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The Epstein Chronicles
Mega Edition: The OIG Report Detailing The Investigation Into Epstein's NPA (Part 41-44) (4/7/26)
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The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report into Jeffrey Epstein’s 2007 Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) presents a disturbing portrait of federal cowardice, systemic failures, and deliberate abdication of prosecutorial duty....
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Indeed, on November 24, 2008, the USAO gave notice that it deemed Epstein's participation in work release to be a breach of the agreement with a failure to report on October 20, and had envisioned that entire collateral attack. I think would have looked at this very differently. Once the NPA was signed, Acosta could have ignored Epstein's request for further review by the Department and if Epstein failed to fulfill his obligations under the NPA to enter his state guilty plea, declared Epstein to be in breach and proceeded to charge him federally. When questioned about this issue, Acosta explained that he believed the Department had the right to address Epstein's concerns. He told OPR that because the USAO is part of the Department of Justice, if a defendant asks for a departmental review, it would be unseemly to object. During his OPR interview, Sloman described Acosta as very process oriented, which he attributed to Acosta's prior department experience. Sloman, however, believed the USAO gave Epstein too much process, a result of the USAO's desire to do the right thing and to the defense team's ability to keep pressing for more process without triggering a breach of the npa. Furthermore, Epstein's defense counsel repeatedly and carefully made clear that they were not repudiating the agreement. Acosta told OPR that the USAO would have had to declare Epstein in breach of the NPA in order to proceed to file federal charges, and Epstein would undoubtedly have litigated whether his effort to obtain departmental review constituted a breach. Acosta recalled that he was concerned, as with Sloman, that a unilateral decision to rescind the non prosecution agreement would result in collateral litigation that would further delay matters and make what was likely a difficult trial even harder. Acosta and Sloman's concerns about declaring a breach were not unreasonable. A court would have been unlikely to have determined that defense counsel's appeal of the NPA to the department and an unwillingness to set a plea date while the appeal was ongoing was sufficient to negate the agreement. However, some of the difficulty the USAO faced in declaring a breach was caused by decisions Acosta made before and shortly after the NPA was signed. For example, and significantly, it was Acosta who changed the language Epstein shall enter his guilty plea and be sentenced not later than October 26, 2007 to Epstein shall use his best efforts to enter his guilty plea and be sentenced not later than October 26, 2007. Acosta also agreed not to enforce the NPA's October 26, 2007 deadline for entry of Epstein's plea, and he told defense counsel that he had no objection if they decided to pursue an appeal to the department. Following these decisions, the USAO would have had significant disaster difficulty trying to prove that Epstein was not using his best efforts to comply with the NPA and was intentionally failing to comply, as opposed to pursuing a course to which the U.S. attorney had at least implicitly agreed. Acosta did not exercise sufficient supervisory review over the process. The question at the center of much of the public controversy concerning the USAO's handling of its criminal investigation of Epstein is is why the USAO agreed to resolve the case in which the defendant faced decades in prison for sexual crimes against minors with such an insignificant term of incarceration and made numerous other concessions to the defense. As OPR set forth in substantial detail in this report, OPR did not find evidence to support allegations that the prosecutors sought to benefit Epstein at the expense of the victims. Instead, the result can more appropriately be tied to Acosta's misplaced concerns of about interfering with a traditionally state crime and intruding on state authority. Acosta was also unwilling to abandon the path that he had set, even when Vilafana and Lori advocated to end the negotiations. Even though Acosta himself learned that the state authorities may not have been a reliable partner, many of the problems that develop might have been avoided had Acosta engaged in greater consultation with his staff before making key decisions. The contemporaneous records revealed problems with communication and coordination among the five key participants. Acosta was involved to a greater extent and made more decisions than he did in a typical case. Lori told OPR that it was unusual to have a U.S. attorney get involved with this level of detail. I know we would have spoken about this case a lot, okay. And I'm sure with Jeff as well, that there were conversations, a meeting that I had with Marie and Andy as well. Lori similarly told opr, well, he would have been talking to Jeff and Matt, talking to me to the extent that he did, and he would have been looking at the pros memo and the guidance from CEOs. He would have been reading the defense attorney's