palestinian people. The whole open air prisons and all that stuff. No, no, no, that's not what they say. That's not what they've done since 2007. I mean there are billionaires in Qatar, millionaires in Gaza. 90% of the population barely could get food before the war.

[C]

If you knew everything you know today on October 7, 2023, what would your strategy have been and how would it have been different from the one that Israel undertook? Knowing everything we know today?

[B]

That's a really interesting question because you can't talk about justice Gaza because you know the, the northern battle against a much larger enemy that actually had an existential power. It would have cost tens of thousands of Israeli lives. I couldn't have predicted the war as a strategist for achieving the goals in Gaza, I would have done it differently. There is an Israeli way of fighting because they don't have a military, a stand in military. They have a reserve rotational force. So they can say that they fought this war for two years and they have rotating people because they have to go back into the economy, they have to go back into their jobs, you would have one I would have asked, although I know they did, about Egypt would have been a part of my information operation strategy every day the fact that they are the sole people that can get the people out of harm's way and I would have deployed maximum amount of force and never left the Gaza Strip. But I also acknowledge that Israel, the hostages have factored into the protraction of this war. Every time Israel has stopped it was for a good reason and I probably would make the same decision. But as a strategist, you don't take your foot off the neck of the enemy because that's the relief he wants to try to achieve their goals. I would not have rotated the idea of forces out like they. Like they have, but they have also. I understand all of this in the context of having to fight Hezbollah, having to fight Iran, having to deal with a lot of other situations. The Syria, the fall of Syria during all this time is that this little nation fighting all these wars by itself has done the unthinkable. Had I not known everything I've known since October 7th in defending itself and defeating all of these enemies to include Hamas military in a very unique way. I actually teach the Israel way as a part of one of my courses about how do you attack urban areas. And one of the ways is this Israeli way up in attack the military out in out. That is unique that the US military wouldn't do that way. We would go in and we would clear the enemy and then we'd hold his ground. It would lose its ground. It would loot what it values most. The hostages have factored into that. But also the Israeli capabilities of how many soldiers can they mobilize and keep mobilized? Two years, relatively speaking. And I had to have this with a very close friend of mine for a war, a war of this goal is a relatively short amount of time. Israeli doesn't want to hear that this is the longest war they've ever fought since their existence.

[C]

By far.

[B]

By far. But from a long view of war with a goal of removing something from power. It's a short amount of time in order to achieve that goal of removing Hamas from power. You have the Hashis, of course. But just to remove that and do clear of militarized capability. Two years is actually a relatively short amount of time.

[A]

Is it short considering the small size of Gaza? Would you still say it's short?

[B]

So the small size but the scale of the enemy and the radicalization of the people. So this is the ideal again a fact is a radicalization of the population of Gaza from birth. Right. I don't know if you've seen the Palestinian Sesame street, the books in the school. That factors in. How do you achieve the goal of removing a political power? You're right though. If it was the US military and we were to approach the conditions of we wouldn't have the capabilities that Israel does in some sense. But we would have the capability to keep 100,000 troops deployed into Gaza nonstop until the job was done. And it could be done faster. Yes, but there's always context.

[C]

What happens if they don't surrender they just never, you know, like, the Japanese might never have surrendered if not for the atom bomb. What will Israel do?

[B]

I can't tell you what Israel will do. It's a democracy. That's been my concern for a long time now, and I don't know if we've ever talked to that. Like you said, a society gets to make a decision on we're done, right? Like, we don't believe the cost of pursuing the goal is worth continuing this. And there are people in Israel, and I'm sure you've listened to that, want, want it over.

[C]

They're weary.

[B]

And even this is the. From a strategic perspective, just to be sure, Hamas has never said, if you stop, I'll just give you all your hostage back. That deal has never been offered by Hamas.

[C]

Even behind the, you know, it's always.

