The Lawfare Podcast — FCC’s New Submarine Cable Rules with Adam Chan

Date: August 20, 2025
Host: Justin Sherman (Lawfare)
Guest: Adam Chan (National Security Counsel, FCC)

Overview

This episode examines the new submarine cable rules issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), featuring an in-depth conversation between Lawfare’s Justin Sherman and Adam Chan, National Security Counsel at the FCC and inaugural director of its new Council on National Security. The discussion explores how submarine cables underpin the global internet, strategic competition (especially with China), evolving threats, and the FCC’s updated regulatory response to national security challenges in submarine cable infrastructure.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Adam Chan’s Role at the FCC and Council on National Security

• Background: Previously served on House China Committee; experience with national security, legislation, and tech competition with China. (03:35)
• FCC’s National Security Council: Adam leads an internal group designed to centralize and elevate the FCC’s national security focus, promoting inter-bureau information sharing and policy leadership.
  “I saw this as kind of a real sign of sort of [the Chairman’s] broader prioritization of national security...” (03:48)

2. Submarine Cables: Critical Infrastructure in the AI/Data Era

• What Are Submarine Cables?
  Carry ~99% of global internet traffic, enable about $10 trillion/day in financial transactions. (06:44)
  • Only ~600 active cables worldwide; only ~90 connect to the US, highlighting infrastructure vulnerability.
  • Ownership shift: from major telcos to tech hyperscalers like Google, Meta, Amazon, Microsoft, in response to the AI/data center boom (08:10).
  • Physical vulnerability highlighted by recent incidents (Baltic/Taiwan cable cuts).
• Quote:
  “They really have been for a long time and are increasingly so the unsung heroes of global international communication.” — Adam Chan (06:46)

3. The FCC’s Traditional Role in Submarine Cable Oversight

• Legal Authority: Rooted in the Cable Landing License Act of 1921, authority delegated from the President to the FCC.
• Licensing: Any cable landing in the US requires an FCC license; cables typically operated by consortia (companies with >5% ownership must be licensees).
• Risk Review: National security review by "Team Telecom" (DoJ, DoD, DHS), analogous to CFIUS process for foreign investment. FCC traditionally not involved in direct risk assessment, but conditions licenses on Team Telecom’s recommendations (10:21).
• Recent Changes: Major 2025 rule overhaul is the biggest submarine cable regulatory revamp in decades (13:50).

4. FCC’s New Submarine Cable Rule: Key Features & Rationale

a. Threat Landscape & Risk Motivation

• Threats Include:
  • Accidental or malicious cable cuts.
  • Cyber/physical attacks on cables or landing stations.
  • Vulnerabilities from foreign adversary ownership/equipment.
  • Repair/maintenance challenges due to cable scarcity and reliance on limited US ships.
• Strategic Point:
  “What happens [if] we get into a war with a foreign adversary...? We can’t rely on a lot of cables where foreign adversaries have access.” — Adam Chan (15:37)

b. Dual Approach: Protect & Promote

• Protect:
  • Restricts adversaries (entities from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Venezuela) from acting as licensees or major suppliers.
  • Prohibits certain leasing agreements and use of adversary-produced equipment/services.
  • Mandatory detailed reporting on cable and landing station locations.
• Promote:
  • Codifies updated definitions for legal certainty.
  • Streamlines licensing/reporting requirements to incentivize "good guys" (US and allied entities) (19:20).
  • Future consideration given to even further streamlining for trusted entities.

Notable Quote:

“We’re really motivated by looking at a wide variety of threats to submarine cable infrastructure... At the same time, we want to make it as easy and welcoming as possible for investment by the good guys...” — Adam Chan (18:37)

5. New Security Certification Requirements

• Certification Mandate: For the first time, applicants must certify development and implementation of cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans; prior process was ad hoc via Team Telecom agreements (21:59).
• Self-Certification: Default model, with FCC reserving audit rights and heavy penalties (including license revocation) for violations.
• Scope: Applies to initial, renewal, and modification applications; must be signed by a senior officer.
• Quote:
  “This is the first time that we’re putting a kind of standard certifications for all applicants...” — Adam Chan (22:21)

6. Restrictions on Foreign Adversaries & Covered Entities

a. Definition of "Foreign Adversary"

• Based on Commerce Department ICTS Rule:
  Six countries — China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Venezuela. Also includes entities on the FCC’s covered list (e.g., Huawei, Hikvision). (29:42)
• Scope: Encompasses affiliates, subsidiaries, and entities “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of” a foreign adversary.

b. Presumption of Denial

• Standard: License applications from adversaries face a “presumption of denial”, only overcome by “clear and convincing evidence,” mirroring standards from the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.
• Connectivity Restrictions:
  Direct US-to-adversary-country cable links (e.g., US-China, US-Iran) face the same presumption (34:35).
• Quote:
  “If Huawei or Hikvision or any of their affiliates... tried to get a license, they would fall under this category.” — Adam Chan (30:19)

7. Decoupling & Working with Allies

• Supply Chain Strategy: Promotes reliance on “trusted vendors” from allied nations (e.g., Japan, Korea, Scandinavia) for both infrastructure and critical services like cable maintenance. (37:32)

• Allies’ Role: Acknowledgement that full “Buy American” is not always feasible given international nature of the industry; US must lean on close allies, especially on shipbuilding and repairs.

