The Lawfare Podcast: “Ukraine After Year One of Trump’s Second Term” (Feb 17, 2026)
Guests: Francis Farrell (Kyiv Independent), Eric Ciaramella (Carnegie Endowment)
Host: Anastasia Lapachina (Lawfare Institute)

Overview

This episode analyzes the state of the war in Ukraine following the first year of President Trump’s second term, a period marked by dramatic diplomatic shifts, shifting battlefield realities, and evolving U.S. and European support. Frontline reporter Francis Farrell and national security analyst Eric Ciaramella survey Trump administration policy, battlefield developments, the current shape of negotiations, and prospects for peace, offering a candid look at U.S.-Ukraine-Russia dynamics in 2026.

Key Discussion Points

Initial Expectations: Trump’s Second Term and Ukraine ([02:00]–[04:33])

• Eric Ciaramella: Expected Trump would quickly abandon Ukraine and force a hasty peace, heavily pressuring Ukraine for concessions; while some pressure materialized, wholesale abandonment did not. There was a brief hold on intelligence and aid after an Oval Office blowup, but U.S. cooperation resumed after GOP and European pushback.

  • Quote: “The wholesale abandonment of Ukraine hasn’t really happened. So... we’re not quite in the worst case scenario that many of us anticipated.” [03:43]

• Francis Farrell: In Ukraine, initial reactions post-election were “dark and foreboding.” Some hoped Trump’s desire to end the war fast might spur pressure on Russia, but it became clear his focus was on pressuring Kyiv, not Moscow. The overall situation felt static and frustrating.

  • Quote: "We haven't, in a way, moved anywhere over the whole year." [06:48]

How the Battlefield Has Changed ([07:11]–[11:31])

• Farrell: Russian momentum increased significantly after Trump’s election, but Ukraine’s robust drone-based defenses have held major lines. The war is now a grinding attritional stalemate: Russia’s manpower edge allows constant pressure, but they can’t break through; Ukraine’s defensive capabilities remain strong, but infantry is depleted.
  • Quote: “Most brigades are really running out of infantry at this point. But there are some bright spots as well... Russia doesn’t seem able to replace its losses.” [10:51]

U.S. and European Aid: Changes in Flow and Form ([11:31]–[17:45])

• Farrell & Ciaramella:
  • U.S. transfers mainly advanced systems (Patriots, intelligence support), but less artillery and ammunition.
  • Bipartisan mechanisms from the Biden era continue deliveries for a few more years due to long-term contracts (“ingenious” design).
  • “Pearl Initiative”: Europe now buying U.S. weapons for Ukraine. Trump wins political points by saying U.S. taxpayers no longer foot the bill.
  • Ukraine’s indigenous drone production offsets aid reduction, but volumes of Western aid are still “significantly down.”
  • Quote (Ciaramella): “It allows [Trump] to satisfy both parts of his party... and the MAGA wing that... wants no more American aid.” [16:24]

Trump’s Failed Promise to “End the War Quickly” ([17:45]–[22:51])

• Ciaramella: White House focused nearly all pressure on Ukraine, not Russia—except a one-off sanctions move against Rosneft and Lukoil. The Trump team underestimated Ukraine’s resilience and misunderstood both Russia’s aims and effective negotiating leverage.

  • Quote: “They really did have a unique opportunity to shake things up, and they squandered it in large part by focusing all of the pressure on Ukraine and putting minimal pressure on the Russian side.” [18:36]
  • Trump appointed inexperienced negotiators, leading to blunders at summits (e.g., the “Anchorage summit” misunderstanding).

• Farrell: The administration failed to grasp that “the only thing that matters is the balance of power” and did not appreciate that neither Russia (with imperial goals) nor Ukraine (with strong will to resist) were close to accepting the needed compromises.

U.S. “Aggressive” Moves Versus Russia: Contradictions ([25:35]–[32:34])

• While Trump maintains a superficially friendlier posture towards Russia, his administration has sometimes authorized more aggressive actions (sanctions; intelligence support for strikes inside Russia).

• Ciaramella: These exceptions stem from isolated cabinet figures or bureaucratic inertia, not strategic vision.

  • Quote: "It's a feature of the dysfunction of this administration rather than any kind of sign of a strategic shift.” [29:34]

• Farrell: Such actions lack sustained impact when not paired with consistent policy or messaging.

  • Quote: “If it was part of a coordinated strategy... then these isolated actions could have had some sustained impact.” [31:16]

Why Hasn’t Trump Fully Walked Away from Ukraine? ([32:34]–[38:05])

• Ciaramella: Restraint comes from:
  1. Republican pushback, especially in the Senate
  2. Trump’s aversion to appearing weak or presiding over disaster (e.g., Afghanistan withdrawal optics)
  3. Pressure from key European leaders and his need to preserve U.S.-Europe relations
  • Quote: “Those three factors... are probably the guardrails that exist on policy towards Ukraine.” [36:36]

Has Europe “Risen to the Challenge”? ([38:17]–[45:23])

• Ciaramella: Europe shows more seriousness (NATO equipment purchasing, €90B aid package to Ukraine, security guarantees talk), but is “still not mobilizing resources at the needed scale.”

