← The Lawfare Podcast
Loading summary
Transcript74 lines
- [00:01]
Trey Farrow
The following podcast contains advertising to access an ad free version of the Lawfare Podcast. Become a material supporter of lawfare@patreon.com lawfare that's patreon.com Lawfair also check out Lawfare's other podcast offerings, Rational Security Chatter, Lawfare, no Bull and the Aftermath.
- [00:32]
Instacart Ad
Instacart is on a mission to have you not leave the couch this basketball season because between the pre game rituals and the post game interviews, it can be difficult to find time for everything else. So let Instacart take care of your game day snacks or weekly restocks and get delivery in as fast as 30 minutes because we hear it's bad luck to be hungry on game day. So download the Instacart app today and enjoy $0 delivery fees on your first three orders. Service fees apply for three orders in 14 days. Excludes restaurants Picture this.
- [01:04]
eBay Ad
You're halfway through a DIY car, fix tools scattered everywhere, and boom. You realize you're missing a part. It's okay because you know whatever it is, it's on ebay. They've got everything. Brakes, headlights, cold air intakes, whatever you need. And and it's guaranteed to fit. Which means no more crossing your fingers and hoping you ordered the right thing. All the parts you need at prices you'll love. Guaranteed to fit every time ebay things people love.
- [01:38]
Mykola Bileskov
Russia want to compromise Ukrainian security Ukrainian sovereignty have Ukraine on its own mercy. Basically defenseless. Ukraine want on the other side to preserve sovereignty, thus NATO options should be open. Also guarantee its own security through its own defense forces through interaction with its partners. So compromise for me is not possible.
- [02:03]
Anastasia Lopatyna
It's the lawfare podcast. I'm Anastasia Lopatyna, Ukraine Fellow at lawfare with Mykola Bileskov, a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at the Comeback Alive Foundation.
- [02:20]
Mykola Bileskov
Major criticism out of Ukraine and it's fair and it's universally shared that escalation management exercise in 2022 cost Ukraine a right to deal a decisive blow on.
- [02:35]
Anastasia Lopatyna
Friday, May 9, McCullough and I sat down to discuss the past three months of peace negotiations between Ukraine, Russia and the U.S. a lot of intense public diplomacy happened in the three days since then, but the conversation remains relevant.
- [02:53]
Interviewer
So to set the stage for the conversation, I wanted to ask a bit of a general question because I wanted to talk to you about the past three months of the negotiations between the United States, Ukraine and Russia and what all of that means for Ukraine. But before we get into that, I wanted to ask it's clear that when Donald Trump came back to power, there is now a shift in the American standing in the world, how the United States approaches foreign policy, how it approaches Ukraine. So how do you think Ukraine fits into that new Trump's worldview and his understanding of just how global politics work? Because it's clear that Ukraine and Russia's war are no longer the top priority for the United States government. So why do you think it's that.
- [03:38]
Mykola Bileskov
The problem for Ukraine, the challenge for Ukraine that it's very difficult for Ukraine and Ukrainian position to Russian Ukraine war to fit into Trump worldview for the number of reasons. So the major problem, the major challenge for Ukraine is that Donald Trump and his subordinates doesn't see current world order, world order established after 1945 as advantages as favorable for the US so their thinking is that it's either US enemies like China or US allies like Germany who benefited more than US while US was just protecting this order. So this order is not favorable, not advantageous for Ukraine. There is no point for the US to defend this order. And this is a problem for Ukraine because our argumentation like basis for promoting our national interest was a constant appeal to this post 1945 so called rule based international order. So that's a major challenge. Another challenge is that it seems that Trump personally subscribed to the very archaic, I would say ideas that might makes right. So if you are more powerful then you can do whatever you want. So in his thinking it is Ukraine which is weaker in absolute terms in terms of resources, manpower than Russia, which is the one that was subjected for the aggression. And there is nothing wrong with this. So this might makes right philosophy is very dangerous. But it seems that Trump subscribed to this and thus it's also problematic because we appealed to values, we appeal to norms and norms like you and chatter. It says that voters shouldn't be violated whether you are strong or not, but they should be respected, not violated. And thus we see this clash between UN Charter and makes right approach of Donald Trump. And personally also I think that there is a strong strong anti Ukrainian sentiment or not maybe anti Ukrainian sentiment, but skepticism towards Ukraine by Donald Trump because of number of instances. So in 2016 when Paul Manafort was relieved because of working before this for the party of regions in Ukraine. So it was one example which is like for Donald Trump is evidence that Ukraine is against him. Another example is this first impeachment proceedings after after an attempt in 2019 by Rudy Giuliani, a private lawyer of Donald Trump to get some blackmail Material for Hunter Biden to discredit President Biden campaign. So he has this anti Ukrainian streak which also makes it difficult to interact with him. So in my view, there is this combination of factors which contribute to the difficulty for Ukraine to establish good working relations with Donald Trump.
- [06:33]
Interviewer
Let's go back to Trump's reelection several months ago. Trump was confident that he could end Russia's war extremely quickly. And he spoke about this a lot, right. He said that he could end it in 24 hours, in a matter of days, weeks or months, whatever the deadline. It seemed like there were a few operating assumptions that Trump and his team had. And one of them, one of the operating assumptions of Trump was that neither side nor Ukraine, nor Russia can win on the battlefield, that there is no military solution to this war, that no realistic amount of military aid can help Ukraine turn the tide. What do you think about this assumption? Is this true?