[B]

You have to release our prisoners to do certain things. You have to stay out of Gaza. You have to guarantee. You have to send in this type of aid. I mean, during the last ceasefire, 42 days, which again gets to this false claim of famine and starvation as well. During the last ceasefire, I don't know if you look closely at what the requirements that Hamas made to release just. Was it 20, 30, 40 hostages, they required 25,000 trucks of aid. They required 1 million, all the people that were in humanitarian zones in southern Gaza to be pushed back into northern Gaza. So that part of their strategy to win the war was to force those civilians back into there. And like you said, the release of hundreds of convicted, some involved in October, not they took some of the October 7th. It always becomes the deal, names off of it, but convicted killers, rapists, you name it. They've never said, well, if you, we'll just give you your hostages back. Not that I, as a war strategist would say that that is a reason to end the war. You want to end the war so you have peace, right? You want to make it so Hamas knows that they can never do this again, or anybody like Hamas, and that you want to remove this threat that tells you every day that it wants to destroy you from your border. And this is the proximity that most analysts aren't even genuine about. Like, I've stood in places like Faraza and you can see Gaza two football fields away, and you can see civilians during the last ceasefire where they weren't supposed to be, right there. That threat is existential.

[C]

This is what's so difficult for me to comprehend because what's happened to Hamas and to Gaza, I believe would be enough to demonstrate that you can never do this again to any previous war fighting entity in history. There's, and there they don't seem to, there seems to be nothing that can convince them. Maybe it's, I don't want to be bigoted about this. I, I, maybe it's because they believe everybody's a martyr. I hope I don't have like a shallow understanding of their mentality, but that certainly seems to be what they often say. And then that if, if, if every death is fine with them, how do you ever demonstrate to them they can never do it again? Go ahead.

[B]

I wanted to answer your question though, because it's historically from a war perspective. Of course. War is an act of force to compel your enemy to do your will. In this case it would be to release the hostages and surrender. It is not, it wouldn't be accurate to say that wars aren't won if the other side doesn't acknowledge that they've been defeated. Although if you look at World War I versus World War II, that was a big problem. You want the other side, like the Japanese unilateral surrender to acknowledge that they've been defeated. I wouldn't say that's always happened in war. ISIS didn't do that. And many other really situations where the enemy you're fighting doesn't acknowledge they're defeated. So then you get to power. You can take somebody's power without them giving it to you. So in a situation like this in Gaza, you have to factor in the radicalization of the population. You could still achieve Israel's three goals without Hamas surrender because you weaken its power so much so that something else can exist. And this is where I actually agree with some of the Arab nation plans. And everybody, if they would just get to like, well, how do we get Hamas out? Because they actually have plans for after, right, the multinational security force and all these things. If you wanted the Palestinian Authority, which is just a terrorist organization, but if to you wanted, you would actually say like that's winning. If Hamas is not in power, but you have to weaken its power and only Israel can do that to the point that anything else could survive in its place. So you could right now progress forward like Israel is doing, until Hamas has lost its sanctuaries, which is what it's had since October 7th. It's had a sanctuary in Gaza City and in the central camps. You remove that and then you remove its power to the point that anything else could survive because there are Hamas free zones in southern Gaza right now. Not saying those are good guys, but There are clans, Bedouin clan that supposedly has nefarious backgrounds who are running Hamas free zones in southern Gaza. You can still defeat Hamas without it surrendering.

[C]

And then so what is, what is post war look like then?

[B]

Yeah. Who runs Gaza, having asked that question of very high leadership as well, is like well there's nobody raising their hand. Right. So this is the idea of like Egypt or Saudi Arabia sending troops into Gaza to be a part of some peacekeeping force. Now there's European countries saying they might. I can say it's very likely that that won't happen until there is a certain level of security achieved by Israel. Like nobody's coming to save Israel in this perspective. Not that they're asking for anybody. They're asking for people to stop stopping them in the progression of a just Lee executed war trying to protect the civilians. And oh by the way, if you would just get the civilians out of harm's way, this would go very quickly. You know who secures it though is a great question. But as soon as one of those people die, right. So like if Egypt's not going to do it, but let's say an Arab nation force goes in there and Hamas is still have power and if it would attack and kill those that would go away really quickly and we'd be back at start at zero.

[C]

It reminds me of. And then actually I can bring it back to where we started. It reminds me of these, this, you know, philosophy games about playing chicken where two people are driving towards each other and who's going to drive out of the. Move out of the way first. And some famous philosopher said that well, the best way to win chicken is to yank the steering wheel out of the column and you know, and you know, I guess and the pedals too so that the guy driving towards you understands you have no way of stopping the car. And once he realizes you have no way of stopping the car or steering out of the way, he'll have to pull off the road. Hamas is doing a good impression of that driver that has that, you know, is not going to stop. They are playing chicken with Israel. And I think actually have you actually said this and Israel's made the mistake of thinking that's what this aid debacle.

