Lawfare Daily: The U.S. Plan for Venezuelan Oil Revenue

Summary

The Lawfare Podcast: The U.S. Plan for Venezuelan Oil Revenue

Lawfare Daily | February 5, 2026
Host: Natalie Orpet (Executive Editor, Lawfare)
Guest: Scott R. Anderson (Senior Editor, Lawfare)
Main Theme:
A deep dive into the newly announced U.S. plan for managing and distributing Venezuelan oil revenue post-Maduro, unpacking the complex legal, financial, and diplomatic mechanisms at play—including the involvement of Qatar, creditor claims, recognition dilemmas, and the parallels to past post-conflict resource management efforts like Iraq.

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Episode Overview

This episode unpacks the U.S. administration’s strategy to control, sell, and safeguard Venezuelan oil revenues amid immense sovereign debt, ongoing humanitarian crises, and political transition following the removal of President Nicolás Maduro. The discussion explores why the U.S.—with Qatar's assistance—is creating special financial arrangements, the legal complexities of sovereign immunity, creditor litigation threats (notably from terrorism-related claims), and the unresolved challenge of diplomatic recognition. Natalie Orpet and Scott R. Anderson draw on their recent in-depth Lawfare piece, providing both context and insight into this unusually intricate episode of sanctions policy and state rehabilitation.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Background: Why Venezuelan Oil? (04:05–08:12)

• Venezuela’s Oil Profile:
  Venezuela has some of the world’s largest hydrocarbon reserves outside the U.S. and Canada. The oil is heavy and difficult to refine but valuable, especially with proper investment and additives ("diluents"). It’s the backbone of the Venezuelan economy—70–80% of revenue and vital for foreign currency.

• Nationalization and Sanctions:
  The Chavez regime nationalized the oil sector in the 2000s, sparking legal claims of expropriation (theft) from foreign companies, especially American. Subsequent mismanagement, corruption, and U.S. sanctions under Chavez and Maduro crippled oil exports, culminating in a nearly total shutdown.

• Economic Collapse and Sanctions:
  Recent U.S. oil embargoes (Trump administration) left Venezuela with nearly no oil revenue and economic desperation. Storage overflowed, tankers idled offshore, and vital imports stalled.

"Venezuela is extremely reliant on these oil exports... 70 to 80% of its economy is based on oil exports."
—Natalie Orpet (07:37)

2. U.S. Plan: Seize, Sell, Safeguard (09:44–17:11)

• The Two Mechanisms:

  • U.S.-Based Mechanism: Long-term framework rooted in U.S. law, aiming to protect Venezuelan oil revenues deposited in the U.S. from creditor seizure while subjecting their distribution to U.S. supervision.
  • Qatar-Based Mechanism: A stopgap, “ad hoc” solution using Qatari bank accounts to move ~$500 million in oil proceeds, avoiding immediate legal entanglement and expedited due to Venezuela’s acute financial crisis.

• Creditor Threats:
  Venezuela’s sovereign debt is nearly twice its GDP, owed to dozens of claimants—sovereign lenders (Russia, China), bondholders, companies with expropriation awards, and terrorism-related claimants. These creditors aggressively pursue “attachment” of any assets entering the U.S. legal or financial system.

• Legal Loopholes and Litigation:
  Assets in the U.S. are typically protected by sovereign immunity, but many exceptions exist (commercial use; state-owned enterprises), and Venezuela’s assets are particularly vulnerable. Even legal claims without final decisions can “freeze” assets for years.

"Even if there’s an ongoing litigation about whether attachment is appropriate... those assets could be frozen in place."
—Scott R. Anderson (15:36)

3. Legal Frameworks: IEEPA, FSIA, and Executive Orders (20:30–31:42)

• Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA):

  • Protects most foreign state assets from U.S. court seizure, but carve-outs (notably commercial activity and state-owned entities like PDVSA) bring many Venezuelan assets at risk.
  • Many claimants have already won U.S. or arbitral judgments, making their legal position strong.

• International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA):

  • Used by the president to declare a national emergency and regulate (including freeze) foreign assets.
  • The Trump administration’s Executive Order 14373 utilizes IEEPA to create “safe harbor” protections for Venezuelan oil revenue held in designated U.S. Treasury accounts.

• Historical Precedent:
  The U.S. created a similar “Development Fund for Iraq” to shield post-2003 oil revenue from creditors, using the Federal Reserve and layering legal protections.

"The thing that it really adds on... is it has a number of mechanisms that say, basically, hey, nothing can move out of this account except where authorized by us."
—Scott R. Anderson (25:19)

• Tension Over 'Vesting':
  • IEEPA allows freezing, but not seizing (vesting) assets, unless during wartime—which the administration conspicuously avoids claiming exists.

4. Why Involve Qatar? (57:08–62:29)

• Legal Advantages:
  Qatar poses fewer risks of immediate asset seizure by creditors (less reciprocal enforcement of foreign judgments, strong sovereign immunity norms). It didn’t recognize the U.S.-favored opposition government in Venezuela, so has fewer recognition disputes.

• Strategic Partnership:
  Qatar is a longstanding U.S. partner, with a reputation for handling sensitive international funds (e.g., Iran hostage deal accounts) responsibly, and for abiding by U.S. direction.

• Practical Precedent:
  The U.S. previously used Qatari banks to hold Iranian assets for humanitarian trade, offering proof of concept and trust in Qatari compliance.

"The Qataris have a track record of that in relatively recent memory... they followed our directions."
—Scott R. Anderson (62:17)

5. The Special Case of Terrorism-Related Claims (36:21–45:00)

• TRIA (Terrorism Risk Insurance Act):
  Provides broad ability for U.S. terrorism victims to attach assets frozen under sanctions, even where other statutes like FSIA and IEEPA say they can’t.

• Major Litigation Risk:
  U.S. courts have allowed FARC victims (and similar) to reach Venezuelan state oil company (PDVSA) assets, citing evidence and U.S. policy against the Maduro regime’s terrorist ties. Routing money through the U.S. risks immediate legal challenge under TRIA, potentially freezing or seizing funds for years.

• No Congressional Fix Yet:
  Unlike Iraq (where Congress granted exceptions), Venezuela has no legislative carve-out—raising questions over whether oil revenue can be safely shielded from these claims.

"There is at least a significant risk that these particular sets of claimants... will still come at these assets and try and attach them."
—Scott R. Anderson (42:23)

6. Recognition & Who Controls the Money? (45:19–51:07)

• Layered Government Legitimacy:
  The U.S. (since 2019) recognized opposition leader Juan Guaidó, then the 2015 National Assembly (Venezuela’s last elected legislature), rather than Maduro or his successor Delsey Rodriguez.

  • U.S. courts defer to this policy, allowing the opposition’s appointees to control Venezuelan state assets in the U.S.

• Legal Dilemma:
  If the Rodriguez regime, now cooperating with the U.S., sells oil but revenue flows through U.S. accounts, the Guaidó-aligned opposition could sue for control.

• Recognition and Asset Access:
  The president can freeze and direct assets, but can’t pass legal title under IEEPA outside war. The solution may require a negotiated arrangement reconciling the opposition’s rights with the need to fund immediate stabilization.

"The 2015 National Assembly could sue... and I think probably would win, to say we should control how these assets are spent and control what happens to them, not the Delsey Rodriguez regime."
—Scott R. Anderson (49:06)

7. Bankruptcy Analogy & Future Debt Workouts (53:24–56:19)

• Bankruptcy as a Model:
  The U.S. is acting as a “bankruptcy judge,” freezing creditor claims and controlling revenue distribution, but has not yet prioritized payouts or restructured the debt.

• Precedent for Debt Restructuring:
  In Iraq, temporary immunity led to a formal process of loan workouts, prioritization, and eventual negotiation with creditors. Similar action is anticipated and necessary for Venezuela.

"The United States has deemed itself the bankruptcy judge."
—Host/Orpet (54:11)

8. Unanswered Questions and Forward Look (64:09–68:42)

• Oversight & Transparency:
  No public details yet on independent oversight or audit mechanisms for the new funds, unlike the UN- and U.S.-monitored DFI for Iraq.

• Outstanding Issues:

  • When/how will Venezuela renegotiate debt?
  • How will recognition conflicts be resolved?
  • Will the U.S. enable one-off Qatari transactions for expediency, or revert to U.S.-based mechanisms?
  • How will terrorism claims be extinguished or settled?
  • Will priorities favor U.S. claimants or broader international interests?

• Potential for Legal Challenge:
  The setup faces certain litigation in U.S. courts, as well as diplomatic resistance if creditor states feel disadvantaged.