- [07:12]
Mykola Bileskov
Well, the problem is that Russia doesn't subscribe to this assumption. Russian political and military leadership doesn't subscribe to this assumption. If you analyze your statements, if you analyze Russian conduct on a battlefield, your thinking is that despite all the problems, despite all the difficulties and challenges of sustaining the current military strategy, very human intensive, resource intensive, attritional war, Russia still can effort this strategy. It can sustain it for some time despite huge losses and thus create a new reality on the ground. So there is no point for Russia to negotiate on the idea of mutual exhaustion. And that is the reason why Russian leadership is so stubborn. When the Russian leadership is so confident that they are attach some conditions before they are ready to come to any ceasefire, to come to any truce, they in advance require major political concessions. Because in zero calculation, if there is no agreement, if there is no framework, they can still try to advance. Whether they would be successful or not, it's another question. But they still can sustain this level of fighting, level of casualties, this military strategy, despite all the difficulties. So that's the reason why I think Trump, his subordinates thinking was wrong. And it is a good explanation why we hadn't seen any major progress in negotiations because it was based on the wrong assessment on the battlefield and the wrong assessment of Russian strategic thinking.
- [08:46]
Interviewer
What does that mean for Ukraine though? Does that mean that Ukraine in fact did have a chance to win on the battlefield given the, you know, if Ukraine had the necessary amount of support from the United States?
- [08:58]
Mykola Bileskov
Well, it's a point of debate. I mean, there are different takes. My own take, my own idea is that we still can deny Russia outright victory. We can deny them a situation where they can dictate like the terms of the settlement, zero maximalist demands that Ukraine constrain its sovereignty. Ukraine impose limits on its own security with all negative consequences for the future developments. So with proper level of support, we still can deny Russia victory. Because this war, it's a defensive war where defensive mode of action is prevalent over offense because of the proliferation of reconnaissance and strike technologies. Thus, in this kind of war, Ukraine can use all these nuances of the battlefield to its advantage and deny Russia outright victory. So the fact that we are not able maybe quickly to recover temporary lost territories doesn't mean that we should agree with the Russian terms. There is like third option, middle ground between two extremes and this middle ground, the third option is that we can deny Russia outright victory through defensive mode of warfare that is prevalent on the battlefield.
- [10:08]
Interviewer
The second assumption that is worth highlighting that it seems like the Trump White House has, is that you have to, as they say, use carrots with Russia, not sticks. And that the Biden administration made a big mistake by not pursuing the diplomatic solution by cutting all the diplomacy with the Russians. What conditions are needed to make diplomacy effective with Russia? Can diplomacy even succeed when it comes to the Kremlin and negotiating with the Kremlin?
- [10:36]
Mykola Bileskov
Well, diplomacy succeed. Compromises are forged by two approaches. One of them are concessions. Another of them is creating a kind of balance of power, balance of risk, balance of threat that would underpin the framework and make either side stick to it because otherwise negative consequences would be negative and would be vigorous and sticking to the agreement. So just suggesting concessions without creating a kind of framework, military framework through kind of deterrence package for Ukraine is a futile effort because first there is no ground for actual compromises. Ukrainian and Russian political positions, they are mutually incompatible. Russia wants to compromise Ukrainian security, Ukrainian sovereignty, have Ukraine on its own mercy, basically defenseless. Ukraine want on the other side to preserve sovereignty. Thus NATO options should be open. Also guarantee its own security through its own defense forces through interaction with its partners. So compromise as for me is not possible. So it's a zero sum game. Unfortunately, that's the only possible way it's to actually do a career scenario. People like to talk about Korea scenario, how Korean War ended. But they usually use it not to suggest the frameworks that appeared political, military framework, but just to justify the fact that Ukraine won't be able to reclaim temporal lost territory. So if people invoke Korea's scenario, then they should follow the logic fully. And the logic is very straightforward. Why not Korea stick to this armistice with no political deal. Because if it violates this armistice, it means negative consequences because there is independent South Korean capabilities, there is mutual defense clause between South Korea and us and thus this agreement sticks though there is no like major political agreement, no peace deal. Basically there is just armistice. So if people want to have indeed durable and sustainable framework and not to repeat Minsk1, Minsk2 fate. So they should follow the, the Korean scenario logic fully. It means creating a balance of power Russia would respect and not violate. That's the only possible option because compromises, it's non starter. If you compromise Ukrainian security sovereignty, there would be no Ukraine. Thus this option is not acceptable either for Ukrainian leadership or for Ukrainian population in general.
- [13:13]
Interviewer
It sounds like this is exactly why the Ukrainian government is pressing for security guarantees from the United States. Right, because we understand that without it no kind of ceasefire is going to hold.
- [13:27]
Mykola Bileskov
Yeah, that's, I would, I would say the fact that Ukrainian leadership so stubbornly defend the Ukrainian position, it's in general the sign of growing Ukrainian maturity as a nation that is able to define its own national interests and to defend them, even if it means incurring negative emotions out of Trump. And it's not only about like example of Minsk 1, Minsk 2 agreement of 2014, 2015, that yes, they decrease intensity of fighting, but unfortunately they didn't prevent the enlargement of the scale of the Russian aggression. It's in general about Ukrainian history, modern history. When we re established independence in 1991 and we usually conducted foreign relations as, as a, as a teenager, as a child. So we believed the people, we believed good will of people. We concluded bilateral multilateral agreements with Russia, but they were not supported by powers, they were not supported by external commitments. Thus Russia never observes them. So we learned the lessons not only of Minsk1, Minsk2 but in general of our modern diplomacy of the last 33 years, which demonstrated that mere goodwill is not enough, only goodwill supported by hard power is working. And it's about ending the cycle of Russian violence because right now what external players are asking for Ukraine, you agree for someone supported framework that doesn't guarantee that the next round of Russian aggression won't happen. So you basically agree for the de facto lost of another chunk of your territory with no security, with no development and no instruments to prevent another round of Russian aggression which might be mortal in the next couple of years. So it's, it's an explanation why in this case, after this dispute, public at White House, we've seen a number of surveys inside Ukraine that demonstrated actually that support among Ukrainians for Volodymyr Zelensky increase. They basically supported the stance demonstrated by Zelenskyy that sovereignty and security of Ukraine are not the scenes for the compromise.
