The Lawfare Podcast: Serhii Plokhii on the History of the Nuclear Arms Race

Date: October 15, 2025
Host: Mikhailo Soldatenko (Lawfare Institute)
Guest: Serhii Plokhii (Harvard Historian and Author)
Episode Focus: The motivations, history, and legacy of the nuclear arms race, through discussion of Serhii Plokhii’s new book, Nuclear: An Epic Race for Arms, Power, and Survival

Episode Overview

This episode spotlights Serhii Plokhii’s new book, Nuclear: An Epic Race for Arms, Power, and Survival, which chronicles the history of nuclear proliferation—examining why nations seek nuclear weapons, what makes them give them up, and how the nuclear age's lessons shape present anxieties. Plokhii and Soldatenko explore the driving forces of fear, prestige, and international politics that underlie nuclear policy, reflect on pivotal episodes from Hiroshima to the Cuban Missile Crisis, and discuss today’s challenges in nonproliferation in the shadow of the war in Ukraine.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Book’s Central Argument and Motivations

• The book is a history of the nuclear age through 11 national case studies—nine nuclear-armed states (understood broadly, with Israel’s ambiguous status) and two denuclearization stories (Ukraine, South Africa).
• The immediate motivation for the project was Russia’s war against Ukraine. Plokhii reflects on Ukraine’s post-Soviet denuclearization and whether retaining its arsenal could have prevented aggression.

“Ukraine...gave up the third largest arsenal in the world that it inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union...The question for me was...why countries and nations acquire nuclear weapons and why they give up.” (03:23 – Serhii Plokhii)

2. Fear as a Driving Force in Nuclear Policy

• Plokhii places “fear” at the heart of both acquisition and policy, citing the “balance of terror” articulated by Churchill and critiquing the notion that international laws can ensure state security.

“It wasn’t just a balance of terror, but a balance of fear. In a sense, that fear...as a threat, real or...imagined, [influences] societies, political elites...to act on that.” (07:22 – Serhii Plokhii)

• The discussion draws parallels between public debates on individual gun ownership and global nuclear strategy: do you trust in collective security, or in self-reliance through armament?

“Same debate...should be no guns and there should be police...No global policeman. The same debate seems to me is happening in the world as a whole.” (10:30 – Serhii Plokhii)

3. The Interplay of Fear, Prestige, and Power

• While security/fear is crucial, Plokhii argues that prestige, national status, and the desire to be “great powers” also propel nuclear acquisition—especially for the UK and France.

“Atomic bomb, British bomb and French bomb are as much, quote, unquote, anti-American as anti-Soviet...it was also about the equality or degree of equality in relations with the United States.” (14:05 – Serhii Plokhii)

• The motivations for proliferation are always “cocktails,” mixing different proportions of fear, prestige, and political context.

4. The U.S., Hiroshima and Beyond: Motivations for First Use

• The Manhattan Project was driven primarily by fear—initially of Nazi Germany.
• Once Germany was out of the picture, new motives emerged, such as limiting Soviet influence and justifying the immense investment.

“Truman...believed...he would not be forgiven if [the U.S.] continued the war and lost hundreds of thousands of American lives...having this wonder weapon in his back pocket.” (20:19 – Serhii Plokhii)

• The Soviet entry into the war against Japan was hastened after the demonstration of the bomb, further reinforcing the strategic dimensions of nuclear use for postwar influence.

5. Deterrence Theory and the Cold War

• The Cuban Missile Crisis is seen as a pivotal moment: pre-crisis years were a naïve, unregulated “wild race”; post-crisis, the superpowers recognized the need for arms control.

“Before the Cuban Missile Crisis, people are rushing...There is no rules yet...The intersection happens to be Cuba in 1962.” (29:59 – Serhii Plokhii)

• Mutually assured destruction (MAD) emerges as a stabilizing doctrine.
• Scientists and public opinion (e.g., the global concern about fallout from above-ground tests) play key roles in driving treaties on test bans and nonproliferation.

6. Failed Dreams: International Control vs. Proliferation Management

• Early visionaries, influenced by H.G. Wells, imagined that nuclear arms would force global government. Negotiations in the UN considered internationalizing atomic weapons, but by the 1950s, “atoms for peace” and state-level control prevailed.

“People were acting...believing that...there has to be a world government...by the 1950s, this push...was really defeated.” (37:11 – Serhii Plokhii)

• Resulting compromise: widespread civil nuclear technology but tightly controlled weapons, a status quo now under strain.

7. Preemptive War as a Non-Proliferation Policy Tool

• U.S. considered (but refrained from) preventive strikes against China and Israel’s nuclear programs. The only true preemptive war for nonproliferation, Iraq 2003, proved disastrous.