letters, maybe talking to the state attorney. I don't know, just all these different sources of information. He was uncomfortable that he knew the case. He, you know, that he was, he was reading everything. Apparently he, you know, read the pro's memo. He read all the stuff at the same time. Acosta was significantly removed in physical distance and in levels in the supervisory chain from the individuals with the most knowledge of the facts of the case, Vilafana, and to the lesser extent, Lori. Lori normally would have signed off on the prosecution memorandum on his own, but as he told opr, right recognized that the case was going to go through the front office because there was front office involvement from the get go. Yet although Acosta became involved at certain points in order to make decisions, he did not view himself as overseeing the investigation or the details of implementing his decisions. OPR observed that as a consequence, management of the case suffered from both an absence of ownership of the investigation and failures in communication between that affected critical decisions. On occasion, Vilafana included Acosta directly in emails, but often information upon which Acosta relied for his decisions and information about the decisions Acosta had made traveled through multiple layers between Acosta and Vilafana. Vilafana did draft a detailed analytical prosecution memorandum, but it's not clear that Acosta read it and instead may have relied on conversations primarily with Menshel and and later with Sloman after Menshel's departure. Despite these discussions, though, it is not clear that Acosta was aware of certain information, such as Ostra Bond's strong opinion from the outset in favor of the prosecution or of Vilafana's concerns and objections to state based resolutions or the final npa. Acosta interpreted the state indictment on only one charge as a sign that the case was weak evidentially, but but it's not clear that when making his decision to resolve the matter through a state based plea, he knew the extent to which both Vilafana and Laurie believed that the state had intentionally failed to aggressively pursue a broader state indictment. One example illustrates this communication gap. In September 20, 2007 email to Lori asking him to read the latest version of the proposed hybrid federal plea agreement calling for Epstein to plead to both state and federal charges, Acosta noted, I don't typically sign plea agreements. We should only go forward if the trial team supports and signs this agreement. I didn't even sign the public corruption or Cali cartel agreements so this should not be the first in his email to Villefana, Lori attached Acosta's email and instructed Vilafana to change the signature block to your name and send as a final to Jay Lefkowitz. Vilafana raised no objections to signing the agreement. Acosta told OPR that he wanted to give the trial team a chance to speak up and let him know if they did not feel comfortable with the agreement. Vilafana, however, told OPR that she did not understand that she was being given an opportunity to object to the agreement. Rather, she believed Acosta wanted her to sign it because he was taking an arm's length approach and signaling that this was not his deal. The fact that the top decision makers believed he was giving the line AUSA an opportunity to reflect and stop the process if she believed the deal was inappropriate. But the line AUSA believed she was being ordered to sign the agreement because her boss wanted to distance himself from the decision reflects a serious communication gap. As another example, at one point Villefana, frustrated and concerned about the decisions being made concerning a possible resolution, requested a meeting with Acosta. In a sternly worded rebuke, Menshel rejected the request. Although Menshel told OPR that he was not prohibiting Vilafana from speaking with Acosta, Vilafana interpreted Menschel's email to mean that she could not seek a meeting with Acosta. As a consequence, Acosta made his decision about a state resolution and the term of incarceration without any direct input from Vilafana. Acosta told OPR that he was unaware that Vilafana had sought a meeting with him and he would have met with her if if she had asked him directly. OPR did not find any written evidence of a meeting involving both Acosta, the final decision maker, and Vilafana, the person most knowledgeable about the facts and the law before Acosta made his decision to resolve the case through state charges or to offer a two year term, and Vilafana said she did not have any input into that decision, although a U.S. attorney is certainly not required to have such direct input, and it may be that Menshel presented what he believed to be Vilafana's views. OPR found no evidence that Acosta was aware of Vilafana's strong views about and objections to the proposed resolution. Alright folks, we're going to wrap up right here and then the next episode we're going to pick up where we left off. All of the information that goes with this episode can be found in the description box. What's up everyone and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. This episode we're picking up where we left off with the Jeffrey Epstein OIG Report into the npa. Two logistical problems hindered effective communication. First, the senior managers involved in the case, Acosta, Sloman and Menchel had offices located in Miami, while the offices of the individuals most familiar with the facts of the case, Vilafana and to a lesser extent, Lori, were located in West