- [15:33]
Interviewer
On that note, I want to ask you, what did you think of the Oval Office meeting between Trump and Zelenskyy, which was, you know, quite dramatic in the media? What did you think about how that unfolded?
- [15:46]
Mykola Bileskov
For me, it was a culmination of very difficult months of the February. There was a number of like, contentious ideas that other side didn't like, starting from Pithax ideas raised at the NATO ministerial meetings, which caused an uproar. So it was a culmination of these exchanges. And as for me, people miss the major point. People analyze theatrics, people analyze emotion. But beneath this theatrics, beneath these emotions, there is very objective scene that our priorities, our vision, it is different. And it's very difficult to reconcile, like Trump administration priorities and Ukrainian priorities as they were defined. So that's the major problem, and that's an objective situation that Trump want to have a peace. Trump want to have a kind of, what, have a framework that both sides are ready to accept. He can demonstrate to world to his voters and say, I promise to you this kind of agreement, I delivered it to you. While Ukraine is not ready to repeat the same kind of mistakes we repeated all along, not only with Minsk 1 and Minsk 2 and mistakes basically starting from nuclear disarmament in 1990s when we surrendered third biggest arsenal without actually receiving persuasive security guarantees, only assurances. So that's theatrics. It's just was reflection of deep differences between priorities, between interests, how two sides define them.
- [17:21]
Interviewer
After that meeting, the US Cut intelligence sharing and aid with Ukraine. It was just for a day or two, but that caused a big uproar in Ukraine and the Ukrainian government. Significantly, the Ukrainian government significantly shifted its tone right vis a vis Trump and his administration. And since then, Ukraine has said that it agrees to a full and unconditional ceasefire even without the prior security guarantees or anything like that, which is what we pushed for before. And since then, we've been kind of trying to cater to Trump and be on his good side. Do you think that was the right strategy? And is it even still in our interest to keep the US Engaged and to keep the US on our good side?
- [18:05]
Mykola Bileskov
Let's start from the second part. I think one of the problems of our attempts to engage Trump and his team is that with these attempts, Trump has an impression that mere presence of us is important. For Ukraine. But Ukraine values US Meaningful presence, which means more aid for Ukraine, hardware, munitions, intelligence sharing, plus more pressure on Russia. So mere presence is not enough. But more we try to engage Trump, more we try to persuade him, more we try to find proper arguments. More he has this wrong. I would say impressions that mere presence of us is. Is great for Ukraine, which is unfortunately not. Because meaningful presence is important, because meaningful presence gives leverage both over Russia and over Ukraine. Otherwise no aid. What is rational for Ukraine to listen to you if no matter what you do, you would lose this aid? So that's the problem. Otherwise, well, it was heated exchange. We decided to change our approach. We listened to our partners, European one, who a kind of intermediaries. They basically helped us in coining this like letter of private communication to say that we regret this. And the only side that would benefit from this heated exchange is Russia, which is. Which is true. But in the end, all these things doesn't solve like the problem and the challenge for Ukraine how to ensure future U.S. meaningful participation through further aid, through further pressure on Russia. Because it didn't change this new approach that US Is kind of intermediary, not the side that is aiding Ukraine unequivocally. So that's the problem that trying to engage Trump not to have like public dispute in itself doesn't solve this dilemma. How to have meaningful US Involvement, not symbolic US Involvement as a kind of mediator.
- [20:14]
Interviewer
Do you think anything can ever solve that, can ever put Ukraine truly on Trump's good side and turn him into a supporter? Or is that just a lost cause? Is that something that Ukrainians should just even stop pursuing and move on to other priorities, just like Trump says he might move on to other priorities?
- [20:34]
Mykola Bileskov
Well, that's a difficult question because we depend on US. US Is indispensable nation for number of capabilities, air and missile defense, intelligence, sharing munitions for himars. So we still stick to engagement strategy. Thus this minerals deal we signed last week, and we hope it would be a basis for more meaningful interaction. Whether it would be successful or not, we'll see. But there is still simultaneous statements out of Trump team, like from Secretary of Defense Pete Hexit, who say that Europe responsibility for European defense is number one goal. So it's not US that is going to be a prime guarantor. It's Europe that should assume its responsibility. And that's a problem. So we try engagement. We never close the door, but we're never certain.
- [21:28]
Interviewer
Why is it a problem that the US Is shifting responsibility to Europe For.
- [21:33]
Mykola Bileskov
Europe, it would take time and effort to fill the gap. Even if there is a major readiness for Europe to spend more on defense, it doesn't automatically translate in capability. So it would take years to increase production of this Aster 30 missiles, which are kind of equivalent for the Patriot munitions. It would also take years to create its own production of munitions for himars. So that's a problem that doesn't automatically translate in capability. And it would take time. And time, as you see, as you all know, is gained by very precious sacrifice of Ukrainian life. So thus, ideally there should be a period where us for instance, is ready to provide all this capability for Ukraine if Europe fund this. In meantime, Europe develop its own capability. And thus we don't have this very threatening period when US already withdrawn. And for Europe, it still sometime is needed to fill the gap in meaningful way in terms of capability.