[B]

Yeah.

[C]

Which I don't know how you feel about it, but this was haviv put it this way is that Israel thought it could play chicken with Hamas over Palestinian lives. How did that turn out? Because Hamas is driving that car straight and they do nothing is going to stop them. And it's just A very pessimistic outlook. Except I'm wondering if this recognition of the Palestinian state, if in some way, if there's a unintended consequence here potentially, whereas the European nations begin to put their fingerprints on the conflict in a more overt way, that they're now somehow more responsible to what's going on there. And like we recognized your state with Hamas in charge. Okay, England, okay. France. Hamas is still there. You just want to be a spectator now or are you going to? Because obviously the one answer would be is if there would be some concerted effort of the world to impose their will rather than, you know, just mouthing off about it.

[B]

Yeah, this is the marker rather than ostracizing Israel. Go ahead. The Secretary Rubio comment, like none of this is helpful is actually the opposite of help. This doesn't help achieve peace. This hardens Hamas's will because it thinks it's going to get. And war is a contest of will. And you're absolutely rooted right to frame that. And anytime there's been daylight between the world and Israel, especially the United States, because it is such a force and a member of the UN Security Council, all that Hamas truly believes it can win. If you took that away from Hamas and all these countries made that clear and then said, but we want a path towards a Palestinian state after this, that would be completely different. But by just saying, because Israel won't stop in achieving, trying to achieve the goal of the destruction of Hamas, we're going to designate the Palestinian state and they create more will. And I agree with Marco Rubio call that out every time to include tangible examples of like when there was a hostage deal that I don't agree you should be dealing with them at all, but I understand why. And something like this happens, Hamas walks away from the table where it changes its terms.

[A]

Does Hamas think that the fall of Israel is imminent? What exactly are they hoping for at this point?

[B]

They are hoping no. They in Israel has actually shown its strength since October 7, where the Islamic regime in Iran, who is the head of all of this, has been weakened and its ring of fire turned on upside down. Now it has a ring of power around it, but Hamas thinks it can survive. Doesn't matter if every the the cost. And be able to say that they did October 7th and survived it as a political organization. And they will get, you call it street cred, but you can call it actual political power from being the terrorist organization that did October 7th and survived Israel's response to it. And they across the terrorist world will Be viewed. They'll make statues out of these guys, just like they have statues in Judea and Samaria for terrorists. They'll make statues from Yahya, Sinwar and Haniyeh and all these guys as the great people who did October 7th and survived it. And Hamas maintains power in Gaza. That's really one of their prerequisites, is just to keep power over the people. And that gets you to the humanitarian aid and all these things that they use. But they're a bar of victory from a war.

[C]

Personal glory.

[B]

It's just the bar. Analysts of winning versus losing, although that's a terrible framework in war. Hamas wins if they survive.

[A]

Was that their goal from the outset or their goal has now changed given the ferocity of Israel's response.

[B]

The goal from the outside was the destruction of Israel. I firmly believe that based on their coordinations with Hezbollah, Iran and others.

[D]

And what about. And what about Qatar? What about what just happened in Qatar, which seems to be something that nobody's really talking about. That seems seem to initially have been like a major move.

[B]

Political theater.

[D]

Political theater.

[B]

I mean, a week ago, the United States did an airstrike to kill an ISIS leader in Syria.

[D]

Nobody said a word.

[B]

No, I said a word.

[D]

You said a word.

[B]

I'm proud of that. I'm killing terrorists that have a goal of destruction of Israel, destruction of the United States. All of this. The theater was the. The aghast that Israel did it. Right when I think they're aghast is that Qatar, it's a very large conversation. Has given the Hamas leadership sanctuary, of course, for so long and that they're billionaires living in luxury while their people, they don't care about. They say this, not me. Are living the way they're living even before October 7th, but especially after October 7th.

[D]

I mean, there's also the theater of all the propaganda with the hostages. Right. They just released the pictures of all 48 hostages, and under each one, they put the name Ron Arad, who was, I believe, an Israeli Air Force member who disappeared in 1988, never to be found. And they said that this is the fate of all the 48 hostages.