"My hope is that now that we've been able to shed some light on the broad contours... we can start spending more energy and attention on the poles in that knowledge and the outstanding questions that need to get answered."
—Scott R. Anderson (68:38)

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the Role of Oil Revenue:
  "The oil industry is kind of the linchpin of all of the Trump administration's broader plans for Venezuela in the post-Maduro era."
  —Scott R. Anderson (07:57)

• On U.S. Self-Interest:
  "The United States actions here are not exclusively... for the purpose of humanitarian efforts to help rebuild Venezuela. They are in the interest, at least as stated, of the national security of the United States."
  —Natalie Orpet (28:37)

• On Legal Risks of Terrorism Claims:
  "If you were to route the initial $500 million in Venezuelan oil sales through the United States, even with these immunities in place, there's at least a significant risk that these particular sets of claimants... will still come at these assets."
  —Scott R. Anderson (42:23)

• On Qatar’s Facilitator Role:
  "Qatar is kind of like modern-day Casablanca. It keeps ties with all these actors—just as it does with the United States. And that lets it play this sometimes very valuable facilitator sort of role."
  —Scott R. Anderson (58:26)

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Important Timestamps for Segments

• Venezuela’s Oil Reliance and Sanctions History: 04:05–08:12
• Description of U.S. and Qatar Mechanisms: 09:44–17:11
• Legal Barriers (FSIA & IEEPA): 20:30–31:42
• Terrorism Litigation Risks (TRIA): 36:21–45:00
• Recognition Struggles and Asset Control: 45:19–51:07
• Bankruptcy Analogy and Debt Restructuring: 53:24–56:19
• Rationale for Using Qatar: 57:08–62:29
• Unanswered Policy and Legal Questions: 64:09–68:42

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Tone and Takeaways

The tone is meticulous but accessible, with technical legal and international policy issues translated for a general audience. Both speakers emphasize the unprecedented complexity and the many open questions—including humanitarian, legal, and geopolitical consequences arising from the ongoing saga of Venezuela’s oil, its creditors, and the geopolitics of U.S. sanctions policy.

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For further reading, listeners are directed to the co-authored Lawfare article and encouraged to follow ongoing developments as the U.S. government negotiates with Venezuela, creditors, and third-party states like Qatar.

Transcript

[Matt]

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[Brian Halligan]

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[Scott R. Anderson]

The Trump administration, reasonably in my mind, or at least not patently, unreasonably, felt that even though it had set up this regime through Executive Order 14373, it decided to route the initial sale of oil that Venezuela engaged in that it helped broker for about $500 million through.

[Natalie Orpet]

This Qatar mechanism, which is a separate mechanism which is essentially just routing it through a bank account in Qatar.

It's the Lawfare podcast. I'm Natalie Orpet, executive editor of Lawfare, with my colleague, Lawfare Senior editor Scott R. Anderson.

[Scott R. Anderson]

There's a real tension in US Recognition.

[Natalie Orpet]

Polity towards Venezuela because the Trump administration.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Is now coordinating with the Delsey Rodriguez regime in Venezuela. It's basically the Maduro regime, but just.

[Natalie Orpet]

Sans Maduro, with his deputy now in charge.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But that government hasn't been the US recognized government of Venezuela since at least 2019. I believe that's the year President Trump said, I am recognizing Juan Guaido as.

[Natalie Orpet]

The interim president of Venezuela.

Today we're talking about the recently announced US Plan to take possession of Venezuelan oil, sell it on the world market.

[Host/Interviewer]

And hold the revenue from those sales.

[Natalie Orpet]

In accounts based in Qatar. Scott And Lawfair contributing editor Alex Zurdin recently published a piece in Lawfair digging into the complexities of the plan. Scott and I talked through them all. What exactly is this plan? How is it supposed to work? Why is Qatar involved? And what are all of the many legal challenges in play?

[Host/Interviewer]

So, Scott, you and Alex Zurdin just published a really extraordinary piece in Lawfare that digs into this series of questions that is, I think, truly mind boggling to most of us, which relates to Venezuelan oil. So first of all, I'm gonna really commend it to our listeners to go to our site and read it, because we will get into it as much as we can orally here. But it is, man, is it compl.

[Natalie Orpet]

That it is. Yeah.

[Host/Interviewer]

So the piece is called Unpacking the Trump Administration's Plans for Venezuela's Oil Revenue. Like I said, you can find it on our site. So, Scott, to get us started, I wanted to just do a little bit of contextualizing before we get to the core of the question your piece is answering. Why on earth are we talking about Venezuelan oil? Most people in the United States are aware of the fact that the United States conducted this operation to arrest and bring to the United States the President of Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro. But what all does that have to do with oil? What are we talking about here?

[Scott R. Anderson]

Yeah, it's an interesting and complicated historical story. Venezuela is a country, and I think probably to the greatest extent of any country in the Western Hemisphere, except perhaps Canada or the United States, blessed with large scale hydrocarbon resources. A lot of oil particularly, they have a kind of heavy, sludgy sort of oil that's difficult to transport and get out of the ground, but is very.

[Natalie Orpet]

Good for converting into diesel fuel and.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Other sorts of fuels and can be mixed with what are called diluents. I think I'm pronouncing that correctly to.

[Natalie Orpet]

Kind of make it more of a.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Conventional, lighter oil that you might be.

[Natalie Orpet]

Able to transport and move and sell in global markets.

[Scott R. Anderson]

For a long time, Venezuela was a major oil producer, including having a ton of external investment, particularly from the United states. In the 2000s, you saw the Chavez regime, the Hugo Chavez, whose predecessor Nicolas Maduro, nationalize the oil industry in the country of Venezuela. That's where a lot of these claims President Trump keeps talking about, about oil companies having had their property stolen by the Venezuelan government. That's often generally what he's referring to, which there is a credible argument that was an unlawful expropriation under international law.

[Natalie Orpet]

So it's not totally made up by any stretch of the imagination.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And since then, the oil industry has primarily been dominated by the state, run by pdvesa, the national oil company there. But it's fallen into disrepair for a variety of reasons. Because they don't have external investment, because of mismanagement and corruption by the government, and for the last several years, because.

[Natalie Orpet]

Of economic sanctions imposed by the United.

[Scott R. Anderson]

States that have prevented them from exporting oil. And the most severe chapter of that, of course, is the oil embargo that the Trump administration has started imposing at the very end of last year, which over the course of a few months.

[Natalie Orpet]

Which pretty much completely shut down Venezuela's oil exports, are almost completely to the.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Point that Venezuela was on January 3.

[Natalie Orpet]

When Maduro was removed from power, essentially.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Over brimming with oil. It had socked away as much oil as it could in its various storage capacities. It was actually at the point where it was bringing in tankers from offshore to anchor in its own waters just to hold additional oil because it wanted to keep producing it so it could eventually get on the market but didn't have anywhere they could sell it. And this is all, of course, coinciding with the fact that Venezuela has been under an immense amount of economic duress for really the last several decades, but.

[Natalie Orpet]

Particularly the last few years and particularly the last month or two, that the United States has been ramping up economic sanctions.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And so in the eyes of the Trump administration, now that Maduro has been removed, now that they appear to have who they think is a fairly pliant.

[Natalie Orpet]

Replacement in the person of Delsey Rodriguez, who was Maduro's vice president, is now the interim president for. For Venezuela.

[Scott R. Anderson]

She seems to be going along with a lot of plans the Trump administration has and conditions they've put on alleviating the sanctions pressure, which primarily has to do with rehabilitating Venezuela's oil sector and then steering it in a particular direction that the Trump administration sees as strategically.

[Natalie Orpet]

Beneficial to the United States.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And so a big part of what US Policy towards Venezuela now is in.

[Natalie Orpet]

The aftermath of Maduro's removal is about.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Getting the oil sector back up and running, in large part because that is expected to be what will fund any subsequent re. Sort of alignment or rehabilitation or reconstruction.

[Natalie Orpet]

That takes place in Venezuela across any other sector.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And at a minimum, is necessary even.

[Natalie Orpet]

For keeping Venezuela stable and secure, because.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Venezuela is extremely reliant on these oil exports, both for its domestic exports and.

[Natalie Orpet]

Most of its revenue generation.

[Scott R. Anderson]

I think 70 to 80% of its economy is based on oil exports.

[Natalie Orpet]

And for in particular, foreign currency reserves. That's like where they get essentially they don't export much else. It's where they get their foreign currency.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Reserves, which they need to be able to facilitate imports by their own domestic producers and domestic consumers and is essential.

[Natalie Orpet]

To Venezuela's macroeconomic stability.

[Scott R. Anderson]

So in other words, the oil industry is kind of the linchpin of all.

[Natalie Orpet]

Of the Trump administration's broader plans for Venezuela in the post Maduro era.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And so kind of getting that right has understandably, in my view, been their.

[Natalie Orpet]

Main focus so far.

[Host/Interviewer]

Okay, that's really helpful and I'll just preview for folks because it will come up a little bit later when we're talking about some of the various legal regimes at place, that this is not purely a sort of humanitarian effort by the United States to rescue the economy of Venezuela and to ensure political stability. And all of that, given the context that you were just describing in terms of the state that Venezuela is currently in, particularly after Maduro is no longer in place. But before we get there, which will be a while from now, because there are so many things to discuss, let's move on to the central question that your piece addresses, which is this mechanism that the United States has set up to essentially take the oil that, as you say, has been building up over time and to sell it on the world market and then maintain the revenue from it in specific accounts for, as President Trump put it, the benefit of Venezuelans and Americans, and that this will happen, these accounts will be hosted in Qatar, which we will come back to at the end, because why on earth does Qatar come into this at all? But first, just describe for us the basics of this arrangement that I've only stated at a very, very high level. What exactly is this mechanism that has been set up?

[Scott R. Anderson]

Sure. So it's basically actually two separate mechanisms. One a more long term arrangement which is based in the United States, and the other, a more short term, kind of ad hoc arrangement that at least according to Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his testimony gave before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee late last week on 28 January, was intended to be a kind of short term expedient solution to address what they saw as a time.

[Natalie Orpet]

Sensitive crisis economically in Venezuela that required.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Them to move some oil before they could get the domestic, meaning the US.

[Natalie Orpet]

Based legal regime, fully in place and stable.

[Scott R. Anderson]

So let's start with, I guess, the US Based regime. Oil exports from Venezuela are limited by and have been limited by US Sections essentially. So in theory, the United States lifts the sanctions, Venezuela can Start selling oil and people out there who want to.