- [22:42]
Interviewer
I want to talk about these truces that Russia has been announcing in the past month. So a few weeks ago, Russia announced the so called Eastern truce that lasted almost just one day. And then more recently, it proposed another short ceasefire from May 8 to May 11 to celebrate its victory day and have its parade in Moscow. And neither of those is a real ceasefire. We know that Russia keeps attacking Ukrainian positions on those days. So why is Russia initiating this? What does it have to gain here?
- [23:18]
Mykola Bileskov
Well, I think my explanation would be very simple, but I think it's relevant. It has its meaning, that it's just an attempt to deflect publicly the criticism that is Trump now applying more evenly to both sides. So first it was Ukraine which was more criticized for its so called unreadiness for the peace plan suggested by Trump. Now both sides are criticized more evenly, not only Ukraine, but also Russia. There were a number of aggressive statements directed towards Russia. So they tried to deflect this criticism and say, look, we have our own initiative, we are open to negotiations, some process, but on our terms. So it's a part of, as I say, it's a kind of dances around the peace plan, peace process suggested by Donald Trump. And both Ukraine is trying to find a way to demonstrate its readiness to pursue it, but without sacrificing its core interest, core priorities. And Russia is doing the mirror scenes with all these truces, with all these ceasefires, which is not observing. And a lot of people are not ready to get to nuances. I'm pretty sure that in a number of audiences in Latin America, in Africa, in Asia, people would laud in a positive way Russian attempts, without getting into details, that all scenes are meaningful. The same is about Donald Trump, who is not a big fan of details.
- [24:50]
Interviewer
But speaking of the details, the Ukrainian military has reported that even though there haven't been any large scale missile attacks against big cities during those ceasefires on the battlefield, the Russians are still attacking, they're still advancing, or if they're not attacking and advancing, they're kind of moving freely around their positions, moving their troops around, knowing that our side, the Ukrainian side, isn't going to fire at them. So is Russia also using these ceasefires to gain a tactical advantage on the battlefield and to just then, you know, kind of regroup and attack with more force in like 24 hours when the ceasefire is over?
- [25:30]
Mykola Bileskov
Absolutely. It's a good opportunity for them to use this, to regroup, to bring reinforcements, to bring supply and to use it. The major problem is that why Russia feel itself so confident that in their calculation, if they do not agree with the framework suggested by Trump, they would face no consequences. Negative one. So they can play with all these ideals. They can basically rebuff all the suggestions. And they have seen a number of signals with suspension of aid to Ukraine, with disrupting transatlantic relations. With all this reshuffles inside of Trump team in US Domestic politics being radicalized, anatomized and differences growing between Republicans and Democrats in zero calculation, they see that this administration won't be able to deliver a consistent policy to oppose Russia. Thus they basically feel this pretty confident and stick to the zero maximalist approach. That's a major problem for me.
- [26:32]
Interviewer
This ties perfectly into my next question. I was going to ask why do you think Russia is rejecting the American peace plan? Because I've seen some experts say that Trump has given Russia, it seems like nearly everything it has asked for, including things that used to be unthinkable, like the American legal recognition of Russia's rule in Crimea. And Putin still hasn't budged even though the US has offered so many concessions. Why do you think that? Is Russia actually interested in the US withdrawing from the peace process and walking away? Or is Putin just, you know, miscalculating.
- [27:10]
Mykola Bileskov
And being emotional in this first major major nuance? I think, which is important to mention that Trump dangled a number of ideas very pro Russian. But I think the last 100 days plus demonstrate that though Ukraine is dependent on us, us can't impose this harsh terms of Ukraine even using the aid, which is evaporating basically because there was zero, no packages approved and Biden approved aid is ending. So the problem, I think in Putin mind, in Putin calculation that yes, Trump might suggested a couple of scenes but he's not sure not certain that Trump would be able to deliver them. Stream position on Ukraine Ukraine in this 100 plus day demonstrated an agency yes, we are dependent on us right us didn't manage to impose all these terms. We still basically I would say politely called the bluff because Trump is bluffing. You can have a leverage if you suggest something. If aid is going to end in any scenario, then what is the point for Ukraine to agree with these harsh terms. So in Putin assessment I think yes he's seen a number of very favorable points ideas out of Trump, but he's not sure that Trump would deliver through imposition on Ukraine. That's the first thing. Another thing is that he still want to have even more harsher terms because there are some nuances between US suggestions and Russian demands as far as I understand out of like publications in media that okay, this administration is skeptics towards NATO in general and to Ukrainian membership in NATO in particular. But they are not like in in the mood of restraining Ukrainian independent capability Military one but Russia want to impose very harsh limits on Ukrainian independent capabilities. So there are new nuances and differences between Trump suggestions and Putin demands. And last but not least, Putin doesn't feel any negative consequences if he doesn't agree with peace framework because again to persuade Putin to think otherwise, Trump need to demonstrate ability to pursue consistent policy. And for a number of scenes I've already described previously, this administration unfortunately thus far didn't convey and drive Putin to the idea that they are able to pursue a consistent pressure policy towards Russia if Russia basically turned down current US suggestions.
- [29:54]
Trey Farrow
Think advertising on TikTok isn't for your business.
- [29:56]
Mykola Bileskov
Think again.