[C]

Yeah, well, I mean, I'm more pessimistic than I was coming in. I wish there was a good outcome because. A good outcome to be had. Because first of all, I want a good outcome for the Palestinian people. I want a good outcome for the Israelis, number one. Number two, because I'm emotionally attached to Israel, of course, I feel that only a good outcome can help Israel recover its place in the world. Memories are short when an outcome is good. Memories are short when there's a victory. I mean, our whole beating ourselves over the head about Iraq is only because there's not a great outcome to show for it. It's not because the war. If Iraq was a bustling democracy now and a strong ally of America, nobody would be saying boo about whether or not we found wmd, because the outcome would speak for itself. But bad outcomes, what's the express. You know, success has so many parents. And failure as an orphan. Right. So. So everybody would be happy with success.

[D]

Why are you. Why are you more pessimistic now?

[B]

Yeah. You mean. Give you some pauses about Israel.

[A]

He did say that victory was possible even if Hamas doesn't surrender, can be defeated.

[C]

I. I just don't. I'm pessimistic. But one last question. You've had a lot of fights with people about the ratio of.

[B]

Sure.

[C]

Combatants to fighters.

[B]

Yeah.

[C]

And you've been very, very confident. And every time I hear you speak, I say to myself, oh, God, I hope John is not out over his skis. Because my private fear is twofold. First of all, it's that.

[B]

Well, it's not.

[C]

Not twofold, but I have two thoughts. First of all is that why would we think we'd have a good ratio comparatively to other wars?

[B]

Yeah.

[C]

When Hamas can, I think, always manage to put a tremendous number of civilians between itself and any target that Israel has to hit. So. So they control the ratio in a way, which would imply that it would have to be a worse ratio than other conflicts where the enemy actually wanted its civilians to survive. That's number one. And, and number two, I always felt like even if you want to say that stuff, we should still focus on the fact I think the ratio is better than any other war. However, to the extent that it's not, this is a result of Hamas's strategy, not Israel's failure to give due care to the. To the task it's faced with. Because let's say you say the ratio is like 50 50, and you'll talk about that in a second. If it was 8020 civilians and fighters, I'd say if 50. 50 is. Is. Is realistic and it's actually 80 20, that extra 30% is to be put at the blame of Hamas and only Hamas, so not Israel. But that's the argument I'm more comfortable with.

[A]

So I'm sure you had an agreement from John.

[C]

Why are you so confident that this ratio is on the lower end while people like Matthew Cockerel are so confident that it's one of the worst ratios ever.

[B]

