The Lawfare Podcast: The Wagner Group, One Year After Prigozhin

Host: Tyler McBrien (Lawfare Institute)
Guest: Vanda Felbab-Brown (Brookings Institution)
Date: August 30, 2025
Episode Theme:
A deep-dive into the state of Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa one year after the death of its infamous leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, exploring Moscow’s evolving strategies, local dynamics in Mali, and the wider ramifications for Russia’s Africa policy.

Episode Overview

This episode revisits the Wagner Group’s operations and transformations since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, with special attention to recent setbacks in Mali, the Kremlin’s reassertion of control through “Afrika Korps,” and the broader, anti-Western goals Russia pursues on the continent. Vanda Felbab-Brown unpacks the group’s shifting role, Prigozhin’s myth and legacy, and Russia’s tactics on the African continent.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Setting the Scene: Mali, July 2025

• Summary of Recent Events ([03:59–09:40]):
  • In late July, Malian Army and Wagner (now "Afrika Korps") suffered significant losses in northern Mali.
  • Wagner/Afrika Korps has operated in Mali for nearly two years, mainly to protect the ruling junta and target the Tuareg rebel groups, sidelining jihadist groups like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (JNIM) and Islamic State.
  • French and UN withdrawal fractured previous peace deals with Tuareg rebels; Wagner targeted Tuaregs, prompting their renewed alliance with jihadist groups.
  • The July ambush led to record casualties for the Russian mercenaries and Malian forces.
  • Felbab-Brown:

    “What happened at the end of July was the Tuareg signing up once again with JNIM, and together taking on the Malian forces and Afrika Korps and causing very significant casualties to both. The largest casualties to Afrika Korps in the country. About 20 fighters are known to have been killed.” ([08:33])

2. The Significance of Setbacks in Mali

• Defeat vs. Strategic Consequences ([09:40–17:35]):
  • The losses puncture Wagner’s narrative of superiority and deliver a “hole in the image,” but are not expected to significantly shift Moscow’s or Bamako’s strategy unless such defeats become routine.
  • Malian junta remains reliant on Wagner; few alternatives exist for regime security after the country’s break with Western powers.
  • Wagner/Afrika Korps's primary appeal:
    • They offer a "license to brutality” not available from Western partners.
    • They focus on regime survival over true counterinsurgency.
  • Felbab-Brown:

    “Their whole selling point … which is very appealing to the governments, much more so than the West saying, ‘No, you cannot slaughter entire villages…’ But the other selling point… is that they will prevail—and they have not been prevailing.” ([12:22])

  • Anticipation of “revenge brutality” and its implications for conflict and legitimacy following such defeats.

3. Moscow’s Response and Restructuring

• From Plausible Deniability to Direct Control ([17:35–22:33]):
  • Moscow silent on Mali defeat; Russian news tightly controlled and focused on Ukraine.
  • Post-Prigozhin, Wagner was stripped of autonomy: direct control by Russian military intelligence (GRU) and the Ministry of Defense now explicit.
  • Some Wagner officers remain embedded in Africa, but the operational face is now openly governmental.
  • Felbab-Brown:

    “The whole restructuring of Wagner after Prigozhin’s march on Moscow … was about the visible, explicit takeover of the group by GRU … The relationship is now explicitly with the Russian government.” ([18:10])

4. One Year After Prigozhin: Wagner’s Fate

• What Lessons Did Putin Take? ([21:58–28:56]):
  • Key lesson: No more latitude for privateers; Wagner and similar outfits are now tightly leashed.
  • Breakdown of Wagner assets:
    • Ukrainian/Wagner fighters rolled into the Russian National Guard.
    • Some units absorbed into Chechen militias under Ramzan Kadyrov.
    • Most African operations now branded as Afrika Korps under direct government oversight.
  • Prigozhin myth dispelled: he was always a subordinate tool; after his challenge (“the march on Moscow”), his empire was dissected and reallocated.
  • Felbab-Brown:

    “If Prigozhin understood all along that he was a servant of the Kremlin … he would still be a very rich and influential man and live a happy life. Instead, he’s dead and his economic empire has been carved up.” ([28:56])

  • Prigozhin’s business acumen was exaggerated; much of Wagner’s wealth originated from Russian state contracts.

