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The Epstein Chronicles
Transcripts From The Hearing Dealing With Tyler Robinson’s Courtroom Appearance (Part 5) (7/29/26)
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The October 24, 2025 hearing centered on Tyler Robinson’s request to appear at future court proceedings in civilian clothing and without restraints. His attorneys argued that routinely presenting him in jail clothing and shackles would undermine the...
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And welcome back to the program. In this episode, we're going to pick up where we left off with the Tyler Robinson hearing about court appearance. The court. Thank you, Mr. Novak. The state, Mr. Ballard for the state. Your Honor, I think this issue, this motion raises two primary issues. And the first one is when is defendant's presence necessary at a hearing? And then the second one Is when is his presence necessary? What security measures are necessary because of defendants presence? And I think of course the overarching question involved in this motion is how best to protect the defendant's presumption of innocence and avoid tainting the jury pool while maintaining the security of everyone involved. And let me make it clear that the state is just as concerned about a fair trial in this case as the defendant is. We are going to try this case once. Now as far as the first question whether a defendant's presence is necessary, I think this court can resolve many of those concerns by holding non critical hearings either virtually or hybrid with the defendant appearing from jail. Redacted. And this Court under Rule 17.5 is, has the discretion as to what format a hearing will take, whether it'll be in person or hybrid or completely virtual. Rule 17 the factors that this Court looks at in Rule 17.5 and exercising that discretion favor holding virtual hearings for all noncritical hearings and allowing the defendant to appear virtually, especially at those non critical, non evidentiary hearings. It doesn't implicate the defendant's right to be present. He can be present. He can communicate with his counsel face to face in real time and in confidence if necessary and do all of that virtually. And I think the court could require that his, that if his appearance on the screen is shown, that it's not shown, that he's appearing from the jail that he is in, not in, that he's not in the custody in order to protect his presumption of innocence. Holding those kinds of hearings virtually also gets rid of this question about shackling and it avoids the significant costs and risks, especially the risks to defendant of transporting him here to the court. I think it's interesting that in one of the cases that defense cites in support of his argument that these, that the right to appear in civilian clothes and without restraints applies beyond the jury trial. State vs. Luthi the Washington case in 2024. There is a subsequent case in Washington, 2025 case Stant v. Ferguson, that's 568 page 3d 314 where in that case, even though in Luthie the Washington Supreme Court said that requiring a defendant to appear in a holding cell that was adjacent to the courtroom violated the right to appear without restraints. Absent this individualized determination in Ferguson which was subsequent to Luthien, the court said that appearing by video from jail didn't implicate the right to be free from restraints. So again I think the first thing for the court to do is consider when does defendant need to be present. And if he doesn't need to be present, then hold those hearings virtually. So that comes to the second question, which is when defendant appears in person, what kind of security measures are necessary? Does he need to be in civilian clothes? Does he need to be shackled? And I want to make it clear that at this point the state agrees that in any proceeding before a jury, the defendant has the right to be in civilian clothes and unrestrained unless those restraints are justified based on a showing that the state would need to make. But the defendant asked this court to extend those principles to non jury proceedings. And there's no basis and there's no reason to do that. I just want to remind the court of the tenuous grounds that that defendant's request rests on. Defendant doesn't cite any controlling Utah case law. What defendant relies on is a U.S. supreme Court case that clearly does not apply to non jury proceedings and then a vacated 9th Circuit opinion. And as we point out in our response, the state points out, a vacated opinion isn't like an opinion that's been reversed on other grounds where part of that opinion remains viable, but the reverse part is not viable. When an opinion is vacated, it's, it's vacated. It's like it didn't exist. Now opposing counsel says that he reviewed the United States supreme court opinion that vacated that opinion and it doesn't take issue with the reasoning of the ninth Circuit opinion. And that's correct. But the reason for that and this, your honors read through enough appellate court opinions to know that when a court vacates an opinion, either because it's moot, the case is moot, or because there is some other procedural defect that prevents the court from reaching the merits of the issue. The court's not going to comment on those on the merits. So it's completely unremarkable that the Utah, the United States Supreme Court case that vacates the 9th Circuit opinion, that it doesn't say anything about the reasoning there. I think it's interesting in point five of the defendant's reply that the defendant agrees with the state and the sheriff that these concerns could be resolved if the court prohibits the media from displaying