Lawfare Podcast: Michael Beckley and Arne Westad on the U.S.-China Relationship

Episode Date: November 2, 2025 (Archive episode from July 18, 2024)
Host: Matt Gluck (Lawfare Research Fellow)
Guests: Michael Beckley (Associate Professor of Political Science, Tufts) and Arne Westad (Elihu Professor of History, Yale)

Episode Overview

This episode revisits a pivotal discussion (originally aired July 18, 2024) between leading scholars Michael Beckley and Arne Westad, focusing on the current state and strategic direction of the U.S.–China relationship. Framed through the lens of historical analogies—most notably the parallels with great power dynamics prior to World War I—the conversation explores the risks of conflict, the viability of engagement, and the complexities of economic interdependence and military deterrence, particularly concerning Taiwan.

The episode analyzes:

• The entrenched competition in the U.S.–China relationship and opportunities (or lack thereof) for cooperation
• Lessons from history about deterrence, engagement, and the dangers of conflating all disputes
• Economic decoupling, trade wars, and the prospect for managed rivalry
• The Taiwan flashpoint and the risks of escalation or miscalculation
• Divergent perspectives on whether maintaining “red lines” leaves room for substantive progress

Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. Entrenchment of Competition: Lessons from History

[04:48] Arne Westad:

• The U.S.–China relationship is at a "watershed moment," where competition overshadows cooperation.

• Westad warns of “downward spiral” reminiscent of Britain and Germany before WWI:
  "This looks to me very much like the kind of downward spiral that we found in Europe at the beginning of the 20th century that led to the First World War..."
  [05:54]

• Both sides struggle to “disaggregate” issues (e.g., security, trade, regional affairs), heightening risk of uncontrollable escalation.

2. The Limits and Dangers of Engagement

[06:35] Michael Beckley:

• Engagement alone cannot paper over power imbalances or divergent interests:
  "Unless you have a clear balance of power such that both sides are deterred from using force, all the happy talk in the world is not going to be able to paper over those cracks."

• Historical cases (WWI détente, Cold War, Munich Agreement) show that engagement, if misinterpreted as weakness, can embolden aggression.

[08:47] Beckley (on U.S. strategy missteps):

• U.S. is “provoking China in economic and diplomatic areas while lagging militarily”—the "worst of all worlds."
• Recommends "getting the sequencing right" by focusing first on military deterrence as the backbone of stability.

3. Deterrence and Reassurance: Striking a Balance

[10:14] Arne Westad:

• Both agree deterrence must be robust:
  “The lack of effective deterrence, particularly from the British side, was one of the reasons why we ended up in a global catastrophe in 1914.”

• Cold War lessons: Peace was maintained by combining deterrence with reassurance—sometimes, reassurance can prevent escalation without sacrificing core interests.

• Attempts to artificially suppress China’s economic growth are both impractical and dangerous—akin to failed strategies with pre-1914 Germany.

4. Economic Conflict and (Im)possibility of Decoupling

[15:36] Beckley:

• Chinese elites inherently distrust U.S. intentions and see aspects of the current order (“the status quo”) as intolerable, particularly on trade, tech, and territorial issues.
• Mutual perceptions of incommensurable interests feed pessimism:
  “This is why I think the best case scenario is a sort of cold war standoff... You can have a cold war or a hot war, or one side can completely capitulate to the other.”

[19:06] Westad:

• There is still room to “disaggregate” issues and seek marginal progress, especially on trade, so long as these efforts are not perceived as attempts to impoverish China.

[22:49] Beckley (citing Dale Copeland):

• Economic interdependence among rivals increases vulnerability and drives each to seek “choke points.” “Among enemies, suddenly that becomes mutual vulnerability. It’s terrifying to rely on your adversary for a critical technology…”

• Decoupling, especially in strategic sectors, could stabilize competition, but the process is fraught and often leads to “trade security spirals.”

5. Taiwan: The Greatest Flashpoint

[27:14] Westad:

• Proposes a “Shanghai Plus Initiative”—essentially a diplomatic restatement of the status quo:

  • U.S. reaffirming One China policy, not supporting formal Taiwan independence.
  • China pledging not to use force so long as Taiwan refrains from formal steps toward independence.

• Realistically, neither side is likely to make new concessions soon, but “buying time” through such restatements could help manage tensions.

[32:25] Beckley (Stability-Instability Paradox):

• Overconfidence that nuclear weapons will deter escalation leads to riskier conventional behavior.
• Both U.S. and China may believe the other will not cross certain thresholds, making “limited” wars more thinkable—but escalation can always spiral.

[36:11] Beckley (U.S. military commitments):

• President’s repeated statements and the Taiwan Relations Act commit the U.S. to Taiwan’s defense, raising the stakes for both sides.
• China’s war planning now assumes a likely U.S. response.

[38:23] Westad:

• PLA strategies increasingly resemble Germany’s Schlieffen Plan—risking automatic great power intervention.
• Taiwan is more like Alsace before WWI (core territorial claim), not a distant outpost like Cuba.

6. The Debate: Is Progress Possible?

[41:23] Westad:

• Disagrees with the idea that thawing relations requires one side to abandon red lines entirely.
• Advocates for incremental, practical steps—"not necessarily to begin with much success, but in order to avoid... doomsday scenarios."