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Consequently, Vilafana's discussions with her senior managers required more effort than in other offices, where a line AUSA can more easily just stop by a supervisor's office to discuss a case. Second, key personnel were absent at varying times. Menshel's last day in the office was Aug. 3, 2007, the day he sent to the defense's letter making the initial offer, and presumably in the immediate period before his departure date, Menschel would have been trying to wrap up his outstanding work. Yet this was also the time when Acosta was deciding how to resolve the matter. Similarly, in the critical month of September, the NPA and plea negotiations intensified and the NPA evolved significantly, with the USAO having to consider multiple different options as key provisions were continuously added or modified while Villefana pressed to meet her late September deadline. Although Laurie was involved with the negotiations during this period, he was at the same time transitioning not only to a new job but to one in Washington, D.C. and was traveling between the two locations. Sloman was on vacation in the week preceding the signing when many significant changes were made to the agreement, and he did not participate in drafting or reviewing the NPA before it was signed. Accordingly, during the key negotiation period for a significant case involving a unique resolution, no one involved had both a thorough understanding of the case and full ownership of the decisions that were being made. Vilafana certainly felt that during the negotiations she was only implementing decisions made by Acosta. Acosta, however, told OPR that when reviewing the NPA, I would have reviewed this for the policy concerns did it do the bullet points, and my assumption, rightly or wrongly, would have been that Andy and Marie would have looked at this and that this was appropriate. The consequences flowing from the lack of ownership and effective communication can be seen in the NPA itself. As demonstrated by the contemporaneous communications, the negotiations were at times confusing as the parties considered multiple options and and even revisited proposals previously rejected. Meanwhile, Villefana sought to keep to a deadline that would allow her to charge Epstein when she planned to if the parties did not reach agreement. In the end, Acosta accepted several terms with little apparent discussion or consideration of the ramifications. The USAO's agreement not to prosecute any potential co conspirators is a notable example. As previously noted, the only written discussion about the term that OPR found was was Vilafana's email to Lori and the incoming West Palm beach manager with copies to her co counsel and direct supervisors stating that she did not believe the provision hurts us and neither Acosta, Lori nor Vilafana recalled any further discussions about the provision. Although OPR did not find evidence showing that Acosta, Lori, or Villefana intended the scope of the provision to protect anyone other than Epstein's for assistance, the plain language of the provision precluded the USAO from prosecuting anyone who engaged with Epstein in his criminal conduct within the limitations set by the overall agreement. This broad prosecution declination would likely be unwise in most cases, but in this case in particular, the USAO did not have a sufficient investigative basis from which it could conclude with any reasonable certitude that there were no other individuals who who should be held accountable along with Epstein or that evidence might not be developed implicating others. Prosecutors rarely promise not to prosecute unidentified third parties. The rush to reach resolution should not have led the USAO to agree to such a significant provision. Without a full consideration of the potential consequences and justification for the provision, it is highly doubtful that the USAO's refusal to agree to that term would of itself cause the negotiations to fail. The USAO's rejection of the defense proposal concerning immigration consequences did not affect Epstein's willingness to sign the agreement. The possibility that individuals other than Epstein's four female assistants could have criminal culpability for their involvement in his scheme could have been anticipated and should have caused more careful consideration of the provision. Similarly, the confidentiality provision was also accepted with little apparent consideration while of the implications of the provision for the victims, and it eventually became clear that the defense interpreted the provision as precluding the USAO from informing the victims about the status of the investigation. Agreeing to a provision that restricted the USAO's ability to disclose or release information as it deemed appropriate mired the USAO in disputes about whether it was or would be violating the terms of the NPA by disclosing information to victims or the special master decisions about disclosure of information should have remained within the authority and the province of the USAO to decide as it saw fit. There is nothing improper about a US Attorney not having a meeting with a lying USA or other involved members of the prosecution team before he or she makes a decision in a given