[Natalie Orpet]

Buy oil from Venezuela can start doing that.

[Scott R. Anderson]

That is itself a possibility and doesn't.

[Natalie Orpet]

Require any additional intervention by the United States. There's no special mechanism necessary to do that.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But if you were to just say, hey, Venezuela, hop back out on the global markets now sanctions are lifted, Go.

[Natalie Orpet]

Do what you need to do to.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Rehabilitate your oil sector, they would face at least one major category of challenges, and that is the fact that they.

[Natalie Orpet]

Have a massive, massive sovereign debt to the order of twice their GDP, almost close to $150 billion.

[Scott R. Anderson]

That amount is highly, highly diverse as well. Some of it is more conventional sovereign.

[Natalie Orpet]

Loans from Russia and China.

[Scott R. Anderson]

China in particular has done a number of loans that are essentially give them rights to Venezuelan oil at highly, highly.

[Natalie Orpet]

Discounted rates that some have framed as exploitative, including the Trump administration.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But a lot of these other claims are things that have accumulated kind of over the last 20 years, during which the Venezuelan government under both Chavez and Maduro, have kind of thumbed their nose at the conventional legal and international system. So a lot of them are from bondholders, the bonds on which Venezuela has defaulted. They may be people who have contracts or had contracts with the Venezuelan government in different regards that the Venezuelan government.

[Natalie Orpet]

Did not make good on.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Many of them are people whose property was expropriated by Venezuela and have legal claims. And then there are, as we'll get into in some more detail as we dig into other parts of this regime.

[Natalie Orpet]

Some terrorism related claimants.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Because of course, Venezuela has been accused of, and to a substantial extent, credibly engaging with various groups that are designated terrorists by the United States. That includes both recent groups that have been designated terrorists by the Trump administration.

[Natalie Orpet]

Like trend of Aragua being the most.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Notorious in recent months, but also several that have been designated since the 1990s.

[Natalie Orpet]

1990S, that's like FARC and ELN to.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Colombian rebel groups, terrorist groups that have.

[Natalie Orpet]

Long been designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the United States.

[Scott R. Anderson]

All these claims are out there in the world. And the people who believe they're entitled to compensation from Venezuela for the damages.

[Natalie Orpet]

They'Ve suffered or for the debts owed.

[Scott R. Anderson]

To them, many of them have, and many more could pursue legal remedies, meaning.

[Natalie Orpet]

They'Ve secured judgments or arbitral rewards in.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Their favor, in part because Venezuela has has as many countries that are in.

[Natalie Orpet]

This kind of pariah status like Venezuela has been for the last several years has often failed to really represent itself very adequately in court. So they end up with a lot of Default judgments against them, meaning they.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Are large scale and basically given the.

[Natalie Orpet]

Plaintiffs almost everything they want because they just have to present a kind of minimal credible case because it's unopposed in an adversarial legal system.

[Scott R. Anderson]

All these judgments. Now the job of those claims holders and their lawyers is to try and.

[Natalie Orpet]

Force them against specific assets through a process called attachment, or generally called attachment. There are certain other mechanisms that can come into play as well.

[Scott R. Anderson]

That means they find assets of Venezuela or whatever Venezuelan entity owes the money.

[Natalie Orpet]

PDVESA itself, the state owned oil company, has a lot of debt and other sort of claims against it and then.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Makes an argument as to why legally they can attach those assets. Normally, foreign government assets are pretty heavily protected by sovereign immunity against attachment. But there are a variety of carve.

[Natalie Orpet]

Outs, particularly where those assets are owned by an agency or instrumentality, not the government itself. So like psa, the national oil company.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Or if the assets are used in commercial activities, those carve outs make a lot of assets that Venezuela may bring into the United States or other countries.

[Natalie Orpet]

Potentially vulnerable to attachment.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And that poses a real problem for Venezuela because Venezuela to rehabilitate its oil sector and it needs to collect money.

[Natalie Orpet]

From people, it needs to be able to sell oil overseas.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And frankly it also needs to buy a bunch of stuff.

[Natalie Orpet]

It needs to buy the diluents that I mentioned before to make its oil transportable and marketable internationally.

[Scott R. Anderson]

It needs frankly just plain old equipment to rehabilitate its refinery capacity and its pumping and other oil industry capacity. And if it wants to rebuild other parts of its, you know, government and.

[Natalie Orpet]

State, if it wants to invest in.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Public health sector or other sectors with whatever oil revenue may come in, it's.

[Natalie Orpet]

Going to need to buy things overseas.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And that's going to be really hard for it. So long as it can't put money overseas without that money being at risk.

[Natalie Orpet]

Of attachment by these various claims holders.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And the scale is so huge and these claims, many of them genuinely are.

[Natalie Orpet]

Merited to some extent, or believed to be merited, that those barriers aren't easy to do away with.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Because even if only a fraction of these people are actually able to make.

[Natalie Orpet]

Their claims and get the judgments in time before Venezuela moves assets in and.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Out of the country, that's enough to.

[Natalie Orpet]

Potentially stop any flow of money in.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And out of the country or goods.

[Natalie Orpet]

Or other things they might buy and sell.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And notably the parties don't usually have to win to hold up those assets. Even if there's a dispute as to whether it's appropriate to attach these assets Those assets tend to get held in place because otherwise there's a concern they.

[Natalie Orpet]

Would just move them out of the jurisdiction and not be able to get them.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And so even if there's an ongoing litigation about whether attachment is appropriate or not, those assets could be frozen in place.

[Natalie Orpet]

They wouldn't be available to Venezuela for use for a variety of economic purposes.

[Scott R. Anderson]

So what the Trump administration has done is it has set up a mechanism.

[Natalie Orpet]

That tries to extend certain extraordinary protections.

[Scott R. Anderson]

To those assets so that at least when they're in the United States, and the United States is, if you had.

[Natalie Orpet]

To pick one country, the country you would want to be able to have hold money in, because it's a great place to buy and sell things from.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Around the world, at least in the United States, in those extraordinary protections, it.

[Natalie Orpet]

Provides a safe harbor where Venezuela can.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Hold their assets and collect assets without them being subject to attachment. And in particular, what we've seen the Trump administration do is a general license issue. Just this past Friday, on January 29th, they basically said, hey, all the sanctions we have on Venezuela's oil sector, they don't apply anymore. It's open for business. The rest world can do business on one condition. All of the money that you pay to Venezuela has to go into the.

[Natalie Orpet]

Special mechanism we're setting up that both.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Provides those protections, but then also has.

[Natalie Orpet]

A number of provisions that provide for U.S. supervision and control.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Notably, all this is separate from the Qatar transaction. The Qatar transaction took place while this mechanism was being stood up, was actually technically in place as a legal matter, but for various reasons I can get into. There's reasons to think it wouldn't be suitable for addressing a short term crisis.

[Natalie Orpet]

Like the Trump administration seemed to think Venezuela is facing, which is why they chose a separate route, a separate mechanism.

[Scott R. Anderson]

That went through Qatar that in theory is temporary, although I wouldn't be surprised.

[Natalie Orpet]

If we see them turn to it again at some point in the next couple of weeks or months.

[Host/Interviewer]

Okay, so before we get into that one, I want to unpack some of what you said. And the first thing I want to do is to just sort of, given all of the substance of that, just sort of make sure we have a good sense of the sort of simple view of this, which if I understand it correctly is say that Venezuela or its state owned oil company begins selling oil overseas, it gets paid for it before the state or the state owned oil company can actually take possession of that money. It gets attached through some of these judicial process mechanisms, through arbitrations, as you were describing, you know, tbd which of those end up being meritorious? But it does seem like there are quite a few that would be relatively uncontroversial. And so very large sums of money would be, would just never make it back to Venezuela because before it is possible for Venezuela to get its hands on it, it gets sort of intercepted by these creditors. And the quantity that we're talking about, given the level of debt and the number of creditors to which Venezuela or its various sub entities owes money, the sale of oil would probably not even be sufficient to cover those. So it would mean essentially no money is going back to Venezuela for all of these investments that are necessary to rehabilitate the oil industry. And as you say, the other piece of it is, even if it takes a little while to adjudicate the question of whether these creditors have meritorious claims, those funds will be held up. So again, intercepted, maybe to be eventually delivered to Venezuela, but will be held for a long time, which at the very least seriously delays the possibility for Venezuela to make investments in, for example, building up its oil sector or whatever else it wanted to do, to essentially invest in what has been a really, really struggling economy with a lot of real humanitarian crises. Does that all sound like a fair summary?

[Scott R. Anderson]

Yeah, that's the concern the Trump administration was addressing with these sorts of actions. But how it tries to go about it again is somewhat unique and we.

[Natalie Orpet]

Can dig into that a little bit more.

[Host/Interviewer]

Okay, great. So the one other thing that I just wanted to mention to make sure folks were following along with what you're saying about the US Regime. One of the main challenges there is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities act, and you mentioned that there are carve outs. But the Foreign Sovereign Immunities act of course, limits the means by which or the possibility by which plaintiffs can call into court states or state owned enterprises, because there is some immunity that is granted to them. But as you mentioned, there are a couple of carve outs that would mean that to the extent there are claims that are jurisdictionally based in the United States, it would be possible, it is more likely than any other given state that plaintiffs would be able to bring claims and potentially meritorious claims. Can you just talk about that a little bit more?

[Scott R. Anderson]

Yeah, I mean, essentially the Foreign Sovereignty of Immunities act has two different baskets of immunities. One set of immunities is about immunity from the jurisdiction of US Courts, which means the ability to not be hauled into US Court if you're a foreign.