[44:51] Beckley:

• “Red lines” (vital interests) are hard limits; unless reevaluated, they will block genuine breakthroughs.
• Deterrence, not diplomatic “guardrails,” is the primary check on war over Taiwan.
• Engagement can help “maintain” stability—not produce “progress” in the classic sense.

[49:02] Beckley:

• Real danger: China’s fear of decline and belief in a “maximum moment” (window of opportunity) often precede great power wars.
• “Perception of future fear of decline, I think, is probably the most disruptive force in geopolitics.”

7. Value of Talking: Communication as ‘Buying Time’

[51:04] Westad:

• The value of engagement is not in resolution but in delaying conflict—“talking... buys us time.”

[52:55] Beckley:

• Agrees, but warns the U.S. cannot fully control the signals received by Beijing, as Taiwan’s democracy and other regional actors also shape perceptions.

8. Chinese Perceptions and Deep Mistrust

[55:13] Beckley:

• Even during periods of peak engagement (1980s, 1990s), Chinese elites viewed the U.S. as the main adversary and engagement as a potential subversive threat.

Notable Quotes & Moments with Timestamps

• Arne Westad [05:54]:
  “This looks to me very much like the kind of downward spiral that we found in Europe at the beginning of the 20th century that led to the First World War, that neither side... could stop.”

• Michael Beckley [06:35]:
  "Unless you have a clear balance of power such that both sides are deterred from using force, all the happy talk in the world is not going to be able to paper over those cracks."

• Arne Westad [10:14]:
  “The lack of effective deterrence... was one of the reasons why we ended up in a global catastrophe in 1914.”

• Michael Beckley [15:36]:
  “From a Chinese point of view... they despise the status quo. They don't like the way the borders are drawn... They certainly hate the Western finger wagging about human rights...”

• Westad [19:06]:
  “If the ordinary Chinese and the Chinese elites get the impression that there are no areas in which China's expansion economically will be accepted, then I think we are really heading down a very, very dark path.”

• Michael Beckley [22:49]:
  “Among enemies, suddenly that [interdependence] becomes mutual vulnerability... what you typically see is a fierce commercial competition where each side is trying to gain self reliance... lord that over the other side as a form of leverage.”

• Westad [27:14]:
  “...what talking does is that it buys us time... Attempting to identify some areas which are not totally subsumed to conflict... can help us postpone that conflict.”

• Michael Beckley [36:11]:
  "The American president has said no less than four times that if China attacks Taiwan, the United States will respond militarily. The Taiwan Relations Act makes it American law that the US is supposed to help to fend off threats."

• Westad [38:23]:
  “Taiwan is much more like Alsace before World War I... One of the two powers claim it as an integral part of its own state, of its own territory... that influences the kind of military planning that's put into it as well.”

• Beckley [49:02]:
  “Perception of future fear of decline... is probably the most disruptive force in geopolitics. And when I look at China, I think they have good reason to be in that kind of mindset.”

Timestamps for Major Segments

• 03:50 — 06:12: Setting the scene / Historical parallels to pre-WWI Europe
• 06:12 — 08:34: Beckley on dangers/limits of engagement; Cold War & detente
• 08:47 — 10:14: U.S. strategy misalignments and recommendations
• 10:14 — 13:38: Westad on trade wars, deterrence, Cold War lessons
• 15:36 — 19:06: Chinese perspective, zero-sum conflicts, prospects for coexistence
• 22:49 — 26:30: Interdependence and “trade security spiral”
• 27:14 — 32:25: Taiwan as a flashpoint; “Shanghai Plus” initiative; risk management
• 32:25 — 38:23: Nuclear deterrence, U.S. commitments, limited war risks
• 41:23 — 44:51: Debate: room for progress vs. entrenched red lines
• 49:02 — 54:34: China’s sense of “maximum moment,” fear of decline, lessons from 1914
• 55:13 — 58:13: Deep mistrust on the Chinese side, historical record of engagement

Flow of Perspectives

• Convergence: Both guests agree that deterrence is crucial, engagement has limits, and failing to manage tensions risks catastrophic war.
• Divergence: Westad is (slightly) more optimistic about the possibilities for incremental progress and believes engagement can “buy time,” while Beckley is more pessimistic, emphasizing structural conflicts and warning against illusions that engagement or “guardrails” will fundamentally alter Chinese strategic calculus.

Useful Takeaways

• The U.S.–China rivalry is deeply structural, rooted in incompatible visions and interests—particularly over Taiwan, technology, and regional order.
• Engagement and confidence-building measures may not resolve the fundamental conflict, but they can delay escalation and reduce the risk of war—"buy time."
• Economic decoupling in strategic sectors might reduce vulnerability, but the process is inherently destabilizing and hard to manage.
• Effective deterrence is necessary; overt diplomatic reassurances or concessions, if miscalculated, could increase risk rather than promote stability.
• Major change, if any, may only come with significant shifts in the balance of power or dramatic leadership decisions—neither of which seem imminent.

Final Thought

This episode offered a sobering, rigorously historical perspective on great power competition between the U.S. and China. While both guests see little room for breakthroughs, their nuanced debate illustrates that even in hardened rivalries, crafting time and space for diplomacy—however modest—remains essential to prevent disaster.

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