  • Quote: “Ukraine... doesn’t really have time to sit around and wait for... 27 European leaders to duke it out.” [41:25]

• Farrell: Praises some countries’ leadership but criticizes “delusional language” about security guarantees, given European realities and Russian resolve.

  • Quote: “What really frustrates people inside Ukraine, I think, is the slightly... delusional language that comes out from the Europeans around security guarantees...” [42:47]

The Status and Prospects of Peace Negotiations ([45:23]–[55:03])

• Seriousness of Talks: Both sides engage in “performance” to keep Trump engaged; Ukraine is showing flexibility, internal policy shifts, but major concessions remain off the table.
  • Ciaramella: Surprised by the amount of real Ukrainian debate on “creative” solutions, e.g., demilitarized or special economic zones for Donbas—the most contested region. [46:00, 55:13]
  • Farrell: Deep skepticism that military or populace would accept outright withdrawal from Donetsk oblast, warning it risks “snowballing capitulation.”
    • Quote: “Even on my last trip, just last week, commanders and soldiers continued to tell me that they would refuse an order to leave positions in Donetsk oblast.” [24:03]
    • Quote (Ciaramella): “Could you have some sort of framework agreement... a demilitarized zone... the Russians would punt the question to the Ukrainians in a referendum... I wouldn’t put it as likely, but it’s not a zero possibility.” [58:27]

Looking Ahead: What Determines 2026 Outcomes? ([59:35]–[67:47])

• Battlefield Outlook:

  • Farrell: No full collapse imminent; expects brutal attrition and minimal front movement through spring/summer. Russia’s edge is massed expendable infantry, Ukraine’s is elite drone teams—but both are stretched to their limits.
    • Quote: “Because we’re dealing with such an intensely drone-saturated tactical environment... neither side will have... the ability to land a... final killing blow...” [63:30]

• Resource Crisis:

  • Ciaramella: Ukraine needs Europe to provide multi-year resources for a move from “survival” to “planning.”
  • Urges Ukrainians to always keep a backup plan as scenarios may abruptly worsen or improve.

• Negotiation Dynamics:

  • Both stress that negotiations—however frustrating—still provide the greatest “pivot” risk or opportunity this year.

Notable Quotes

• Ciaramella: “It’s no wonder why we’re all being sort of given whiplash when there’s been these strange statements... expressing a huge amount of optimism about a breakthrough... Here we are six months later and really nothing has moved.” [21:12]
• Farrell: “The only thing that there are is the balance of power so far. And Trump and his team for some reason didn’t understand that that’s what first needed to be addressed before these sides could be brought together for a peace deal.” [24:13]
• Ciaramella: “The volumes [of aid] have gone down significantly... but... the steepness of the drop off from external aid is not having quite as serious an impact as it would have had had Ukraine not been able to develop this indigenous capability.” [17:41]
• Farrell: “That delusional language is frustrating because... Russia has repeatedly said that this is an absolute deal breaker for them in terms of stopping having European troops and a NATO presence inside Ukraine and so talking more and more about something that is pretty much impossible...” [43:00]

Important Timestamps

• [02:00] — Initial reactions to Trump’s reelection: expectations and fears
• [07:43] — Update on battlefield dynamics, drone warfare, resource depletion
• [11:31] — Shifts in aid, new “Pearl” funding mechanism
• [17:45] — Trump’s failed promise to end war; what went wrong?
• [32:34] — Why Trump hasn’t fully withdrawn U.S. support
• [38:33] — Europe’s evolving, if halting, response
• [45:23] — Are peace negotiations “serious” or more performance?
• [49:12] — Deep dive: The strategic value and politics of the Donbas
• [55:13] — Possible “creative” frameworks for the Donbas
• [59:35] — Spring/summer 2026 predictions: Attrition, manpower crisis
• [64:10] — Long-term planning, the need for a Ukrainian “Plan B”

Memorable Moments

• Report from the ground: Farrell recounts his latest trip to Donbas, describing entrenched Ukrainian resolve even as manpower issues mount. [50:27]
• Inside the Trump administration: Ciaramella details dysfunction, citing Trump installing a real estate associate as Russia point person. [20:44]
• Discussion of “creative ideas” for Donbas: The panel weighs the possible (if improbable) frameworks like international administration or referendums. [55:13–59:35]

Tone and Takeaways

The discussion is sober, pragmatic, and at times deeply frustrated—punctuated by dark humor and battlefield anecdotes. Neither guest is optimistic, but they find some hope in Ukrainian resilience, European learning curves, and the small but persistent space for diplomatic surprises.

Overall:
Ukraine’s future now hinges on its ability to hold militarily and politically under immense pressure; Europe has stepped up but not enough; and the Trump administration’s internal contradictions, lack of strategic focus, and aversion to crisis define this uncertain new phase. The peace process remains gridlocked, with both sides entrenched—but with spring and summer battles possibly breaking the stalemate or deepening the impasse.