case. Indeed, US Attorneys often make decisions without having direct input from line A. USAs and Acosta did have discussions with Menschel and possibly Sloman before making the critical decision to resolve the matter through a state plea, although the specifics of those discussions could not be recalled by the participants due to the passage of time. This case, however, was different from the norm and Acosta was considering a resolution that was significantly different from the usual plea agreement. Contemporaneous records show that Acosta believed the case should should be handled like any other, but Acosta's decision to fashion an unorthodox resolution made the case unlike any other and it therefore required appropriate oversight. Acosta may well have decided to proceed in the same fashion even if he sought and received a full briefing from Villefana and others, but given the highly unusual procedure being considered, his decision should have been made only after a full consideration of all of the possible ramifications and consequences of pushing the matter and into the state court system with which neither Vilafauna nor other subjects had experience, along with consideration of the legal and evidentiary issues and possible means of overcoming those issues. OPR did not find evidence indicating that such a meeting or discussion with the full team was held before the decision was made to pursue the state based resolution, before the decision was made to offer a two year term of incarceration or before the NPA with its unusual terms was signed. As Acosta later recognized and told OPR and a question that I think is a valid one in my mind is did the focus on let's just get this done and get a jail term mean that we didn't take a step back and say let's evaluate how this train is moving? Many features of the NPA were given inadequate consideration, including core provisions like the term of incarceration and sexual offender registration, with the result that Epstein was able to manipulate the process to his benefit. Members of his senior staff held differing opinions about some of the issues that Acosta felt were important and that factored into his decision making. There does not seem to be a point, however, at which those differing opinions were considered when forming strategy. Rather, Acosta seems to have made a decision that everyone beneath him followed and attempted to implement, but without a considered strategy beyond attaining the the three core elements. As U.S. attorney, Acosta had authority to proceed in this matter, but many of the problems that developed with the NPA might have been avoided with a more thoughtful approach, as Acosta belatedly recognized. If I was advising a fellow U.S. attorney today, I would say think it through. No one of the individual problems discussed above necessarily demonstrates poor judgment by itself. However, in combination the evidence shows that the state based resolution was ill conceived from the start and and that the NPA resulted from a flawed decision making process. From the time the USAO opens its investigation, Acosta recognized the federal interest in prosecuting Epstein. Yet after that investigation had run for more than a year, he set the investigation on a path not originally contemplated. Having done so, he had responsibility for ensuring that he received and considered all of the necessary information before putting an end to the federal investigation into serious criminal conduct. Acosta's failure to adequately consider the full ramifications of the NPA contributed to a process and ultimately a result that left not only the line AUSA and the FBI case agents dissatisfied, but also caused victims and the public to question the motives of the prosecutors and whether any reasonable measure of justice was achieved. Accordingly, OPR concludes that Acosta exercised poor judgment and that he chose a course of action that was in marked contrast to the action that the Department would reasonably expect an attorney exercising good judgment to take Chapter three Issues Relating to the Government's Interactions and Communications with victims Part 1 Factual Background 1 Overview Chapter 3 describes the events pertaining to the federal government's interactions and communications with the victims in the Epstein case and should be read in conjunction with the factual background set forth in Chapter two, Part one. This chapter sets forth the pertinent legal authorities and department policies and practices regarding victim notification and consultation, as well as OPR's analysis and conclusions. OPR discusses key events relating to the USAO's and the FBI's interactions with victims before and after the signing of the NPA, beginning with the FBI's initial contact with victims through letters informing them that the FBI had initiated an investigation. A timeline of key events is provided on the following page. Alright, we're going to wrap up this episode here and in the next episode we're going to pick up with two the CVRA US Code 18, Section 3771. All of the information that goes with this episode can be found in the description box. What's up everyone and welcome back to the program. In this episode, we're picking up where we left off with the OIG report into Jeffrey Epstein's NPA B. Enumerated Rights the CVRA defines the term crime victim as a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a federal offense or an offense in the District of Columbia. Initially, at the time relevant to the Federal Epstein investigation, the CVRA afforded crime victims the following eight 1. The right to be reasonably protected from the accused. 