I'm so confident because in God I trust all others bring data. And like you, I'll challenge people on the data in which they're using to make their position. Of course, I've been studying this just urban battles for over a decade. I've written books, I've written case studies. I know how hard it is to find the number. When I'm writing a case study about a war that happened 10 years ago, I initially started and this is where these jokers. I don't name names. I attack veracity of statements, try to argue against me. Although I was bringing the data showing that in a battle, let's say like the battle of Mosul, where the ratio was this. I can tell you, as a person who has studied, talking about war, studying war before October 7, that nobody's ever been asked during a war, what's your civilian to combatant ratio? So that's one of the reasons I was so confident, because one, I had done all these case studies, like, here you go, here's the numbers of recent history. But I also knew that this is, this is all a, a false argument because it's not how war works, right? It's just not how war works. And then I, but I, if I wanted to, they want to play their statistical warfare, right, and say that the number that I'm generating means this. No. 1, your number is highly controversial and unlikely. And I've never studied a battle or war in history where, where you could have a number in real time with accuracy, just objective accuracy. But you have nefarious intentions. I know from your other statements. Let me give you an example. An apple to an orange, right? I'm somewhat consider myself an academic and I know that if you compare an apple to an orange, it's not a good argument to make. So in the beginning, when people were saying that the number was like 10,000, it was so bad, I compared the opening moments of October 7th to battles in recent history and said, this is what we know years later was the ratio of civilians versus combatants. But. And I would caveat that with but this is not how war works. These numbers, lies, damn lies and statistics isn't how it works. And the example I gave is that you're comparing a battle in Gaza, the numbers, whatever number you got, however you got it from whoever you got the number from, Hamas to a war like, well, that's a battle, that's a war. 20 million civilians or 20 million soldiers die in war. Two 50 million civilians, 200,000 civilians die in the Iraq war. Nobody knows how many combatants really died. All these battles in which there is no number, but of the available numbers. And if we want to play this game, yes, the number ratio in Gaza, despite the context, like you said, of Hamas trying to get civilians killed, this is where I don't believe that person's numbers, but I believe this person's numbers. And at the time I wrote the article that they love to use, this is what Israel is saying, how many combatants they had killed. This is what Hamas is saying, how many civilians, everybody that they list, although the list is terrible, say, and then the ratio was X, Y and Z, Right? One to one, one to two to. It's not how war works at, at all. So I'm very confident in the numbers, but I'm also very aware of how the other person is generating their number. Like the guy you mentioned uses this other guy named Spaggott's numbers, right, who wrote an article. So I made this statement. It's not a mistake because it's a fact that the United nations, because I was arguing in the United nations for years in urban warfare was saying that 90% of the casualties of modern wars that happen in urban areas are civilians. So that's the one, the nine. This guy Spaggott wrote a whole article how that's a false number, My number, Like, I didn't say it was my number. I know it's a false number. I'm saying, here's the 10 times since 2020 that the United Nations, Secretary General, the Red Cross, a Civic, have used 90% of the casualties of wars that happen in urban areas are civilians. I didn't say I used it. I know where it comes from. From like an air war study where they gerrymander information. And now Spagot, same guy is doing that in Gaza, saying, well, we called everybody in this area and asked if they lost any family members. And 100% of the people. We're saying, because those people we asked said that they weren't involved in any in Hamas. And we take that and then we extrapolate across the Gaza Strip and that's where we come up with our higher numbers than that Hamas is like. Like that's not how this works. This is. That's not how the number works. The ratio is not like you said, even if the number wasn't low historically, although it is. And then you have the aggregating factor, right? So they aggregate any number they can find in Gaza and then disaggregate a number from another event in history to compare it against. So the civilian to combatant ratio in the Battle of Rafah is so low that nobody will ever use it because Israel killed so few civilians that it's probably like 100 to one civilian. Right, right. But they don't want to use that. They want to take northern Gaza In November of 2023, when there were 40,000 Hamas launching 4,000 rockets, and Israel. And then there's a number being produced. But how? It's all disingenuous, Noam, that the numbers, if you want to use the numbers, I'll use the numbers against people. I know. This is not how any of the law of war works. There's no number that says, okay, you hit 50,000, it's genocide. There's no number that said, look, your ratio is disproportionate, so you got to stop. It's not illegal. That's not how this works. I mean, in the Korean War, you might have heard me say this. The Korean war went for 37 months. Most people, like you said at the beginning, view it as a just war. For the South Korean people, 2 million civilians die, Researchers say after years after the war, 2 million civilians died in that war. It's a 37 month war. That's 54,000 civilians dying a month every month of the war. If we did the numbers that way. But it's not how it works. Who killed the civilians? How did they die? So I can say factually that yes, Israel has a low civilian to combatant ratio in these battles of the war compared to these battles in previous modern history. But what I can say with even stronger conviction is that there's not one bit of evidence saying that Israel has targeted civilians in the West.

[C]

Yes, yes. Well, I mean, on a macro level, I'm sure there's some, there's some sick soldier who's done something horrible.

[B]

Right.

[C]

And, and not just one or two, probably, but, but whatever. I mean, that's, that, that's the human condition.

[B]

But even the Biden administration, who wasn't a fan many times, where they put out the correct number of civilian casualties in Gaza is zero, which is. That's wrong.

[C]

Yeah, I mean, so when, Listen, I've said on the show before, but it's really important, I think, for people listening to think about it, Operation Pied Piper, which was right when, when England knew that the Germans were coming, when the blitz was coming, they evacuated, I think, a million and a half people out of London and the environs in a week or 10 days or something like that. They got all their children and women out of harm's way because they knew a war was coming. When Hamas knew the war was coming, they urged everybody to stay in place. And from that everything else became predictable. And to this day, and this also obviously has a tremendous bearing on this whole genocide argument, to this day, all Hamas would have to do is properly evacuate its non combatants to an area of Gaza, put ribbon around them, and say, these are our civilians now. We're going to fight you over here. And that would be the end of the civilian deaths. And that would be. But of course, that would be the end of Hamas, which is why they won't do it. And the world simply is impotent. The world does not call on Hamas to, to shield the civilians. The world does not call on Hamas to let them use the tunnels. It just blames Israel. They won't even for the outcome of Hamas's strategy.