[Natalie Orpet]

Government or agency or instrumentality of a foreign government.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And then they have actually even higher degree of immunities there that apply to.

[Natalie Orpet]

Attachment of foreign government assets.

[Scott R. Anderson]

You may be able to bring a foreign government before a US Court and make a claim against it and have.

[Natalie Orpet]

A judgment that it's liable to you.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But still not be able to attach any of its assets, because the exceptions.

[Natalie Orpet]

Are narrower for attaching assets than it is for actually exercising jurisdiction over foreign governments and their agencies and instrumentalities.

[Scott R. Anderson]

The problem here is that these judgment holders have already surmounted a the jurisdiction bedroom.

[Natalie Orpet]

They already have judgments and arbitral awards.

[Scott R. Anderson]

That for various reasons have penetrated whatever sovereign immunity may be extended.

[Natalie Orpet]

These are often foreign, sometimes they're US Based.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But foreign countries usually have a, if.

[Natalie Orpet]

Anything, stronger sovereign immunity regime than the United States does.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And then you have the question of attachment. And that's where these exceptions about commercial activities and involvement become a bigger issue. Now, again, many of the claims may.

[Natalie Orpet]

Not be able to surmount those barriers.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But the concern is because of the sheer volume here, that enough will of enough scale that it would essentially obstruct.

[Natalie Orpet]

The flow of oil revenue in substantial amounts back to Venezuela, or at least.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Could in a way that eventually maybe Venezuela could pay them all off and have them resolved.

[Natalie Orpet]

And that's fine.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But in the meantime, it wouldn't have.

[Natalie Orpet]

The money to reinvest in its oil sector or rebuild.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And notably, that also means it's less.

[Natalie Orpet]

Likely to be able to repay them in the long run, or it will take longer because it will not be able to increase its oil production, which.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Is a necessary precondition to be able.

[Natalie Orpet]

To pay off such a large debt.

[Host/Interviewer]

Okay, so thank you. I think that's helpful since there is quite a lot happening here. But that's a good segue into this other mechanism that you referenced, which relates to which is how the state of Qatar comes into all of this. So tell us about that mechanism and why Qatar is involved at all.

[Scott R. Anderson]

So to understand why Qatar is involved, it's worth looking at the technicalities of the mechanism that the Trump administration has set up in the United States. Because the Qatar workaround is really meant to address deficiencies or existing risks that.

[Natalie Orpet]

The Trump administration can't manage with that other mechanism.

[Scott R. Anderson]

The mechanism that goes through the United States basically says oil revenue from Venezuela can come in, will be held in.

[Natalie Orpet]

A particular treasury account, which is a little odd. That's a little different from a departure from similar regimes the United States has set up before.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Bergadi is going to be held in.

[Natalie Orpet]

A Treasury Department account on behalf of Venezuela, PDVESA and other sorts of entities.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And it uses A authority called the International Emergency Economic Powers act, the same one, iipa, as it's called, same one used to impose economic sanctions also being right now litigated before the Supreme Court.

[Natalie Orpet]

As it was being used to impose the tariffs President Trump has imposed around the world, or at least many of the tariffs, the reciprocal tariffs.

[Scott R. Anderson]

I should say that authority is used to say these assets in this account cannot be attached, meaning they are not.

[Natalie Orpet]

Subject to legal process.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And that is something that we have good reason to think IPA can be used for. The United States set up a really, really similar regime for Iraq. After invaded in 2003, Iraq faced really similar problems to Venezuela of a similar.

[Natalie Orpet]

If maybe not quite as severe, SC.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And really when the United States took over, there was this exact same concern.

[Natalie Orpet]

Saying we need oil revenue to start flowing to help fund the reconstruction of Iraq.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But all these claimants are going to make this very difficult. So they used IPA to install extraordinary immunities for the Iraqi oil revenue. And very similar language is used here.

[Natalie Orpet]

In regards to Venezuelan oil revenue.

[Scott R. Anderson]

The only thing that really changed is that the DFI was primarily held by the Iraqi Central Bank.

[Natalie Orpet]

The Development Fund for Iraq, I should.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Say, is the main account around which.

[Natalie Orpet]

The Iraqi regime was built that was.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Held in the Federal Reserve bank of.

[Natalie Orpet]

New York by Iraq's own central bank.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Here the account is being held by the United States in the Treasury Department, not touching the Federal Reserve System, at least by designation.

[Natalie Orpet]

Not clear why.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Frankly, it'd be arguably advantageous if it did, because Venezuela's central bank, if those assets were held by Venezuela's central bank, they would be able to qualify for the highest tier of sovereign immunities under.

[Natalie Orpet]

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But regardless, that's not the mechanism that's being used here.

[Natalie Orpet]

The Trump administration has decided to instead.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Say, no, these accounts are going to be held, these funds are going to be held on Venezuela's behalf in the.

[Natalie Orpet]

United States in a Treasury Department account. And the Treasury Department can establish that account, variety of places domestically, overseas, including the Federal Reserve bank of New York if it wants to. But that's not the default, I guess, in this particular case.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Regardless, the thing that it really adds on the Trump administration does to the kind of Iraq based regime is it has a number of mechanisms that say, basically, hey, nothing can move out of.

[Natalie Orpet]

This account except we're authorized by us.

[Scott R. Anderson]

That is, again, not extraordinarily different from the Iraq regime, but notable. And we can get into why.

[Natalie Orpet]

I think it reflects some confusion about internal tensions and how the United States under Trump has approached recognition of the.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Venezuelan government who would otherwise be able.

[Natalie Orpet]

To control those funds.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Then it also says a bunch of other provisions that seem clearly trying to bring in things like international comedy and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities act by making.

[Natalie Orpet]

A bunch of presidential findings about the assets.

[Scott R. Anderson]

This is an odd thing to do a little bit in executive Order, not unprecedented, but a little odd because it's making very case specific factual assertions about how these assets are being used, that there are no assets in this account yet.

[Natalie Orpet]

So it's hard to say with confidence that's actually how they are being used.

[Scott R. Anderson]

I think it's intended to communicate, here's.

[Natalie Orpet]

How they should be used or shouldn't be used.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Regardless, it's clearly the administration trying to.

[Natalie Orpet]

Lay the groundwork for other potential legal.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Defenses to these assets, but in a way that I find I think is a little clumsy.

[Natalie Orpet]

I think there's less operational happening there. IEEPA is still the main focus of the source of legal protections for these particular assets.

[Host/Interviewer]

So talk a little bit about the different layers here, because you've mentioned AIPA and the Executive Order, which maybe start with just explaining what the Executive Order is, what it says, and then how it interacts with AIPA in this case.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Yeah, the Executive order, Executive Order 14373.

[Natalie Orpet]

Which President Trump issued a couple of weeks ago, I think, on January 9, if I recall correctly, invokes IPA.

[Scott R. Anderson]

IEEPA is implemented when the President declares a national emergency and uses it to.

[Natalie Orpet]

Address a threat to the national security or economy of the United States that.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Has its origins at least partially overseas.

[Natalie Orpet]

I'm paraphrasing there, but that's basically what the elements of the requirement are.

[Scott R. Anderson]

When that happens, it says the president's supposed to declare a national emergency, and then when he does, he can use this extraordinary authority that AIPA gives, which.

[Natalie Orpet]

Is basically to regulate however it sees fit, foreign economic transactions.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Although, as we're seeing litigated for the.

[Natalie Orpet]

Supreme Court, there are some outer limits on that authority, particularly around revenue generation and the imposition of taxes, potentially, as at least the parties are arguing in that case, the plaintiffs.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And there are limits that actually come into play here, traditionally understood to be limits about vesting, which is where the United States actually claims title to assets.

[Natalie Orpet]

Basically say, these are our assets.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Now, that's something that EAPA only expressly allows during wartime or the event of an armed attack, although some have argued that it should allow that more generally.

[Natalie Orpet]

Particularly in the context of debates around Russian frozen assets and compensating Ukraine, which We've had debates about in lawfare at length.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Folks who look back to I will say I don't think those arguments are right.

[Natalie Orpet]

I think IEIPA pretty clearly doesn't allow vesting outside of wartime.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But people do make those arguments regardless. That sort of broad authority is what's being used to basically say, hey, through our regulatory authority we are making clear here, these assets, they can't be attached.

[Natalie Orpet]

They can't be subject to legal process. Doing so would be a violation of ieipa.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And that is the same tool that DFI used in the Iraq contest or.

[Natalie Orpet]

Used for the DFI in the Iraq context and it proved successful there.

[Scott R. Anderson]

There is one important carve out and exception which we should get into about terrorism related claims. But other than that, those protections have.

[Natalie Orpet]

Proven fairly effective in the past and.

[Scott R. Anderson]

I expect them to do the same here. Although that doesn't mean they won't be.

[Natalie Orpet]

Subject to legal challenge at some point, they almost certainly will be.

[Host/Interviewer]

Okay, that's helpful. And I'll just note the use of IEPA is sort of what I was previewing before about the fact that the legal infrastructure at play here demonstrates this point that I think is important to keep in mind, which is that the United States actions here are not exclusively, at least for the purpose of humanitarian efforts to help rebuild Venezuela. They are in the interest, at least as stated through the executive order and the use of IEEPA determined to be in connection with the national security of the United States and the determination by the President that there is an emergency at issue here. And I'll just make one other tangential note, but I can't resist the point about the carve out regarding vesting outside of war. I will just point out again the particular irony I find of the fact that the administration is justifying the boat strikes that you and I have written about on the basis of we are at war and then justifying the capture of Maduro by saying we are not at war. There was a law enforcement, this was a law enforcement operation. And I think the potential conflict you could see here about whether or not we are at war is something to keep an eye on.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Yeah, this is something that Secretary Rubio.