2. The right to reasonable, accurate and timely notice of public court proceeding or any parole proceeding involving the crime or of any release or escape of the accused. 3. The right not to be excluded from any such public court proceedings of unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at the proceeding. 4. The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding. 5. The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the government in the case. 6. The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law. 7. The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay. 8. The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy. Although many of the rights included in the CVRA already existed in federal law as part of the vrra, the CVRA afforded crime victims standing to assert their rights in federal court or by administrative complaint to the Department and obligated the court to ensure that such rights were afforded. The passage of the CVRA repealed the rights portion of the VRRA U.S. code 42 Section 10606, but kept intact the portion of the VRRA directing federal law enforcement agencies to provide certain victim services such as counseling and medical care referrals. U.S. code 42 section106.07 department training emphasizes that VRRA obligates the department to provide victim services which attach upon the detection of a crime, while the CVRA contains court enforceable rights that attach upon the filing of a charging instrument. In 2015, Congress amended the CVRA and added the following nine the right to be informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain or deferred prosecution agreement. 10. The right to be informed of the rights of under this section and the services described in section 503 of the Victims Rights and Restitution act of 1990 U.S. code 42 section 10607 and provided contact information for the Office of the Victims Rights Ombudsman of the Department of Justice. Part 3 the Department's interpretation of the CVRA's definition of crime Victim at the Time of The Epstein Investigation April 1, 2005 Office of Legal Counsel Preliminary Review In 2005, Department management requested informal guidance from the Department's Office of Legal Counsel regarding interpretation of the CVRA's definition of crime victim. On April 1, 2005, OLC provided preliminary and informal guidance by email concluding that the status of a crime victim is may be reasonably understood to commence upon the filing of a complaint and the status ends if there is a subsequent decision not to indict or prosecute the federal offense that directly caused the victim's harm. OLC concluded that because the CVRA defines crime victim as a person directly and proximately harmed by the commission of a federal offense, the definition of victim is thus tethered to the identification of a federal offense, an event that occurs with the filing of of a complaint. OLC further concludes that because the House Report stated that the CVRA codifies the rights of crime victims in the federal judicial system and a complaint commences the judicial process and places an offense within the judicial system, the legislature must have intended for CVRA rights to commence upon the filing of a complaint. OLC also found that the language of the CVRA rights supported its interpretation. For example, the first right grants a victim protection from the accused, not a suspect. Additionally, the second, third, and fourth rights refer to victim notification and access to public proceedings involving release, plea, sentencing, or parole, none of which commence prior to the filing of a complaint. B. 2005 Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance In May 2005, department updated its Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness assistance that the 2005 guidelines to include the CVRA. The 2005 guidelines specifically cited the CVRA requirements that agencies engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crimes shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of and accorded their CVRA rights, which in 2005 encompassed the initial eight CVRA rights. The 2005 guidelines provide details regarding implementation of the Department's CVRA duties and divided criminal cases into an investigation stage, a prosecution stage, and a correction stage. The individual responsible for notifying crime victims of their CVRA rights varied depending on the stage of the proceedings. During the investigation stage of cases in which the FBI has the investigative agency, the special agent in charge was responsible for identifying victims at the earliest opportunity after the detection of a crime and notifying them of their rights under the CVRA. Services Available under the VRRA and other Federal statutes. During the investigative stage, the Department mandates compliance with the Victims Rights and Restitution act, which requires federal officials to, among other things, identify victims, protect victims, arrange for victims to receive reasonable protection from suspected offenders, and and provide information about available services for victims. Therefore, even though the Department may not afford CVRA rights to the victims if charges have not