Podcast Summary: The Lawfare Podcast
Episode: Lawfare Daily: Trump, Greenland, and the International Order
Date: January 29, 2026
Host: Molly Roberts (Lawfare Senior Editor)
Guests: Ariane Tabatabai (Lawfare Public Service Fellow), John Drennan (Visiting Fellow, Egmont Institute, Brussels)
Main Theme / Purpose
This episode examines the recent "Greenland Crisis," triggered by President Trump’s threats—including talk of annexation—towards Denmark (a NATO ally) regarding Greenland, and the subsequent shockwaves through the transatlantic alliance system. The discussion explores what this crisis reveals about the evolving international order, U.S.-Europe relations, NATO’s future, and how U.S. adversaries may exploit Western disunity.
Key Discussion Points & Insights
1. The Greenland Crisis: Origins and Escalation
[02:36–07:29]
- Background: President Trump has long expressed a desire to acquire Greenland, citing security and economic interests (rare earths, missile defense sites).
- In January 2026, the administration escalated rhetorical and policy threats, openly discussing the annexation of Greenland and explicitly stating that "use of force was on the table."
- Denmark, Greenland, and NATO allies opposed the U.S. position, insisting on existing channels for addressing security issues.
- Key Turning Points:
- Danish and Greenland foreign ministers traveled to Washington; a working group was announced, but the U.S. doubled down.
- U.S. threatened tariffs on participating allies; EU began considering counter-tariffs—the so-called "trade bazooka."
- U.S. public opinion was negative; even some Hill Republicans criticized Trump’s moves.
- At Davos (mid-Jan. 2026), Trump "walked back" threats, suspended tariffs, dropped the threat of force, and claimed a vague framework agreement.
- Key Quote:
- "So, basically, as of recording today on January 27, we have had several weeks of largely self-inflicted crisis [...] even though the worst of the crisis has passed, we have a rattled set of allies and basically a lack of clarity for exactly what comes next."
— John Drennan [05:57]
- "So, basically, as of recording today on January 27, we have had several weeks of largely self-inflicted crisis [...] even though the worst of the crisis has passed, we have a rattled set of allies and basically a lack of clarity for exactly what comes next."
2. U.S. Credibility: Domestic and Allied Perception
[07:29–12:54]
- There was momentary relief after Trump’s walkback, but guests caution against assuming future crises are averted—given the unpredictability of U.S. actions.
- Key Insight: In the U.S., the rapid pace of the news cycle means public attention quickly moves on, but in Europe, perceptions of U.S. unreliability are "sticking" and accumulating.
- Trump’s pattern: consistent rhetoric about questioning alliances since at least 2016, including recent disparagements of European contributions in Afghanistan, and online provocations (e.g., referring to Canada's PM as "Governor Carney," implying annexation).
- Damage to trust: Allies are "starting to move away from this view of the U.S. as their main security guarantor ... and moving more toward a view ... as an adversarial power at this point."
— Ari Tabatabai [10:49]
3. European and Allied Response Strategies
[13:20–20:00]
- Allies are absorbing the shock for now, but seeking to hedge strategically, technologically, industrially.
- Examples: Poland developing closer ties with South Korea for defense procurement; talk (still embryonic) of pan-European nuclear deterrence.
- Structural constraints: Many NATO members cannot immediately replace U.S. capabilities (e.g., nuclear umbrella), but long-term shifts are underway.
- Potential for nuclear proliferation rises if trust in U.S. guarantees erodes.
- Key Quote:
- "...Their baseline assumption is volatility in the relationship with the US as opposed to partnership."
— John Drennan [16:48]
- "...Their baseline assumption is volatility in the relationship with the US as opposed to partnership."
4. What the U.S. Gets from NATO and the Risks to U.S. Interests
[20:00–25:21]
- Not just Article 5: Daily, tangible benefits include intelligence sharing, access/overflight rights, forward bases, and military industry exports.
- NATO’s deterrent value keeps threats at bay and lowers U.S. security costs, allowing global force projection.
- Shrinking trust and cohesion within the alliance risks undermining these assets and making the U.S. less influential.
- Secretary General Mark Rutte’s remarks ("keep dreaming" if Europe thinks it can defend itself without the U.S. [20:00]) highlighted alliance dependence, but generated pushback from other European leaders.
5. Impact on Russia, Ukraine, and Adversarial Narratives
[30:07–36:57]
- Russia’s Perspective: Kremlin officials have drawn pointed comparisons between Greenland and Crimea, using the narrative to justify their own territorial ambitions and spotlight "Western hypocrisy."