- [29:57]
Trey Farrow
We've generated over 100,000 leads which has converted into over 40,000 sales for our pet insurance policies. My name is Trey Farrow. I am the CEO of Spot Pet Insurance. TikTok's Smart Plus AI powered automation takes the guesswork out of targeting, bidding and optimizing creative if I can advertise on TikTok, you can too. Drive more leads and scale your business. Today only on TikTok. Head over to getstarted.TikTok.com tiktokads Every idea.
- [30:24]
Warby Parker Ad
Starts with a problem. Warby Parker's was simple. Glasses are too expensive. So they set out to change that. By designing glasses in house and selling directly to customers, they're able to offer prescription eyewear that's expertly crafted and unexpectedly affordable. Warby Parker glasses are made from premium materials like impact resistant polycarbonate and custom acetate. And they start at just $95, including prescription lenses. Get glasses made from the good stuff. Stop by a Warby Parker store near you.
- [30:54]
Trey Farrow
Running a business, I've learned that every missed call is a missed opportunity. Before my team found openphone, it was chaos. Personal numbers for customer calls, missed messages, no visibility into who followed up or didn't. Now we've got a business phone system that keeps up with OpenPhone. Our whole team can call and text from a shared number, assign follow ups, and track every conversation with call transcripts and summaries. Best part, whether it's after hours or we're just busy, AI steps in to handle calls, answer customer questions, and capture leads. Our phones are covered 24, 7 and we never miss a beat. OpenPhone starts at just 15 bucks a month and they'll even port over your existing numbers for free. Over 60,000 businesses are using OpenPhone. And now I get why try it out and get 20% off your first six months@openphone.com business. That's openphone.com business for 20% off openphone. No missed calls, no missed customers.
- [31:57]
Interviewer
So basically, Putin feels like no matter what happens with the war in Ukraine and no matter what happens with, you know, if the US Decides to withdraw from the peace negotiations, the US Will eventually go back to business as usual with Russia anyway. Is that sort of the calculation that, you know, he doesn't fear any major sanctions, he doesn't fear any sort of blowback, so it doesn't matter to him?
- [32:21]
Mykola Bileskov
Well, I think Putin is still calculating because ideas suggested by Trump, it's like the maximum things that can be suggested to Russia. He can't expect anything bigger than that. So I think he's still calculating whether to turn down them outrightly or to accept them, though I think he would turn them down in general. Unfortunately, Trump administration, in this 100 plus days, they did a number of scenes that are contrary to the sound strategy. So first, you never undermine transatlantic unity if you want to pressure Russia. Second, you do not suspend aid to the country which is subjected to the war of aggression. You also form a coherent policy and implement it with a coherent team. And you also do not undermine your own country from inside if you want to be persuasive on a global stage. So basically, the signals that were sent, the, the steps that were taken, they are counterproductive. And in Putin eyes, it's not persuasive, that's not a signal that are necessary to persuade Putin to stop this aggression and to negotiate honestly.
- [33:42]
Interviewer
So is Putin counting on just continuing his war and Continuing trying to achieve his goals through military means.
- [33:51]
Mykola Bileskov
Well, Russians are very unique people. They would never publicly admit weakness, never. Even when they have problems, they usually publicly demonstrate even more aggressiveness, even more overconfidence. What is the Russian calculation right now? I think that they suppose that they can attain their goals before they won't be able to sustain this level of fighting because even Russia has its own limits. Even Russia with its advantage of manpower and disregard for human rights, lives and human rights, they can't sustain losing like 400,000 plus people dead and wounded a year as they lost last year. So Russia has limits, but they are thinking that they would jump in this window of opportunity before their current military strategy would be unsustainable. So I guess this thinking is guiding Russian policy. But they never would admit publicly problems. They would demonstrate publicly only aggressiveness and overconfidence.
- [34:56]
Interviewer
So essentially Russia doesn't really need a ceasefire right now then, does it? Because I've seen some experts say that the Russian economy isn't doing well. As you've mentioned, the military losses are terrible and that ultimately Russia does need a pause in fighting. But everything they're doing in the diplomatic track seems to suggest otherwise.
- [35:16]
Mykola Bileskov
Quite interesting development was seen recently. I mean how US Intelligence, NATO intelligence have changed its calculations. Because there was a CNN report like a week ago that said that according to latest estimates, intelligence estimates, Putin changed his calculation and he is now more about solidifying control on the occupied territories and maybe having some rest. But previously, like at the the beginning of the Trump administration, if you look at the public reports by intelligence leaks from intelligence to media, it said that no, Putin still thinks that he can impose maximalist terms. And it basically was idea of annual threat assessment published jointly by all intelligence US community in March of 2025. So I don't know what caused them to change calculation. Maybe it is a politically motivated change that now we want not to contravene our commander in chief. So that might be the reason. Or maybe they know something we do not know. But for this year, at least this year, 2025, despite all the economic difficulties, despite the fact that now this refinance percentage, this central bank major, major economic like indicator on what terms they are ready to lend money, it's like 20% something and it's incredible and it's not, not favorable for doing business, despite all these problems like inflation and also the price of oil. Absolutely. Despite all this, I think for the this year we should proceed from the assumptions that Russians would be able to sustain their military strategy device that tested in 2023, 2024.
- [37:08]
Interviewer
Let's then consider the worst possible scenario, which for Ukraine, which would be that, you know, the US Walks away, abandons the peace effort, but also it stops intelligence sharing, stops weaponry, even sales. We're not even talking about aid. That seems just completely unrealistic. What would be the consequences of that for Ukraine?