pictures, photographs or video or otherwise displaying the defendant's appearance. I think defendant's willingness to agree to that position, assuming your honor is willing to order, that resolves this motion. It allows the sheriff to provide whatever security measures he believes is necessary, clothing and shackling, without any possible prejudicial effect of those security, those security measures on any prospective juror because those Images won't be being shown. Now, defendant says that shackling him somehow impairs his ability to consult with counsel. But I think just like today, if the defendant has the ability to be able to make a note to counsel, I don't see how, if the sheriff believes that those requirements are necessary, those restraints are necessary, how that could possibly interfere with his ability to participate in in his defense and to consult with his counsel. I think any suggestion that this court might be prejudiced by seeing defendant in jail, clothing or restrained is it demeans this court and it ignores well established precedent. In Utah, primarily State versus Cravens and a host of other cases that talk about situations that might prejudice a jury do not have the same effect on the court. Knowing the defendant is in custody, knowing the defendant has prior convictions, he hearing evidence that should not have been admitted, none of those situations would have the same effect on a judge as it would on a jury. And I want to point out, because I think the defendant takes issue with this, but Cravens was not just a clothing case, a civilian clothing case. It points out in paragraph 4 of the opinion that the defendant appeared for his bench trial in shackles and in jail, in prison clothing. Now, Deck, the United States Supreme Court case doesn't change any of this because as I mentioned, that was about proceedings before a jury, not about proceedings in front of a judge or pre trial proceedings. That was a penalty phase proceeding that was in front of a jury in a capital case. And to the extent that the court, even though it's clear that DEC doesn't apply here and that this court feels like it should nevertheless consider the rationale of that case, I think it's important that the court also consider that the dissenting opinion in that case by Justice Scalia and Thomas, where they talk about and criticize those rationales, especially in non jury, non guilt phase proceedings, which is again, I think all that we're talking about now because the state agrees that at a jury trial and even at the penalty phase, assuming we get there, that the defendant should appear in civilian clothing and without restraints unless something changes to demonstrate that the defendant should should be restrained in those proceedings. The dissenting deck points out that the case is based on a very ancient common law that no longer exists, or at least the rationale for the rule no longer exists. The rationale for the rule was that when the rule was first developed, prisoners actually appeared in irons, heavy ponderous irons. They were painful, they rubbed the skin away and they wore them constantly in their cell, even when they were Sleeping. They wore them during trial. They wore them during a trial where they did not have the right to counsel, where they had to defend themselves literally, maybe not with their arms tied, chained behind their back, but with their arms restrained in irons. And the rationale for that rule was not so much that it affected the presumption of innocence, but rather it affected the defense's ability to defend themselves when they're chained under those conditions and for that long of a period of time. The dissent in the case saw no basis for treating a defendant at sentencing proceeding where he'd already been convicted. He lost a presumption of innocence for treating that kind of defendant the same as a defendant who's on trial and still retains the presumption of innocence. I think it's interesting also that the dissent talks about the rationale of courtroom dignity and decorum and debunks this notion that somehow shackling demeans those interests, somehow undermines the dignity of the court. Courtroom decorum and dignity is not a principle that creates affirmative rights for a defendant. Instead, it's a principle that limits a defendant's behavior in court. The court relies on those principles in order to make sure that the defendant behaves and that everyone in the courtroom behaves. It doesn't create affirmative rights. The 9th Circuit opinion, Sanchez Gomez, as I pointed out that was vacated, that rationale doesn't apply in the case and shouldn't apply for those reasons. And the same for any court that has relied on the rationale for extending the right to appear in civilian clothes and without restraints beyond just the jury trial. And I think it's important that the court consider what defendant is asking the court to do. Again, there's no Utah case law that supports the kind of rule the defendant's asking for a pretrial proceeding. It's contrary to the practice of courts across the state. This court would be plowing entirely new ground, and it would be setting precedent for trial courts throughout the state. And I think also the court should recognize that the rule that defendant's asking for is contrary to the security plan for this court that the court Security Administrator has developed. So even though other courts, non Utah courts, have held the defendant can appear, or at least have the right to appear without shackles in a civilian clothing outside of jury proceedings. The Utah Judicial Council has considered this issue. They promulgated the Rule 3, 4149C. And it's true that rule leaves the ultimate decision about courtroom security up to