- Russia benefits as NATO’s division hands it a propaganda and strategic advantage, with little need for direct action. The crisis distracts allies from the war in Ukraine and enables Russia to potentially "peel off" frustrated European partners.
- Short-term effects: Danish troop deployments to Greenland—forces that might otherwise be used in Ukraine; EU reconstruction package for Ukraine delayed due to the crisis.
- Long-term danger: If Article 5's credibility weakens, deterrence decays.
- Key Quote:
- "NATO's weakened cohesion is going to make it more difficult to achieve its objectives when it comes to both supporting Ukraine now and... deterring Russia going forward."
— John Drennan [30:27]
- "NATO's weakened cohesion is going to make it more difficult to achieve its objectives when it comes to both supporting Ukraine now and... deterring Russia going forward."
6. Global Adversaries: China and Beyond
[36:57–42:49]
- The crisis provides ammunition for adversaries (China, DPRK, Iran) to reinforce a "U.S. as unreliable partner" narrative and actively sow discord among U.S. allies.
- China, specifically, is likely to leverage these events as precedent and rhetorical justification regarding Taiwan, while framed U.S. inconsistency makes alliance-building in the Indo-Pacific harder.
- Key Quote:
- "A lot of allies that are turning more toward China and taking US concerns about those relationships a lot less seriously, in part because ... they need to diversify their own kind of relationships if they can't really quite rely on the United States."
— Ari Tabatabai [41:42]
- "A lot of allies that are turning more toward China and taking US concerns about those relationships a lot less seriously, in part because ... they need to diversify their own kind of relationships if they can't really quite rely on the United States."
7. Is This the End of the (Liberal) International Order?
[42:49–47:21]
- Restoration isn’t possible: Even with a hypothetical future U.S. administration seeking to "reset," the trust underpinning the postwar order has already eroded.
- The Trump administrations have fundamentally shifted allied expectations; efforts to "roll back the clock" are likely to be inadequate.
- Key Quote:
- "If they (the next president) come in expecting to return to... the before Trump times, I think that is fundamentally not going to be possible... the cumulative effects of this approach to allies is going to require some fundamental rethinking for whoever comes to power after President Trump."
— John Drennan [44:11]
- "If they (the next president) come in expecting to return to... the before Trump times, I think that is fundamentally not going to be possible... the cumulative effects of this approach to allies is going to require some fundamental rethinking for whoever comes to power after President Trump."
- NATO’s future: Dismantlement is not inevitable but significant further decay could become irreversible without new strategies.
Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments
"President Trump has long talked about wanting to acquire Greenland... This is when the administration started saying it wanted to annex Greenland and take control of the island, stated that the use of force was on the table."
— John Drennan [03:07]
"We have a rattled set of allies and basically a lack of clarity for exactly what comes next."
— John Drennan [05:57]
"I think the damage is done... Allies ... are starting to move away from this view of the United States as their main security guarantor and moving more toward a view... as an adversarial power at this point."
— Ari Tabatabai [10:49]
"The potential for proliferation has increased, which is something that historically the U.S. has been opposed to."
— John Drennan [15:55]
"NATO is essentially a victim of its own success and has been extremely successful in kind of...meeting that core mission."
— Ari Tabatabai [22:37]
"Russia's benefiting from everything that's been going on without even having to act."
— John Drennan [30:27]
"For all of these adversaries, a major goal for decades now has been to really push back against and try to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies...And so it's going to be a lot harder for the United States to object to China going after Taiwan...given what we've just seen..."
— Ari Tabatabai [38:26]
"If [the next administration] come in expecting to return to... the before Trump times, I think that is fundamentally not going to be possible."
— John Drennan [44:11]
Timestamps for Important Segments
- Origins of the Greenland Crisis: [02:36–07:29]
- Domestic and Allied Perceptions/Damage: [07:29–12:54]
- Allied Response & Nuclear Proliferation: [13:20–20:00]
- What U.S. Gets from NATO: [20:00–25:21]
- Effects on Russia/Ukraine: [30:07–36:41]
- China and Adversarial Opportunism: [36:57–42:49]
- Future of the International Order: [42:49–47:21]
Conclusion
The episode delivers a nuanced, sobering analysis of the Trump administration's approach to alliances, the severe ramifications of the Greenland episode for the transatlantic partnership, and the strategic opportunities these crises open for global adversaries—especially Russia and China. The consensus: the damage to international order and allied trust is real, restoration is highly unlikely, and the path forward requires candid rethinking of alliance structures and U.S. foreign policy assumptions.