“Preemptive wars bring disaster and destruction, and still allowing and controlling the process of acquiring nuclear weapons, even by countries that you don’t want [to], actually comes at a lesser cost.” (44:32 – Serhii Plokhii)

• History shows that “pariah” states acquiring nukes has not been as catastrophic as feared, and military threats can even motivate proliferation, as with China and North Korea.

8. Ukraine, the Budapest Memorandum, and Today’s Security Vacuum

• After the USSR, Ukraine denuclearized, expecting Western guarantees and Russian restraint. The U.S. treated post-Soviet inheritance as “proliferation,” pressuring Ukraine to surrender its arsenal for “assurances” (Budapest Memorandum), which proved ineffective.

“The Americans made the decision very early on that...they decided to treat [the presence of nukes in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus] as proliferation, when in reality, in geographic terms it wasn’t.” (48:12 – Serhii Plokhii)

• The ambiguous, non-binding nature of these guarantees is highlighted, with the Ukrainian and Russian versions of the memorandum using the stronger word “guarantees.”

“Let me add a linguistic element to your legal analysis because Ukrainians got ‘guarantees.’ That was the word in the Ukrainian version...” (55:52 – Serhii Plokhii)

9. The Erosion of Nonproliferation Today

• Russia’s aggression with nuclear threats has gravely harmed the credibility of nonproliferation.

“It’s not that it is completely dead, but it is really on its deathbed. And the only way to really bring this, this process back to life...is to really now protect Ukraine from the aggression.” (57:03 – Serhii Plokhii)

• Without robust, credible security commitments, more countries may seek nuclear arms, with up to 40 states now having the latent capacity (“nuclear latency”).

10. Final Thoughts on the Nuclear Age’s Ongoing Relevance

• Plokhii argues that we are mistakenly treating the nuclear age as over—its lessons remain urgently relevant, and without robust arms control, risk is rising again.

“The idea that the nuclear age was in the past...is really misreading history. The nuclear age started, it continues today...We have more drivers on the nuclear highway than we had before—and potentially there can be an explosion...” (59:48, 60:50 – Serhii Plokhii)

• Restoration of arms control, negotiation, and fixes for cases like Ukraine are vital to minimize risk of accidental or deliberate nuclear catastrophe.

“Without that, we are heading towards New Cuba, and we don’t know...whether we would be lucky the next time...” (61:17 – Serhii Plokhii)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Fear as Core to Nuclear Policy:
  “Fear as something...that societies, political elites...acquire and then act on that.” (07:22 – Serhii Plokhii)

• On the UK’s National Motivation:
  “Let’s put the British flag, the Union Jack, on that damn thing.” (13:05 – Serhii Plokhii, quoting Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin)

• On Preemptive Wars:
  “Preemptive wars bring disaster and destruction...allowing and controlling the process of acquiring nuclear weapons...comes at a lesser cost.” (44:32 – Serhii Plokhii)

• On Nonproliferation’s Future:
  “It’s not that it is completely dead, but it is really on its deathbed.” (57:03 – Serhii Plokhii)

• On the Need for Arms Control:
  “Regulations and street lights that were there during the Cold War...are now gone, and we have more drivers on the nuclear highway.” (60:50 – Serhii Plokhii)

Timestamps for Important Segments

• 03:23 – Plokhii’s motivation and the structure of his book about the nuclear age
• 07:22 – Discussion of “fear” as driving force for proliferation
• 14:05 – National prestige and the UK/French nuclear programs
• 20:19 – U.S. rationale for dropping atomic bombs on Japan
• 29:59 – The Cuban Missile Crisis, MAD, and the shift to arms control
• 37:11 – Failure of international control, rise of “atoms for peace”
• 44:32 – On the dangers of preemptive wars in nonproliferation policy
• 48:12 – Why Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons and what followed
• 55:52 – The Budapest Memorandum, guarantees, and their failure
• 57:03 – Russia’s war in Ukraine and the crisis of nonproliferation
• 59:48 – The continuity of the nuclear age and need for renewed arms control

Conclusion

This episode provides a nuanced, deeply contextual history of the nuclear arms race, warning that old lessons—about fear, security, and arms control—remain urgently relevant. Plokhii’s insights, grounded in both scholarship and contemporary crisis, highlight the fragility of the nonproliferation regime and the need for vigilant, renewed international cooperation.

Recommended: Plokhii’s Nuclear: An Epic Race for Arms, Power, and Survival offers richer detail for those seeking to understand both historical and current nuclear dilemmas.