this court. But it creates a presumption that all in custody, defendants should be restrained and supervised. Excuse me, restrained or supervised at all times. And again, I think it's important for this court to consider that the court security administrator and the sheriff, who's responsible for to provide security here, in their opinion, restraints are should be required for all pretrial detainees. And it's important to note that the rule 3, 4, 14, it talks about cases of when there's significant publicity and like this case, and that those circumstances call for more security, greater security, not less. And again, where defendant has suggested that he would be okay with. With not having any photographs of him in the courtroom, then I think that alleviates any concerns of having defendant appear in jail, clothing and restraints because the images won't be broadcast to the potential jury pool. Oh, let me also point out, as it was mentioned, it was suggested that the defense counsel stated that it was the sheriff that released defendant's booking photo, and that's not accurate. The booking photo did not come from the sheriff, but it was not the sheriff's office that released that to the media. That was a different law enforcement agency that did that. That wasn't the sheriff's office. It was shared with law enforcement agency under the government sharing provisions under Grama, and there wasn't any intent to try and get that out. In fact, when that was made public, the sheriff, the sheriff's office, was very concerned that it had been made public. Unless the court has any further questions for me on these issues. The court. I do, Mr. Ballard. Sure. The court. What prejudice is there if Mr. Robinson appears in civilian clothing at proceedings to the state or the security? Mr. Ballard? I think, as pointed out in the security plan, And I think Mr. Van Noy can address this more particularly. This is the sheriff's domain. But the prejudice is that if there's anything that happens while defendant is in civilian clothing, then it's harder to identify him and be able to either neutralize the threat or. Or protect him. If he's in civilian clothing, he's better identifiable in jail clothing. The court. And looking at this courtroom today, if he was in civilian clothing, is that a realistic threat? Mr. Ballard? Again, I think Mr. Van Noy can address this better. The court. I'll direct it to you, sir. I'm just trying to understand this line of thinking and I appreciate you expounding upon it and I appreciate the security protocols which is being applied across the board, not to an individual, but I'm trying to apply it to this case. And it's unique. Whether we like it or not, this case is Unique. And I think the shackles and the clothing are two separate issues. They can't be lumped together. But just going to the clothing issue, citing security presence, which both sides have cited to, but to the clothing. I'm trying to understand the rationale about that, because what I saw was one of the main issues was being able to identify and. And identify the person in custody. And there will be potential confusion if they're wearing civilian clothing. And I'm just trying to apply it to this scenario because this is what's in front of me, and this is the decision. So I'm trying to gain that guidance in applying that logic to the case where we've noted there is significant security. Mr. Ballard. Which is exactly what your honor needs to do. I guess I would just add before I turn it over to Mr. Van Noy, that we're talking about hearings that will not be sealed, where there will be members of the public, potentially members of the media. This courtroom will be full with a lot, with many more participants. And the issue will have to be to identify the defendant in that setting, not just in a setting like this. The court. And before we turn to you, sir, one question is, we've talked about the prejudice and we've talked about a jury trial setting. It's established that they're to be dressed in civilian clothing. However, the proposed solution, theoretically proposed by both sides is. Is if it's remotely transmitted, we don't run into the issue even if he's in court. But what stops a journalist from saying Mr. Robinson appeared in jail Clothing. Doesn't that create the same risk as video? Mr. Ballard. I think your honor's order could stop that. The court. To suppress journalists from writing. Ballard. I think from writing about a particular topic, just like your honor can protect jury members identities, prevent the press or anyone from identifying a juror. You could also say there is to be no comment, no pictures, no videos about the defendant's appearance. The court. But would. Oh, I'm sorry. Go ahead, Mr. Ballard. And if that's the case, then I guess I'm thinking, and there's not going to be any. Anything broadcast about the defendant's appearance or communicated to the public, then why not just have him appear in jail clothing. Because it's not going to prejudice anyone in the court, any decision maker, any potential juror, the court. But even if I were to go down that route and say a blanket order that journalists, members of the press cannot comment about his clothing, every member of the public could be a blogger. Does that extend to them Mr. Ballard? Your Honor controls what happens in this courtroom. And I think your honor could say that there's to be no comment about the defendant's appearance. The court. Okay. And I appreciate your response to that. Thank you. All right, folks, we're going to wrap up right here. And in the next episode, dealing with the topic we're going to pick up with Mr. Van Noy. All the information that goes with this episode can be found in the description box.