[Natalie Orpet]

Expressly addressed at his testimony.

[Scott R. Anderson]

It was interesting because he basically said, no, we're not at war with Venezuela. We may for Alien Enemies act purposes.

[Natalie Orpet]

Because in response to a question from.

[Scott R. Anderson]

A senator which is a statute that the administration has invoked several months ago now at this point alleging basically hostilities.

[Natalie Orpet]

With Trinder, Aragua and other sort of armed groups that it associates with Venezuela.

[Scott R. Anderson]

The Secretary tried to parse that very carefully, saying we have said we're at.

[Natalie Orpet]

War with Trinderaga and these other groups. We don't say we're at war with Venezuela as a state.

[Scott R. Anderson]

It is interesting because in some ways the administration's life would be easier as a legal matter if it said it was at war because perhaps it could.

[Natalie Orpet]

Use some of these IPO provisions to exercise more direct control over vesting and spending of some of these assets. And maybe they'll get there at a.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Certain point, but they seem resistant to cross that line. I suspect it has something to do.

[Natalie Orpet]

With the degree of pushback they got after the Maduro strike, including from Senate.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Republicans about the potential for a second.

[Natalie Orpet]

Wave for further military action. Rubio also is very express that he does not expect there to be any further military action to with a degree of clarity that frankly was a little bit of a departure from what we heard from the administration just a few weeks ago.

[Scott R. Anderson]

So it's not clear to me exactly what they're trying to square about saying, being so adamant that we are not.

[Natalie Orpet]

In a state of war with Venezuela.

[Scott R. Anderson]

As that again would potentially open up.

[Natalie Orpet]

New legal authorities to them in this case.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But regardless, that was clearly the Secretary's.

[Natalie Orpet]

Position and it does not seem like he was speaking off the cuff. He seems he was clearly delivering deliberate point on that. So there's some logic back there that's.

[Host/Interviewer]

Interesting because there is definitely a bit of a tension across very different areas of law. But since Lawfare tends to cover all of them, it's maybe tension that only we see. And I, as I said, couldn't resist bringing it up.

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[Host/Interviewer]

But let's go back to another issue that you raised, which is the terrorism carve out. And this relates more to the US Mechanism that we were talking about first, but is an important contextual thing that we missed earlier. So tell us about that legal issue that presents itself with regard to the Venezuelan oil assets.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Yeah, so this is one of two big reasons why the Trump administration reasonably, in my mind, or at least not patently unreasonably, felt that even though it had set up this regime through Executive Order 14373, it decided to route the initial sale of oil that Venezuela engaged in that it helped broker for about.

[Natalie Orpet]

$500 million through this Qatar mechanism, which is a separate mechanism which essentially just routing it, a bank account in Qatar.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Under US Supervision but held by the.

[Natalie Orpet]

Venezuelan Interim authorities as they're called the Delsey Rodriguez regime in Venezuela.

[Scott R. Anderson]

The main problem, or the least the clearest litigation risk problem, stems from a provision of law called Section 201 of.

[Natalie Orpet]

The Terrorism Risk Insurance act or TRIA.

[Scott R. Anderson]

This law was enacted in 2002 and basically was intended to give individual Americans with certain types of terrorism related claims, but pretty broad category of them, the ability to attach assets that are frozen.

[Natalie Orpet]

Pursuant to sanctions authorities.

[Scott R. Anderson]

It is a law that basically is a notwithstanding provision, meaning it says it.

[Natalie Orpet]

Applies notwithstanding the provisions of other law.

[Scott R. Anderson]

So it can cut through other statutory.

[Natalie Orpet]

Legal protections that might otherwise be provided to those assets. So section 201 cuts through the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. FSIA is not a defense to attachment under section 201.

[Scott R. Anderson]

It also cuts through, most relevantly here.

[Natalie Orpet]

The International Emergency Economic Powers act iep.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Not only that, it actually piggybacks on top of IIPA and says it's when IIPA freezes a certain set of assets. That's when all of a sudden even if the order says the president used AYIPA for says no, these can't be attached TRIA at least can very plausibly be argued to say no, actually we.

[Natalie Orpet]

Can attach them and bring them in.

[Scott R. Anderson]

There's some ambiguity, there's some technicality, a lot of which I didn't have time.

[Natalie Orpet]

To get into in the piece about.

[Scott R. Anderson]

What exactly constitutes seasoned seized assets, even under aipa, the types of relationships required. But the key point here is that at least for these terrorism related claims, even if you use an IPA type mechanism to protect Venezuelan oil revenue, you.

[Natalie Orpet]

Could still face substantial claims from terrorism.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Related claimants because they could at least have a legal argument that they could.

[Natalie Orpet]

Use to penetrate the protections provided by ipa.

[Scott R. Anderson]

This was an issue with the Iraq system that was set up in 2003 because TRIA was enacted in 2002.

[Natalie Orpet]

That law was on the books at the time.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But in that case, the George W. Bush administration did one extra step.

[Natalie Orpet]

The Trump administration hasn't pursued and doesn't seem intend to pursue.

[Scott R. Anderson]

It went to Congress to get supplemental legislation. And amidst that legislation was a provision, one that Congress later doubled down on.

[Natalie Orpet]

After it faced some litigation challenges that.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Basically said, yes, Iraq is a state sponsor of terrorism for that reason. Normally TRIO would allow the pursuit of claims against it against frozen assets of its even where it would otherwise be.

[Natalie Orpet]

Protected, like by the DFI Executive Order.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But in this case we are saying that the President has the authority to.

[Natalie Orpet]

Waive the consequences of state sponsor of terrorism status.

[Scott R. Anderson]

The Supreme Court actually ultimately upheld the fact that those statutes did in fact.

[Natalie Orpet]

Basically rescind the legal consequences of state sponsor of terrorism designation for Iraq in a case called Beyd v. Republic of Iraq in 2009, if I recall correctly.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And so that basically meant that that Iraq, even though it was a state sponsor of terrorism, effectively had that status.

[Natalie Orpet]

And the consequences rescinded.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And so it wasn't vulnerable to TRIA.

[Natalie Orpet]

Based attachment, at least as they were understood at the time.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Now, notably, Venezuela has never been a.

[Natalie Orpet]

State sponsor of terrorism, at least as.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Officially designated, even though it's accused of.

[Natalie Orpet]

Doing stuff like that by the Trump administration.

[Scott R. Anderson]

It's a discretionary designation that's frankly only been used extremely sparingly because it has.

[Natalie Orpet]

Such dramatic legal consequences and has never been applied to Venezuela.

[Host/Interviewer]

Sorry to interrupt. Is that a State Department determination, that designation, or where does that designate?

[Scott R. Anderson]

I believe it is a State Department determination. It's scattered across a number of statutory provisions.

[Natalie Orpet]

I believe all of them ultimately lie with state. I'm not 100% confident of that. I can actually check on that maybe while we're chatting, but I believe it is a state Department determination, certainly primarily a state determination.

[Scott R. Anderson]

The key point here is that while Venezuela is not a state sponsor of terrorism, it has been accused of having a variety of ties to all these.

[Natalie Orpet]

Other terrorist groups that I mentioned before.

[Scott R. Anderson]

TDA designated most recently as a foreign.

[Natalie Orpet]

Terrorist organization, but Also FARC and ELN, two groups that have been designated FTOs for 30 years. And at least two federal courts or federal appellate courts, I should say the 2nd Circuit, the 11th Circuit, have interpreted.

[Scott R. Anderson]

TRIA to basically say, when you have a judgment against a terrorism party, in this case, an FTO qualifies, you can take that judgment and use Section 201 to enforce it and seek to attach the assets of anybody who materially supported.

[Natalie Orpet]

That sort of effort, acted as its agency and instrumentality, which these two courts.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Interpreted very, very broadly to mean anybody.

[Natalie Orpet]

Who kind of acted its behest or assisted or participated in its scheme in various regards.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Several courts have interpreted that to mean that people with claims against farc, the terrorist group in Colombia, can try and attach them against the assets of Pedda Vesa, the Venezuelan state oil company, because there are lots of allegations that Pedvisa.

[Natalie Orpet]

And the broader Maduro regime were involved in helping launder money and otherwise facilitating the operations of farc.

[Scott R. Anderson]

These judgments alone, in part because of.

[Natalie Orpet]

Default judgment, FARC does not come defend itself in US Courts. But there's no reason to doubt that.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Actually would be liable even if it did come defend itself, are the order.

[Natalie Orpet]

Of hundreds of millions of dollars.

[Scott R. Anderson]

So if you were to route the.

[Natalie Orpet]

Initial $500 billion secured in Venezuelan oil.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Sales through the United States, even with these immunities in place under the executive.

[Natalie Orpet]

Order 14373, there is at least a.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Significant risk that these particular sets of.

[Natalie Orpet]

Claimants with claims against FARC and some of these other terrorist groups will still come at these assets and try and attach them.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And in that case, this total volume of assets wasn't that big that Venezuela could just eat the costs or accept.

[Natalie Orpet]

That some of its funds are gonna.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Be caught up in litigation. There wouldn't be enough left to pass back to Venezuela.

