The Lawfare Podcast: "Defending Ukraine Outside NATO"
Date: August 26, 2025
Guests:
- Michael O'Hanlon: Director of Foreign Policy Research, Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution
- Andriy Zagorodnyuk: Chairman, Center for Defense Strategy (Kyiv), former Ukrainian Minister of Defense, nonresident scholar at Carnegie Endowment
Host: Mykhailo Soldatenko, Lawfare Legal Fellow
Overview
This episode dives into Ukraine’s current and future defense posture in the absence of NATO membership. Mykhailo Soldatenko hosts a discussion with Michael O'Hanlon and Andriy Zagorodnyuk, exploring the viability and credibility of new security guarantees, Ukraine's capabilities to defend itself, Western support, and the prospects for peace or ongoing conflict with Russia. The conversation reflects deep skepticism towards Western "security guarantees" that fall short of NATO Article 5-level commitments and lays out both immediate and long-term strategic considerations for Ukraine’s defense, innovation in warfare, and its relationship with NATO.
Key Discussion Points & Insights
1. Reality and Limitations of "Security Guarantees"
(03:36–09:33)
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Post-Alaska Summit Context: Speculation over the credibility of U.S. and European guarantees for Ukraine outside NATO, especially after recent remarks by President Trump and U.S. envoys referencing Article 5-style language.
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Andriy's skepticism:
- On guarantees:
"I am very skeptical about the chances of the real security guarantees [and] real ceasefire." (04:03)
- On Article 5:
"If we read Article 5 literally how it's written, it's not going to be enough, because it basically doesn't guarantee anything." (05:15)
- U.S. and allies often regard “doing their best” as fulfillment of commitments, which is inherently subjective and, as prior arms shortfalls showed, often insufficient.
- On guarantees:
-
Michael’s historical angle:
- NATO only became credible when backed by material deployments, not words alone:
"It wasn't just the words, it was also the actions, and the presence, the military presence." (10:41)
- Suggestion: Security guarantees without troops ("tripwire") or meaningful physical support fail to provide strong deterrence.
- NATO only became credible when backed by material deployments, not words alone:
2. Designing a Credible Deterrent without NATO
(09:33–23:39)
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Tripwire Logic & Western Presence:
- O'Hanlon supports a model with Western trainers and technicians in Ukraine but warns that without a tangible military presence, any “guarantee” lacks teeth.
- The U.S. may offer limited air cover or a rapid reaction mechanism but is reluctant to deploy combat forces.
-
Pragmatic Role of European (Coalition of the Willing) Forces:
- Both guests express doubts Europe could muster large-scale commitments (e.g., 30,000 troops) and emphasize need for realistic, defined missions.
- Andriy:
"Military cannot operate without the mission. And clearly that number which we've heard, like tens, few tens, they're not going to be a barrier." (22:35)
3. Evolving the Defense Model—Strategic Neutralization and Innovation
(28:23–36:27)
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Andriy’s “Strategic Neutralization” Concept:
- Proposes Ukraine should functionally defeat Russia in every military domain, making the aggressor unable to achieve results regardless of attrition:
"Ukraine has to have a strategy which does not necessarily rest on the assumption that Putin will eventually decide to stop atrocities... If we block the effective operations of Russia in all domains... Ukraine can start kind of breathing freely..." (28:54)
- Advocates cross-domain defense, innovation, and not relying on resource attrition (which disproportionately favors Russia).
- Proposes Ukraine should functionally defeat Russia in every military domain, making the aggressor unable to achieve results regardless of attrition:
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Posture Model (O'Hanlon):
- Multilayered response combining:
- Permanent frontline force (smaller than today's but ready to scale quickly via reserves)
- Rapid reaction maneuvers for breakthroughs
- Robust air/missile defense for cities and infrastructure
- Estimated total force: 800,000 to 1,000,000 including reserves (40:27)
- Multilayered response combining:
4. Historical Models: Inspiration, not Templates
(42:34–48:49)
- Host asks about Swiss, Finnish, Israeli models:
- O'Hanlon leans toward the Finnish approach during Winter War:
"Maybe the Finnish model at first blush strikes me as perhaps the most relevant... They could reposition units as they needed to..." (42:56)
- Zagorodnyuk clarifies that Ukraine won’t “clone” any model, acknowledges selective conscription of women (for medical roles), and reflects on the “Finlandization” debate's negative connotations in Ukraine.
- O'Hanlon leans toward the Finnish approach during Winter War:
5. NATO Aspirations and Russian Motivations
(48:49–55:16)
- Ukraine’s NATO Pathway:
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Zagorodnyuk: Russia’s motivation for invasion extends beyond NATO expansion:
"Russia attacked Ukraine when it had no NATO aspirations... We cannot trade NATO pathway for peace because none of those promises from Russia can be enforced unless they are secured by something much more tangible." (49:28)
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O'Hanlon:
"If I were Ukrainian, I would want the option to join NATO. There's nothing wrong with that... NATO really is the gold standard for the closest thing you can get to a guarantee." (52:59)
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Both agree Russia uses NATO as a rationalization rather than true casus belli.
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6. Technological Revolution & Future of Military Innovation
(55:27–57:02)
- Andriy’s Conclusion:
- Emphasizes the need for a technological edge, suggesting Western and Ukrainian joint innovation could decisively overmatch Russia.
"If we turn on that engine of technological collaboration and jointly produce... the West has these amazing tools. If we combine those resources, Russia must have no chance..." (55:27)
- Emphasizes the need for a technological edge, suggesting Western and Ukrainian joint innovation could decisively overmatch Russia.
Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments
-
Andriy Zagorodnyuk on guarantees:
“We can talk later about whether any guarantees would create the deterrence effect. We don't know that because we don't know how Putin makes decisions.” (06:32)
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Michael O’Hanlon on military presence vs. treaty:
“Neither a treaty nor a presence was adequate... We spent the Cold War, the entire Cold War, worried that the Soviets had superiority against us in Europe. So we didn’t consider a guarantee to guarantee anything.” (16:00)
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Andriy Zagorodnyuk on innovation:
“We need to get out of paradigm of the infantry warfare, because that immediately gets us to the symmetric responses and to the war of attrition. And war of attrition is not going to be to Ukraine's benefit.” (35:24)
Important Timestamps
- 03:36: Overview: Security guarantees after the Alaska summit
- 04:03: Andriy’s skepticism on guarantees and ceasefires
- 10:41: Michael on historical weakness of Article 5 without presence
- 18:17: Andriy unpacks the complexity of air and missile defense needs
- 23:51: O'Hanlon on reality of European military resources
- 28:54: Strategic neutralization concept explained
- 40:08: O'Hanlon’s proposal for post-war Ukrainian defense structure
- 42:56: Finnish model as an analogue
- 49:28: Zagorodnyuk deconstructs NATO rationale for Russian aggression
- 52:59: O'Hanlon: NATO as the “gold standard” for deterrence
- 55:27: Andriy on the importance of technological collaboration
Conclusion
The episode underscores that “guarantees” on paper, short of full NATO membership backed by military presence, are insufficient for deterring Russian aggression. Both guests advocate for a robust, multi-domain Ukrainian defense built on innovation, Western support, and a rapid reaction capacity, with an eye on making warfare so costly and ineffective for Russia that eventual peace becomes likely. The role of innovation, Ukrainian adaptability, and Western technological superiority are framed as essential in this evolving conflict, while the limitations of both historical analogies and current political will are frankly addressed.