- [37:33]
Mykola Bileskov
Well, Ukraine would find it more challenging to implement its own active defense military strategy. Consequences won't be felt overnight because on the battlefield we are not dependent as we were dependent on the US supply. It's not an artillery war. It was in 2022. It's more UAVs war. But it would be by the way the rare which would feel the major negative consequences because of air defense intelligence sharing. Then we can go to Europe and say are you ready to face negative consequences if we fail? Or you're ready to risk your own security and give us air defense stock. Missile defense stock is still preserved. So it's still there are some chances we can cope with negative consequences. And you know, I'm not that gloom and doom if we manage to sustain fighting without major US aid in one quarter, in two quarters, like half a year, I think we would provide a powerful argument for pro Ukrainian forces inside us especially if it would be successful in this year campaign defensive one, inflicting a major damage and ensuring that there is no major breakthrough, that even for Trump it would be difficult to ignore Ukrainian defensive needs. So the fact that we might indeed face very negative scenario doesn't mean that it's the end of fighting. There are still like scenarios, still ways how we can cope with it and provide arguments for Ukrainian forces both on both sides of the Atlantic.
- [39:07]
Interviewer
The Trump administration of course talks about the war in Ukraine in these kind of very grand, dramatic and disastrous terms. Talking about how if it wasn't for Trump and his efforts, Russia would just take the whole country or if the US withdraws, the whole country just collapses. So you think that's a complete over exaggeration that we can actually hold on our own?
- [39:31]
Mykola Bileskov
Although it will be hard, it will be more difficult. It means losing another chunk of Ukrainian territory. It would be more price in terms of human rights and human lives. But it might sound paradoxically, but in these three years Ukraine increased its own agency even in terms of weaponry. Now we produce almost 40% of our own needs through our own production. Yes, rest is supplied by our partners. Yes, we don't have production of some capabilities. But the fact that now we meet 40% of our needs of armament and weaponry through our own production. It's a major achievement. So Ukrainian agency increased, not decreased. I don't think that even Trump would afford a major and, like, full pause in aid indefinitely if Ukraine is successful in confronting Russia not on its own, but with European support. If we keep fighting successfully for three months, for half a year, even without usaid, I think it would be really, really difficult for even Trump to withstand the pressure that would be constantly growing out pro Ukrainian Republicans, pro Ukrainian Democrats, pro Ukrainian media, pro Ukrainian think tank. So the fact that we should be prepared for the most negative scenario doesn't mean that it's the end of fight. It's the end of fight on the Russian terms.
- [40:58]
Interviewer
I want to reflect a little bit on the Biden administration as well and how things have changed for Ukraine. So a lot of people see Trump's comeback and Trump's approach to Ukraine as this radical shift from the Biden era, a near complete reversal of the Biden policy to support Ukraine as long as it takes. But is that really true? How much has Ukraine's reality on the battlefield and with the negotiations, how has our standing really changed since Trump's reelection? If we compare it to the Biden.
- [41:30]
Mykola Bileskov
Era, it's a difficult question, complicated question, because, you know, people make assessments based on their political affiliations. And yes, opponents of Trump would say it's a major departure, major difference in a negative way. But I would say that there are some differences. Again, their starting assumptions were different. 1. So Biden and his team, they were staunchly defending post 1945 orders, and thus Russian aggression against Ukraine was a major blow to this order, and they supported Ukraine. This administration is not a big fan of post 1945 order, and thus, it's a difficult sell for Ukraine. But otherwise, you know, you said as long as it takes. But this very difficult, complicated process to have Congress to agree for a package of aid that was eventually approved in April 2024 demonstrated that it was more and more challenging for the Biden to get more funding out of Congress. And let's do a hypothetical scenario. Kamala Harris is elected. She's a commander in chief. Would Republicans support another package this year? I hardly doubt so. There were objective difficulties already in the Biden approach. And by the way, the major problem was that, okay, you can sustain some funding, you can sustain some aid, but it wasn't persuasive in a Putin eyes. As we see, Putin didn't demonstrate readiness to negotiate based on a true compromise. During Biden administration, though, Biden provided U.S. aid through the approval of Congress. There was also a difference in approach towards like Ukraine NATO option. So Trump's thinking is that since you are not able to join NATO quickly, then why you should pursue it at all and maybe you even should agree to neutrality. Biden approach was more nuanced one. Yes, they basically saw the same thing in terms of like Ukraine won't be able to make in NATO quickly. But they never closed this option or even like thinking in publicly that Ukraine should like stop pursuing NATO membership. So there are some difficulties otherwise. Neither Biden nor Trump never say that Ukraine victory is recovering all the territories, unfortunately temporarily lost. You won't find any Biden administration representative in almost three years of the big war saying that Ukraine victory is recovering all the territories. So in this case difference is not that great. So each administration, from the point of view of Ukraine, was challenging in its own way from the standpoint of Ukrainian national interest and our end goals in the war. So neither was ideal and each was difficult in its own ways.
- [44:31]
Interviewer
This is a very complicated and kind of big question, but I'm going to ask it anyway. Could you just reflect a little bit on the Biden administration's approach to the war? You already started doing that a bit. But what do you think they got right and what did they get wrong when it came to supporting Ukraine?