• Further Steps:
  Possible future prohibition on any adversary-controlled equipment or services, extending supply chain decoupling further.

• Quote:
  “Having sort of close allies as partners, especially for ... an international industry like the submarine cable industry ... is important to ensure there’s sort of no supply chain disruptions.” — Adam Chan (40:29)

8. Streamlining for Trusted Entities (“Frequent Flyer” Program)

• Proposed “Whitelist” System: Entities that have passed Team Telecom review and operated cables without issue could be exempted from repeated national security review for new applications, incentivizing high security standards and expediting harmless builds (43:08).
• Industry Feedback: This streamlining is a sought-after reform by industry, balancing bureaucratic efficiency with strong baseline security.
• Quote:
  “The idea here really is to kind of incentivize industry to do the right thing ... [by making] it as easy and welcoming as possible for investment by the good guys...” — Adam Chan (45:36)

9. The Evolving National Security Threat Space

• Growth of Threats: As AI and submarine cables become more critical, the near-term risk landscape is intensifying, especially vis-à-vis US-Asia and Pacific region cable connections.
• Resilience by Redundancy: Building more secure, redundant cables reduces single points of failure and bolsters resilience.
• Broader Technology Risks: FCC is also considering risks to other telecom sectors (space, radio devices, drones).
• Quote:
  “These risks will only grow over the near term as submarine cables are ever more critical and as AI becomes ever more critical… [but] over time, I think we have a real opportunity to substantially reduce the risks by building in resiliency...” — Adam Chan (47:01)

10. Industry–Government Engagement & Transparency

• New Era of FCC Engagement: As an economic regulator, FCC can foster broader, more open industry engagement than the intelligence community, crucial for effective national security cooperation.

• Bipartisan Approach: Emphasized that submarine cable security is a bipartisan priority at the FCC.

• Balance: Need for industry to rise to the security challenge—FCC incentives (carrots) and rules/enforcement (sticks) will help bend the curve toward decoupling from adversaries.

• Quote:
  “We see American industry is obviously critical to innovation ... but we also need industry to do more on the national security front, especially in critical industries like technology, telecom.” — Adam Chan (51:03)

Notable Quotes (with Timestamps)

• “Submarine cables ... are increasingly so the unsung heroes of global international communication.” — Adam Chan (06:46)
• “We have a kind of protect and promote side of things. So on the protect side, we have restrictions on foreign adversaries ... On the promote side ... we streamline a lot of the licensing rules and reporting requirements.” — Adam Chan (19:20)
• “If Huawei or Hikvision or any of their affiliates or subsidiaries tried to get a license, they would fall under this category. ... What we’re really looking at there is six foreign adversary countries...” — Adam Chan (30:19)
• “The idea here really is to kind of incentivize industry to do the right thing ... then you’re going to have a real streamlined process that’s going to save a lot of costs and kind of promote kind of certainty and investment.” — Adam Chan (45:36)
• “These risks will only grow over the near term as submarine cables are ever more critical and as AI becomes ever more critical … [but] over time ... by building in resiliency ... the safer we are because the harder it is to disrupt cables...” — Adam Chan (47:01)
• “We ... need industry to do more on the national security front, especially in critical industries like technology, telecom.” — Adam Chan (51:03)

Timestamps for Key Segments

• Adam Chan’s background and Council: 03:35–05:58
• Explanation of submarine cables’ criticality: 06:44–09:38
• FCC’s legal authority and Team Telecom process: 10:21–13:50
• Summary of new rule and threat overview: 14:58–20:47
• Security certifications—requirements and enforcement: 21:59–24:53
• Adversary restrictions and definition: 29:42–34:35
• Decoupling rationale and working with allies: 37:32–41:09
• Streamlining, “frequent flyer” program: 43:08–46:24
• Evolving risks and US government engagement: 47:01–52:54

Memorable Moments

• The image of a submarine cable’s physical fragility (“about the width of a small garden hose”) juxtaposed with their outsized role in the global economy (09:38).
• Explicit framing of new rules as marrying “carrots and sticks”—streamlining for trusted companies, restrictions for adversaries.
• Candid acknowledgment of US and allied industrial limitations, especially ship repair, and the necessity of partnering with Japan and Korea.

For Listeners New to the Subject

This episode offers an accessible-yet-comprehensive overview of how submarine cables are managed as critical national security infrastructure. Adam Chan demystifies both the technical realities and bureaucratic evolution of cable governance, emphasizing the emerging risks, technological and geopolitical shifts, and how the FCC’s regulatory reforms are designed to keep pace.

End of Summary