[Host/Interviewer]

That seems to me an example that you were mentioning before of where even if the assets were not ultimately taken by the claimants, they would certainly be held up in court, because I would imagine to prevail in being able to collect against Venezuela for claims against farc, you would have to do a lot of work to actually prove the connection between Venezuela and FARC in order to make that a viable legal claim. Given the sort of degree of separation presumably you would need a lot of evidence and there would just be, I assume, quite lengthy litigation about whether Venezuelan assets are even available for that purpose to those claimants. But that would tie them up at the very least, even if they ultimately made their way back to Venezuela.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Yeah, there certainly is a lot of factual questions involved in this, but notably these facts have been litigated before, particularly.

[Natalie Orpet]

In the Southern District of Florida, but a handful of other places around the country.

[Scott R. Anderson]

So you have a lot of district court judgments for very similarly situated assets, Pedda Vesa related kind of regime assets for the Maduro regime, where courts felt.

[Natalie Orpet]

The threshold was met, if nothing else.

[Scott R. Anderson]

So there's a little bit more of a trail blazed here already that wouldn't be completely novel, but you're right, they.

[Natalie Orpet]

Would have to demonstrate some facts and build it out.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And notably, this is one of these awkward cases where the Trump administration, from a policy perspective, would rather probably prefer that these parties not be able to attach these assets. And notably, I would say I'm not sure these courts interpretation of section 201.

[Natalie Orpet]

Of TRIA is correct.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And there may be factual reasons to.

[Natalie Orpet]

Doubt whether these courts are reading the situation right.

[Scott R. Anderson]

At least one of them, I would note, I think actually has US Recognition.

[Natalie Orpet]

Policy towards Venezuela wrong. It says that the Maduro regime was derecognized in 2017, and I'm almost positive that's wrong. I think it was in 2019.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Regardless, there may not be perfect factual.

[Natalie Orpet]

Records here, but it's very awkward for.

[Scott R. Anderson]

The United States under the Trump administration to step in and try and assist in arguing this, even if it would consider doing it, because a American victims.

[Natalie Orpet]

Of terrorism are very understandably incredibly sympathetic people and plaintiffs and nobody wants to see victims of terrorism not get compensation that they're deserving.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But also, the Trump administration has been amongst the most vocal people about illustrating.

[Natalie Orpet]

The ties between the Maduro regime and terrorist groups like farc.

[Scott R. Anderson]

So it would be contradicting its own prior determinations, including lots of official statements.

[Natalie Orpet]

Like the terrorism designation of groups like.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Trinidad, to begin to walk back some of these. So my guess is it doesn't see.

[Natalie Orpet]

That as a politically viable option, even if it might be a legally viable option as a way to push back on these understandings of tria.

[Host/Interviewer]

Okay, so I did want to ask you one thing you just mentioned there, which is the complexity you describe in the piece relating to the question of recognition, which I think is really not obvious as to why the question of whether and the extent to which the United States as a diplomatic matter recognizes the Government of Venezuela, what that has to do with any of this. So can you just talk through that?

[Scott R. Anderson]

Yeah, it is really integral to his argument. This is something I've really, actually, really.

[Natalie Orpet]

Been trying to flag for people since.

[Scott R. Anderson]

The intervention in media engagements and some.

[Natalie Orpet]

Other written work for Lawfare and for Brookings.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And I haven't seen people glom onto it, but maybe people will begin to catch onto it now because Rubio did.

[Natalie Orpet]

Basically say this in his testimony.

[Scott R. Anderson]

There's a real tension in US recognition.

[Natalie Orpet]

Polity towards Venezuela because the Trump administration is now coordinating with the Delsey Rodriguez regime in Venezuela.

[Scott R. Anderson]

It's basically the Maduro regime, but just.

[Natalie Orpet]

Sans Maduro with his deputy now in charge.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But that government hasn't been the US.

[Natalie Orpet]

Recognized government of Venezuela since at least 2019. I believe that's the right date. Again, some courts have said 2017.

[Scott R. Anderson]

That's the year President Trump said, I.

[Natalie Orpet]

Am recognizing Juan Guaido as the interim president of Venezuela.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Juan Guaido is an interesting figure. He was an opposition leader. He was the head of the National Assembly, a legislator body, the composition of.

[Natalie Orpet]

Which at that time and still currently.

[Scott R. Anderson]

I believe, was elected in 2015. Kind of the last fair ish elections.

[Natalie Orpet]

That people see that has legitimacy in the country.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And what they said essentially is that, well, Maduro claimed to win election in.

[Natalie Orpet]

2018, but we think that election was fraudulent.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Under the Venezuelan Constitution, the presidency is vacant. And they said it basically was because.

[Natalie Orpet]

Maduro was fraudulent and was not adequately.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Elected, then the presidency should go into.

[Natalie Orpet]

Interim status to the head of the National Assembly.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And so this national assembly voted.

[Natalie Orpet]

We're going to put Guan Guaido in the interim presidency.

[Scott R. Anderson]

He had no control of the country, didn't control any institutions of government, but was recognized as the interim president by Donald Trump during his first administration. And the Trump administration persuaded a wide swath of U.S. allies, most countries in.

[Natalie Orpet]

Europe, lots of countries in Asia, lots of other countries in the Western Hemisphere.

[Scott R. Anderson]

To do the same, in hopes that this would give Guaido the popular or global support that he would need to eventually mobilize political forces to assume power in Venezuela. Presumably, that never came to the fore. Instead, what happened is in 2023, early 2023, the National assembly decided to end.

[Natalie Orpet]

The interim presidency, something that appears to be within their rights. They basically said, this isn't really working for us. And there was some internal disagreement between different factions of the opposition as they prepared for elections the following year.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And instead, at that point, the Biden administration shifted its US Recogn to say well, the Juan Guaido interim presidency doesn't exist anymore. We still recognize the 2015 National assembly.

[Natalie Orpet]

As the last legitimate institution of government in Venezuela. Paraphrasing lightly, but basically something to that effect.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And what that meant is that they allowed, and some federal courts have essentially.

[Natalie Orpet]

Also allowed, at the direction of the.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Executive branch, the 2015 National assembly to appoint people to exercise control over the state owned assets that are in the United States, including control over, for example.

[Natalie Orpet]

Petevaisa's litigation positions or assets Pedevasa may have in the United States, or control of other Venezuelan assets and interests in the United States.

[Scott R. Anderson]

All those are in control now of.

[Natalie Orpet]

The 2015 National assembly and its delegates.

[Scott R. Anderson]

That becomes a real problem when you start bringing in oil that Delsey Rodriguez has authorized the sale of. But the revenue is coming into the United States States because In theory, the 2015 National assembly could sue and I think probably would win. To say we should control how these.

[Natalie Orpet]

Assets are spent and control what happens to them, not the Delsey Rodriguez regime.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And notably, precisely because of that vesting restriction we already talked about, the President can't actually use ieepa, clearly, to contradict that. The President can stop the owner of.

[Natalie Orpet]

Assets from moving them anywhere.

[Scott R. Anderson]

It can direct banks to consolidate assets.

[Natalie Orpet]

In various places as a holder, as.

[Scott R. Anderson]

A agent of the actual owner of those assets.

[Natalie Orpet]

But.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But it can't divest the owner of title. It can't vest them in the presidency.

[Natalie Orpet]

Himself or transfer it to a third.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Party, or at least there's big legal doubt as to whether a President can.

[Natalie Orpet]

Do that under ipa.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And so because of that, the President can't use IIPA to just spend the money on Venezuela's behalf and get rid of it. Instead, all this money is essentially going.

[Natalie Orpet]

To pour into this account that is set up under 14373.

[Scott R. Anderson]

It's going to sit there until either US recognition policy changes, something the President can do on his own to recognize the Delsey Rodriguez regime, or the 2015 National assembly somehow acquiesces or at least agrees not to actively challenge how those.

[Natalie Orpet]

Assets are being used and disposed of.

[Scott R. Anderson]

At the direction of whoever that might.

[Natalie Orpet]

Be, Delsey Rodriguez or somebody else.

[Scott R. Anderson]

How exactly you get to this point is really complicated. It's going to require some sort of negotiated solution. My guess is it's going to be part of a package that the Trump administration is going to have to negotiate with the Rodriguez regime, saying, hey, we have to give the opposition something. You need to give us a timeline or a process at getting to democratic.

[Natalie Orpet]

Elections in Venezuela or some other transition to power.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But whatever that arrangement is, that gets the 2015 National assembly on board with the Rodriguez government or Rodriguez regime, I should say that's going to take time to negotiate. And that's something that they. My guess is they just didn't feel.

[Natalie Orpet]

They had for this initial transfer of.

[Scott R. Anderson]

$500 million, or sale, I should say, of oil for $500 million, because according to Rubio, they thought Venezuela was on.

[Natalie Orpet]

The verge of an actual economic collapse and they needed to transfer at least most of that money. They ended up giving 300 million to.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Venezuela very, very quickly to stave off that collapse. And there was concern this recognition debate.

[Natalie Orpet]

Could complicate that further.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Again, that's a second consideration that led them to turn overseas to do that.

[Natalie Orpet]

Initial transfer and ultimately to Qatar.