- [44:50]
Mykola Bileskov
Major criticism out of Ukraine and its fair and it's universally shared that escalation management exercise in 2022 cost Ukraine a right to deal a decisive blow. Yes, we managed to recover major sources of temporary occupied territories, but escalation management, which translated in delay in provisional weaponry or decrease the scale of provisional weaponry, it allowed Russia to regroup to basically create defense in depth. And thus our offensive in 2023 failed. So the major criticism for the, for The Biden, that zero cautious approach in 2022 cost us outright victory back at that time, since Russia was not mobilizing, since Russia was lacking a manpower, there are calculation that in September 2022, for the front line that was above 1,000 kilometers, there was just 100,000 Russian troops. Majority of them were concentrated in Kherson region. And if we have more manpower, if we have more weaponry, if you have these two corps that were eventually prepared for the 2023 offensive, but if we have them in 2022 and if we applied them against Melitopol, not in 2023 but in 2022, maybe war might have changed differently. But then we all know that Biden was fearful and that if Russia is about to lose quickly, then they might resort to unconventional means. So That's a major criticism to Biden administration.
- [46:27]
Interviewer
Right. That's the fall of 2022 that we now know from reporting. That was supposedly the moment when the chance of Russia using a tactical nuke was a flip of a coin, as they say in the media.
- [46:41]
Mykola Bileskov
It was a deliberate Russian manipulation.
- [46:43]
Interviewer
Okay, could you unpack that?
- [46:45]
Mykola Bileskov
Well, there was a number of reports first in New York Times and another Media that in October 2022, Russian General Surovikin he discussed there was no major movement of nuke warhead, but he just discussed the possibility of using tactical nukes. I guess Russians calculated in the right way. So since they are been monitored, communications are monitored by US signal intelligence, very capable one. So we can use it to our own advantage. And by mere discussions, not even movements of the warhead from the storage, they managed to manipulate US strategic calculation.
- [47:25]
Interviewer
What do you think the US got right about the war if we had to talk about the pros of their approach?
- [47:33]
Mykola Bileskov
Well, the fact that they ensured sustained flow of defensive weaponry that make our defense successful. That's to their credit. They might have said that it's not our war, we don't have a major stake. So we indeed should credit previous US government with readiness to give a lot of hardware, a lot of munitions to sustain Ukrainian defense. But again, the major chance was missed because just do a thought experiment. Imagine the US provided the same amount of weaponry it provided in the first 18 months of the war till August 2023. In just first six months of the big war. I think situation might have been different.
- [48:19]
Interviewer
Let's talk about Europe for a little bit. Because its role in the war seems to be growing in light of the American withdrawal from European affairs. What do you think Europe's role should be right now in this peace process? And then also in contrast, what role can it currently play? Because it feels like there is a gap there between what the Ukrainians would want to see happening in the EU and what Europe can really offer to Ukraine.
- [48:48]
Mykola Bileskov
Well, situation is very uneven. And there is unfortunately a gap, a gap first between rhetoric and actual policy in general and a gap between different countries in terms of gap between the rhetoric and actual policy is that Europe still doesn't spend enough on defense, both on its own defense and for aiding Ukraine. On average now Europe spend even less than 2% of a GDP. It's on average 1.9% of the GDP because there are countries like Spain and Italy that only now would spend 2% over GDP. So there is this one gap that rhetoric is beautiful. They say a lot of right things. But 2% of GDP is not enough, though even now they didn't met on average this benchmark. So that's a major gap, another gap between different countries, because as I said, Mediterranean countries only now would attain the goal of 2%. Then France and UK we value France and Ukraine diplomatic involvement, but they also do not spend as much as necessary. Then there is a Germany. Germany finally start to produce more and more in terms of munitions, in terms of weaponry, thus dear packages indeed meaningful of aid towards Ukraine. And there are Nordic countries, Scandinavian countries, Baltic states and biggest share of Central and Eastern Europe that spent already to spend even more than on average in NATO plus staunchly support Ukraine. Because in general Scandinavian plus Baltic states, if you add everything, they provided as much aid as Germany in absolute terms. So it's quite persuasive. And they are even ready to support Ukraine more. So the story is very uneven. So there is a gap between states and there is a gap, general gap between rhetoric and actual policy. The major problem is that the recipe for success is already discussed. In war of attrition, you need to spend more GDP on defense, but 2% is not enough. And politicians unfortunately still not ready to challenge general population and to translate this latent power economy technological advantage into actual battlefield advantage. Thus Russia is 10, 15 times poorer than Europe, but has more artillery shells.
- [51:22]
Interviewer
The Trump administration has said in recent days that they'd love to see Ukraine and Russia negotiating directly. Right. That they're interested in getting us to talk directly. And that's something that the Ukrainian government has said that it's not interested in doing, doesn't want to do. And the Russians have made some signals as well that they, that they're open to, that they're open to direct negotiations. What would that kind of negotiation mean for Ukraine? And why is that something that the Ukrainian government has been avoiding?
- [51:53]
Mykola Bileskov
Well, formats of negotiations, it's a secondary scene. So we can do it bilaterally, we can do it trilaterally, we can do separate tracks like US, Ukraine, US Russia. The major problem is that our positions, our national interest as we define them, are incompatible. And that's a major problem. And so we can start discussing all the issues bilaterally, as we did, by the way, in February, March, April 2022.
- [52:25]
Interviewer
Right? The Istanbul talks.
- [52:26]
Mykola Bileskov
First Belarus talks, then talks in Turkey. But the major problem is that wars of attrition, they radicalized position and they destroy this compromised space. And you can discuss things countlessly, but if there is no room for compromise, there would be no compromise. And we can't Compromise our security and sovereignty. We can't repeat the same mistake all along, like just agree that you won't control some territories, limit your security, limit your sovereignty to please everyone, not only Russia, but Europe, some Europeans, some Americans. And what is the point for Ukraine? We already made that mistake. So why Ukraine should follow the same wrong path, that's a major problem.