been filed in their cases, the Department may provide certain services to victims that may serve the same function as some CVRA rights. The 2005 guidelines stated that the prosecution stage of the case began when charges are filed and continue through pre sentencing legal proceedings. The U.S. attorney in whose district the prosecution is pending was responsible for making the best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of their rights under the CVRA. During the prosecution stage. The 2005 guidelines required the U.S. attorney or a designee to notify crime victims of case events such as the filing of charges, the release of an offender, the schedule of court proceedings, the acceptance of a guilty plea or nolo contendre or rendering of a verdict, and any sentence imposed. The 2005 guidelines required the responsible official to provide the victim with reasonable, accurate and timely notice of any public court proceeding that involves a crime against the victim. The 2005 guidelines specifically required federal prosecutors to be available to consult with victims about their major case decisions such as dismissals, releases of the accused, plea negotiations, and pretrial diversion. In particular, in 2005 guidelines required the responsible official to make reasonable efforts to notify the identified victims of and considered victims views about prospective plea agreements. Nevertheless, the 2005 guidelines caution prosecutors to consider factors relevant to the wisdom and the practicality of giving notice and considering the victim's views in light of various factors such as whether the proposed plea involves confidential information or conditions and whether the victim is a possible witness in the case and the effect that relaying any information may have on the defendant's rights to a fair trial. Lastly, the 2005 guidelines stated that a strong presumption exists in favor of providing rather than withholding assistance and services to victims and and witnesses of crimes. The correction stage involved both pretrial detention and the defendant and incarceration following a conviction. Depending on the agency having custody of the defendant, the U.S. attorney or other agencies were responsible for victim notifications during this stage. USAO and the FBI Victim Witness Notification Practice at the time of the Epstein investigation, a USAO training as U.S. attorney Alex Acosta disseminated the May 2005 updated guidelines to USAO personnel with a transmittal memorandum dated February 27, 2006, stating that he expected each recipient to read and become familiar with the 2005 guidelines. Acosta noted in the memorandum that the USAO had recently held an all office training addressing the 2005 guidelines and that new USAO attorneys who missed the training were required to view a videotaped version of the training immediately. Acosta further noted that the USAO's victim witness staff were ready to assist with details of victim notification and other areas for which United States Attorneys offices are now explicitly responsible under the act the USAO's Victim Witness Program Coordinator told OPR that the USAO provided annual mandatory office wide training on victim witness issues and training for new employees. The Automated Victim Notification System Both the FBI and the USAO manage contacts with crime victims through the Victim Notification System, an automated system maintained by the Executive Office for the United states attorney. The 2005 guidelines mandated that victims contact information and notice to victims of events shall, absent exceptional circumstances such as cases involving juvenile or foreign victims be conducted and maintained using vns. The VNS is separate from agency case management systems maintained by the FBI and the usao. Both the FBI and the USAO use the VNS to generate form letters to victims at various points in the investigation and the prosecution of a criminal case. Although each form letter can be augmented to add some limited individual matter specific content, the letters contain specific language concerning the purpose of the contact and cannot be removed, such as the arrest of the defendant or the scheduling of a sentencing hearing. In the usual course of a criminal case, the FBI collects victim contact information during the investigation stage, which it stores in its case management system. The FBI Victim Specialist exports the victim's information Data from the FBI's Case Management System into the VNS database. Victim information stored in the VNS is linked to the investigation's VNS case number at the time of Epstein's investigation. The FBI Victim Specialist could use the VNs to generate seven different form notification letters. One initial notification, two cases under investigation, three arrest of the defendant, four declination of prosecution, five other six advice for victims rights and seven investigation closed after a charging document has been filed and the prosecution Stage begins. The USAO's victim witness specialist assumes responsibility for victim notification. The USAO imports data from the case management system into the vns. The USAO Victims Witness Specialist uses the VNS to generate form letters providing notice of case events such as charges filed, an arraignment, a proposal plea agreement, change of plea hearings, sentence hearings, and the result of sentencing hearings. All right, we're going to