5. Russia’s Africa Policy in 2025

• Priorities & Projections ([34:10–41:57]):
  • Core objective: Anti-Western competition, not genuine counterterrorism.
  • Key ambitions: Strategic bases on the Red Sea and Mediterranean, logistical expansion via Libya and potentially Guinea Bissau.
  • Heightened risk of Russian-African organized crime coalitions (Guinea Bissau cited as nexus for Latin American and African drug cartels, with Russia eyeing connections for “hybrid warfare”).
  • Africa central in Russia’s scheme to launder money, evade Western sanctions, and project itself as a legitimate, anti-colonial partner.
  • Russia actively cultivates diplomatic ties, leveraging Cold War relationships and “anti-colonial” narratives, even as its tactics are highly extractive and domineering.
  • Felbab-Brown:

    “Russia has been really successful in developing a wide spectrum of smuggling networks and evasion systems … And Africa is part of that money laundering evasion story.” ([36:05])

  • Russia labels France/US as “new colonialists,” yet pursues patently neo-colonial resource and regime-capture policies.
  • Felbab-Brown:

    “It’s very, very colonial-like policy under the propaganda disguise that it is anti-colonialist.” ([41:35])

Memorable Quotes & Notable Moments

• On narrative and reality:

  “This is no doubt a big tactical defeat that is poking a hole in the narrative of Afrika Kor and Moscow, that here are the superior fighters who are able to deliver security defined in a very extremely narrow sense for the government in a way that the West could not.” – Felbab-Brown ([10:13])

• On Wagner’s “selling point”:

  “The proxy actor, semi-proxy, semi-private actor of Moscow is appealing to African governments because it’s selling a license to brutality. Unlike the West… it does not come with demands that it protects non-combatants from violence.” – Felbab-Brown ([12:22])

• On Prigozhin’s myth:

  “There’s a lot of mythologizing around Prigozhin.” – Felbab-Brown ([28:28])

• On Russian strategic aims:

  “Russia’s principal lands in Africa is not counterterrorism, it is anti-Western agenda.” – Felbab-Brown ([34:37])

• On Africa as a proving ground:

  “Africa, more than a decade ago, really became the place where Russia just was explicit about what was coming… Just cross the US wherever you can.” – Felbab-Brown ([41:05])

Important Timestamps

• [03:59] – Overview of Wagner/Afrika Korps’s role in Mali and the July battle.
• [08:33] – Details of casualties and partnership shifts after French/UN withdrawal.
• [10:13] – Interpretation of the defeat’s significance.
• [12:22] – “License to brutality” and Wagner’s unique appeal.
• [17:45] – Moscow’s information control, post-Prigozhin structures.
• [22:33] – The reorganization of Wagner after Prigozhin’s death.
• [28:56] – The survival (and limits) of the Prigozhin myth.
• [34:37] – Russia’s true goals in Africa, far beyond counterterrorism.
• [41:35] – Russian “anti-colonialist” rhetoric as cover for colonialist practice.

Tone and Atmosphere

The conversation is measured, analytical, and sobering. Felbab-Brown’s expertise is evident in her historical scope and detailed analysis. There’s a clear sense of realism—neither panic nor complacency—about the evolving security landscape in West and Central Africa, Russian hybrid warfare, and the continued risk to both governance and civilian populations in the region.

Conclusion

The episode elucidates that, despite dramatic leadership changes and military setbacks, the Wagner/Afrika Korps apparatus remains pivotal to Russian influence in Africa. Kremlin control is now nakedly direct, and Africa continues to be seen by Moscow as a key domain for projecting anti-Western power and forging new forms of alliance—often with destabilizing consequences for the continent.