- [53:11]
Interviewer
So essentially the only paths forward are either just counting on winning in the war of attrition, or to go back to the scenario that you brought up, the Korean example, the South Korean example. Why that worked is because America clearly identified that it had a stake in that conflict and that it was fully backing South Korea. And that's the only reason why that held up. Does that mean that those are kind of our Ukraine's only option? It's either where we're somehow negotiating a security guarantee and kind of a FedEx plea for Russia, like, you know, we're freezing, we're freezing, you know, we're making a ceasefire, freezing the line here. And if you attack, the US or NATO will respond. That's one. And then two, just continuing grinding in the war of attrition.
- [54:00]
Mykola Bileskov
Well, I think a lot of people who discuss like this negotiations process, they miss the point that Ukraine is not suggested good viable option. Right now it's two bad options. If Ukraine was suggested the option either you keep fighting though conditions deteriorate, or you agree with some freezing to which Russia also agree, plus you have commitment out of us of Europe, sustained shipment of weaponry, then we can do a choice and it would be a second choice. Right now Ukraine is not suggested a viable choice. So one choice is just to keep fighting though we have problems or agree with unacceptable terms which mean the end of Ukraine, but stretch in time, that's a major problem. If we are suggested good option among number of options, then we would choose good option and leave bad options. If you are suggested an option, either you keep right now and hope to treat Russians before they would be able to attain their goals, or you agree with no NATO, no security, sovereignty, restraint, then it's better to keep fighting, though it's difficult because otherwise you agree outrightly with the end of Ukraine. If you keep fighting, you still preserve a hope that Russia would find the limits on its own quicker than it would be able to impose its will militarily.
- [55:20]
Interviewer
Is it the NATO prohibition that makes the, you know, the America presented plan a bad option that Ukraine can't agree to?
- [55:28]
Mykola Bileskov
It's one of the things it's ability to persuade a membership its sovereignty, whether or not we would use it. It's another sin. It's like in Finland. Finland after the Cold War reclaimed an option to join NATO. It didn't pursue it till the all out war and only Zain pursued it. But the very option of joining NATO was a sign of sovereignty. If you constrain your sovereignty, then your development is in question. The same is about security. Plus, by the way, first, UN NATO membership is basically a kind of instrument to persuade our partners to aid us. We always raise NATO membership. Our partners are not ready to give us NATO membership right here, right now. But in meantime they do something. They give some hardware, some munitions, some training, some intelligence as a compensation for inability to admit us into NATO quickly. So for Ukraine, it's not only about sovereignty, which is important for any independent state, but also it's a major leverage, it's a major instrument to somehow guarantee security. Though partners and NATO countries are not ready to meet Ukraine right now, what.
- [56:36]
Interviewer
Do you think is the effective path forward for the US Administration in actually achieving Trump's stated goal of ending the war? What is it that the White House can do right now to actually achieve a lasting ceasefire?
- [56:52]
Mykola Bileskov
We are in a paradoxical situation. The only viable way forward, if we are talking about durable and sustainable framework and not about Ukrainian surrender and of independence and sovereign Ukraine is too pursuing further Biden approach of aiding Ukraine, of pressuring Russia, sanctioning Russia, weakening Russia. But for Trump, it's non starter to admit that only viable option, only possible option if you indeed want a durable framework, not a pose of fighting. And by the way, Marco Rubio, in one of the first interviews, he said that we are interested not in a pose of fighting for two, four years, but in actual solution, final political solution. Good one. So if you want to have this kind of thing, you can only pursue Biden approach. But it's non starter for Trump to admit that only possible way is a Biden way.
- [57:47]
Interviewer
So essentially that leaves no good options for anybody. That's what it sounds like.
- [57:53]
Mykola Bileskov
That's all about strategy. You never have ideal solutions, but you need to pursue least harmful solution. And again, it was written countless times that it's cheaper to support Ukraine than to have Ukraine losing Russia imposing its will and then you need to confront Russia on its own somewhere in Baltic states. So it was countless reports, articles that demonstrate the logic, the rational to support Ukraine.
- [58:24]
Interviewer
Well, on that note, Mikola, thank you so much for spending a whole hour with us. This was really fascinating.
- [58:30]
Mykola Bileskov
Thanks for this opportunity.
- [58:35]
Anastasia Lopatyna
The Lovefair podcast is produced in cooperation with the Brookings Institution. You can get ad free versions of this and other Love Fair podcasts by becoming a LoveFair material supporter through our website lovefairmedia.org support. You will also get access to special events and other content available only to our supporters. Please rate and review us wherever you get your podcasts. Look out for our other shows including Rational Security, Allies, the Aftermath and Escalation. Our latest Lover Presents podcast series about the war in Ukraine. Check out our written work@lovefamedia.org the podcast is edited by Jen Patya and our audio engineer. This episode was Ian Unright of Goat Rodeo. Our theme song is from Alibi Music. As always, thank you for listening.
- [59:28]
Warby Parker Ad
Optimize your nutrition this year with Factor America's number one Ready to Eat meal service. Factor's Fresh Never Frozen meals are dietitian approved. Ready to eat in just two minutes, choose from 40 weekly options across eight dietary preferences like calorie smart, protein plus and keto. Eat smarter at FactorMeals. Com listen50 and use code listen50 for 50% off plus free shipping on your first box. Factor meals.com listen50 code listen50.