wrap this episode up right here and then the next episode we're going to pick up with Part C FBI Victim Notification Pamphlets. All of the information that goes with this episode can be found in the description box. What's up everyone? And welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode, we're picking up where we left off with the OIG report in the Jeffrey Epstein's NPA C FBI victim notification pamphlets. The 2005 guidelines recommended that victims be given a printed brochure or card that briefly describes their rights and available services and contact information for the victim witness coordinator or specialist. At the time of the Epstein investigation, FBI agents nationwide reported routinely followed a practice of providing victims with pamphlets entitled Help for Victims of Crime and the Department of Justice Victim Notification System. The Help for Victims of Crime pamphlet contained a listing of the eight CVRA rights. The pamphlet stated, most of these rights pertain to events occurring after the indictment of an individual for the crime and it will be the responsibility of the prosecuting United States Attorney's office to ensure you are afforded those rights. The case agent in the Epstein investigation told OPR that she provided victims with the FBI pamphlet upon the conclusion of an interview. The pamphlet, entitled the Department of Justice Victim Notification System, provided an overview of the VNS and the instructions on how to access the system. 5. The Introductory USAO and FBI Letters to Victims August 2006 the FBI Victim Notification Letters on August 8, 2006, shortly after the FBI opened its investigation into Epstein, the victim specialist for the West Palm Beach FBI office, under the case agent's direction, prepared a victim notification form naming 30 victims in the Epstein investigation and stating that additional pertinent information about them was available in the vns. Thereafter, the victim specialist entered individual victim contact information she received from the case agent into the VNS whenever the case agent directed the victim specialist to generate an initial letter to a particular victim. The FBI case agent told OPR that formal victim notification was always handled by the FBI victim specialist. According to the VNS records, beginning on August 28, 2006, the FBI victim specialist used the VNS to generate FBI letters to be sent to the victims over her signature, identifying eight CVRA rights and inviting victims to provide updated contact information in order to receive current status information about the matter. The FBI letters describe the case as currently under investigation and noted that this can be a lengthy process and we request your continued patience while we conduct a thorough investigation. The letters also stated that some of the CVRA rights did not take effect until after an arrest or an indictment. We will make our best efforts to ensure you are accorded the same rights described. Most of these rights pertain to events occurring after the arrest or indictment of an individual for the crime and it will become the responsibility of the prosecuting United States Attorney's office to ensure you are accorded those rights. A sample letter follows VNS data logs Correspondence maintained in the FBI's case management system and the FBI interview reports for the Epstein investigation reflect that during the Epstein investigation, the FBI generally issued its victim notification letters after the victim had been interviewed by the FBI case agents, but its practice was not uniform. B August 2006 the USA owes letters to the Victims during the time that the FBI victim specialist was preparing and sending FBI victim notification letters, Vilafana was also preparing her own introductory letter in anticipation of meeting with each victim receiving the letter. Vilafana told OPR that she was generally aware that the FBI sends letters but believed the FBI's process didn't have anything to do with my process. Vilafana told the OPR the FBI had their own victim notification system and their own guidelines for them and when the information had to be provided and what that information had to be provided. Moreover, Vilafana didn't know when FBI letters went out or what they said. Nevertheless, Vilafana told OPR that she did not intend for letters she drafted to interfere with the FBI's notification responsibilities. In August of 2006, Vilafana drafted her letters to victims who had initially been identified by the FBI. Based on the Palm beach investigative file. Vilafana told OPR that she made the decision to make contact with victims early and she composed the introductory letter and determined to whom they would be sent. Although these letters contained CVR rights information, Vilafana mainly intended to use them as a vehicle to introduce herself and let the victims know the federal investigation would be a different process from the State Attorney's office investigation in which the victims felt they had not been particularly well treated. Vilafana told OPR that in the case in which she needed to be talking to young girls frequently and asking them really intimate questions, she wanted to make sure that they feel like they can trust me. Vilafana directed the FBI case agents to hand deliver the letters as they were conducting interviews. Vilafana told OPR that the USAO had no standardized way to to do any victim notifications