[B]

They won't even name them. The United nations make statements. They won't even name Hamas. And you're right, they won't criticize Hamas. Hamas hasn't just not evacuated, it has put out written guidance and published it, that if a civilian evacuates, they'll face severe consequences to include death. All 2 million civilians in Gaza could fit in Hamas's 300 miles of tunnels with ease. And back to what we said earlier, not one is but the world. You've never heard a world leader say that.

[C]

Why.

[D]

Do you think that's the case? Is it just because it's Israel and people hate Jews? I'd be remiss not to ask you that question.

[B]

I believe by a series of deduction and studying many wars to include wars I'm studying right now in other parts of the world that there is no other answer but antisemitism.

[D]

Thank you.

[B]

Because using Natan Sharansky's double standard, I can validate. I've written articles with at least 10 double standards applied only to Israel. In a war like this or in a war in general, the delegitimizing Israel's right to defend itself, and then the demonization of Israeli leaders, IDF soldiers, everybody. That's the definition of. At the heart of that, whatever position you have is anti Semitism. And I have done that. And I didn't start there on October 7th. On October 7th, having studied Israel like, okay, Israel has to fight a different way. And then as the statements keep coming out and keep coming out and the position is like, you can't. You can do it, but not that way. And if you're trying to do it that way, you have evil intentions. Like no, he publicly said his fight is not with the people. It's with Hamas, the 3DS. It's anti Semitism.

[C]

Well, I mean, I don't know. I, I don't know if I agree. Certainly the kind of rampant disposition of so much of the world towards having negative feelings about the Jews is the petri dish that this all grows in. But we're also seeing something like yet another moral panic that we saw during MeToo, that we saw during BLM where, where there's tremendous social pressure to have a particular view of this and a tremendous lack of people being informed about it. Tremendous Mac of lack of tremendous susceptibility to half baked information misinformation, disinformation. That I would not want to accuse everybody who feels a certain way about this war of feeling that way because they don't like Jews. I don't think that's the essence.

[D]

Then why don't.

[C]

But that might. But without anti Semitism, this, this bacteria main probably would have never grown as it did, but it's taken on life of its own.

[D]

They don't care about any other war in the entire world. Did you see what just happened with Greta and her flotilla today that they. People were saying, well, we want no part of this because there's a gay guy on the boat and we do not believe that that's okay. And.

[C]

But it's become a virtuous signaling. It's become moral panic has become trendy.

[D]

Because people like to hate the Jews.

[A]

Well, that could have been what set it off. So we're also talking about the Holy Land. We're talking about an area that people are very much interested in.

[D]

Look how people know nothing.

[C]

Look how a concept like believe all women, which was absurd on its face.

[D]

No, that's not abs.

[C]

No, you, you had people mouthing this all over the country and people like me afraid to even be caught on my podcast saying what I'm saying now. That's ridiculous. Many of us thought it was ridiculous. There was tremendous, it was a social, moral panic. A social panic. Tremendous pressure. People were saying things they didn't believe. Malcolm Gladwell comes on a few weeks ago and says, I have to admit I was cowed when I said that trans women ought to be able to compete against CIS women in, in sports. I, I uttered a lot of howlers. He never made it clear whether he actually had come to actually believe what he was saying or not. I think he did believe what he was saying. Point is, I don't think Malcolm Gladwell was coming from any place of bigotry one way or another. Human. Human psychology is so deep, it's so interesting. We're so weak, we blow like feathers. Look what's happening on the right now with all these conspiracy theorists and Tucker Carl. Now Megyn Kelly is, is, you know, giving safe harbor to Candace Owens who. Who talks about Israel assassinating Charlie Kirk. I would never would have thought I'd live to see.

[A]

Do you think Trump's defense of Israel is based on where he thinks the electorate is Listen. Or his own conviction?

