Lawfare Podcast: Inside Iran's Complicated Relationship with Russia

Date: March 17, 2026
Host: Anastasia Lopatyna (Lawfare Institute)
Guest: Hanna Notte (Eurasia Director, Center for Non Proliferation Studies, Middlebury College)

Episode Overview

This episode explores the complex and evolving relationship between Iran and Russia, how historical mistrust informs their interactions, and the impact of recent conflicts—including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the US-Israeli war against Iran—on their partnership. Hanna Notte, a leading expert on Russia’s Middle East policy, discusses security, defense, and geopolitical chess moves shaping these two countries' actions, as well as the implications for broader regional dynamics.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Historical Context and Mutual Mistrust (02:19–04:52)

• Despite perceived closeness, the Iran-Russia relationship is built on a legacy of “mutual mistrust and mutual grievances” (A, 02:52).
• Key factors:
  • Soviet occupation of Iran during WWII and Soviet support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war.
  • Post-1979 Islamic Revolution tensions: Iran’s radical ideology was “perceived as a challenge by the Soviet leadership.”
  • Economic ties remain shallow; Russian businesses are hesitant “to get deeply involved in the Iranian economy” (A, 03:39).
  • Competition in oil export markets further constrains cooperation.
  • Disappointments in defense: Iranians frequently desire Russian military capabilities they are not granted.

2. Russian Interests in the Middle East and Iran's Role (04:59–08:15)

• Security: Prevent spillover of radical Islam into Russia, especially the North Caucasus.
• Status & Leverage: Russia’s presence in Syria (since 2015) acts as a launchpad for “power projection vis-a-vis NATO” (A, 05:39).
• Economics: Arms sales, nuclear cooperation (Rosatom), OPEC coordination, and a use of the UAE as a financial and logistical hub post-Ukraine war.
• Diplomatic Leverage: Russia’s unique ties with Iran give it “cards to play vis-a-vis the Gulf Arab states and Israel” (A, 07:43).

3. Russia and the Iran Nuclear Dossier (08:15–11:35)

• Russia’s role historically constructive in nuclear negotiations, participating in mediation and not vetoing UN resolutions.
• After 2022 invasion of Ukraine, “Russia kind of cools towards cooperation with Western states...becomes more defensive of Iran, less interested in mediating” (A, 00:40 and 09:38).
• The window to restore the nuclear deal closed in fall 2022 with Iranian domestic crackdowns and Tehran’s military support for Russia in Ukraine (shahed drones).
• “I just think that Russia confronting the west over the war in Ukraine sees no longer any utility in cooperating with the west on nuclear non–proliferation” (A, 10:57).

4. Impact of the Syrian Civil War (11:35–12:54)

• 2015 saw institutionalized military coordination: Russia provided air power, Iran provided ground forces, supporting the Assad regime.
• The Syrian war catalyzed deepened “military-to-military ties” and political coordination (Astana process) (A, 12:14).

5. Regional Reactions, Especially Israel and Gulf States (12:54–16:03)

• Israel and Gulf Arab states dislike growing Iran-Russia cooperation but try to “limit it and confront it” (A, 13:20).
• Israel responds with increasing military strikes against Iranian assets.
• Gulf states pressure Moscow diplomatically (e.g., MBS convincing Russia not to supply anti-ship missiles to the Houthis).
• Russia avoids crossing certain “red lines,” not supplying advanced military systems like Su-35s or S-400s to Iran.

6. Limits and Balancing Acts in the Partnership (21:24–25:00)

• The partnership lacks a NATO-style mutual defense clause: “Both sides didn’t want this kind of clause”—Russia fears entanglement, while Iran values “self sufficiency” (A, 23:51; 25:00).
• The economic relationship is shallow; sanctions hinder deeper investment.
• Russia calibrates support to Iran to avoid jeopardizing its relationship with Donald Trump, especially “because of the war in Ukraine” (A, 21:32).

7. Reaction to the US-Israeli War on Iran (26:07–31:48)

• Initial Reaction: “There was quite a bit of shock...this kind of American impunity caused a little bit of shock in the Russian system” (A, 26:17).
• Evolving Calculation: Russia sees an “opportunity to extract some concrete benefits” from the chaos, even if it was unwelcome initially (A, 27:26).
• Different Messaging: Russian MFA is overtly critical of the US/Israel; the Kremlin and Putin “will be more careful in what it says,” avoiding direct blame to maintain ties with Trump (A, 28:24).

“Vladimir Putin does not want to ruin his personal relationship with Donald Trump because of the war in Ukraine. So you see this kind of interesting bifurcation between the Kremlin and then everyone else in the Russian system who can be more forward-leaning in criticizing the United States.” (A, 02:01 and 28:48)

8. Intelligence Sharing and Tactical Cooperation (29:04–31:48)

• Russia’s sharing of operational lessons with Iran (e.g., drone warfare) is not surprising given their “partner, not ally” status:

  “It’s sort of the least that Russia can do, having originally received the technology from Iran and having also been quite limited in what else it can do for Iran.” (A, 29:33)

• Russia balances support to Iran with a desire not to antagonize the US or regional players.

9. Is the War Good for Russia? (31:48–37:18)

• Short-term benefits outweigh costs:
  1. Oil Prices: War-driven price surge gives Russia budget relief; the US has temporarily relaxed restrictions on Russian oil exports to India (A, 32:20).
  2. Diversion of Military Resources: Patriot interceptors redirected from Ukraine to Gulf states (A, 33:10).
• Some see American unpredictability as dangerous for Russia (concern that the Trump administration’s assertiveness could one day target Russia or its allies).
• Russia’s nuclear status ensures it is “playing in a different league from Iran and Venezuela” and not vulnerable to US regime-change tactics (A, 36:55).
• Overall, benefits are tangible but strategic unease persists over US unpredictability and global attention shifts.

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “The Russia-Iran relationship has a history of mutual mistrust and mutual grievances.” (A, 02:52)
• “Russia wants these partnerships to be of concrete utility to Vladimir Putin, but he doesn’t want these partnerships to come at the expense of what are Russia’s core interests. And at the moment, that is prosecuting the war against Ukraine.” (A, 25:09)
• “For the moment, the benefits for Russia outweigh the costs, at least in the short term.” (A, 31:53)
• “What happened to Maduro and Khamenei can never happen to Putin. Because... Russia has nuclear weapons. Russia plays in a different league from Iran and Venezuela.” (A, 36:55)

Timestamps for Key Segments

| Segment | Timestamp | |:-----------------------------------|:-----------| | Opening Historical Context | 02:19–04:52 | | Russian Interests in the Middle East| 04:59–08:15 | | Iran Nuclear Dossier | 08:15–11:35 | | Impact of Syrian Civil War | 11:35–12:54 | | Regional Responses | 12:54–16:03 | | Limits in Relationship | 21:24–25:00 | | Partnership Agreement | 23:34–24:50 | | US-Israeli War against Iran | 26:07–31:48 | | War’s Impact on Russia | 31:48–37:18 |

Conclusion

This episode provides a grounded, expert-driven tour through the roots and realities of the Iran-Russia relationship, dispelling myths of unbreakable alliance and highlighting layers of pragmatism, mistrust, and shifting ambitions. Its insights are essential for understanding the Middle East's evolving power matrix and the intricate gamesmanship between states navigating both opportunity and constraint.