[Host/Interviewer]

I want to turn to why Qatar? Because I think you guys had some interesting things to say there. But I want to first try out for you an analogy that is definitely not perfect, a little bit overly simplistic, but I think maybe an interesting way to conceptualize this, which is to bankruptcy. So I think with regard to the recognition issue, it's sort of a question of, okay, if you imagine an analogy to a company going bankrupt, it would be the question of what constituted the company, and if there is some dispute over the control within the company. That's sort of analogous to the recognition question. If they're, you know, two competing CEOs who say, no, the money is mine because the company is mine. Right. So that's on that side. And then it seems to me that what the Trump administration is doing here in terms of taking control of the situation through all these mechanisms that we've described is part of this overall question of in what order? Right. This is something that comes up in bankruptcy. The point of bankruptcy litigation is there is some limited quantity of money, and the court has to help work out the order in which different creditors can recover, the means by which they can do that, and how much, because there is such limited money. And oftentimes the reason that they're going bankrupt is because there isn't enough money to cover all of the creditors. So it seems to me, you know, we talked up front about all of the different creditors, including other nations, including a lot of judicial processes, not only within the United States, but elsewhere, all over the world. And it seems sort of like what is happening here is the United States is using these mechanisms to sort of skip to the front of the line and make sure that it is in control of it sort of takes the place of the first creditor and is controlling all of the means by which the money is going to be distributed back to the creditors. Does that work for you as an analogy?

[Scott R. Anderson]

I think up until that last bit about being the kind of first in place creditor, because that's actually not what we see the Trump administration doing yet, although maybe they will get there. Right now, no creditors are getting paid, including lots of American creditors. And that is going to become a point of contention.

[Host/Interviewer]

Right.

[Scott R. Anderson]

We heard President Trump say at various points, oh, I'm going to get compensation for these oil companies that have their property expropriated. It hasn't happened yet.

[Natalie Orpet]

There aren't signs about how the Trump administration is prioritizing that or doing that.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Instead, what we really have right now is essentially, again, bankruptcy proceedings.

[Natalie Orpet]

I would say. I think that's a good parallel to.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Say, okay, we're going to freeze all.

[Natalie Orpet]

The liabilities out there. People aren't going to be collect on.

[Scott R. Anderson]

This entity, but they haven't sorted out how they're going to restructure them or compensate or begin to repay them yet.

[Host/Interviewer]

So maybe the better analogy is the United States has deemed itself the bankruptcy judge.

[Scott R. Anderson]

I think that's a better way to do it.

[Natalie Orpet]

Exactly.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And what we saw happen in the Iraq context is that a, the DFI.

[Natalie Orpet]

Protections were always understood to be temporary.

[Scott R. Anderson]

That's something that they haven't actually expressly said about These executive order 14373, although.

[Natalie Orpet]

It'S, I think it's presumptively true, but who knows?

[Scott R. Anderson]

And even though they were understood to be temporary, the George W. Bush administration and subsequent administrations went to Iraq and said, hey, you guys are going to.

[Natalie Orpet]

Have to deal with these sovereign debt.

[Scott R. Anderson]

We are giving you protection on a temporary basis to help rebuild your government, rebuild your economy, but you need to renegotiate. You need to actually come to terms.

[Natalie Orpet]

With all these different creditors and figure out a way to either pay them.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Back over time or if you don't think they're valid claims, contest them in courts and fight them, or figure out.

[Natalie Orpet]

A way to repay everybody everything.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And that's what Iraq did over many years. The DFI arrangements stayed in place on.

[Natalie Orpet]

The books until 2014.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But Iraq did do this very conscious.

[Natalie Orpet]

Effort of restructuring and was able to.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Use the leverage of having the defi protections and the support of the United States to essentially reduce a lot of.

[Natalie Orpet]

Its debt burden and contest certain claims that it felt were not ultimately valid against it.

[Scott R. Anderson]

That's something I fully expect Venezuela is.

[Natalie Orpet]

Going to have to do.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And the Trump Administration, frankly, in my view, would be well advised to start.

[Natalie Orpet]

Saying that more expressly because if they.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Don'T, they're soon going to have lots of these claimants very validly start saying, how are you privileging what is essentially the Maduro regime just sans Maduro, over people to whom you agree have been.

[Natalie Orpet]

Abused by it for the last 20 years?

[Scott R. Anderson]

It is again, a sign that there are big parts of the strategy that I don't think have been fully implemented yet, or maybe not even fully cognized.

[Natalie Orpet]

By the senior leaders leadership who talks most about this in the Trump administration.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But that are essential components of it. If that's not a part of this, if this really is an effort to indefinitely insulate Venezuela from these costs, I would be a little surprised by that. That would be a very different game. And if there were frankly a genuine effort to say, hey, American claimants get first in order, I suspect some of that will be tolerable. But too much of that will become an international issue for the lots of.

[Natalie Orpet]

Other governments that also have claims against Venezuela, and that includes Russia and China, among many others.

[Host/Interviewer]

Okay, so let's talk about Qatar and why Qatar is the location of this account. Because it's not accidental. There are plenty of other places where one can open bank accounts. But you know, it may be, I think it's meaningful in the first place, but it may be even more meaningful because as you note in the case of DFI in the Iraq case, this temporary, so called temporary mechanism lasted for 10 years. And you know, we've discussed a ton of complexities with this set of issues and this mechanism even beyond what happened in the Iraq case. So it seems quite plausible to me that this temporary measure is not so temporary. So why Qatar in the first place and what are sort of the longer term implications you think might exist for the fact that it isn't Qatar?

[Scott R. Anderson]

Yeah, it's a really good question. You know, Qatar is one of these countries that is always viewed suspiciously by.

[Natalie Orpet]

People across the political spectrum for kind of different reasons.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Like people on the political left right now are very skeptical of Qatar because.

[Natalie Orpet]

Of course, it gifted President Trump a.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Jet and is seen as being fairly obsequious in its flattery of him to an extent that is seen as having.

[Natalie Orpet]

Led to the Trump administration making what.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Many people criticize as poorly considered concessions on access to AI technology and a.

[Natalie Orpet]

Variety of other measures. That's true of a lot of the Gulf countries, but particularly Qatar as well.

[Scott R. Anderson]

On the right, a lot of people criticize Qatar because it's viewed as closer to the Muslim Brotherhood and closer to other sort of political Islamic components and ideologies and movements around the region, around the world that are seen by some.

[Natalie Orpet]

As contrary to US Interest and therefore more hostile in that regard.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And Qatar has been accused of running massive influence campaigns in the United States. And so everyone who is critical of.

[Natalie Orpet]

Views of Qatar is also very quick to say, well, people are obviously in Qatar's back pocket.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And look, there sometimes is truth to.

[Natalie Orpet]

Some of those claims, potentially at least.

[Scott R. Anderson]

The key point here though, is that Qatar is also and long has been a strategic ally of the United States.

[Natalie Orpet]

Or strategic partner, facilitator, if not ally.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Obviously. The largest US Military base in in.

[Natalie Orpet]

The Middle east is located there, Al Uday Air Base.

[Scott R. Anderson]

It also has played this role as a facilitator with lots of rivals of the United States, between the United States and with those rivals, including the Taliban, including different groups in Syria, including Iran, precisely because Qatar is kind of like modern day Casablanca. It keeps ties with all these actors, it has credibility with them just as it does with the United States. And that lets us play this sometimes.

[Natalie Orpet]

Very valuable facilitator sort of role.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And notably it did this in regards to Venezuela under the Biden administration.

[Natalie Orpet]

It did facilitate negotiation between the Maduro.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Regime and Biden precisely because it maintained.

[Natalie Orpet]

Ties with both of them.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But in this particular case, I think the reasons why it ended up playing.

[Natalie Orpet]

This role are actually much more specific and kind of contextual.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Notably, Qatar doesn't have the legal problems the United States does in a way.

[Natalie Orpet]

That many other foreign jurisdictions would for holding Venezuelan assets.

[Scott R. Anderson]

It's harder to enforce foreign judgments and.

[Natalie Orpet]

Arbitrary awards in Qatar than it is in places like Europe.

[Scott R. Anderson]

It's getting better to some extent and easier.

[Natalie Orpet]

Qatar has just recently overhauled its laws.

[Scott R. Anderson]

For doing this, but nonetheless, it's a challenge.

[Natalie Orpet]

In particular, Qatar requires reciprocity for enforcing foreign judgments, a lot of things that other countries don't give to Qatari judgments.

[Scott R. Anderson]

More fundamentally as well, Qatar still has a fairly strong view of sovereign immunity. And sovereign involvement seems to be something.

[Natalie Orpet]

That can kind of squash a lot of legal actions to some extent. And Qatar foreign policy kind of trumps conventional legal process more easily than in other jurisdictions.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And Qatar never recognized the Juan Guaido.

[Natalie Orpet]

Government or the 2015 National Assembly.

[Scott R. Anderson]

It appears to have always kind of.

[Natalie Orpet]

Adopted the de facto rule. That is the more traditional approach many.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Countries take to recognition, which is to say, look, whether we like it or not, the Maduro now Rodriguez regime is in control of Venezuela on the ground.

[Natalie Orpet]

And that's what matters. We're going to treat it like the government.

[Scott R. Anderson]

All this means that the Rodriguez regime should be able to open an account there and hold money there without the legal risks that people were worried about in the United States consequences context. And many of those legal risks would.

[Natalie Orpet]

Also apply in a lot of other.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Countries, not least because a lot of them that are closest to the United States followed the United States lead in.

[Natalie Orpet]

Recognizing Juan Guaido and then the 2015 National assembly in a way that Qatar did not.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But the real tiebreaker on this, I think the real thing that probably led.

[Natalie Orpet]

Just from my experience in government working.

[Scott R. Anderson]

On related sets of issues that probably led people to settle on Qatar on this is really almost coincidental. It's just that Qatar almost did the exact same thing that the Trump administration needs just a few years ago for the Biden administration. When the Biden administration reached a deal that basically exchanged the release of large.

[Natalie Orpet]

Tranches of sums that were owed to Iran by South Korea and Japan in exchange for the release of certain American.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Hostages in 2022, 2023, the Biden administration basically said, okay, we are going to let this money be transferred to two.