[C]

I'm going to say about Donald Trump, and this is probably going to be the most offensive thing anybody's ever heard me say. Donald Trump is doing terrible things in many ways with First Amendment and all tariffs, you name it. I just want to say as a Jewish person, he is a singular figure right now in modern Jewish history. He is the little Dutch boy with his finger in the dike on the left and the finger dike on the right. And he is holding back the deluge of from both directions. This guy is the best friend that the Jewish people have ever had in my lifetime. He does not give a shit what anybody says. He knows that Mag is turning against it. He knows that the lev is running bad. He has not budged. He took out Iran. I. Whatever else you want to say about him, if this issue is important to you, then you have to give this guy another look because there is no other politician in either party anywhere who I don't think you could expect 50% of the support for Jewish issues that you're getting from Donald Trump. Not a single Democrat, and I hate to say it, maybe not a single Republican. Maybe Marco Rubio. Maybe Marco Rubio, if he has the. But. But he's still a politician. And already we see Andrew Cuomo backtracking, I don't know if. Who's been a pretty good friend of the Jews. I didn't even know if Marco Rubio, if he were a politician under the pressure that Donald Trump is under, if he wouldn't start double talking, whatever it is in this case.

[A]

Where's this coming from? You think just his personal conviction is that strong?

[C]

Yes. You know, I will say about myself, I always thought Donald Trump, that this whole thing. Donald Trump has no convictions. I always thought that was bullshit. I've been saying that for almost 10 years already. He says a lot of stuff he doesn't really care about, but the things he does care about, he's been more Consistent about including the things we disagree with him, like tariffs and trade deficits. These are the things he's been saying 10, 15, 20 years. He does believe them. When we had people like, I don't want to say the names who are saying, I think he's transactional. He's going to throw Israel under the bus. I remember I said, I don't think he will. I think he's, he, he is a friend to the Israelis.

[D]

Richie Torres.

[C]

Yeah. Richie Torres. Well, we'll see. But, but Donald Trump. Listen, if I had to ask you a question, which president has spent less time looking at polls than any president in the last hundred years, what do you think it would be? You imagine Donald Trump looking at the polls on issues. No. Again, it's his flaw quite often. But in this particular issue, I thank God for Donald Trump. That's all. I can't even imagine what this would all look like without him. That's how I feel about it. Prove me wrong. Podcastcommysol.com John, you disagree with that take about Donald Trump?

[B]

Oh, I do war. I don't do politics. I agree with you. And I just released my own podcast. An interview with the Mossad chief about the Israel raid into Tehran to get the nuclear archive that was proof that Israel was developing a bomb. And, and yes, the United States has been facilitating the development. And President Trump said, not on my watch. Tried everything politically feasible, possible, and made a decision that I don't know if anybody else that would have made that decision.

[C]

Barack Obama, 15 years ago was quaking in his boots at the very thought of even threatening Iran, that we might drop a bomb on them. Right. When Iran was much less of a threat than they were now. Now, looking back on, I wonder if he said to himself, why didn't I just do that? It was nothing. They collapsed in two seconds.

[B]

No risky, giant risk. So you got to give, like you said, give the person credit for the amount of risk taken, not just politically, but even geopolitically.

[C]

Yeah, I'm okay with Trump on this issue. I do not like him on 20 other things. But this is, you know, and I don't know if I've said this to you before. I've said it on the show. Jews are always accused of, you know, dual loyalty, as if no other ethnic group is concerned. Like, as if Serbs don't care what happens in Serbia. Right.

[B]

But.

[C]

And of course, I do care what happens in Israel, but this is different right now because for the first time, Jewish parents, of American citizens, of American Jewish citizens understand that their children's lives as Jews in America is affected in a very real way by what's happening in this war in Israel. And for the first time, my concern in this war is not just about, I hope Israel is okay. It's very much about, and I think about all the time, how my children are going to experience being a Jewish citizen in America. Already they say, sense, we're Jews, you know, our dad's Israeli, and we're kind of maybe, you know, a lot of people think that's a bad thing. Some of the parents might make me uncomfortable about that. They, they read it loud and clear. So in this sense, I'm, I'm happy for my president, Donald Trump, who is looking after me as an American, not after Israel, me as an American, so I can live my life and as a Jewish person with my children in a particular way, the United States of America. That's how I feel about it. Okay. Anyway, John Spencer, I'm very proud to know you, Very, very proud that with your busy schedule, you, you fit time in to come and do our podcast. Our friends are downstairs in the Olive Tree, if you want to come down now and kick back. Podcastamicshow.com the Urban Warfare Institute. John Spencer, thank you very much, sir.