prior to filing of federal charges and therefore Villefana did not use a template or VNS generated letter for content, but instead used a letter she had created and crafted herself for another case. The letters contained contact information for Vilafana, the FBI case agent and the Department's Office for Victims of Crime in Washington, D.C. and itemized the CVRA rights. The USAO letters described the case as under investigation and stated that the victims would be notified if anyone is charged in connection with the investigation. The letters stated that in addition to their rights under the cvra, victims were entitled to counseling, medical services and potential restitution from the perpetrator and that upon request the government would provide a list of counseling and medical services. Lastly, the letter advised that Investigators for the defense might contact the victims and those who felt threatened or harassed should contact Vilafana or the FBI case agent. Although the USAO letters did not contain any language limiting CVRA rights to the post arrest or indictment stage, Vilafana told OPR that she did not intend for the letters to activate the USAO's CVR obligations, which she believed attached only after filing of criminal charge. Vilafana told OPR that she did not think that the victims potentially receiving both an FBI letter and a USAO letter would be confused about their CVRA rights because the USAO letter was coming with an introduction from the agents who were hand delivering them. Later in the course of the CVRA litigation, Vilafana stated that she and the investigative team of adopted an approach of providing more notice and assistance to potential victims than the CVRA may have required even before the circumstances of those individuals had been fully investigated and before any charging decisions had been made. Vilafana informed Lori and Sloman about the letters, but the letters were not reviewed by any of Vilafana's supervisors who considered such correspondence to be a non management task. Acosta told opr, I've had no other case where I'm even aware of victims being notified because I assume it all operates without it rising to management level. Similarly, Menschel told opr, as chief of the Criminal Division of the usao, I did not consider it to be within my purview to ensure that appropriate victim notifications occurred in every matter investigated or brought by the office. I I also recall that the USAO employed one or more victim witness coordinators to work with line prosecutors to ensure that appropriate victim notifications occurred in every matter investigated or brought by the office. USAO and FBI letters are hand delivered. The FBI case agent told OPR that the FBI made its notifications at the time that we met with the girls. The case agent recalled that she hand delivered the USAO letters to the FBI letters and to some victims following in person interviews and in the instances where she did not provide a victim with a letter, she provided an FBI pamphlet containing CVRA rights information similar that set forth in the FBI letters. The CO case agent also recalled that he may have delivered a few letters to victims. The FBI victim specialist told OPR that she mailed some FBI letters to victims and she provided some FBI letters to the case agent was for hand delivery. Nevertheless, the case agent told OPR that she did not sit there and go through every right with victims. She stated, however, in the beginning whether it was through the FBI victim specialist Giving the letter, Me giving a letter, the pamphlet. I believe that the girls knew that they were victims and they had rights and they had a resource, the FBI victim specialist, that they could call for that. The FBI case agent further explained that once the case agents connected the FBI victim specialist with each victim, the victim specialist handled the Victim's rights and resources. 6 August 2006 to September 2007 FBI and USAO contacts with victims before the NPA was signed early in the investigation, Vilafana informed her supervisors that up to that point, everyone whom the agents have spoken with so far has been willing to tell her story. Getting them to tell their stories in front of a jury at trial may be much harder. Between August 2006 and September 24, 2007, when the NPA was signed, the FBI case agents interviewed 22 victims. On a few occasions, Vilafana met with victims together with the FBI. Vilafana's May 1, 2007 draft indictment included substantive crimes against multiple victims and Vilafana described the circumstances of each of their encounters with Epstein in her prosecution memorandum. There is some evidence indicating that during interviews, some of the victims expressed to the FBI case agents and Vilafana concerns about participating in a federal trial of Epstein, and those discussions touched upon in broad terms the victim's views regarding the desired outcome of the investigation. Before the USAO entered into the npa, however, no one from the government informed any victim about the potential for resolving the federal investigation through a state plea. All right, we're going to wrap up this episode right here and in the next episode we're going to pick up with a the case agents and Vilafauna solicit some victims opinions about resolving the federal investigation. All of the information that goes with this episode can be found in the description box.