[Natalie Orpet]

Accounts in Qatar with these relatively small kind of banks that didn't have major ties to the US Economy.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And then we're going to allow vendors to directly petition them for payment direct to vendors. They're not going to give any money to the Iranian government, but we're going to let the Iranian government say, we want to pay this vendor for this humanitarian good. And they're only allows you to spend.

[Natalie Orpet]

The money on humanitarian goods.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And it's up to the Qatari banks and the Qatari government, with facilitation cooperation with the United States to ensure that.

[Natalie Orpet]

Those transfers are only taking place as approved.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Whatever the arrangements were, the Biden administration always said it had utmost confidence that.

[Natalie Orpet]

The Qataris were cooperating with it fully and not allowing any money to get to Iran that wasn't supposed to be there.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And notably after the October 7 attacks by Hamas on Israel, the Biden government basically said, hey, we don't want to deal with this deal anymore.

[Natalie Orpet]

We don't want any of this more money getting out of this account.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And the Qataris appear to have cooperated.

[Natalie Orpet]

With that, despite substantial pressure from the Iranian government to release more of that money.

[Scott R. Anderson]

So my guess is the folks in the Treasury Department, many of whom probably worked under Biden as well, saw what the Trump administration is trying to do, and they're going to say, well, we're going to need a reliable partner who can hold these money free of legal risks and with whom we know we have an established track record of being able to monitor the funds, make sure.

[Natalie Orpet]

They'Re being used for purposes that we.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Approve of, and that is comfortable working with the US Government in that regard.

[Natalie Orpet]

And will follow our directions.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And the Qataris have a track record.

[Natalie Orpet]

Of that in relatively recent memory.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Maybe other governments could have done that too. But if you take Rubio at his word and his testimony, the Trump administration thought it was acting very quickly in.

[Natalie Orpet]

Response to a very urgent economic crisis.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And so in that situation, policymakers and.

[Natalie Orpet]

Folks aren't going to try and reinvent the wheel.

[Scott R. Anderson]

They're going to try and go to.

[Natalie Orpet]

Something that works in the way they need it to work.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And my guess is that that put.

[Natalie Orpet]

Qatar pretty readily at the top of the pile.

[Host/Interviewer]

And just a quick question on that, which is, what's in it for Qatar in this? It's a, it's a controversial issue. There are all these creditors out there. It's complicated. Is it really as simple as Qatar has a lot of foreign policy interests in continuing to have this sort of special role in US Foreign policy, of serving as an intermediary and such, or is there something more in it for Qatar?

[Scott R. Anderson]

No, I think that's the bulk of it. I mean, look, it's not bad for Qatar to have an extra $500 million in a bank account. This money is reportedly being held at.

[Natalie Orpet]

Qatar national bank, which is a partially state owned major financial bank.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Not perfect, but frankly a bigger, more sophisticated, with more sanctions compliance entity than.

[Natalie Orpet]

Was used in the Iran deal, it seems.

[Scott R. Anderson]

So you are in this position where Qatar maybe gets a little economic benefit, but probably minimal for a country as rich as it is. Instead, its benefit really is political. But it's not just with the United States. This is activity that the Rodriguez regime in Venezuela probably values as well and do many other countries. And it's Qatar's ability to serve this.

[Natalie Orpet]

Sort of facilitator role between parties that.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Might otherwise disagree that gives it a lot more influence than it probably would.

[Natalie Orpet]

Otherwise have on the international scene.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And this just plays into that along.

[Natalie Orpet]

With many other actions Qatar has pursued in recent years.

[Host/Interviewer]

Yeah, that makes sense. Okay, I want to wrap by just zooming out a little bit to say we've laid out this incredibly complex set of mechanisms, legal issues layered on top of legal issues. I want to talk a little bit about what we're looking for next. Right. We've talked about how this may play out. We've talked about the lawsuits that might come. What exactly are you looking for in the sort of short, medium and long term?

[Scott R. Anderson]

Yeah, I mean, this was a big motivation for Alex and me, or I'll speak for myself. I don't know about Alex, but I think we're on the same page on this. In writing this piece is that there was so much confusion and effort to understand the different pieces of the scheme that we knew about that not as much time was being spent on the really big questions that we need answered.

[Natalie Orpet]

Moving forward that are actually more important to the execution of the scheme effectively.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Because if executed as the Trump administration says it wants to execute it, it is, if nothing else, a fairly reasonable sort of policy to advance the stated goals of helping rehabilitate Venezuela's oil sector. And it looks a lot like things.

[Natalie Orpet]

Prior governments, prior US Administrations, I should.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Say, have done that were reasonably successful.

[Natalie Orpet]

If not perfect, at doing that.

[Scott R. Anderson]

But there are big questions outstanding here right now. A, we have no sense of what sort of accountability or oversight is being.

[Natalie Orpet]

Done done for the spending of money, either in Qatar or in the United States for that matter.

[Scott R. Anderson]

The DFI arrangement set up for Iraq had massive, massive oversight, had whole independent auditing bodies set up, in part because.

[Natalie Orpet]

Part of the money was being sent back to the UN for compensation for claims arising from the first Gulf War.

[Scott R. Anderson]

It had lots of measures in place to ensure that money was spent appropriately. And it still had huge problems, particularly.

[Natalie Orpet]

In its first few years of operation, before some of those mechanisms got fully stood up.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Those have been widely reported on.

[Natalie Orpet]

Politico ran an article on this just last week or the week before.

[Scott R. Anderson]

So it's not very encouraging that you don't have to see the Trump administration apparently being at least very transparent about.

[Natalie Orpet]

Whatever mechanisms it has to monitor these funds.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Now, the only funds that we know of so far have gone into anywhere yet is the $500 million in the Qatari account. And there Rubio was asked about that in his testimony and he said essentially, well, we're going to have to do a retrospective audit on that.

[Natalie Orpet]

We were moving too fast. We just had to get the money to Venezuela.

[Scott R. Anderson]

That might be right, but hopefully people.

[Natalie Orpet]

Will follow up and ask about the.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Retrospective audit and ensure that if that mechanism is used in the future, and notably it could be, you do now have the 14, 373 mechanism in place. And in theory, that is what the general license allowing for economic transactions with Venezuela requires money to be channeled through. But that doesn't prevent the Trump administration from doing case specific licenses for a.

[Natalie Orpet]

Part transfer, like the Qatari transfer.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Again, I think we may see more of those because there will be times where Venezuela may need a quick infusion of funds that would otherwise get held.

[Natalie Orpet]

Up by the legal challenges the US Mechanism might yet face.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And so maybe we're going to see some more of those. So you're going to want to have.

[Natalie Orpet]

Some transparency around how those things are being used.

[Scott R. Anderson]

And then the big question is the big chunks of this policy that seem to be on the horizon, but we haven't heard anything about yet, what is the plan for Venezuela, getting Venezuela to.

[Natalie Orpet]

Renegotiate its massive sovereign debt?

[Scott R. Anderson]

How much of that priority is that going to be?

[Natalie Orpet]

What kind of timeframe it's going to be?

[Scott R. Anderson]

How is the United States going to.

[Natalie Orpet]

Handle the recognition of the 2015 National assembly versus the Rodriguez regime?

[Scott R. Anderson]

And where does some sort of democratic.

[Natalie Orpet]

Election or something like that come into play in regards to bridging those two areas of concern?

[Scott R. Anderson]

What are we going to do to get rid of these terrorism claims against Venezuela? Is there going to be a claim settlement agreement? This is something the United States and presidents can do that kind of extinguish those claims in exchange for a lump sum the United States government then distributes. If so, what lump sum are they looking for? Is that what the $200 million in.

[Natalie Orpet]

Qatar is being held for?

[Scott R. Anderson]

Is it being held for some other purpose? There's all these really big major policy.

[Natalie Orpet]

Questions just hovering out there that the.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Trump administration, to my knowledge, has not addressed. And even Rubio's testimony, which I will say was very substantive and he was fairly forthcoming on, on January 28th, the questions weren't. I don't think people had quite delved deep enough into the structure to understand where to push on these. A few of them got hit on a few times. There are some really good lines of.

[Natalie Orpet]

Questioning from Senator Schatz, from Chairman Shaheen.

[Scott R. Anderson]

A few other folks. But there's a lot more we want to know and need to know about these parts of the plan that are still big blanks. So my hope is that now that hopefully we've been able to shed some light on the broad contours of what the Trump administration is doing and the ways in which it does and doesn't make sense, we can start spending a lot more energy and attention on the.

[Natalie Orpet]

Poles in that knowledge and the outstanding questions which need to get answered.

[Host/Interviewer]

Okay, well, I think we're going to have to leave it there, but I do want to really thank you and your co author Alex Zurdan for delving into this morass of issues for us and really helping to clarify it. I think it was a really helpful piece and I think this has been a very helpful conversation. So thank you very much.

[Scott R. Anderson]

Thank you for having me.

[Natalie Orpet]

The lafair Podcast is produced by the Lawfair Institute. If you want to support the show and listen ad free, you can become a Lawfare material [e-mail] support supporters also get access to special events and other bonus content we don't share anywhere else. If you enjoy the podcast, please rate and review us wherever you listen. It really does help. And be sure to check out our other shows including Rational Security, Allies, the Aftermath and Escalation, our latest Lawfare Presents podcast series about the war in Ukraine. You can also find all of our written [e-mail] the podcast is edited by Jen Patia with audio engineering from Scott Anderson. Our theme song is from Alibi Music. As always, thank you for listening.

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